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Abstract 
 
Can ‘loving blackness’ become a new discourse for anti-racism in the UK and the broader 
black diaspora? This thesis will critically assess the concept of ‘loving blackness as 
political resistance’ as outlined by the African American feminist bell hooks (1992). 
The thesis will show the ways in which blackness has been both negated and 
denigrated in western cultures and thus constructed in opposition to notions of love 
and humanness. Conversely, love and blackness are also rehabilitated in different 
ways by Black diasporic populations in Britain through the transnational space. The 
transnational space can provide opportunities for constructing, networks of care, love 
and anti racist strategies that affirm the value of blackness and Black life. However, 
the transnational space can also be fraught with risks, dangers and exclusions 
providing Black and migrant populations with uneven forms of citizenship and 
belonging to western neo-liberal states. Loving blackness within a transnational 
context can help to create a dynamic space to affirm blackness against racial 
exclusions and dominations whilst providing a lens to suggest alternative ways of 
being human.  
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Introduction 
 
 1 
The Politics of Loving Blackness in the UK 
An Introduction 
  
Background 
This thesis explores the ways in which concepts of blackness and love are often divorced from 
each other within the social context of white privilege and white supremacy. It will show how 
blackness has been denigrated, within the context of contemporary Western culture and 
constructed in opposition to notions of ‘love’ as an idea that measures the value of our 
humanity and human worth. In turn, this thesis is equally interested in the ways in which love 
and blackness become rehabilitated by Black
1
 diasporic populations in Britain through the 
transnational space. The transnational space has historical, social, political and cultural 
significance for Black working class populations in the UK who remain largely excluded in 
different and uneven ways from how the neoliberal nation imagines and narrates itself, 
specifically through concepts of race and national forms of belonging and citizenship. The 
transnational space thus provides and sustains lineages of kinship and political bonds, whilst 
creating new opportunities and new risks for new and old migrant communities. In this sense, 
throughout this thesis I will also be scrutinising the notion of ‘Black Britain’ in relation to the 
transnational to consider its meaning and significance for changing migrant populations in the 
UK.  
The theoretical heart of this thesis stems from my engagement with the transnational 
space in the context of the UK in relation to bell hooks’s essay, ‘Loving Blackness as Political 
                                                 
1
 I am using the terms ‘Black’ or ‘blackness’ to mean primarily people of African Caribbean and more generally 
people of African descent within the global Black diaspora. I also recognise that in the UK, these terms have 
incorporated a non-white, non Western definition of blackness as a broad symbolic and political location against 
forms of racism, imperialism and racialised subjugation by groups who may not define themselves as being of 
African descent but who wish to establish political positions of solidarity with other racially subjugated groups. 
This thesis welcomes an open and fluid definition of blackness that affirms humanity across the complexity of 
Black experience and Black life. 
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Resistance’ published in Black Looks: Race and Representation (1992). hooks argues that 
blackness has become the quintessential signifier of what oppression means in the United 
States. Citing the Black theologian James Cone, hooks urges us all to stand against white 
supremacy by choosing to value, and indeed to love blackness (hooks 1992). Loving 
blackness becomes an act of psychological and political decolonisation, a process that 
challenges the dehumanisation of Black and Brown subjects in their contact with white 
supremacy. Thus loving blackness becomes a discourse on anti-racism, which seeks to move 
beyond the racial dehumanisation of blackness to reclaim Black life (hooks 1992). 
However, hooks’s discussions on loving blackness as well as the writings of Cornell 
West (1992), who also engages with discourses on love in his essay ‘Nihilism in Black 
America’, emerge from a specific national and racial arrangement within the US. Here, 
African Americans have been victimised within a turbulent national history of racist acts of 
exclusion, discrimination, segregation, enslavement and impoverishment. Subsequently, 
hooks’s and West’s response to racism are predominantly concerned with the racial healing of 
America as a nation. I am arguing that racial wounds need to be heeled beyond the US and 
that such healing would need to take place on a global scale.  Therefore, in this thesis I will be 
utilising hooks’s concept of loving blackness beyond American shores to situate it within a 
Black transnational formulation to include historical and contemporary experiences of Black 
migrant and diasporic populations that reside in the UK. In this space, blackness is conceived 
beyond narratives of national commitments and much more along transnational networks of 
diaspora and migration. By mobilising loving blackness in this way, I am arguing that there is 
a need to recognise that blackness is also a global quintessential signifier of what oppression 
means. As such, the concept of loving blackness has an important role to play in developing 
anti-racist strategies to combat racism as a global phenomenon. Furthermore, I am identifying 
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racism as a global problem that manifests itself along nationalistic commitments whilst also 
transcending these national boundaries to structure and govern our global social order. 
 
Black feminist methodologies and personal narratives  
For this thesis, I have used methodologies from Black feminist discourses and theories on 
love and care as anti-racist strategies within a transnational context. Thus, the contours of my 
research methods arise from an intellectual exercise that ties together Black feminist concepts 
of love and their political/personal interface as tools to dismantle structural and psychic 
manifestations of racism. At different points within this thesis, I also deploy the trope of 
‘personal experience’ as a Black feminist epistemological location to underscore my 
methodological engagement with the transnational space and its impact upon Black/Caribbean 
communities in Britain. Before I move on to discuss what I mean by the term ‘transnational’ 
and how I am choosing deploying its use throughout this thesis as a method of enquiry, I will 
briefly discuss the importance of ‘personal experience’ as a form of ‘knowledge validation’ 
within the tradition of Black feminism and why I see ‘experience’ as an important site not 
only for Black feminism but also for subjugated knowledges within transnational discourses.   
As a declaration of solidarity with Black women across varying, social, class and 
geographical locations, Black feminists have used autobiographical narratives and personal 
experiences of Black women to validate a Black female epistemological worldview (hooks 
1990, Collins 1991, Reynolds 2004, Lorde 2007). The main objective for using Black female 
‘experiences’ as an epistemological framework is to recognise and acknowledge the ways in 
which systems of oppression have worked to subjugate the intellectual ideas and thinking of 
Black women both inside and outside of formal academic institutions (Collins 1991). In the 
United States, Patricia Hill-Collins (1991) argues that African American women have created 
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viable and independent, ‘yet subjugated knowledge concerning our own subordination’ 
(Collins 1991, p.13). She further reasons that Black feminist intellectuals in the US have been 
engaged in the struggle to reconceptualise all aspects of Black female oppression through the 
reclamation of a Black feminist intellectual tradition (Collins 1991). Collins locates the 
suppression of Black feminist thought within what she describes as a seamless web of 
economy, polity and ideology that ‘function as a highly effective system of social control 
designed to keep African American women in an assigned, subordinate place’ (Collins 1991, 
p.7). Thus the exploitation of Black women’s labour through slavery and service occupations, 
past practices of political subordination by forbidding Black women the vote, the exclusion of 
African American women from public office, alongside a long history of systematic 
educational disenfranchisement, have each contributed to the subordination of Black women 
and consequentially, the subjugation of Black feminist thought. So too has the ideological 
terrain where representations of Black women are narrowly conceived between ‘the 
mammies, Jezebels, and breeder women of slavery to the smiling Aunt Jemimas on pancake 
boxes, ubiquitous Black prostitutes, and ever-present welfare mothers of contemporary 
popular culture’ (Collins 1991, p.7). Collins thus argues that in light of systematic forms of 
subordination, Black women intellectuals have played a central role in reclaiming a Black 
feminist intellectual tradition by discovering, recovering, analysing, documenting, narrating 
and reinterpreting the experiences of Black women’s lives. She writes, 
 
At the core of Black feminist thought lie theories created by African American women 
which clarify a Black women’s standpoint – in essence, an interpretation of Black 
women’s experiences and ideas by those who participate in them … Reclaiming the 
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Black women’s intellectual tradition involves examining the everyday ideas of Black 
women not previously considered intellectuals (Collins 1991, p.15).   
 
As Collins makes clear, Black feminist intellectual thought is not narrowly defined or 
confined to the formal academic setting, but located within the everyday experiences of Black 
women. Thus concrete experience becomes a criterion of knowledge and meaning (Collins 
1990). Utilising the concept of ‘experience’ could be seen as an ill conceived epistemological 
method which repeats the earlier mistakes of white feminists by simply reducing and 
essentialising women’s experiences under a common understanding of  white Western 
‘womanhood’.  An essentialist understanding of ‘womanhood’ would not take account of the 
specific nuances and variations, discontinuities and differences experienced by all women 
across the boundaries of race, class, sexuality, region and global geographical location. 
Within Black feminist discourses it is commonly asserted that Black women live at the 
oppressive intersection of race, class and gender. Indeed, Black British and African American 
feminists have argued that white feminism had failed to adequately account for Black female 
experiences of interlocking forms of oppression (hooks 1982, Amos and Parmar 1984, Mirza 
1997, Collins 1990, Carby 1999). Equally, Black feminists have also warned against the 
dangers of using one singular Black female voice to represent the experiences of all Black 
women. As hooks reminds us, ‘all too often in our society, it is assumed that one can know all 
there is to know about Black people by merely hearing the life story and opinions of one 
Black person’ (hooks 1990, p.11).   
Within this thesis, I utilise the Black feminist trope of ‘experience’ within a 
transnational framework to explore subjugated yet concrete experiences of racism. I see 
‘experience’ as an important site not only for Black feminism but also for subjugated 
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knowledge within transnational discourses. The transnational space has produced its own 
forms of subjugated knowledge through, for example, the ways in which Black diasporic 
communities in the UK experience the transnational as an immediate everyday reality. This 
thesis seeks to recognise and acknowledge the ways in which interlocking systems of racial, 
national and transnational oppressions work to negate blackness and the violence of racism. 
At the same time our contemporary transnational situation facilitates alternative ways for 
Black diasporic communities in the UK to experience the transnational space as a site for 
recovering, creating and sustaining a sense of validation and human worth.    
In the following section I will discuss my own personal ‘experience’ in relation to how 
the transnational space emerged as a methodological strategy within this thesis. Whilst the 
transnational can be the site of institutional forms of global governance, of global financial 
markets and global trade, I am approaching the idea of transnationalism from the perspective 
of the everyday cultural practices of Caribbean communities in Britain. From this perspective, 
I am interested in the ways everyday experiences are shaped by transnational political, 
cultural and social economies. 
 
The transnational space and personal narrative as a methodological reflection 
The various ways in which I can choose to define myself, as working class, African, 
Caribbean, female, from Birmingham, remains for me a site that is constantly contested. My 
specific locality is a space where my Black female Caribbean heritage has consistently 
remained at odds and unsettled with my country of birth. I have never really been sure about 
how it feels and what it means to be British, and so this is one label that I have struggled to 
embrace. This is despite the fact that in the UK during the mid 1980s, for a few years after the 
urban uprisings in Handsworth, Toxteth and Tottenham, being Black and British in the 
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academy, in literature and the arts as well as popular culture, seemed a site of possibility and 
optimism. However, as a young Black girl from the Midlands during this period, my sense of 
Britishness was less likely to be shaped by the Black British cultural renaissance in London 
(Mercer, 1994), and more likely by the everyday institutionalised racism and social neglect 
that seemed to shape and pervade the ‘bog standard’ secondary education my friends and I 
received in our north Birmingham school.  
Growing up in a society in deep denial of how racism is manufactured in different 
forms and how racism subsequently debilitates the life chances and everyday wellbeing of its 
non-white citizens often meant that African Caribbean communities would turn to other 
cultural sources for ‘soul’ survival. In this sense, what could be called the ‘transnational 
space’ became a vital and primary source of cultural, political and psychic repair and 
sustenance. Within Birmingham, for example, Black vernacular cultures had created 
alternative social realms in the form of pirate radio stations such as The Peoples Community 
Radio Station (PCRL) and Sting FM, two of Birmingham’s most longstanding ‘free’ radio 
stations. These radio stations served as vital public audio spaces which through a mixture of 
Black musical traditions, talk shows, news and live phone-in debates connected our 
community to the postcolonial geographies of the Caribbean and Africa, to the diasporic 
cartographies of North America, and back to other regional localities within the UK.   
When I began to think about the role of pirate radio stations in Birmingham as 
transnational agents, they helped me to think further about the transnational space as a method 
of interpretation for this thesis. Although I knew at this point in my research that I was not 
going to do a specific project on pirate radio stations in Birmingham (as necessary and 
important as this would be), I was increasingly interested in Caribbean communities in Britain 
and how we utilise the transnational space to stay culturally connected to blackness. These 
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local connections were routed in complex ways to divergent Black diasporic territories that 
produced Black transnational identities. As the child of parents and grandparents who 
migrated to the UK from Jamaica, the transnational space is tied to longer histories of Empire, 
African enslavement and colonial rule within the English speaking Caribbean. The 
transnational space also connects social movements of resistance to slavery, oppositional anti-
colonial movements in the Caribbean and Africa as well as subsequent histories of Caribbean 
settlement in Britain. As Karen Fog Olwig and Jean Besson write, 
 
A long history of colonial conquest, externally controlled social and economic 
systems, and large-scale and extensive population movements characterise the 
Caribbean region. Contemporary Caribbean society thus emerged within a complex 
framework of extensive and exploitative interconnections on a global scale, and 
intimate inter-cultural and unequal social relations at the local level (Besson and 
Olwig 2005, p.1). 
 
In Birmingham, my own genealogy, like many more people of Caribbean descent, is an 
extension of this narrative of global interconnections that Besson and Olwig outline. At the 
start of this research, I began to observe that these transnational connections to the Caribbean 
and to the Black, predominantly North American, diaspora were being sustained not only 
through Black music cultures and the legacies of enslavement, imperialism and colonialism, 
but also through transnational kinship networks of love and care. These kinship networks of 
love and care connected migrant families in Birmingham to parents, siblings, children, aunts 
and uncles in the Caribbean. These networks were also entangled in complex ways to other 
structural models of transnationalism, in particular to global financial economies that facilitate 
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remittances and the flow of global capital through money transfer services such as Western 
Union, MoneyGram, Jamaica National and Swift Cash. In this sense, whilst the circulation of 
hard currency through money transfer services form part of what Arjun Appadurai (2004) has 
called the ‘finanscapes’ of global capitalism,  they are also one of the few ways in which 
migrant families can demonstrate acts of care and love through sending remittances home 
when living and working abroad.  In a similar way to Appadurai, I am interested in the 
implications of this ‘disjuncture’ within our interconnected global cultures. Thus, in this 
thesis, I am particularly interested in transnational arrangements where marginalised and 
exploited groups find ways to survive their marginality by creating and generating alternative 
social realities through the very global and local mechanisms that structure and maintain their 
marginal status. As Appadurai writes, 
 
The complexity of the current global economy has to do with certain fundamental 
disjunctures between economy, culture and politics which we have barely begun to 
theorize (Appadurai 2004, p.221). 
 
The disjuncture of the transnational space produces unexpected and contradictory outcomes. 
In this sense, this thesis recognises that whilst the transnational space has been utilised as a 
site of love, recovery and repair that transcends nationalistic forms of racism and exclusion, it 
is also a site that historically and contemporarily produces the conditions for racism, 
marginalisation and exclusion to exist. Caribbean communities in Britain and the cultures 
they produce are important examples of such transnational disjunctures.  
It is from the interconnection and disjuncture of personal experiences which are 
intimately tied to broader social, historical, political, financial and cultural economies in 
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complex and contradictory ways, that I deploy the use of the term ‘transnational’ throughout 
this thesis. Thus the transnational space is utilised to analyse debates on historical and 
contemporary forms of racism and anti-racist strategies, post-racialism, diversity, 
multiculturalism, ‘mixed-race’ histories and identities, changing configurations of ‘Black 
Britain’, Black popular culture and the idea of ‘loving blackness’ itself. I approach the 
transnational space as being part of the intimate as well as immediate everyday realities and 
social histories of Caribbean communities in the UK. And clearly, transnational histories and 
narratives of migration, kinship networks, colonialism and imperialism as well as oppositional 
movements to colonialism and imperialism, resonate and connect directly with many more 
migrant communities in Britain, including settled groups of South Asian descent who arrived 
in the UK via India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Kenya and Uganda. And indeed, communities 
of African descent from Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Somalia to name but a few, who equally 
share histories of migration to Britain, and long, specific and complex historical encounters 
with the British Empire. In this sense, I am also deploying the use of the transnational space 
to draw our attention to the burgeoning complexity of Black and Brown populations in 
Britain, whose intricate and multifaceted histories are connected in very specific ways to 
Empire as well as to more recent trends of globalisation and ‘new migration’ to Britain which, 
in turn, have given rise to new forms of racisms which this thesis will explore. Whilst this 
thesis cannot do justice to the specific complex histories of South Asian and continental 
African transnationalisms, I do wish to acknowledge in small but significant terms how these 
diasporas are entangled within changing notions of what it means to be ‘Black and British’. I 
wish to demonstrate that the transnational space itself is a potent force in changing and 
redefining what it means to be ‘Black and British’ and poses a set of challenges and 
opportunities for future forms of anti-racist politics.  
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The anti-racist tools I have in mind relate specifically to making a link between two 
terms that white supremacy has wanted to keep separate: love and blackness. This thesis will 
analyse the ways in which ideas of blackness have been denigrated in Western culture and 
written in opposition to notions of ‘love’.  In order to challenge anti-blackness discourses, 
rather than writing race out of the equation, as discourses on ‘colour-blindness’ and ‘post-
racialism might do, I am suggesting the need for a counter-narrative to blackness as a site of 
lovelessness. This means not deconstructing race or blackness but reconstructing a discourse 
that links blackness and love in ways that affirm Black humanity. The work on repairing the 
bond between love and blackness has already begun amongst the writings of Black feminists 
working in the US which I will now discuss. 
 
Love and Black feminism 
I am a feminist, and what that means to me is much the same as the meaning of the 
fact that I am Black: it means that I must undertake to love myself and to respect 
myself as though my life depends upon self-love and self-respect. It means that I must 
everlastingly seek to cleanse myself of the hatred and the contempt that surrounds and 
permeates my identity, as a woman, and as a Black human being, in this particular 
world of ours (Jordan 2002, pp.269-270). 
 
Black feminist scholarship has utilised and developed discourses on love and caring to shape 
the critical consciousness that informs the political and social visions of Black liberation 
struggles against the tyrannies of racism, sexism, classism and homophobia. Black feminist 
scholars do not claim to have any exclusive or privileged right to love and caring and the 
grounds of their racial or gender specificity. However, the different ways in which Black 
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women become both gendered and racialised subjects informs our experiences of love. 
Subsequently how we practice and ‘act out’ love in the divergent social spaces of our lives 
whether in our homes, in the work-place, in our relationships, in our local or global 
community, or in relation to self, our experience of love is tied to the social conditions that 
surround us. Black feminists such as bell hooks have argued that without love, ‘our efforts to 
liberate ourselves and our community from oppression and exploitation are doomed’ (hooks 
1994, p.243).  
Love in the context of Black feminist politics is highly intersectional crossing the 
borders of ‘romantic’ intimacy concerning the longstanding debate over the ‘crisis’ of Black 
male/female relationships to transformative socio-political activism with deep and far 
reaching concerns for psychic renewal in the context of community (Collins 1991, hooks and 
West 1991, hooks 1994, Nelson 1997, Richardson and Wade 1999, Jordan 2002, Collins 
2005, Lorde 2007). hooks sees love as a tool for social transformation suggesting that by 
adopting a focus on love we can actually see how ‘the denigration of love in Black 
experience, across classes, has become the breeding ground for nihilism, for despair, for 
ongoing terroristic violence and predatory opportunism’ (hooks 2001, p.xxiii). In Salvation: 
Black People and Love, hooks observes that Black people were perceived by those who 
colonised us as lacking in the human capacity to love. Through systems of indentured labour 
and slavery, acts of racial aggression were justified against enslaved African men and women 
because we were considered not to be fully human. hooks argues that since the end of slavery 
such racist stereotypes were challenged by Black artists and intellectuals in the early 1900s 
who had debated the issue as to whether the dehumanising affects of racism had left Black 
people incapable of knowing and practicing love. She writes, 
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Writers like Richard Wright, Zora Neale Hurston, Ann Perry, Lorraine Hansberry, and 
James Baldwin sustained vibrant debates about the issue of love in fiction and 
nonfiction. Hurston’s novel Their Eyes Were Watching God showed that love was not 
only possible among the poor and oppressed but a necessary and essential life force 
(hooks 2001, p.xx). 
 
In recognising this life force, an ethic of love and care has been used as an 
epistemological method to validate the subjective knowledge and experiences of Black 
women (Collins 1991). For Patricia Hill Collins (1991), an ethic of caring, empathy and 
emotional expressiveness informs the dimensions of an ‘Afrocentric Feminist Epistemology.’ 
An ethic of caring becomes a tool for validating the knowledge claims of African American 
women. Intellectual activity was traditionally seen as male pursuit, constructed as a 
scientifically objective and rational exercise for validating knowledge claims. Collins argues 
against the notion of seeing emotion and intellect as separate and distinct entities by drawing 
on the Black women’s blues tradition as a location where emotional expressiveness goes 
hand–in-hand with social commentary. In this sense our personal expressions and our ability 
to bond empathetically, not only produces valuable knowledge and meaning, they also 
connect our interior life to the outside world. 
An ethic of love and care also acknowledges the need and longing for change in those 
social structures which support systems of race, gender, class, and heterosexist domination 
(hooks 1994, hooks 2001).  As hooks argues, 
 
Without a love ethic shaping the direction of our political vision and our radical 
aspirations, we are often seduced, in one way or the other, into continued allegiance to 
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systems of domination – imperialism, sexism, racism, and classism. It has always 
puzzled me that women and men who spend a lifetime working to resist and oppose 
one form of domination can be systematically supporting another (hooks 1994, p.243). 
 
In this statement, hooks makes it clear that a love ethic entails that we must all become aware 
of our own capacity to overlook systems of domination, especially those systems that we 
believe serve our own self-interest. Thus whilst hooks embraces the decolonising critiques of 
racism and white supremacy that emerged from Black liberation struggles in the US during 
the 1950s and 1960s, she is highly critical of patriarchal homophobic rhetoric and attitudes in 
the Black liberation movement during the sixties that ‘made homophobia a criterion for 
authentic blackness’ (hooks 2001, p.194). Within Black feminism, an ethic of love involves 
embracing difference in order to build networks of political solidarity. This means, for 
example, acknowledging the important contribution that Black gay people have made to the 
struggle for Black liberation. As hooks writes, 
 
Many prominent Black women thinkers, writers, and activists are gay. Sometimes it is 
important for the public to know this information so that the negative stereotypes 
which imply that Black gay people are only concerned with sexuality can be 
collectively challenged and debunked. Collectively the straight Black world should 
acknowledge the powerful positive contribution of gay folks to the Black liberation 
struggle. Such acknowledgement is always an act of resistance; it stands as a challenge 
to homophobia, to those who think heterosexual Black folks have more rights in 
“blackness” than anyone else (hooks 2001, p.200). 
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Although this thesis does not explore loving blackness in relation to gay identities and LGBT 
politics, it is important to note at this stage, that many important and revolutionary ideas 
regarding building a politics of solidarity across divergent positionalities have emerged from 
Black intellectuals, artists and activists who are gay. Audre Lorde (2007) argues that our 
sexual identities and other differences as Black women must not blind us to the need for 
bonding in order to defeat racism and sexism. Within Black feminism, some writers are keen 
to ensure that whilst gay men and women can validate their identities on their own terms 
beyond heterosexual validations, the overall human bonding between Black women and men, 
heterosexual and gay, must remain intact in order to bring into reality an environment where 
no one is excluded or discriminated against (hooks 2001, Lorde 2007).  This is why when 
June Jordan asks, ‘Where is the love?’, we must consider questions of self love, self-
determination, self respect, and self-validation as the basis of a love ethic that does not 
‘require my suicide to any degree’ (Jordan 2002, p.271).  
The fragmentation of Black life through different forms of oppression requires a 
particular form of unity that makes a decisive shift away from seeing Black people as ‘some 
standardly digestible quantity. In order to work together we do not have to become a mix of 
indistinguishable particles resembling a vat of homogenised chocolate milk’ (Lorde 2007, 
p136). As a love ethic, this particular kind of unity sees the tensions within our differences as 
opportunities for growth toward a common goal that seeks complex solutions to interlocking 
forms of oppression (Lorde 2007). How this unity takes shape, how it comes into being, 
cannot run the risk of privileging the oppression of one group over another. Such a form of 
unity as an ethic of love makes explicit references to the centrality of our differences seeing 
them as part of a universal commitment to the survival and wholeness of people in our 
entirety. 
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It is at this interface of love as an interior exercise to cultivate self-love which extends 
itself to wider external social transformations, commitments, values and ethics, that Black 
feminist discourses on love form an essential element of liberation work. Black feminism, 
specifically in the African American context, thus argues that Black female experiences of 
love are important sites for producing and validating knowledge claims (Collins 1991), thus 
transforming dominant structures of knowledge that construct blackness as a site of 
lovelessness. Love within Black feminist thought also becomes a weapon against racism and 
all other systems of domination (hooks 1994), thus creating a social climate of revolutionary 
democracy where political acts of love cannot exist in the same space as domination. In this 
sense, love requires that we change the way we think by making a conscious decision to 
decolonise our thoughts in order to bring into existence new ‘democratic’ ways of being 
through the ethics of care, justice, unity and difference. With these ethical tools, love in Black 
feminism seeks to open up the possibility that we can be and live differently as subjects and 
communities making a conscious choice to affirm who we are without the need to commit to 
violence and domination against others who are different to ourselves. Furthermore, as 
Collins has argued, ‘Black Feminism is a process of self-conscious struggle that empowers 
women and men to actualize a humanist vision of community’ (Collins 1991, p.39). Black 
women intellectuals see their struggle for human dignity and empowerment as part of a wider 
humanist vision to eradicate the ideology of domination in favour of reorganising humanity 
along lines of solidarity.  
 
Love as a means for social change 
Alongside Black feminists, a diverse group of thinkers are also considering the possibilities of 
love as a tool for social transformation that serves to build new egalitarian forms of 
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community and human relations. Hilary Rose (1994) approaches love to argue for a feminist 
transformation of the sciences which seeks to go behind love, its ‘naturalness’ as ‘woman’s 
work’, ‘to reveal the systematic relations of domination and subordination within patriarchy’ 
(Rose 1994, p.30). Rose observes that without close interpersonal relationships of love, 
human beings, especially young human beings cannot survive. However she argues that the 
unacknowledged labour of housework, child care and the sexual servicing of men is 
profoundly naturalised through the notion of love as woman’s work. Thus a feminist response 
to love has been to expose the ‘double-sidedness’ of women’s work as both labour and love. 
Rose calls for a radical re-visioning of labour as a concept so that emotion is restored within 
concepts of work and within knowledge. A rationality of responsibility for others, Rose 
suggests, becomes central to the feminist re-conceptualisation of labour. Furthermore, she 
argues that feminist critiques of the sciences from Mary Shelley onwards have spoken on the 
dangers of knowledge without love (Rose 1994). 
Continuing with this theme of love as a form of social responsibility to others, Martha 
Nussbaum (2002) writes about love in relation to the intensification of US patriotic 
commitments, specifically, in the shadows of the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the 
World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001. Nussbaum argues that patriotism is by and large a 
morally misguided exercise that should be distrusted. Whilst patriotism can serve a worthy 
purpose such as ‘the goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of justice and 
equality’, Nussbaum suggests that these goals would be better served in our contemporary 
interconnected world by the old ideal of the cosmopolitan ‘whose allegiance is to the 
worldwide community of human beings’ (Nussbaum 2002, p.4). Thus to challenge parochial 
nationalism in politics and education, Nussbaum calls for a ‘cosmopolitan education’ rooted 
in Greek Stoicism where as human beings we are defined as citizens of the world rather than 
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citizens attached to local temporal forms of power and government. Nussbaum believes that 
through learning about others we learn more about ourselves thus cultivating the values of 
responsibility, reason, justice and the love of humanity. Furthermore, the cosmopolitan 
citizen, can also think beyond its responsibilities to the nation in order to construct a global 
dialogue thus making headway to solving problems that require international cooperation 
(Nussbaum 2002). In response to Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan ideal, the historian Gertrude 
Himmelfarb argues that Nussbaum is wrong to extol the virtues of cosmopolitanism, 
dismissing her thesis as both high minded and illusionary. Himmelfarb even doubts whether 
the values of freedom, justice and the love of humanity even exist outside of the Western 
governmental, political and ‘civilised’ hemisphere, stridently declaring that these values 
belong to the West, and are indeed primarily, if not exclusively Western principles and 
traditions (Himmelfarb in Nussbaum 2002). Himmelfarb’s observation seems strikingly 
amnesic, if not wilful in its attempt to forget the historical and contemporary ways in which 
‘Western principles and traditions’ have failed to extend the ideals of love, justice, freedom 
to, for example, enslaved Africans during European systems of trans-Atlantic slavery or to 
populations violently subjugated under old and new forms of colonialism and occupation. 
Such ideals are as slippery in the hands of Western (neo) liberal democracies as they are in the 
hands of any ideological or religious fundamentalist. Les Back elucidates this point, when he 
writes, 
 
In the 21st century hate speaks the language of divine love and everyday justice – and 
this is not just confined to the perpetrators of the events of 11 September. The racial 
nationalists, white fundamentalists and patriotic zealots of today also claim that they 
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do not hate anyone. They merely profess self-love, the pursuit of ‘justice’, and the 
desire to preserve and cherish their ‘civilisation’ and history (Back 2001[online]).   
 
Whilst I agree with much of Nussbaum’s argument on the need for discourse and action on a 
cosmopolitan love of humanity, I am also interested in uprooting the boundaries of dominator 
thoughts and practices that seek to place limits on love’s expansive reach. This includes 
discourses that on the surface appear to support the idea of a love for humanity but below this 
veneer conceal systems of exploitation and injustice. It is within these ‘double-sided’ 
discourses on love (Rose 1994) where love is both dangerous and risky. Linnel Secombe 
(2007) pulls together gender theory, philosophy and cultural analysis to deconstruct the 
paradoxes of the love relation within ‘humanist’ colonial discourses. Secombe engages with 
love stories in literature, cultural production as well as ancient Greek to contemporary 
philosophical accounts of love.  In her chapter on ‘colonial love’ Secombe uses Frantz 
Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks and the Aboriginal Australian Artist, Tracey Moffatt’s short 
experimental film ight Cries to challenge the dangers of love as a humanist project within 
the context of the colonial civilising mission. Within this colonial relation, ‘love’ can be 
misconstrued as a benevolent attempt to ‘cultivate the savage’ or to ‘transform the heathen 
into a human’ (Spivak cited in Secombe 2007, p.88). This ‘gift’ of humanist civilising is 
conceived as a benevolent gesture by the coloniser towards those they seek to subjugate. 
However, in reality, this form of ‘love’ is dangerous and coercive. It serves as a mechanism to 
secure the perpetual subordination of the colonised through the requirement that the colonised 
return the gift of humanist civilising love through service to the colonial state, religion, 
society and economy. As Secombe explains: 
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Confronting the traditional models of gift giving in which gifts circulate in an 
economy of exchange rather than being free and unreciprocated (Derrida 1993), the 
colonial gift of benevolent love and of civilising education puts the colonised recipient 
under an obligation or debt to be repaid through allegiance, gratitude and especially 
through labour for the coloniser (Secombe 2007, p.89). 
 
Secombe’s insightful analysis reveals the dangers of humanist forms of love that perpetuate 
conditions of subordination under a guise of benevolence and civility. Thus as Secombe 
suggests, ‘love may be more effective than violence in producing docile subjects’ (Secombe 
2007, p.76).  
Clearly, love is a highly contested field. And as such, any discussion on the social 
function of love carries with it some real dangers, specifically when contested notions of love 
such as Nussbaum’s critique of patriotism and Secombe’s assessment of colonial love, can 
work to sustain existing structures of domination and exploitation. This makes the task of 
advocating a discourse on loving blackness quite precarious. Precarious in that it can be easily 
misconstrued as replacing one racialised dominator culture with another. However it is my 
intention and hope that my deployment of the idea of ‘loving blackness’ remains integral to 
the vision of bell hooks in that rather than seeing loving blackness as another system of 
domination, we should instead see it as a tool that ‘transforms our ways of looking and being, 
and thus creates the conditions necessary for us to move against [all] the forces of domination 
and death and reclaim Black life’ (hooks 1992, p.20). 
 In this thesis, I am utilising loving blackness to deconstruct discourses on race and 
racism within the UK. Currently, no substantial work in the field of critical race theory has 
linked the discourse on loving blackness to anti-racist practices in Britain.  This debate is 
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timely as new forms of racism are emerging such as xeno-racism – ‘a racism that is not just 
directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial territories, but at the newer 
categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted’ (Sivanandan 2001, [Online]). 
Along with xeno-racism, we are witnessing the recent post 9/11 surge in ‘anti- Muslim 
racism’ and Islamophobia where the lines of ethnicity and faith have become increasingly 
blurred (Kundnani 2007). Next to these new forms of racism, we are also witnessing the ways 
in which racisms are being ‘pushed further and further out of sight, out of “existence,” 
unmentionable because the terms by which to recognise and reference them recede, fade from 
view and memory’ (Goldberg 2009, p.360).  In other words whilst the structural effects of 
racism are materially evident, they are accompanied by increasingly silent and muted 
discourse on racism, ‘as the terms of articulation, analytical and critical, are dimmed and 
deleted, distorted and redirected’ leaving us with ‘racisms without racism’ (Goldberg 2007, 
p.360). This dynamic terrain where racism exists and functions requires new ways of 
building, thinking and approaching anti-racist politics. In this respect I am utilising loving 
blackness to argue for a democratic love that affirms difference and complexity whilst 
suggesting that love necessarily requires a unifying entity in the form of solidarity and 
compassion amongst allies against racist forms of domination. This form of unity is not a 
flattening process of homogenisation, but one that takes into account the need for a continuing 
evolving debate on anti-racism that recognises both the multiplicity of racist power and of 
racialised subjects. And finally I am also deploying ‘loving blackness’ to reconstruct 
blackness and love to examine the praxis of love within Black communities. These forms of 
love are found more obviously in the terrain of popular culture, but also, as suggested above, 
they are also tied in interesting ways to the transnational space as a location where love as 
praxis produces complex and contradictory outcomes for Black communities in Britain.  
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Thesis outline 
In order to propose a discourse on loving blackness as a transformational anti-racist 
practice, I wanted to explore the many divergent ways in which different forms of blackness 
have been and continue to be denigrated, mainly within the Western social context of Britain. 
Thus, the structure and organisation of this thesis follows this logic, in that before we can 
think about repair, we must first understand the damage caused by historical and 
contemporary processes of racial violence and power. Thus, I have delayed my discussion on 
loving blackness towards the latter half of this thesis in order to discuss contemporary and 
historical processes of racism that continue to devastate, denigrate and dehumanise Black life. 
In chapter one, I introduce the broad themes of this thesis, ‘blackness’ and ‘love’, to 
discuss how contemporary and historical forms of racism have denigrated Black life. I have 
chosen to open this discussion with Frantz Fanons’ Wretched of the Earth to argue for a 
renewed politics of decolonisation which reconfigures oppositional politics and anti-racist 
strategies in ways that reposition the roles of women at the heart of liberation struggles. bell 
hooks’ (1991) notion of ‘postmodern blackness’ as a site of difference and solidarity is used 
as an antidote to Fanon’s ‘masculinised’ discourse to argue for renewed political alliances 
against organised and persistent forms of racialised oppression. I introduce my conversation 
with a young member of my family to illustrate how racism teaches us to perceive blackness 
in ways that are pathological and monolithic. Contemporary pathological ideas on race and 
blackness belong to longer genealogies of racism including religious, pseudo-scientific and 
Enlightenment arguments regarding the European belief in the ‘inherent’ and ‘natural’ 
inferiority of Africans. I am suggesting that this historical process of denigration remains a 
potent force in contemporary discourses on blackness in Britain where blackness is frequently 
separated from notions of love and instead is too often configured as a site of lovelessness.  I 
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argue that such beliefs exist because dominant cultures are failing to examine racism as a 
devastating ideological, political and institutional weapon against humanity. 
The failure of Western nations, specifically the US and the UK, to sufficiently 
examine racism and its devastating outcomes has produced a politics of ‘forgetting’ racism. 
Thus chapter two starts by examining memory, post-racialism and diversity, in light of the 
2008 election of Barack Obama and in relation to forgetting the history of violence embedded 
within imperial power. One important question for this thesis is how we can achieve social 
transformation through discourses in love to bring into existence more equitable human 
relations. I have chosen to examine post-racialism and institutionalised forms of diversity 
‘talk’ (Ahmed 2007) because both discourses appear to mark a positive social shift towards 
more equitable human relations through the ideal of meritocracy. However, I will make the 
claim that both Britain and the United States as modern neoliberal nations continue to negate 
blackness and the violence of racism through the ideals of ‘post-racialism’ and ‘diversity’ thus 
allowing racialised denigration to remain intact. Systems of domination can thus be ‘dressed 
up’ in the grammars of equality and meritocracy thus producing a culture where racism can be 
wilfully forgotten. I introduce Aime Césaire’s notion of the ‘forgetting machine’ and what 
Barnor Hesse calls ‘decolonial fantasies’ to support my claim that racial forgetting denies 
racial violence thus perpetuating the conditions for racism to persist in the context of 
racialised regimes of brutality within Western democracies.   
   In chapter three I continue to trace the denigration of blackness and race through 
recent debates on multiculturalism and its contested, varying, social and political 
configurations within Britain. In a similar way to post-racialism and diversity, 
multiculturalism had seemed at one stage to offer an equitable solution for healthier human 
relations within culturally diverse societies. This chapter shows the ways in which 
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multiculturalism has been widely condemned as an outright failure and as a source of injury 
and violence in Britain. In order to be British, migrant groups and outsiders can only belong 
to the nation if they negate cultural and religious practices or traditions deemed incompatible 
with the values of the dominant, benevolent and tolerant nation. In this sense, belonging is 
framed through Sara Ahmed’s notion of multicultural love (Ahmed 2004), where the nation 
becomes the victim of what is often perceived to be an ‘innately’ violent multiculturalism that 
is being manufactured by unloving and ungrateful outsiders. However, this chapter also 
examines multiculturalism as a highly contested space for ‘Black British’ subjects and our 
continuing negotiation of blackness and Britishness. I have chosen to frame these debates 
between two important figures on the Black British scene: A. Sivanandan and Stuart Hall who 
argue for two very different models of multicultural blackness in Britain that expose the 
tensions between differing ideas on social unity and diversity. Using the work of Barnor 
Hesse (2000), I finally, turn to the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester where 
transnational political agents constructed their own meanings of blackness in the British 
diaspora through Black political networks such as Pan-Africanism and Black feminism. This 
thesis argues that the transnational space is an important resource for Black communities in 
Britain for building and sustaining Black diasporic identities and politics. Thus, I examine the 
anti-imperialist discourses within the Manchester Pan African Congress of 1945 to 
demonstrate that the transnational space is not new and had already provided a rich resource 
for diasporic and transnational notions of blackness in Britain before the emergence of 
multiculturalism and the ‘Black and British’ (Hall 1992) paradigm.  
Another key argument within this thesis is that the transnational space is disrupting the 
notion of what it has meant to be ‘Black British’. As I attempt to show in chapter three, the 
political idea of ‘Black Britain’ is historically underpinned by transnational processes such as 
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migration and pan-Africanism. In chapter four I show how Stuart Hall sought to redefine what 
it means to be Black and British during the 1980s and 1990s emphasising the need to see 
blackness and Britishness, not as mutually exclusive categories but as a unified position 
where both identities could exist jointly without contestation (Hall 1992). But has this 
‘optimistic moment’ in Hall’s formulation of ‘Black Britain,’ now passed?  I will attempt to 
answer this question in relation to the predicted ‘mixed race’ future of Britain that suggests 
social attitudes towards ‘race’ are changing and more equitable and humanistic social 
relations are emerging due to increasing levels of mixed race couplings. I use textual analysis 
to deconstruct the Channel 4 documentary The Great British Black Invasion to demonstrate 
how ‘positive’ discourses on Britain's ‘mixed race’ future can conceal hidden residual 
discourses on ‘diminishing blackness’ whilst paradoxically working to reinforce deeply racist 
ideas about British ‘racial purity’. I also examine the work of Mark Christian (2000) and 
Jacqueline Nassy Brown (2005) on the ‘mixed race’ histories of Liverpool to demonstrate that 
‘mixed race’ communities are not simply a novel contemporary phenomena, but have deep 
historical routes within the social fabric of Britain that are often ignored due racist narratives 
of national racial purity. I draw upon Christian’s and Brown’s writings to also highlight that 
Black communities in Liverpool have utilised the transnational space as an important Black 
diasporic cultural resource through dynamic lines of kinship, gender and oppositional Black 
cultural politics. 
In chapter five I continue to examine the shifting parameters of ‘Black Britain’ 
through the genre of UK Grime music and the continuing importance of the Black diaspora as 
resource for sustaining transnational identities. By contrast, I also consider recent migration 
shifts from Africa to the UK and the different ways in which the ‘Black British’ identity is 
being reframed through recent discourses on immigration, refugees and asylum seekers. These 
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factors are impacting upon the everyday spheres of Black life in Britain, gradually decoupling 
older postcolonial notions of ‘Black Britain.’ But rather than just focusing on the construction 
and organisation of new ‘Black British’ identities, I am also questioning the political and 
ethical value of Black Britishness within a highly contentious national situation where racism 
and the popular vilification of migrant groups continues to shape the lives of various Black 
and migrant populations in Britain. It is as this point within the thesis that I begin to ask how 
divergent Black populations in the UK can begin to rethink a new anti-racist politics of 
solidarity. I introduce bell hooks’ concept of loving blackness to ask whether this idea has any 
ethical political significance for Black communities in Britain. 
In chapter six I analyses bell hooks’s concept of loving blackness alongside Cornell 
West’s essay, ‘Nihilism in Black America’ (West 1992). I suggest that the continuing 
conditions of racism, political discourses on love are important critical interventions in the 
reclamation and recovery of Black life. I contextualise West’s nihilistic thesis in the context 
of Hurricane Katrina and the ‘loveless’ federal government response to this epic tragedy. 
Love as a form of social justice is also considered in the context of the ‘psychic despair’ left 
behind by the violent assassinations of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King. Love as justice is 
also examined within the possibilities and limitations of self-help strategies adopted by Black 
people to defeat the ravages of racism. I argue that whilst I see loving blackness as a 
necessary anti-racist strategy, the theoretical orientations of hooks’s (1992) and West’s (1992) 
debates emerge from the specificity of race and responses to racism within the African 
American experience. As such, I mobilise the discourse of loving blackness to place it within 
a transnational framework of migration and Caribbean families in Britain and the diaspora. 
 In chapter seven I will cover new ground in the area of transnational and diasporic 
musical forms through a gendered analysis of lovers’ rock music. Lovers’ rock is one example 
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of how loving blackness has been manifested as a form of praxis amongst Caribbean 
communities in Britain. ‘Lovers’ rock’ is a largely overlooked genre of ‘Black British’ reggae 
music that emerged in London during the 1970s through Caribbean nightclubs and ‘pirate 
radio’ stations. The genre was an integral part of the reggae music scene of that period. 
However lovers rock became gendered as genre that appealed particularly to the romantic 
aspirations of Black teenaged girls growing up in ‘Thatcher’s Britain’. Within the political 
context of the dancehall scene, both lovers rock and roots reggae are seen as binary opposites 
of each other - lovers being ‘soft’ feminised reggae concerned with romantic love, and roots 
as masculinised ‘serious’ reggae concerned with Black oppositional politics. Using Black 
feminist theories on love and the erotic, this chapter challenges the gendering of lovers’ rock 
by suggesting that the genre was part of a much broader and complex political expression of 
love and rebellion amongst Caribbean communities in Britain. Indeed, whilst the gendering 
process is highly problematic, the chapter also argues that Caribbean communities had also 
used the erotic and political intersection of both genres to reconfigure racist and sexist 
representations of their identities.  As such Caribbean males and females had created their 
own ethic of ‘loving blackness’ as a way of restoring and validating their experiences within 
Britain’s often hostile urban centres. 
 In the conclusion I summarise the key arguments I have made throughout this thesis 
and suggest further avenues of research. I argue that my configuration of the transnational 
space has primarily been based on the triangulation of the English speaking Caribbean 
diaspora with a specific engagement with the US. I suggest that future research in this field 
needs to disrupt this transatlantic trajectory to consider the transnational configuration of 
‘Black Europe’ in light of growing racialised forms of discontent across different nation states 
within the European Union. 
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Chapter One 
RACISM AD THE DEIGRATIO OF BLACKESS 
 
‘Today, I believe in the possibility of love that is why I endeavour to trace its 
imperfections’ Frantz Fanon 
 
Introduction 
In an impassioned plea for renewal, Frantz Fanon (1963) in the conclusion to The Wretched of 
the Earth calls for humanity, specifically those of us in the ‘Third World,’ to turn over a new 
leaf, to work through new concepts, to set afoot a new man. The creation of a new man is a 
necessary intervention, a new trajectory in the formulation of the whole man, something 
Fanon believes Europe has failed to do in the shadow of imperialist and colonial projects: 
 
The West saw itself as a spiritual adventure. It is in the name of the spirit, in the name 
of the spirit of Europe, that Europe has made her encroachments, that she has justified 
her crimes and legitimized the slavery in which she holds the four-fifths of humanity 
(Fanon 1963, p.313). 
 
In order to avoid the pitfalls of imitating ‘a succession of negations of man, and an avalanche 
of murders,’ (Fanon 1963, p.312) which have become impregnated in European colonialism 
and slavery, Fanon writes, 
 
The human condition, plans for mankind and collaboration between men in those tasks 
which increase the sum total of humanity are new problems, which demand true 
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inventions. Let us decide not to imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our 
brains in a new direction. Let us try to create the whole man, whom Europe has been 
incapable of bringing to triumphant birth (Fanon 1963, pp.312-313) 
 
Fanon’s plea is both illuminating and problematic. It is illuminating because Fanon’s ultimate 
concern is with the possibility of (re-)creation, the possibility that we collectively participate 
in and take full and active accountability for reinventing and reclaiming our humanity from 
the debris of psychic colonial trauma in the spirit of affirming life and not generating 
destruction and murder. Fanon calls upon the subjugated to take up an active, penetrative gaze 
that looks within and beyond the trauma of colonisation to take on the serious and ethical task 
of psychological decolonisation, to create afresh a renewed humanity of the oppressed. 
Fanon’s call is conceptually challenging, requiring new cognitive skills and insights as well as 
one of praxis demanding practical physical action and work founded upon the embodiment of 
revolutionary thought and practice.  
However, Fanon’s plea is also problematic. The masculine bias evoked within Fanon’s 
discourse is ultimately concerned with the ‘philic’ (loving) bonds of solidarity formed 
between men as equals in a form of ‘brotherly love’ (Fromm 1995, pp.37-38). Such male 
exclusivity precludes the presence of women in general, and in particular, the presence of the 
Black female body that thinks (hooks 1996, p.81). Fanon’s male centred thinking suggests the 
process of decolonisation pivots exclusively around the bonds of brotherhood formed between 
Black men as the primary protagonists for anti-colonial revolutionary struggle. There are no 
allusions to or suggestions as to the role of de-colonised Black women who yearn for a new 
social condition to end systematic forms of oppression as much as for political solidarity with 
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Black men. Thus our function as Black women in this revolution is eclipsed, silenced by the 
exclusive focus upon the healing work of brothers.  
Fanon’s vision of resistance is centred on masculine ascendancy, which equates 
intellectual praxis with the work of resisting colonised men. Through this particular gaze the 
muscles and brains of the colonised male form the necessary armour in the conquering of 
Europe, as a feminised colonial power. In this vision the power of man exists purely in the 
coalescing of mind and muscle in a unified effort to renew humanity. Feminised power 
remains either unacknowledged through omission or metaphorically acknowledged as a 
violent, dominant imperialist threat. For on the one hand, the intellect, emotion and power of 
colonised women are excluded and marginalised by our absence. Whilst on the other, Europe 
becomes the sole representation of the feminine and symbolises an ethical void, a metaphor of 
devouring bankrupt womanhood. Fanon’s masculinised discourse inadvertently lifts the veil 
that covers a complex discursive tension between race, gender and the cultural politics of 
decolonisation which this thesis will explore.  
This chapter discusses the key themes at the heart of this thesis, namely ‘blackness’ 
and ‘love’, within the context of historical and contemporary configurations of racism. It will 
consider the ways in which blackness has been denigrated historically through discourses that 
defined Black people as being less than human. This chapter will show how such historical 
accounts of blackness are tied to contemporary notions of Black pathology. It will consider 
the possibilities of loving blackness in a white supremacist context and suggest why this can 
be both challenging and necessary. Blackness is discussed in relation to pseudo-scientific 
racism as the ideological underpinning of contemporary racisms. I will also examine older 
myths as to the origins of blackness as a form of ‘lost whiteness’ in sixteenth century England 
and then move on to discuss plantocracy racism as the brutal justification for transatlantic 
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slavery. Finally this chapter will scrutinize pathological racisms and ‘lovelessness’ pertaining 
to blackness within contemporary British culture. The consequences of lovelessness generated 
by structural forms of racism in Britain spawn further consequences for Black and Brown 
populations and the ways in which these communities engage with the transnational space. It 
is this immediate engagement with the transnational space that I will be exploring during the 
overall development of this thesis. 
 
Loving dialogue and the affirmation of Black humanity 
Fanon’s discourses on decolonisation and liberation are central concerns to this thesis. So too 
are the underlying tensions that exist amongst ‘the wretched’ along the lines of ‘blackness’ 
and ‘love’ as Black men and women straddle ‘the conjuncture of race and gender’ (Young 
1996, p.88). Thus the aim of this study is to engage with decolonising tools of resistance in 
the battle against psychological colonialism for the purpose of exploring ways of sustaining 
positions of solidarity across and through blackness as a contested location. bell hooks (1995) 
defines the term ‘decolonisation’ as a process of unlearning white supremacy by divesting of 
white privilege, if we are white, or vestiges of internalized racism, if we are Black, in order to 
transform our minds and our habits of being (hooks 1995, p.264).  
By critiquing patriarchy in Frantz Fanon’s work, it is my intention to engage in 
conscious reflexive dialogue that affirms at once the humanity of both Black men and women. 
From this position I can occupy a shared egalitarian space of solidarity and difference that 
allows for critical dissent without intending to harm or wound the ‘other.’ I can sustain my 
own agency by entering into a dialogue about strategies for decolonisation in ways that 
validate as opposed to cause harm to the humanity of my own subjectivity as well as the 
subjectivity of other Black men and women. I have arrived at such a ‘dialogic’ position 
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through the writings of bell hooks, whose insightful critical voice will echo throughout my 
work. As hooks suggests, it is ‘wrong-minded’ to assume that solidarity cannot co-exist with 
dissent (hooks 1996, p. 78). As a panellist at a conference held at the ICA during the mid 
1990’s, where women thinkers and scholars debated sexism and the legacy of Fanon, hooks 
urged female participants to claim their own agency in their relationship with Fanon, avoiding 
the binary presumption that if a patriarchal standpoint exists, then that leaves women with 
very little room or no way to ‘enter the text.’ hooks explains that she ‘enters the text’ by her 
own capacity to utilise Fanon’s discourse about colonialism (hooks 1996, p.104). By 
‘journeying through the body of the father to connect with the mind’ (hooks 1996, p.80) 
hooks envisions the possibility ‘of a world where women and men in general, and Black 
women and men in particular, would dialogue together,’ a world she feels Fanon has failed to 
imagine (hooks 1996, p.85). For hooks ‘dialogue makes love possible.’ She continues;   
 
I want to think critically about intellectual partnership, about the ways Black women 
and men resist by creating a world where we can talk with one another, where we can 
work together (hooks 1996, p.80). 
 
It is my intention to ‘enter’ into this decolonising ‘dialogue’ from the metropolitan centres of 
the United Kingdom, where blackness is constructed through the dynamics of gender and 
through the complex formation of African and Caribbean globalised transnational networks.  
 
 
 
 
Racism and Blackness 
 
 33 
The politics of love and blackness 
The purpose of this study on ‘loving blackness’ is to stand in solidarity with Fanon’s themes 
of turning over a new leaf, to work through new concepts, to set afoot a new human condition, 
by seeking to unpick the implicit residual dynamics subsumed under Fanon’s illuminating yet 
problematic discourse. The silent residual dynamics include love which is at once tangible 
and elusive to the human condition. Love’s ‘spaciousness’ (Ackerman 1995, p. xviii) lends 
itself to multiple and often contradictory meanings. Thus it is necessary for me to state 
specifically from the outset that I am concerned with love as political praxis. Ana Maria 
Araύjo Freire (McLaren 2000, p.xiv) wife of the late Paulo Freire, provides us with an 
insightful working definition of love as political praxis which underpins my discourse on love 
throughout this thesis. Speaking of love she writes, 
 
A feeling that, when deep and true in human beings, is not wasted on itself but opens 
possibilities for those who live it radically, both for reflections in the political and 
epistemological field and everyday, ethical and generous praxes (McLaren 2000, 
p.xiv) 
 
Freire allows us to see the limitations of narcissistic forms of love offering us an alternative 
view of love that looks beyond the interests of the self to one that extends itself to the realm 
of political thinking and the ethics of everyday human interaction. Alongside love as political 
praxis, I am also concerned with the ‘spaciousness,’ complexity and multiplicity of blackness 
and Black subjectivities as contested locations for decolonised identities. In this respect bell 
hooks’s concept of ‘postmodern blackness’ becomes a useful starting point (hooks 1991, 
pp.23-31). In her essay, ‘Postmodern Blackness,’ hooks critiques the failings of postmodernist 
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discourses dominated by the voices of white male intellectuals and academics who fail to 
include ‘other’ postmodern voices. hooks highlights the hypocrisy of postmodern discourses 
predominated by white male elites that call our attention to ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’ even 
as these groups exclude and ignore the voices of Black critics, particularly Black women.  
However, hooks also constructs an argument in defence of postmodernism in the specific 
sense that it permits a critique of essentialist notions of blackness that are narrow and 
constricting. Non-essentialist notions allow us to affirm ‘different’ multiple Black identities 
and varied Black experience (hooks 1991, p.28). She argues that a critique of essentialist 
thinking, 
  
challenges colonial imperialist paradigms of Black identity which represent blackness 
one-dimensionally in ways that reinforce and sustain white supremacy. This discourse 
created the idea of the ‘primitive’ and promoted the notion of an ‘authentic’ 
experience, seeing as ‘natural’ those expressions of Black life which conformed to a 
pre-existing pattern or stereotype. Abandoning essentialist notions would be a serious 
challenge to racism … This critique should not be made synonymous with a dismissal 
of the struggle of oppressed and exploited peoples to make ourselves subjects. Nor 
should it deny that in certain circumstances this experience affords us a privileged 
critical location from which to speak … There is a radical difference between a 
repudiation of the idea that there is a Black ‘essence’ and recognition of the way Black 
identity has been specifically constituted in the experience of exile and struggle (hooks 
1991, pp.28-29). 
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For the purposes of this study, hooks’s definition of ‘postmodern blackness’ provides a 
helpful framework for understanding blackness as a complex space that contests the limits of 
narrow configurations of blackness that can dangerously reinforce racist essentialisms. 
However ‘postmodern blackness’ also affirms blackness as a location of shared collective 
history and struggle, particularly as it is this global history of Black struggle and resistance 
that is shaped by systematic forms of racism, imperialism and colonialism. Postmodern 
blackness sustains old and constructs new alliances against organised and persistent forms of 
racialised oppression. Indeed, hooks’s discourses on decolonisation and liberation are central 
concerns to this thesis.   
 
Is loving blackness possible in a white supremacist context?  
This research seeks to take a critical excursion through loving blackness, by asking the 
question, is it possible to love blackness in a white supremacist culture? There are many 
reasons why I ask this question. However a recent conversation had made it more pertinent as 
it revealed the pervasive nature of ‘common-sense’ racist logic that exists around blackness 
and identity as we grow to understand who we are in relation to the rest of the world. Not too 
long ago, a conversation I had with my seven year old cousin clearly illustrated to me that 
white supremacist thinking is not only deeply entrenched in British culture but also that it 
becomes deeply engrained in our thinking from an early age. On a recent visit to my home my 
cousin, who is used to having things given to him on demand, asked me for some biscuits, to 
which I replied that we had none. He then asked me for some sweets which we didn’t have 
either. Frustrated, he asked with feisty annoyance, ‘Well what are you going to eat then?’ I 
replied ‘Nothing.’ He said, ‘What nothing! You mean you gonna’ starve yourself like those 
people in Africa.’ I asked him how he knew people in Africa did not have any food. He 
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confidently asserted, ‘I saw it on the TV and my teacher told me that there is no food in 
Africa and that children in Africa are starving. I’m lucky because I don’t have to starve. See 
ya.’   
This brief and swift exchange illustrated that often from an early age young intelligent 
Black children in the Black diaspora are taught in subtle and not so subtle ways to adopt a 
view of African humanity as a condition of lack, suffering, and deprivation. On another level, 
my cousin was able to understand that as a Black boy born and brought up in the UK his 
experience of blackness in a Western environment is in many ways different to how blackness 
might be lived and experienced by an African child on the continent. Through our 
conversation my cousin demonstrated that blackness is not simply understood at the surface 
level of skin colour or phenotype, it can also be differentiated by class, access to foods and 
resources, material lack or privilege as well as by geographical location.  
Indeed, our conversation caused me to think about the way we come to know these 
images of ‘hungry Africans’ and the different meanings they reproduce. One obvious example 
of how we know these images is through print and television emergency relief campaigns run 
by international non-governmental organisations (INGO’s). Charities such as Oxfam are keen 
to emphasise in their marketing publicity that the role they play in ‘empowering’ communities 
in Africa to be ‘self reliant’ is to assist communities to find local solutions to local problems 
(Oxfam 2008). However the notions of ‘empowerment’ and ‘self reliance’ remain ambivalent. 
By suggesting communities are empowered and self reliant Oxfam might be avoiding the 
dangers of racialised stereotypes that suggest African people are burdened by an inability to 
govern themselves. At the same time, however, Oxfam utilises a discourse of dependency that 
makes it clear to potential donors and supporters that the ‘empowerment’ and ‘self-
sufficiency’ of communities is still dependant on Oxfam, its partners and our donations, thus 
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compromising initial claims of ‘local community’ agency. African agency is compromised 
even further when ‘discourses of compassion’ between NGO charities and their supporters 
reinforce the agency of the ‘Western subject’ (Ahmed 2004, p.22) to act to save and rescue 
African people, thus subordinating the agency of the people who feel the pain of poverty the 
most. This becomes even more evident when charities such as UNICEF, Oxfam or Save the 
Children draw upon the cult of ‘celebrity’ to promote high profile media campaigns for 
emergency relief or to highlight long term programmes. As the charities, the celebrities and 
their marketers compete to establish ‘brand personality,’ in a competitive corporate market 
place the issue of acquiring the market share of potential donors can take precedent over the 
very lives they are supposedly helping. As one marketer puts it, 
 
If Denise Van Outen says ‘I'm involved in this charity,’ then people want to be 
involved in it, too, want to be part of that club, to echo that kind of lifestyle. So charity 
is then not about rattling tins and grubbiness and shots of famine and stuff like that, 
which people will turn the page on. Readers will keep the page open if it's Denise Van 
Outen wearing a tight T-shirt saying Oxfam on it. As tragic as this might seem, even 
charities have to be pragmatic to do their job (Smith 2002 [Online]). 
 
However pragmatic in a world of competing markets, it is indeed tragic. It is tragic because it 
underscores the agency of the Western subject, which itself though not quite always white, 
relies heavily on the economic structures of white privilege and the performative display of 
‘kindness.’ Here the newly styled fantasy of ‘the white man’s burden,’ is fashioned through 
Western benevolence, the ‘goodness’ of charity and the social ‘conscience’ of philanthropy 
(Smith 2002). The white man’s burden whose mission it once was to ‘civilize the savages,’ 
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can now call on the supposedly titillating talent of Denise Van Outen’s tightly fitted T-shirt to 
tempt the ‘civilised’ into giving money to ‘charitable causes’ that may, we hope, help to solve 
the problem of famine in Africa.  
The privileged discourse on ‘giving’ that takes place between Western charities, 
celebrities and the giving public is more likely to eclipse those Africans that the charity 
believes Van Outen can assist. It would be an oversimplification to say all charity is bad. Of 
course, this is not the case. However, at the same time discourses on ‘giving’ and ‘charity’ 
often allow us to stop thinking about contemporary socio-economic relations that are unequal 
and the historical violence of colonialism and imperialism that have enabled poverty and 
famine to exist in Africa in the first place. And according to our marketeer the discourse is not 
always about famine in Africa either. As he reminds us the discourse is as likely to be 
concerned with Western celebrity and how Western life style choices and aspirations impact 
upon our decision making. Such aspirations are often predicated on the acquisition and 
consumption of global brands such as Prada and Gucci, companies whose public image can 
appear to have a social conscience whilst simultaneously hiding a multitude of sins, such as 
poor working conditions for their labour force and exploitative pay (McDougall 2006). Very 
rarely on our TV screens do we gain an insightful understanding of local African responses to 
poverty and hunger within specific regions without such narratives being tied to the 
intervention of Western ‘assistance,’ whether through aid or philanthropy. Take for example 
Gucci’s ‘most extensive philanthropic programme’ in support of the charity Unicef with the 
help of Hollywood actress Jennifer Connely, 
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We are committed to supporting important humanitarian efforts through Unicef. 
Connelly has spent considerable time in Mozambique and has personal ties to the 
well-being of the children from this and other regions (McDougall 2006).  
 
It is Gucci’s humanitarian commitments and their defence of Jennifer’s personal integrity that 
is meant to lure us into ‘feeling good’ about securing the ‘well being’ of the children of 
Mozambique as customers purchase products from their special charity Christmas collection 
(McDougall 2006). If Jennifer has the time to be empathetic, then so should we. Thus we are 
encouraged to privilege our own empathetic feelings that we share with Jennifer over the 
well-being of Mozambican children.  Here the human suffering of African and other darker 
skinned and impoverished peoples becomes the backdrop for the excessive tastes of the super 
rich, the unscrupulous motives of global brands and the narcissism of celebrity. The echoing 
language of urgency - disaster, emergency, crisis - often accompanies painful images of Black 
and brown children, men and women who are suffering the most injury from famine and 
hunger at that time. In this case the ‘humanness’ of African suffering becomes ‘humanised’ 
and worthy of attention because the Western subject feels moved enough to empathise and 
intervene.  
It would be unfair and unrealistic to expect my seven year old cousin to understand the 
complex dimensions that make poverty and hunger a persistent and devastating problem in 
specific regions of Africa and indeed in other parts of our impoverished world. Understanding 
these issues remains a challenge to most concerned adults. However the logic of ‘common-
sense’ racism exists when the complexity of African humanity is removed from the specificity 
of its socio-economic and historical context, within which the legacies of colonialism, 
imperialism, neo-colonialism and globalisation have continued to ravage and under-develop 
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Africa through different yet consistent modes of exploitation (Rodney 1981). Through the 
logic of ‘common-sense’ white privilege, where charitable agency is framed through the 
actions and emotions of the Western subject, Africa and its diverse populations become de-
contextualised from the structural dimensions of exploitation. As a consequence, African 
peoples are often depicted in pathological terms that suggest we are rooted in a perpetual state 
of Western dependency. Exposure to such narrow pathological representations of Africa often 
through Western media platforms, is damaging to all African peoples in the continent and in 
the diaspora because at once such constructions deny our humanity, our agency, our human 
rights and our heterogeneity. Such perceptions undermine the work that African people 
themselves are doing to tackle the structural forces of oppression that shape and define our 
daily lives.  
In my conversation with my cousin I had failed to utilise the opportunity to fully 
redress the dehumanising information he had been given by the media and his teacher. When 
Black people internalise dehumanising racist stereotypes of each other we contribute to a form 
of psychological colonialism. If we fail to challenge and interrogate the often racist origins of 
African and Black stereotypes, then the task of decolonising our thinking and of loving 
blackness becomes difficult. In particular loving blackness becomes difficult when we live in 
a white hegemonic Western context such as Europe and North America where blackness is 
more often viewed through the racially hierarchical lens of white supremacy and white 
privilege. As white privilege is constantly promoted in our everyday environment, particularly 
through visual media on TV, online and through advertising, it is no wonder that Black 
peoples often view the world through a lens coloured by the logic of white supremacy.  Les 
Henry argues, 
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Many non-whites seldom consider whiteness as an ideal that influences their thoughts 
and feelings about self, because it’s so taken for granted nature renders it the norm and 
that makes it dangerous to all of us. That is why whiteness as an anti Afrikan presence 
in the Black imagination needs to be considered in any discussion of the power of 
white privilege (Henry 2006a). 
 
When we engage with the task of scrutinising the presence of white privilege in the ‘Black 
imagination’ as well as the taken for granted normative power of whiteness in our daily lives, 
then it becomes possible to engage with loving blackness in a white supremacist context. 
When Africans and Europeans (and any ‘other’ group for that matter) can begin the process of 
removing from their thinking racialised binaries and hierarchies that suggest blackness and 
indeed Africaness are perpetually inferior to whiteness and ‘westerness’, then we can begin to 
reconfigure the politics of our human relations by engaging with a radical erasure of racism 
both externally and internally. Furthermore, loving blackness is thus not only possible, it is 
necessary for a radical decolonised understanding of blackness as a shared location 
differentiated by distinct and uneven global circumstances within Africa and throughout the 
Black diaspora. 
 
Blackness as a discursive location 
This thesis recognises that both love and blackness are conflicting, contentious spaces.  The 
research aims to explore the discursive relationship between blackness and love to see how 
each are problematic to each other. Discussing discursive relationships within Black cultures, 
sociologist and cultural critic Paul Gilroy (1993a) has argued that the existence of multiplicity 
in Black life has created new intra-racial differences,  producing political tensions and 
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divisions based on class, ideology, money, language, locality, sexuality, gender and 
generation (Gilroy 1993a, p.2). Thus Gilroy argues that, although assumptions of racial 
purity, cultural sameness and the appeal of ‘phenotypical symmetry’ are highly prized 
attributes of Black social life, they are fantasy and over simplistic in the formation of 
dissident Black cultures (Gilroy 1993a, p.1). For Gilroy, racial authenticity is elusive to those 
that seek it, even though it remains highly desirable. He argues that sexuality and gender 
become the privileged modes to express this desired but elusive racial authenticity. In the 
formation of Black authenticity, specifically Black male identities, the interlocking modes of 
race and gender have often combined to form a ‘toughened mode of masculinity’ (Gilroy cites 
‘Slackness’ reggae, misogynistic forms of hip hop and Africentiricism as the main culprits for 
this ‘authentic’ male centred form of blackness). Gilroy argues that often Black masculinity is 
formulated as a blend of Spartan authoritarianism and the cunning traits of a Black hustler. Of 
this toughened mode of Black masculinity he writes, its 
 
central characteristic is that it has been stripped of all tenderness, for expressions of 
tenderness are now dismissed as signs of weakness, just as ruthlessness and violence 
are exalted over love (Gilroy 1993a, p8). 
  
Thus for Gilroy what he terms as ‘racial absolutism’ (fixing and essentialising blackness) is 
problematic and so too is the tendency of Black identities to be masculinised through violence 
and ruthlessness. Gilroy’s argument is indeed compelling. I agree with Gilroy that blackness 
as differentiated along the lines of class, ideology, money, language, locality, sexuality, 
gender and generation is neither a secondary or trivial matter (Gilroy 1993a, p.2). I also agree 
that Black masculinity as the modality for which blackness and race is lived and symbolized 
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as ‘authentic’ can, and does, obscure the complexity of Black experience to the detriment of 
Black men and women (Gilroy 1993a, p.7). However, I disagree with the way in which Gilroy 
configures a desire for a sense of collective politics based on a shared sense of blackness as 
something that has been fatally undermined (Gilroy 1993a, p.2). His arguments seem to 
suggest that once differences are delineated and fissures in blackness are exposed, then the 
possibility of finding a language for collective and ‘connected’ Black politics becomes 
invariant and dangerously tied to fascistic notions of ‘racial purity’ and ‘cultural sameness.’ 
Fraught by ‘political divisions’ and ‘tensions,’ the differences and multiplicity within 
blackness appear irreconcilable in Gilroy’s analysis of Black vernacular culture. Difference is 
thus collapsed into antagonistic and amplified divisions. These divisions seem too deeply 
engrained to be reconciled by a democratic commitment to dialogue or debate which have 
according to Gilroy, been replaced instead by a political mood of communal therapy (Gilroy 
1993a, p.3).  It is not my intention to ‘cover-up,’ undermine or pretend that divisions along 
the fissures Gilroy has outlined do not exist. However I would like to suggest that by framing 
aspirations for a shared sense of global Black politics as ‘fantasy’ and ‘simplistic’, Gilroy in 
the end contributes to the loss of dialogue he so rightly defends. The desire for a collective 
sense of politics remains a powerful discourse in the Black world because racialised 
oppression remains a significant contributing factor to Black life in a multitude of ways. The 
parameters and borders of a connected and collective subaltern politics will always be 
contentious and passionately fought over precisely because racialised forms of justice remain 
as highly prized attributes in Black life as opposed to the simple politics of racial or 
‘phenotypical symmetry’ that Gilroy suggests. By contributing to a form of dialogic paralysis 
Gilroy fails to create an open alternative space where complex, contentious and contradictory 
political positionalities can engage in building and sustaining old and new dialogic networks.  
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Rather than suggesting that the valorisation of racial phenotype is firmly rooted in 
‘simplistic’ forms of Black politics, the following discussion will show that the valorisation of 
phenotype is deeply rooted in racist discourses that abounded during the European ‘Age of 
Enlightenment’. During this period, European pseudo-scientific racism was mapped onto the 
African persona where degrees of lighter and darker phenotypes became the marker of ones 
hierarchical position in the pecking order of humanity. Therefore, in order for us to 
understand the originary moments of modern day racism we need to go back to the past to 
understand earlier ideas and configurations of ‘blackness’, ‘whiteness’, ‘race’ and ‘races’. It is 
here that the discursive politics of phenotype have found their most enduring value and 
power. 
 
‘Race,’ racism and pseudo science 
 
Negro, Homo pelli nigra, a name given to a variety of the human species, who are 
entirely Black, and are found in the torrid zone, especially in that part of Africa which 
lies within the tropics. In the complexion of Negroes we meet with various shades; but 
they likewise differ far from other men in all the features of their face. Round cheeks, 
high cheek-bones, a forehead somewhat elevated, a short, broad, flat nose, thick lips, 
small ears, ugliness, and irregularity of shape, characterize their external appearance. 
The Negro women have loins greatly depressed, and very large buttocks, which give 
the back the shape of a saddle. Vices the most notorious seem to be the portion of this 
unhappy race: idleness, treachery, revenge, cruelty, impudence, are said to have 
extinguished the principles of natural law, and to have silenced the reproofs of 
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conscience. They are strangers to every sentiment of compassion, and are an awful 
example of the corruption of man when left to himself (cited in Eze 1997, pp.93-94). 
 
This extract, taken from the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1798), is an example of how the 
perceived ‘essence’ of ‘blackness,’ when understood as a phenotypical signifier to ones 
‘racial’ origin became ‘naturalised’ as a source of corrupted racial difference and human 
inferiority in eighteenth century Western philosophical thought. As the critic Adam Lively has 
noted in relation to the ‘invention’ of race by eighteenth century naturalists, ‘when it came to 
race, the new language of science and rationalism coexisted with ancient prejudices and 
folkloric fantasy’ (Lively 1999, p.14). Scientific racism during the ‘Age of Enlightenment’ 
had made the fallacious claim that the ‘white race’ was naturally superior to all other ‘races’. 
For example, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, an influential figure during the ‘Age of 
Enlightenment wrote, 
 
In the hot countries the human being matures in all aspects earlier, but does not, 
however, reach the perfection of those in the temperate zones. Humanity is at its 
greatest perfection in the races of the whites. The yellow Indians do have a meagre 
talent. The Negroes are far below them and at the lowest point are a part of the 
American peoples (Eze 1997, p.63). 
 
This thesis recognises that the formation of ‘race’ as a concept is based on false pseudo-
scientific and racist doctrines advanced by eighteen century Western European thinkers and 
their studies in phrenology, archaeology, physiology and natural sciences (Eze 1997). Within 
these disciplines French, British and German thinkers sought to categorise human beings into 
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superior and inferior races based on speculative ideas such as the influence of climate on 
human physical traits and the measurement of moral virtue predicated on the superiority and 
civility of the ‘white race’ (Eze 1997).  Emanuel Eze (1997) suggests that some of the major 
thinkers of the European Enlightenment were instrumental ‘in codifying and institutionalizing 
both the scientific and popular European perceptions of race’ (Eze 1997, p.5). Eze argues that 
figures such as Hume, Kant and Hegel had written numerous articles on race. These writings 
played a strong and significant role in articulating not only Europe’s sense of cultural 
superiority but also its sense of racial superiority (Eze 1997). According to Eze, in their 
writings, ‘reason’ and ‘civilisation’ became synonymous with ‘white’ people and northern 
Europe, whilst unreason and savagery were ‘naturally’ located among the non-whites, the 
‘black,’ the ‘red,’ and the ‘yellow,’ outside Europe (Eze 1997). Their writings contributed to 
the ideological, socio-economic, political, scientific, emotional, historical and genealogical 
root of modern day racism (West 1982).  
The ideology of superior and inferior ‘races’ was well accepted within scientific 
thought well into the twentieth century (Fryer 1984, p.169). After the end of World War II 
and following a UNESCO declaration on ‘the race problem,’ the concept of biologically 
distinct human ‘races,’ where human populations could be categorised into different species 
(polygenism), became morally implausible in scientific terms and was discredited as a ‘social 
myth’ (UNESCO 1950). After World War II, the moral legitimacy of scientific racism could 
no longer be justified following the role eugenics had played in the racial policy of Nazi 
Germany. Noting the function of racism in the Jewish Holocaust in Nazi Germany, the 
UNESCO report, The Race Question (1950), named racism as a ‘social evil’ that far from 
being biologically knowable, had existed like war in ‘the minds of men’ and needed to be 
combated (UNESCO 1950).  
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This study recognises that although the concept of ‘race(s)’ is a socially constructed 
myth based on implausible pseudo-scientific meanderings and superstition, its offspring, the 
ideology of racism is a very real and tangible phenomenon affecting the life chances of 
millions of non-white people globally.  Pseudo-scientific racism, its direct coupling with 
Western imperialism and capitalism were used to justify the brutalisation and enslavement of 
African people and the subjugation of ‘non-white’ populations globally (Fryer 1984). In the 
popular and intellectual imagination of white supremacy not only was blackness as a ‘racial’ 
category the epitome of barbarity and lovelessness, it became antithetical to Western 
epistemological definitions of humanity. 
 
Whiteness lost - the ‘origins’ of blackness in sixteenth century England 
Eighteenth century pseudo-scientific racism attempted to fix racialised notions of blackness in 
a deviant binary relationship to whiteness. Literally and metaphorically, blackness and non-
whiteness became associated with notions of ‘evilness’ and inferiority, whilst whiteness with 
‘goodness’ and superiority. However, according to the late historian Peter Fryer (1984) in the 
English language the words ‘Black’ and ‘white’ were heavily charged with meaning long 
before the English encountered African people. Blackness in England traditionally stood for 
death, mourning, baseness, evil, sin and danger. It was the colour of bad magic, melancholy, 
and the depths of hell. English people spoke of black arts, blackmail and the black Death. The 
devil himself was Black, so were sorrow, poison, mourning and forsaken love (Fryer 1984, 
p.135). Jennifer Brody (1998) suggests a more complex relationship existed between 
blackness and whiteness in the etymological root of the word ‘Black.’ Citing the Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2nd ed., Brody highlights that in Old English, ‘Black’ was also confused 
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with ‘… blάc shining, white …’. The two words were only distinguishable by the context in 
which they were used, and sometimes not even by that (Brody 1998, p.11).  
By highlighting the confused etymology of the word ‘Black’ Brody points out that the 
construction of pure whiteness and pure blackness in Victorian culture was based on words 
that were etymologically impure and hybrid. Furthermore, Brody intends to demonstrate that 
meaning is never stable but is ‘through repeated reference constructed and reconstructed’ 
(Brody 1998, p.11). Elsewhere, other originary myths and theories of blackness have 
suggested that whiteness was some originary truth whilst blackness signified ‘some later 
horror, a kind of accident or aberration’ (Little 1993, p.308). Arthur Little (1993) discusses 
Shakespeare’s play Othello in relation to the circulation of popular myths that abounded in 
England during the sixteenth and seventeenth century concerning the origins of blackness. 
These myths and theories had suggested that the origin of blackness was indeed rooted in a 
loss of whiteness. Little argues that between the late sixteenth century and the middle of the 
seventeenth century English audiences both inside and outside of Othello brought with them a 
set of historical ‘pretexts’ full of these originary myths. Some myths linked blackness to 
Africa’s proximity to the sun. One popular pretext was the myth of Phaeton. Little cites Ben 
Johnson’s Masque of Blackness (1605) where Johnson draws on the Greek myth of Phaeton. 
Riding his chariot (the sun), Phaeton loses control burning the Earth. Flames were said to 
hurltle around the world scorching the Ethiopians. The Ethiopians, who were once as fair as 
others, were now Black with Black despair roaming the world looking for their missing 
beauty, their lost identity (Little 1993, p.307). Cursing the sun that scorched them, the 
Ethiopians set out to find a land where they could lose their blackness. They arrive in 
England, where, 
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 Their beauties shall be scorch’d no more:  
 This sun is temperate, and refines 
 All things on which his radiance shines 
 
Adam Lively (1999) suggests that for Johnson, blackness was a mask, a superficial deformity 
that hid an inner purity, a hidden whiteness (Lively 1999, p26). Christian theology also 
provided originary explanations of blackness. Little notes that ‘The curse of Ham’ for 
example, was used in sixteenth century ‘scientific’ literature as evidence that blackness was a 
curse and punishment from God because of an abhorrent unexplained sexual act committed by 
Ham against Noah.
1
 Ham was said to have ‘saw his fathers nakedness’ whilst Noah lay in a 
drunken stupor inside his tent. The descendents of Ham, the Canaanites, who were believed to 
have had Black African ancestry, would be eternally punished for Ham’s ambiguous sexual 
violation of his father. As punishment from God, the ‘blackness’ of the Canaanites would 
remain as ‘a spectacle of disobedience to all the world’ (Little 1993, pp.307-308).  In this 
biblical narrative, utilised as scientific ‘evidence’ in the writings of George Best (1578), we 
see an early example of blackness being synonymous with some form of ‘deviant’ and 
horrific sexual behaviour. As Randall C Bailey rightly claims the ‘curse of Ham’ was used to 
sanction U.S. enslavement of African people and was a cornerstone of South African 
apartheid (Bailey 1995, p.138). Little further suggests that these narratives not only assume 
that ‘whiteness’ functions as an originary truth (that is eventually lost) they also assume that 
the ‘essence’ of blackness can be found and thus provide some ‘proof’ to the literal and 
metaphorical savage and libidinous nature of the Black persona (Little 1993, p.308). 
                                                 
1
 Although in George Best’s account the sexual crime was committed against ‘Noah’s wife’, since the sixteenth 
century, more recent interpretations suggest that this act of sexual violation had taken place not between Noah’s 
wife and Ham, but between Ham and Noah himself. As the theologian Randall C. Bailey (1995)  notes, much 
ambiguity and discussion exists in theological interpretations of the sexual transgression for which Ham is 
punished by God.  
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Peter Fryer argues that English people during the sixteenth century were poorly 
informed about Africa and the people who lived there (Fryer 1984, p.6). He suggests that as 
more and more Englishmen travelled to the ‘dark continent’ a heady cocktail of ‘sober facts’ 
and ‘accepted myths’ began to appear in English travel accounts of Africa. In the socially and 
economically underdeveloped climate of England during the sixteenth century, tales of 
‘Ethiopian Blackamoors’ were at once titillating, entertaining and threatening. Fryer argues 
that England was relatively ethnically homogeneous between the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, geographically isolated, technologically backward, and socially conservative, with 
knowledge and political power concentrated and controlled in the hands of the elite (Fryer 
1984, p.133). The onset of British dominance in the Slave trade had not taken hold at this 
time. Travel writers, predominantly white Englishmen, travelled to Africa and on returning to 
England, would publish their findings in travel books. The books revealed the travellers to be 
surprised by the living standards of Africans in places such as Benin, where the ruling elite 
were fluent in European languages such as Portuguese (Fryer 1984, p.6). However impressed 
they were by the standard of living and development of African civilisations, the writers were 
unable to resist their temptation for the fantastic in their implausible accounts of ‘exotic’ 
Africans.  
Subjected to the Englishman’s gaze, African peoples possessed a peculiar foreignness 
and were viewed as abnormal and irregular, defying the physical composition of the human 
form. Various mythologies were created about the ‘nature’ and ‘essence’ of Africans that 
became inseparable from pre-existing notions of blackness. Africans were depicted as defying 
the limits of age and generation, size and human formation (Fryer 1984). In one example cited 
by Fryer, the King of Ethiopia was said to live to the age of 562. Ethiopians had no noses, 
‘others no upper lip or tongues, others again no mouth; others had no heads but eyes and 
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mouths in their breasts’ (Fryer 1984). Fantasies often reveal more about the subject doing the 
fantasising than the object of the fantasy itself. Thus it is at this point during the sixteenth 
century that we also witness the seeds of English anxiety concerning sex and Africans, where 
the boundaries of blackness and sexuality become the site for ‘monstrous’ and ‘dangerous’ 
transgressions. By fixing their gaze upon African men and women, the English male travel 
writers were thus confronted with their own titillation and proceeded to reduce human warmth 
and sexual intimacy between African males and females to unnatural animalistic and beastlike 
impulses. One writer noted, 
 
after a meal of fish washed up on the shore and baked by the sun… like animals … 
[they would] fall upon their women, just as they come to hand, without any choice; 
utterly free from care because they are always sure of plenty food (Fryer 1984, p.7). 
 
As Peter Fryer argues, 
 
Such fantasies tended to cement in the minds of English people the notion that 
Africans were inherently carefree, lazy and lustful. By the middle of the sixteenth 
century this notion was taken for granted, just as some English people took it for 
granted that every male African had an enormous penis … (Fryer 1984, p.7). 
 
In these early depictions of sexually charged racial fantasies in the white imagination, 
blackness was devoid of emotional fabric, absent of human warmth and intellect and 
reducible to the Black body’s genetalia and physical appearance. It would be reasonable to 
argue here that the Black body was also devoid of love and instead becomes a site of 
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pornographic objectification. Notions of corrupted blackness, inscribed onto the Black body, 
had not only come to signify a deviant, abnormal and alien human identity, it came to 
represent a ‘lost’ white essence. It came to signify a lost or indeed an unsubstantiated 
humanity.  
To summarise, in sixteenth century England the African persona in the popular 
imagination of English people became the embodiment of literal and metaphorical ideas about 
blackness. Pre-existing ideas about blackness were mapped onto African bodies and used to 
categorise Africans as being less than human. As such Africans became dehumanised in the 
European imagination. For these Europeans, African worth could only be redeemed through 
commerce and the global system of chattel slavery. 
 
Plantocracy racism and slavery 
Blackness had taken on a much more acute racial distinction when the European trade in 
Africans demanded an inexhaustible supply of free African labour. As Caribbean scholars 
such as Eric Williams have shown, slavery in the West Indies started as an economic venture 
rather than a racial one (Williams, 1994). However, racist ideologies were used to justify the 
enslavement of African people in the ‘New World’ (Fryer 1988, p.63). Racism became an 
institutionalised cornerstone of British economic expansion, justifying British rule over 
Africans first under slavery and later under colonialism (Fryer 1988, p.67).  According to 
Stuart Hall (1997) the stereotyping of racial difference during slavery was represented around 
the themes of the ‘innate laziness’ of blacks, born and fit for servitude, and the ‘innate 
primitivism’ of Black people, simple and lacking of culture and genetically incapable of 
civilisation. Edward Long, the son of a Jamaican planter and a key exponent of plantocracy 
racism (Fryer, 1988), wrote the infamous History of Jamaica in 1774. His racist attack on 
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Black people linked pseudo scientific assertions about Africans to an economic defence of 
chattel slavery (Fryer 1984, p.159). As Fryer states, ‘his racist diatribe fits into, and serves the 
purpose of, the overall economic argument’, 
 
That the trade in slaves and in goods produced by slaves was immensely profitable, 
not only in the West Indies, but to Britain itself and that it greatly enriched 
Englishmen in all walks of life; that West Indian slavery was, on the whole, a mild and 
benevolent institution and that slaves were better off than the lowest classes in Britain; 
that negro slavery was inevitable and necessary in certain regions of the world; that 
the slave trade benefited and helped to civilise Africa; that virtually all the slaves were 
originally convicted criminals; that in every mental and moral way negroes were 
absolutely inferior to white men, and that the most constructive thing which could 
happen to them was to be compelled to work productively (Fryer 1984, p.160). 
 
Long’s racist rant makes two things clear: that firstly plantation slavery had garnered massive 
economic rewards for Britain and the West Indian planters. And secondly, that the tentacles of 
racism had now moved beyond pseudo-scientific nonsense and nasty epistemological 
ignorance, so that racism as a folklore of Western civilisation became an essential institutional 
component in the political, economic and industrial growth of British global capital and a 
justification for white colonial rule (Fryer 1988, p.61).  
The plantation as a hive of European economic growth and exploitation, as a site of 
systematic racialised violence and oppression, was also a site of sabotage, resistance and 
revolt. Africans struggled for their freedom and independence both during and after the end of 
slavery. Armed slave revolts were common place throughout the Caribbean, the most famous 
Racism and Blackness 
 
 54 
and successful being the Haitian Revolution of 1804 where ‘the Africans in Haiti shook the 
foundations of slavery and capitalism in the Caribbean, North America and Europe’ 
(Campbell 1985, p.27). The island of Jamaica was significant not only because it was the 
most prosperous of the British colonies but also because it was the area with the most slave 
revolts in the New World (Campbell 1985, p.26). Other more surreptitious means were used 
to disrupt the system of slavery such as poisoning, economic sabotage, withdrawal of labour, 
arson, assault and murder (Dadzie 1990). Despite the systematic violence and ideological 
fabrications transmitted against African humanity under the guise of ‘civilisation’ and 
‘science’, enslaved Africans were not passive materials nor moulded by the wills of their 
masters. Stella Dadzie’s gendered analysis of African female resistance in Jamaica during 
slavery found widespread malingering, strikes and physical assaults by women that suggest 
that far from accepting and collaborating with the system, a significant number of female 
slaves were willing to risk all in defence of their right to self-determination (Dadzie 1990, 
p.24). 
 
Early Black presence in England 
Peter Fryer suggests that amongst the Black population settled in London during the 
eighteenth century there is evidence of cohesion, solidarity and mutual help. In England Black 
people were often fragmented and isolated, atomised in separate households (Fryer1984, pp. 
67-70). Nevertheless, Fryer argues Black self-awareness took literary shape in autobiography, 
political protest and other published writings. Black communities had developed a lively 
social life and had found ways to express their political aspirations (Fryer 1984, p.67). 
However, the Black presence in London during the eighteenth century was met with hostility 
by the ruling elite, who were both suspicious and resentful towards Africans presumed to 
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have eloped or to be living undercover having escaped the clutches of servitude by their 
owners (Fryer 1984, p.70). For some, including Sir John Fielding, the possibility of escaped 
servants being ‘intoxicated with liberty’ came too close to witnessing the dangerous seeds of a 
full scale rebellion bloom into ‘the blackest conspiracies against their Governors and Masters’ 
(Fielding [1768] in Fryer 1984, p.71). Here, the fear of Black volatility and revenge lies at the 
heart of white supremacist anxieties about freedom in the hands of ‘blacks.’ Blackness was 
not only a physical injury to mankind, it was innately wild and untamed and thus prone to 
‘evil.’ Could ‘blacks’ be trusted with freedom? For Fielding and his class, it certainly could 
not. Freedom in the hands of African people could only signify danger and vengeance.  
Blackness has been discussed in the historical context of pseudo scientific racism and 
sixteenth century ideas regarding the origins of blackness itself. Transatlantic slavery had 
institutionalised racism within the economic order of Europe with devastating consequences 
for African peoples. Born out of historically deep-seated racial inequalities and systematic 
racial violence, both notions of ‘race’ and racism have proven to be salient and persistent 
modals in which contemporary life is configured and reconfigured. I will now discuss 
contemporary configurations of blackness and the ways in which racism contributes to 
notions of ‘lovelessness’ as it pertains to Black life in the Western context. 
 
Pathological configurations of Blackness in the Western environment 
 
For blackness, again as an expanding metaphor, embodies the nihilistic values that … 
propounds in opposition to the positive values of Western bourgeois Graeco-Christian 
society, values such as work, family, country, love, respect for life and property, the 
high values of art and culture (Oxenhandler 1975, p.418). 
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This citation demarcates the Eurocentric social parameters in which love is imagined to find 
its most positive expression in Western modernity; work, family, country, property, art and 
culture. In the context of Western modernity, love resides within an elite cultural domain of 
white Eurocentric privilege.  Indeed, in The Encyclopaedia of Cultural Anthropology (1996) 
the study of romantic love is said to be nonexistent because of the widespread belief that 
romantic love was unique to Euro-American culture. The entry cites Lawrence Stone who 
insists that if romantic love ever existed outside Europe, it only arose among the elite in non-
Western states who had time to cultivate an aesthetic appreciation for subjective experiences. 
The entry further suggests that underlying these Eurocentric views is the assumption that 
modernisation and the rise of the individual are directly linked to the appearance of romantic 
notions of love. As a consequence, the article concludes that very little work has been done to 
alter the prevalent opinion that romantic love is a European contribution to world culture (The 
Encyclopaedia of Cultural Anthropology, pp.718-719). Here, romantic love is linked to 
material wealth and to the cultural and leisurely pursuits of an affluent and elite social class. 
Romantic love between the elite and affluent is assumed not only to cultivate subjectivity but 
also contributes to the cultural superiority of European civilisations. In the United States, 
Entman and Rojecki’s (2000) important study on media and race in America, analysed prime-
time television adverts to probe racial distinctions between blackness and whiteness. Their 
study found images of white couples and children were represented more frequently than 
Black couples and children (thirty four white couples were shown compared to two images of 
Black couples; fifty five white children were featured compared with four Black children). 
Furthermore, ‘according to the world of TV advertising, whites are the ones who occupy the 
realm of ideal humanity, of human warmth and connection’ symbolised occasionally by their 
love for their pets and by the amount of times white couples are seen touching each other. 
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None of the Black couples were shown touching white people or each other, conveying a sub-
luminal message that Black skin is taboo (Entman and Rojecki 2000). The implications of 
Entram and Rojecki’s research marks the way ‘racisms police the boundaries’ of racial 
difference (Goldberg 2009). It reveals how the codification of racial difference produces 
narratives of civility, value and power, and more importantly about who belongs within these 
boundaries and who is excluded from them.  
Representations of blackness in the media have often been pathologised in terms that 
are disassociated and antithetical to ‘positive values’ such as human warmth and ‘love’. In 
this sense rather than contributing to the cultural reproduction of love in Western society, 
blackness is perceived as damaging and harmful to Western values and is thus precluded from 
‘protection, privilege, property, or profit’, unless it is enlisted to work and labour for them. 
Genocidal narratives that do injury to Black people that assault our bodies, minds and 
humanity, seek to justify Black oppression and racialised forms of annihilation. Take for 
example the right-wing American Republican radio host William Bennett who in September 
2005 made press headlines when he stated that, ‘if you want to reduce crime, you could abort 
every Black baby in this country, and your crime rate would go down’ (Guardian 2005).  In 
this logic of ‘rationalised’ racial hatred, being Black means you become a legitimate target for 
genocide. Criminality becomes genetically imbedded into Black people who thus have a 
‘natural’ tendency to do violence. Unable to give love to the nation and having minimal social 
value, the logic goes that Black people are prime targets to be exterminated. African 
Americans become the epitome of lovelessness within American society because they are 
readily expendable. Love’s absence is marked by blackness, a ‘condition’ that is unworthy of 
receiving love and supposedly incapable of reproducing love within a white supremacist 
nationalist context. Thus blackness must be violently expunged from the nation at its earliest 
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embryonic stage, in order to save the sanctity and liberty of good Americans and ‘their’ 
(white) country. Blackness as a signifier of lovelessness becomes an unspoken assumption, a 
taken-for-granted sub-conscious text within the dominant culture that relies upon the 
brutalisation of blackness to maintain the status quo. As Goldberg (2009) writes, 
 
Bennett’s ‘observation’ trades on a cache of widespread if no longer explicitly 
expressed presumptions: that the crime rate in the US is overwhelmingly fuelled by 
Black criminality, that such criminality is more or less natural and so inescapable 
condition of especially the Black poor, but also that it is not unacceptable to issue 
eugenicist judgements about the implications of hypothetical genocide in the case of 
African Americans in ways it would mostly not be for any other group today (Muslims 
included) (Goldberg 2009, p.79).  
 
Internalised narratives of racism 
Within the UK, blackness has also had is fair share of representational deprecation. Amongst 
Black Caribbean communities it is not uncommon to hear the view that Black people have 
psychologically internalised racism and have produced attitudes that are both self-negating 
and self-hating (Gabriel 2006). Often the evidence of this internalisation seems on the surface 
to be compelling, especially if we consider how Black communities are represented through 
the mainstream British press and media. Constant representations of behaviour deemed as 
intrinsic cultural patterns in Black life - lone parenting, teenage single-mothers, absent male 
fathers, ‘worklessness’, infidelity and womanising, poor academic attainment, intellectual 
inferiority, gun crime and gun culture, sexually transmitted diseases – paint a bleak picture. 
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The social ambience created from these representations suggests Black people in the Western 
environment are morally, psychically and emotionally broken.  
In the autumn of 2006 the BBC screened a television drama entitled Shoot the 
Messenger (originally titled F*ck Black People), a drama that was meant to be a ‘brave’ 
insight into what it was like being Black in 21
st
 century Britain. Written by Sharon Foster and 
directed by Ngozi Onwurah, the drama seemed all too happy to perpetuate the notion that 
being Black in Britain in the 21
st
 century meant being in a chronic condition of Black self-
hate. Considering the lack of television dramas on British television screens that present a 
complex and humane insight into Black life, Messenger seemed to capture and capitalise on 
the popular denigration of blackness in contemporary Britain. Indeed, the screenplay was a 
crash course in Black pathological stereotypes. The main character, Joe, a Black teacher 
working in an inner-city school wants to save the Black pupils in his school from a life of 
gangs, crime and underachievement. Having lost his job and affected by mental illness, Joe 
turns against the Black community and blames Black people for his downfall. He states, 
‘When I think about it, everything bad that has ever happened to me has involved a Black 
person.’ For all its lustre in terms of high television production values, the content of 
Messenger failed to move beyond the lazy one-dimensional stereotypes that plague 
representations of Black people in the mainstream British media.  
According to Ligali MediaWatch, Messenger targets and hits almost every stereotype 
that exists of the African community, including, but not limited to: ‘Black people go on about 
slavery,’ ‘Black people should forget about African identity,’ ‘Black people cause their own 
mental health problems,’ ‘Black people are violent and lazy,’ ‘Black women are desperate and 
predatory,’ ‘Black men are no good’ (Legali MediaWatch 2006). In an interview, the writer, 
Sharon Foster said she wanted to be ‘loving’ toward the Black community and had written the 
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screenplay as an act of love to counter the ‘blame, blame, blame culture which is killing our 
community.’ She went on to say, ‘This film is intended to be a healing experience. To look at 
what we do, to acknowledge it and move on. I do believe we have a difficulty with taking 
responsibility’ (Foster circa 2006). If only Foster had heeded her own advice by taking 
responsibility for ‘healing’ the stereotypical representations of blackness found in her 
screenplay that bludgeon back audiences and others with monolithic depictions of Black 
people. Foster lost the opportunity to write about the serious issues that are affecting Black 
communities in a complex way that went beyond the binary of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
images and stereotypes. This thesis supports Black people taking responsibility for each other, 
for looking at better ways in which we can be with each other, for ending attitudes that negate 
blackness. Such a position places the concept of agency at the heart of the struggle to move 
away from notions of helplessness and powerlessness.  However, this thesis understands that 
Black peoples’ efforts to care for the wellbeing of themselves and others does not take place 
in a vacuum outside of the injuriousness of contemporary and historical racism, outside of 
what bell hooks terms ‘white supremacist capitalist patriarchy.’ Such a context would indeed 
praise Messenger for being ‘brave’, for being ‘a landmark piece for a generation of Black 
Britons’ (BBC Online 2006) precisely because it allows the status quo to stay intact, precisely 
because it allows racism to remain unchallenged. However, Messenger, far from being a 
‘brave’ attempt at confronting Black people with ‘our difficulty with taking responsibility,’ is 
an example of how as Black people we can engage with the process of pathologising each 
other. 
Yet we also know racially pathologised notions of blackness do not provide a full and 
complex picture of Black humanity. We know that to define a segment of humanity in such 
narrow terms contributes to the process of dehumanisation. From the outset this research 
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seeks to centre the humanity within blackness as opposed to essentialising blackness within 
humanity. It seeks to understand that those of us who live and are seen through the lens of 
blackness as a limitation are able to find ways to love beyond the perceived limits, myths and 
narratives mapped onto our existence. We also know that notions of love have been used as a 
tool in various localities whether in the family, the home, the church, the dancehall, in 
grassroots activism and in our artistic, literary, visual and spoken cultures, to resist oppression 
and to maintain and validate our human spirit. Resistance steeped in notions of loving praxis 
have proven to be life-affirming. However these manifestations of love have often been met 
with counter-resistance by the dominant culture. I am arguing that the dominant culture of 
white supremacy in the UK and its globalised manifestations, alongside other systems of 
social domination including sex and class, militate against love in Black life. As bell hooks 
argues, ‘Historically, all unions between Black women and men were forged within a culture 
of white supremacy where in all bonding which did not serve the interest of white people was 
deemed suspect and threatening’ (hooks 2001, p.155). She further writes, 
 
Importantly, remembering that white supremacist thinking is always challenged by 
loving unions between Black males and females sheds light on why there have been so 
many obstacles placed in the path of such union (hooks 2001, p.156).  
 
Internalised racism has produced attitudes that are believed to be self negating producing 
nihilistic cultures that increasingly pervade Black communities (West 1992, pp.37-47).  
Racism has made repeated attempts to dehumanise blackness and has undermined the concept 
of love as it relates to Black populations globally. Narratives of racial expulsion and 
‘evaporation’ are not uncommon within the context of blackness and its presence in Western 
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civilisation (Goldberg 2009). However Black communities in Britain have sought to affirm 
blackness both within and beyond its racially hostile borders. Hence this thesis is arguing that, 
for Black diasporic communities in Britain, the transnational space has become a critical site 
for the construction and reconstruction of Black subjectivity and cross border communities.  
I am arguing that the once optimistic possibility of a cohesive ‘Black British’ identity 
that sought to safeguard a secure postcolonial sense of national belonging has now 
fragmented. It has been broken by the continuing disavowal of Britain’s racialised and 
transnationalised populations, by national and global anxieties over the meaning of 
Britishness as well as by ‘the changing economies of British racism’ (Hesse 2000, p.22). The 
transnational space offers Black communities complex opportunities to reconstruct the 
vestiges of belonging from both contemporary and historical diasporic lineages, in the face of 
resurgent movements towards fascism both in the UK and across Europe (Marble and Agard-
Jones 2009; Hine et. al. 2009). In this respect, bell hook’s theory of ‘loving blackness’ 
becomes the critical lens by which this thesis engages with the politics of antiracism. I am 
extending hooks’s thesis on loving blackness by situating it outside of the local context of 
domestic racism within the US, in order to re-contextualise it within transnational notions of 
blackness and globalised perspectives on race and racism. 
 
Blackness falling out of love with Britishness  
In the contemporary UK context, popular concepts of blackness in the 21
st
 century are 
constructed as being synonymous with the ‘ghetto’ an imagined enclave outside of an equally 
imagined normative British experience. Fraught with the threat of implosion in the face of the 
gun, blackness in Britain is presumed to possess distinctive self-destructive violent cultures 
that belong to being Black. In the final weeks of his premiership, Tony Blair blamed the 
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causes of knife and gun murders in London not on poverty or social deprivation but on a 
distinctive Black culture (Webbe 2007). He said, 
 
When are we going to start saying this is a problem amongst a section of the Black 
community and not, for reasons of political correctness, pretend that this is nothing to 
do with it? … We need to stop thinking of this as a society that has gone wrong - it has 
not - but of specific groups that for specific reasons have gone outside of the proper 
lines of respect and good conduct towards others and need by specific measures to be 
brought back into the fold (Webbe 2007) 
 
Here, nihilistic tendencies are depicted as essences in Black culture, essences that are both 
racially and culturally located. Blackness is constructed in the popular imagination as self-
defeating and self-eroding. The social integration of Black and brown communities into 
mainstream British society is touted in reactionary outbursts as the cure-all to protect the 
integrity of Britain and ‘British values’. Take for example Trevor Philips who suggested that 
Britain was ‘sleep walking into segregation,’ or indeed, the Conservative party leader David 
Cameron who stated that, ‘we need to reassert faith in our shared British values which help 
guarantee stability, tolerance and civility’ (cited in Kundnani 2007, p.125). However, the 
cure-all of integration is proving to be highly problematic. This is because Black and brown 
communities discover a double standard taking place where ‘they are routinely expected to 
demonstrate national allegiances while living with unreliable citizenship rights and 
recognition, and [are] subject to the ever present risks of institutional racism’ (Hesse in Hine 
et. al 2009, p.292). Hence, Black and brown communities are sensitive to the inherent 
hypocrisy within the integration debate where non-white groups are encouraged to do and to 
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be seen to be doing the work of integration in order to suit the needs of the dominant culture. 
Guardian columnist Gary Younge (2005) has highlighted what he sees as the ‘fetishising’ of 
integration particularly in the aftermath of the July 7
th
 bombings in London:  
 
The cause of integration has become so fetishised since the July bombings that it has 
been elevated to the level of an intrinsic moral value - not a means to an end but an 
end in itself (Younge 2005).  
 
Ironically, it has also been suggested that Black groups are still more likely to view 
integration more positively than white groups in the UK (Younge 2005). For example, reports 
have shown that the group that has the hardest time integrating are white people. A poll for 
the Commission for Racial Equality showed that 94% of white people polled compared with 
47% of ethnic minorities say that most if not all of their friends are white. A Mori poll for 
Prospect magazine in 2004 showed that 41% of whites, compared with 26% of ethnic 
minorities, want the races to live separately (Younge 2005). If this report is to be believed, 
then the nature of integration in the UK context reveals that a significant proportion of the 
white population in the UK do not want to integrate. Thus the push for integration can be read 
as a mask for assimilation. Assimilation implies there is something inherently wrong with 
Black and Brown people and the cultures that shape their blackness and brownness that needs 
to be managed or erased. Such logic fails to question the values of the dominant society itself. 
It fails to take seriously the currency, durability, efficiency and efficacy of racism despite 
promoting, bureaucratising and legalising the notion that social equality can be attained in 
such discriminatory circumstances. 
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There is a presumption that the dominant system has nothing to gain from challenging 
and changing their attitudes and beliefs about race, particularly within our supposedly new 
neoliberal post racial climate. However this thesis refutes such thinking on the basis that, 
  
The future of democracy itself depends on the outcomes of racial politics and policies 
as they develop in various national societies and in the world at large. This means that 
the future of democracy also depends on the concept of race, that is, the meaning that 
is attached to it (Winant 2009, p.41). 
 
Thus, we all have a vested interest in ending systematic forms of racial discrimination. 
Racism remains one of the most damaging ideological, political and institutionalised weapons 
against humanity, and will continue to remain so if left unchecked. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how contemporary and historical forms of racism have denigrated 
Black life. It has shown how contemporary racist pathology belongs to a longer genealogy of 
racism including religious, pseudo-scientific and Enlightenment arguments regarding the 
European belief in the ‘inherent’ and ‘natural’ inferiority of Africans. I have argued that this 
historical process of denigration can be found in contemporary discourses on blackness in 
Britain where blackness is often separated from notions of love and configured as a site of 
lovelessness within popular commentary and public discourse. Such beliefs continue to exist 
because dominant Western cultures are failing to sufficiently address racism as a devastating 
ideological, political and institutional weapon against humanity. The following chapter 
addresses the ways in which racism is overlooked in dominant Western cultures and can be 
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buried and forgotten in popular discourses such as ‘post-racialism’ and ‘diversity’. Such a 
politics of forgetting allows racism the power to continue to structure the basis of our human 
relations. 
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Chapter 2 
 
A LOVE THAT BIDS THE ATIO: 
Race, memory and the politics of forgetting 
 
Introduction  
How do memory and amnesia work to stick the neoliberal nation-state together at times when 
the nation feels anxious about its postcolonial legacies and the repercussions of an ‘unsettled 
multiculturalism?’ (Hesse 2000). This chapter critiques the neoliberal nation state and the 
debris of racism as a largely unattended legacy of former imperial enterprises, histories and 
memories. I will make the claim that both Britain and the United States as modern neoliberal 
nations continue to negate blackness and the violence of racism through processes of selective 
historical and cultural amnesia. The ideological vehicles that help to process these forms of 
negation can be found within the popular social discourses of ‘post-racialism’ and ‘diversity.’ 
The post-racial frenzy that accompanied the election of Barrack Hussein Obama in 2008 
seemed to offer an exemplary incarnation of the neoliberal state’s overzealous desire simply 
to forget about racism. In that moment we saw an unnerving wilfulness to evaporate, bury and 
‘mis-remember’ race and racism even as their conditions remained alive and kicking 
(Goldberg 2009).  
In this chapter I will discuss Obama’s America in the context of its ‘post-racial’ 
forgetting. I will expand this discussion to reveal how constructions of whiteness and 
diversity discourses can conceal racisms within Western neoliberal states. Finally, I will 
discuss Aime Cesaire’s notion of the ‘forgetting machine’ and what Barnor Hesse’s calls 
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‘decolonial fantasies’ within the context of racialised regimes of brutality within Western 
democracies.   
For Aime Césaire, the ‘forgetting machine’ conceals the barbarity of European 
colonialism and imperial histories. This concealment allows us to forget that ‘Western values’ 
such as freedom, justice and equality are historically founded upon practices of racialised 
forms of barbarism, domination and exclusion. Indeed, such values and their reconfiguration 
within Western democratic structures emerge from the systematic dispossession and denial of 
such freedoms to those erased from the ideological image of the nation.  
For Hesse, ‘de/colonial fantasises’ deny contemporary ‘racial’ (in)justice by simply 
forgetting that racialised barbarity was an intrinsic instrument to Britain’s colonial and 
imperial dominance. By ‘forgetting’ and ‘fantasying,’ the modern neo-liberal nation state can 
frequently imagine and believe itself to be benevolent and open-minded towards ‘racialised 
others’ through the qualities of, love, tolerance and hospitality (Ahmed 2004). This is 
nowhere more evident in recent debates on multiculturalism, where its perceived failure is 
seen as a cause of ‘injury’ to the cohesion of the nation, specifically here in Britain (Ahmed 
2004).  
My analysis of the need for a politically conscious form of love assumes that the 
power and impact of racism and white supremacy continue to victimise, harm and destroy the 
life chances of people of African descent globally alongside many more of the world’s darker 
skinned peoples and populations. As Horace Campbell (2006) points out, ‘If anything, in the 
era of globalization the exploitation of the masses of the people has intensified. This 
exploitation is being carried out under the neo-liberal ideas of liberalization that redistributes 
wealth from the exploited to the powerful’ (Campbell 2006, p.39). Due to racism’s far 
reaching and devastating global impact, contemporary activists in the field of Pan-Africanism 
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and the global reparation movement continue to stress the need for a globalised and collective 
response to racism. For example, in 2007, I conducted an interview with leading pan-
Africanist and reparations activist campaigner Esther Stanford to discuss the issue of tackling 
racism within a transnational context. She stated, 
 
The reality is if we look globally at the population of peoples of African descent, there 
is genocide happening. We are dying at an undeniable rate. I’m not just talking about 
HIV AIDs; I’m talking about the civil conflict and wars that are fuelled by Western 
powers. I’m talking about the negative impact of climate change. So we do not have 
the luxury [of being partisan]. We have to see ourselves as one. First, of all that’s a 
mental construct.  We have to eradicate some of these artificial, although significant, 
borders and boundaries that have come to define and shape our experience (Stanford 
2007 personal interview). 
 
Stanford’s approach to destabilising some of the ‘significant’ borders and boundaries that 
have come to define blackness is pertinent because the power of racism as a phenomenon 
works to discriminate against people as one monolithic racialised group. I am not suggesting 
that all people of African descent experience racism in the same way. Quite clearly, we should 
always remember how racism intersects and works with other factors such as space, location, 
gender, class, sexuality, poverty, economics, age, employment, trafficking and migration, 
religious intolerance, conflict, the environment, and our human rights. These boundaries are 
indeed significant because they necessarily force us to think beyond narrow and monolithic 
definitions of blackness and one-dimensional approaches to racism. However, across our 
varying localities racism must be seen as an interconnected, continuous, and institutionalised 
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global phenomenon that makes all of our localities relational and dialogic. Within his book, 
David Theo Goldberg argues that the exclusionary, humiliating and violent expressions of 
race have been historically produced, contemporarily articulated, and yet are so often in denial 
(Goldberg 2009, p.vi).  He further claims that the transformational grammars of race and 
racisms as a neoliberal political economy have assumed a firm grip on different societies 
across varying regions (Goldberg 2009, p.vi). Cornell West reminds us that African people 
are part of a rich culture and community that have struggled against racialised oppression in 
light of the fact that ‘all people with Black skin and African phenotype are subject to potential 
white supremacist abuse’ (West 2001, p.39). However, race in the dominant popular 
imagination is assumed to be an ‘antique notion’ (Goldberg 2009, p.329). Instead, in the 
political economy of neoliberalism we see an ‘increasing stress on individualised merit and 
ability in the name of racelessness’ (Goldberg 2009, p.331). This logic of the raceless, ‘post-
racial’ meritocracy became the definitive narrative in the election of Barack Obama in 2008. 
At this seminal moment in American history, the nation began to dream, again. The nation 
could now forget about race. Racism was finally over, evidenced by the individual charisma, 
skill, intelligence, wit and ambition of its newly elected Black leader. 
 
avigating race and blackness in Obama’s ‘post-racial America’ 
bell hooks argues that ‘blackness’ as a racialised sign primarily evokes hatred and fear in the 
public imagination of all groups who have learnt to share racist assumptions about blackness 
in an environment that values whiteness and white supremacy. hooks argues that, 
 
A love that binds the nation 
 
 71 
In a white supremacist context ‘loving blackness’ is rarely a political stance that is 
reflected in everyday life. When present it is deemed suspect, dangerous and 
threatening (hooks 1992, p.10). 
 
The threat, suspicion and danger of blackness has remained a consistent narrative in Barack 
Obama’s sojourn to the White House. With this in mind, how then has Obama managed to 
become the first African American President in a country historically divided along the lines 
of race?  
Conventional wisdom had told us that Obama’s election victory was a clear sign that 
America had entered into a post-racial meritocracy. In this new social order, if you worked 
hard, played fair and could demonstrate your unwavering commitment and belief in ‘the 
greatness and goodness’ of America, as an ideal and as a nation, anyone from any social 
group could make it to the highest seat in the land. Obama seemed to transform this myth into 
reality. With magician-like conjuring, Obama’s victory supposedly had achieved something 
none of us had done before. He had eradicated racism, just like that.  The bar had thus been 
raised for all African Americans to move beyond the racial grievances of the past. No more 
excuses for academic under achievement, no more talk of being a victim of the criminal 
justice system. No more blaming systematised forms of social degradation, deprivation, 
economic exclusion or any form of systematic oppression deeply rooted in racist, class, or 
sexist injustices. No more excuses. We have a Black President now, so please, no more 
excuses.  
Others felt they no longer needed to confront the issue of white guilt over racism. 
According to the Black conservative commentator Larry Elder (2008), the civil rights war is 
over, the good guys have won and white racism is no longer a major problem in America. 
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Elder argues that the fear of being perceived as a racist was now an even bigger problem than 
racism itself (Elder 2008).  Indeed, how could racism be real when Black brown and white 
folk voted for President Barack Obama in significant numbers and believed in his 
fundamental message of change and social transformation? How can race and racism have 
any historical context or social relevance to our post-racial contemporary narrative where a 
Black man is now the Commander in Chief? 
And yet, as always, racism proved itself to be downright stubborn, pernicious, 
indignant and characteristically ignorant. In the face of this extraordinary parable of post-
racial conquest, racism has given the Obama Presidency the finger.  It has accused Obama 
himself of being a racist, of ‘having a deep seated hatred of white people’ (Beck 2009). Even 
Rupert Murdoch, owner of the global media conglomerate, News International, seemed to 
agree (Murdoch 2009). Racism said Obama could never be a true patriot. He was not even 
born in America, he wasn’t a true bona fide American citizen - he was born somewhere 
between Mombasa and Hawaii (CNN 2009).  In the summer of 2009 at ‘tea party’ rallies 
across the country Obama was depicted on placards and posters as the natural air to Hitler and 
Mussolini. In the face of rightwing opposition to healthcare reform, government bailouts of 
big business and the possibility of future tax increases, shouts of ‘U. S. A.’, ‘Glenn Beck for 
President’, ‘freedom’ and ‘we want our country back’ could be heard by protestors lamenting 
the demise of ‘their’ country and the untold damage that had been done by Obama and his 
‘army of socialist Czars’ since January 20
th
 2009. Clearly, racism was not and is not going 
down without a fight. 
During the 2008 presidential race, in the bitterly fought campaign to become the 
Democratic Party nominee, Obama’s blackness became the source of much race-bating and 
sensational media scrutiny.  For some, to know the content of his ‘character’ and his ability to 
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govern America was to look no further than his blackness. His twenty-year membership of the 
African-centred Trinity United Church in Chicago; his relationship with the church’s former 
charismatic leader Rev Jeremiah Wright; alongside comments made by Michelle Obama 
(2008b) about feeling proud to be an American for the first time in her life time, informed a 
wider discourse of ‘racial-reasoning’ used by right-wing media pundits to stoke up the fears 
of undecided white American voters about this suspicious and untrustworthy Black candidate.  
Sarah Palin, infamously accused Obama of ‘palling around with terrorists who would 
target their own country’ referring, of course, to his association with William Ayers, a co-
founder of the 1960s-era Weather Underground, an organization the FBI labelled as a 
domestic terrorist group (Orr 2008). Obama’s fist-thumb gesture with Michelle Obama was 
dubbed a ‘terrorist fist jab’ by Fox News anchor woman Ed Hill (Sweeny 2008) whilst on the 
same network she was described in derogative terms as ‘Obama’s baby mama’ (The 
Huffington Post 2008). Blackness, domestic terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism (his middle 
name is Hussein) and stereotypes of Black dysfunctional families, were all collapsed into one 
singular metaphor that spelt ‘danger, enemy within.’ Racism said this man and his ilk are 
fundamentally un-American, unpatriotic and unfit to govern our nation.   
And still during this racially charged pre-election climate, the notion of a ‘post-racial 
society’ had garnered increasing momentum - perhaps for some good reason on behalf of the 
American electorate. Obama’s victory over his rival Hilary Clinton in the Iowa caucuses and 
soon after in the South Carolina primary seemed to signal, as one commentator put it, the 
moment that ‘Americans began to make race free judgements on who should lead them’ 
(Daniel Schorr 2008[online]).  
Within the media however the post-racial obsession seemed to represent an 
opportunity to silence any complex and meaningful discussion on the continuing problem of 
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racism in America. As the journalist John Stossel wrote, ‘It's time to stop complaining about 
past discrimination and to treat people as individuals, not as members of a certain race. I 
assumed that the success of Barack Obama, as well as thousands of other Black Americans 
and dark-skinned immigrants — demonstrates that America today is largely a colorblind 
meritocracy’ (Stossel 2008). A colour-blind meritocracy imagines that social arrangements in 
the US have transformed to such an extent that ‘race’ and ‘racism’ have become unimportant 
in America’s new post-racial narrative.  
The post racial ideal is not a new idea.  Writing in 2004, Debra Dickerson suggested 
African Americans needed to ‘surrender’ themselves to America as a nation and give up on 
the idea of racial justice (Dickerson in Davis 2004). Dickerson’s views support the notion that 
we now live in a meritocratic ‘post-racial’ world with an even playing field where all 
Americans can compete on equal terms. The academic Grant Farred (2006) argues that the 
notion of post-racialism in African American and Black diasporic cultures has a long history 
that can be traced through the works of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man through to Paul 
Gilroy’s thesis Against Race. For Farred however, post-racialism remains potentially 
destructive to ‘historical subalterns’ precisely because subjugated people are racialised into 
being through race and racism. In other words, in order to transcend race or racism we have to 
acknowledge their existence in order to oppose them. 
In this short lived moment of post–racial celebration, where exactly had racism gone? 
As Guardian journalist, Gary Younge, noted, ‘We have racism but no racists. A system of 
discrimination - albeit much altered from 40 years ago - remains, yet no one will take 
responsibility for it. There are views that pervade, but apparently no one who actually holds 
them’ (Younge 2008). A post-racial meritocracy assumes the historical legacies of Black 
oppositional politics have little or no significance to contemporary struggles for freedom, 
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equality and justice. Indeed, a post-racial meritocracy assumes that racial injustice belongs to 
the past and can thus be locked away and forgotten. Furthermore, it dangerously assumes 
modern racism ‘has been truncated as an ongoing social problem for persons of color 
generally’ (Wise 2009, p.18). As Tim Wise argues, if the idea and perception of meritocracy 
is reinforced, it can make it easier, 
 
to rationalise racial domination and inequity, to rationalise white advantage and 
privilege, and to accept blatant injustices on a mass scale, since they can be written off 
to aggregate gaps in effort, ambition or work ethic between whites on the one hand 
and blacks and Latinos on the other (Wise 2009, p.107). 
Clearly, President Obama himself had done very little to challenge the fallacy of being 
labelled the post-racial candidate. As Younge argues, race played an ambiguous role in his 
election campaign, in which it was both central to Obama’s meaning, but absent from his 
message (Younge 2008). He states, 
This is less a criticism than a description. Obama is navigating uncharted and 
decidedly choppy waters. It is difficult to see how else he could play it. And yet it is 
not without its problems. At any moment, while passing for the presidency, he can be 
outed by anything from a preacher to a fist bump or a magazine cover. Such is the lot 
of the incognegro. For what people really mean when they refer to his candidacy being 
post-racial is that it is ‘not too obviously Black’. The trouble is that is as racial a 
category as any other, albeit a negative one (Younge 2008).  
Obama has not transcended his racial inscription or blackness. He occupies an even more 
precarious and volatile position than that. Obama has to navigate his presidency through a 
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minefield of racial time bombs that are easily escalated and combustible and threaten to derail 
him at any given moment. And yet he cannot continue to obviate the question of racism in 
America by treading hesitantly with caution or with silence.  He cannot continue to instruct 
poor Black people (specifically Black men) in America to take personal responsibility for 
their situation (MSNBC 2008) without asking those who are privileged and white to take 
personal responsibility for structural or everyday acts of racism that sustain white privilege 
and deepen systems of inequality.   
  With declining poll numbers (after his first year in Office) and a tendency to fear 
alienating or worrying the middle class white electorate, it’s worth asking ourselves what 
kinds of turmoil and havoc would erupt if Obama decided to take the lead in an open and 
honest discussion on racism not just in America, but on its deep and devastating effects 
worldwide. A Beer Summit would not suffice.
1
  
As Naomi Klein argues, ‘no matter how race-neutral Obama tries to be, his actions 
will be viewed by a large part of the country through the lens of its racial obsessions. So, 
since even his most modest, Band-Aid measures are going to be greeted as if he is waging a 
full-on race war, Obama has little to lose by using this brief political window to actually heal 
a few of the country's racial wounds’ (Klein 2009). But Klein also suggests Obama has turned 
his back on Black America.  I doubt this is the case or that it is indeed that simple. Obama is 
caught in a racist trap, partly by his own reluctance to confront the issue of racism head on, 
and also by the possibility that a white racist backlash against his presidency could go beyond 
                                                 
1
 ‘The Beer Summit’ is a colloquial term used to describe the talks held at the White House between the Harvard 
Professor Henry Louis Gates, Cambridge Police Sergeant James Crowley, President Barack Obama and Vice 
President Joe Biden, after the arrest of Gates by Crowley at his home in Boston in July 2009. The arrest sparked 
a ‘race row’ in the US media over the issue of ‘racial profiling’ in light of the fact that Gates, an African 
American, was believed to be breaking and entering into a property, which turned out to be his home. After 
charges of ‘disorderly conduct’ were dropped against Gates, President Obama had commented on the arrest 
saying Cambridge Police had ‘acted stupidly’. Following President Obama’s comments, the ‘race row’ escalated 
and the President apologised for exacerbating the situation. President Obama invited Gates, and Crowley to the 
White House to discuss the issue over beers in the hope to defuse the ensuing debate on race in America.  
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simply damaging his Presidency. Such a backlash could have more dangerous implications 
for the safety and security of Black and other non-white populations on a whole. 
In her article, ‘Obama’s Big Silence’, Klein (2009) sites the late Latino activist Juan 
Santos who during the election campaign wrote an essay on how Obama's unwillingness to 
talk about race was a triumph not of post-racialism but of racism. Santos argued that, 
 
Obama's silence was the same silence every person of colour in America lives with, 
understanding that they can be accepted in white society only if they agree not to be 
angry about racism; ‘We stay silent, as a rule, on the job. We stay silent, as a rule, in 
the white world. Barack Obama is the living symbol of our silence. He is our silence 
writ large. He is our Silence running for president … with respect to Black interests; 
Obama would be a silenced Black ruler: A muzzled Black emperor (Klein 2009). 
 
We are now living in an era where racism has a number of different guises. One such guise as 
Santos shows us is silence. Racism thrives off silence. By not speaking its name racism 
continues to outsmart the best of us. We need to unmask it and reveal it for what it is – a 
barbaric, disgusting and brutal hangover from Western imperialism, slavery and colonialism.  
Obama’s success is a hugely powerful and a momentous symbolic step in the 
historical struggle for racial equality. And indeed his ‘A More Perfect Union’ speech on the 
subject of race quite clearly acknowledged the complexity of race in American society, 
something he states America has failed to work through. In it he remarks that we,  
Need to remind ourselves that so many of the disparities that exist in the African-
American community today can be directly traced to inequalities passed on from an 
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earlier generation that suffered under the brutal legacy of slavery and Jim Crow 
(Obama 2008a). 
However, to believe that Obama’s victory marks the end of decade’s structural racism and 
centuries of Black oppression is delusional.  And yet this delusion seems appealing to those of 
us invested in the notion of a post-racial meritocratic democracy. Without the continuing 
reminders that racism is deeply rooted within and remains a function of Western liberal 
democratic cultures (an inheritance that will not simply eradicated because of the election of a 
Black US President) post-racialism allows us to imagine a clean and clinical historical break 
from systems of racial violence and oppression. For some of us being silent about racism 
through a colour-blind post-racial lens, allows us to be comforted by the belief that racism is 
passé and is a convenient excuse for victimhood (Vennochi 2008). 
 
Forgetting racial horrors and imperial terror 
Indeed, what happens to Western liberal democracies when the hegemony of white supremacy 
seeks to perform a break with the past and conceal those features from history that reveal the 
violence and trauma of present day racisms? Furthermore, what happens when the continuing 
inflicted terror and trauma of racism become difficult if not impossible to name in an 
imagined ‘post imperial,’ ‘post-racial’ climate that claims to at once stand for fairness and 
equal opportunity whilst seeking to recall and celebrate the legacies of imperialism and 
empire? Indeed, the United States is not the only place that imagines race and racism can 
simply be obviated through silence.  
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In the UK for example, the former Chancellor and then Prime Minister Gordon Brown on a 
visit to Tanzania in 2005, a former British colony, boldly declared with much hubris that, ‘I've 
talked to many people on my visit to Africa and the days of Britain having to apologise for its 
colonial history are over. We should move forward … we should celebrate much of our past 
rather than apologise for it.’ Furthermore he states, ‘Our strong traditions of fair play, of 
openness, of internationalism, these are great British values’ (Brogan 2005). Whilst the 
British government have not as of yet officially apologised for colonialism or slavery, Brown 
is able to imagine a clinical historical break from the barbarity of Britain’s colonial past. Such 
a break removes and erases the legacy of barbarity from having a lasting or meaningful 
imprint on the contemporary ‘values’ and promises of Britain’s neoliberal democracy. Brown 
would like us to ‘move forward’, conveniently forgetting the bequest of violence and 
barbarity that are intimately imbedded in the legacy of colonialism. But the horrors and 
violence of racism remain an untreated hangover from European colonial and imperial 
histories. Such histories that are at once glorified as triumphant also attempt to conceal the 
horrors of victory to shore up Western claims of superior moral values and civilisations over 
‘other’ inferior, ‘darker’ peoples. Racism is always relevant and ever present in contemporary 
life supported by older historical structures of racialised oppression. Whilst belying attempts 
to conceal it, racism still continues by ‘splitting the world in the course of domination’ (Kovel 
1988). Joel Kovel provides a useful framework for understanding the nature of racism itself: 
 
A society’s racism is not comprised by its degree of racial segregation, or how racially 
prejudiced the population may be. These are manifestations of racism. But the racism 
itself is the tendency of a society to degrade and do violence to people on the basis of 
race, and by whatever mediations may exist for this purpose (Kovel 1988, p.1xiii). 
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As Kovel suggests, racism is dynamic and has many manifestations from personal prejudice 
to structural and institutionalised violence. We all can be clear about the particularity of the 
British National Party’s and the Klu Klux Klan’s flag-waving form of white supremacy. 
However, more subtle forms of racism not only make it easier for society to question the 
nature and the existence of racism itself, they also allow racialised oppression to be ‘forgotten 
like a bad dream’ (Hesse 2002, pp.143–173). Racism forms the corpus of what Barnor Hesse 
usefully refers to as ‘blind memory’ in Western liberal democracies where obstacles of 
perception interrupt the ways in which Western democracies remember and yet forget their 
imperialist and colonial past and mask their present day racisms through acts of wilful 
forgetting. An ideology of ‘post-racialism’ is one such obstacle of perception which works 
toward making racism increasingly soundless and imperceptible despite racism’s concrete 
structuring of our modern-day situation.  
 
‘The white, white, West’ – white hegemony and social amnesia 
Within the political and economic paradigm of Western cultures, white Western cultural 
hegemony can conceal different forms and manifestations of racism and their historical 
routes. This concealment establishes the ambiguous terrain of race and racism in 
contemporary Western cultures. For Black and Brown subjects in contemporary Western 
societies, it is possible to paradoxically ‘feel’ and experience the physical violence of racism 
consciously knowing its presence in our everyday social interactions. And yet at the same 
time racism can be elusive, not easy to locate or to pinpoint in concrete ways through, for 
example, the mainstream articulation and bureaucratic inscription of diversity discourses 
(Ahmed 2007). Subsequently, racism’s modern character is both concrete and elusive. In 
terms of empirical evidence, institutional forms of racism can be found in English schools 
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where Black Caribbean and mixed white-and-Black Caribbean children are excluded from 
school at rates three times greater than that for white children (Curtis 2008). Indeed a report 
published by Warwick University in 2008 concluded that Black Caribbean pupils are being 
subjected to institutional forms of racism which dramatically undermined their chances of 
academic success. Indeed, the academic abilities of African Caribbean pupils by teachers in 
English schools were routinely under-estimated, and assumptions about behavioural problems 
were overshadowing their academic talents (Curtis 2008). In terms of child poverty, 50% of 
Black children compared to 27% of white children are living in poverty in the UK according 
to the TUC (TUC 2008). In Lucinda Platt’s (2009) study on ethnicity and child poverty, the 
report highlights that whilst the UK has set out its ambitions to end child poverty, the poverty 
of ethnic minority children has not been strongly emphasised within the child poverty agenda. 
The report highlights that children from ethnic minority groups are overrepresented among 
poor children. Furthermore: 
 
As these children become adults they will carry with them the consequences of 
childhood poverty and, to the extent that poverty is intergenerational, minorities may 
make up an increasing share of those in poverty in the UK. The greater risks of 
poverty faced by children from minority groups demand attention (Platt 2009, p.1).  
 
In 2003 there were twice as many Black men in prison in the UK than in British universities 
(Cracknell and Bessaoud 2003). According to the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, while some 
ethnic groups have improved their labour market position relative to white people [between 
1991 and 2001], substantial disadvantage remains both in access to jobs and in earnings once 
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in employment. Individuals from all ethnic minorities earned less on average than white 
people and substantial disadvantage remains (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2007). 
However, these concrete examples of racism and racial discrimination can also be 
concealed by more subtle forms of racist and racialised acts. For instance, racism can become 
elusive or hidden by the guise of diversity discourses that proclaim to value difference as an 
economic or moral value whilst concealing and failing to address the continuation of 
systematic inequalities within public and private institutions and organizations (Ahmed 2007, 
p.604). As Sara Ahmed notes, diversity documents have been mainstreamed in British society 
as measures of institutional performance that express a commitment to promoting race 
equality (Ahmed 2007). Ahmed’s research interrogates the politics of diversity documents in 
10 universities in the UK. She argues that institutional preferences for the term ‘diversity’ can 
indicate a lack of commitment to change, and might even allow universities to conceal the 
operation of systematic inequalities. Thus she suggests that ‘the politics of diversity has 
become what we could call “image management”: diversity work is about generating the 
‘right image’, and correcting the wrong one’ (Ahmed 2007, p.605). In other words, ‘diversity 
work becomes about changing perceptions of whiteness rather than changing the whiteness of 
organizations … If we consider the politics of documenting diversity, we can see that 
documents create fantasy images of the organizations they apparently describe’ (Ahmed 2007, 
pp.605-607, original italics). 
Diversity talk and diversity documentation may make it difficult to locate racism in 
our imagined post-racial times. Michael Eric Dyson argues that in the 1960s and before, acts 
of hatred had symbolic clarity because blacks and whites shared an ecology of race, albeit 
from opposing perspectives (Dyson 1997, p.215). Dyson refers to the ideal of post-racial 
colour-blindness as ‘racially murky’ where ‘the ecology of race is much more complex and 
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choked with half-discarded symbols and muddied signs’ (Dyson 1997, p.215). The ‘murky’ 
simulation and performance of cultural diversity through ‘image management’ as well as the 
‘fantasy’ of a post-racial society have become substitutes for scrutinising and dismantling 
structural and institutionalised forms of racism and white hegemony.  
In the United States, Hazel Carby (1992) observes that universities can often point to 
an integrated curriculum which includes the writings of Black women but conversely, they 
cannot point to an integrated body of Black students. In the university setting, the 
commodification of Black women’s literature has produced an essential Black female subject 
for its own consumption. Carby argues that within the university faculty there exists a failure 
to acknowledge the contradiction of having an integrated body of work by Black women 
writers as cultural icons and the failing of faculty to integrate the Black female subject into 
the classroom: 
 
Instead of recognising these contradictions the Black female subject is frequently the 
means by which many middle-class White students and faculty cleanse their souls and 
rid themselves of the guilt of living in a society that is still rigidly segregated (Carby 
1992, p.192). 
 
A ‘multicultural’ curriculum thus works as an illusionary visual ideal of diversity (Carby 
1992). It has been noted elsewhere that postmodern cultural diversity, with its articulation of 
multiculturalism, tolerance, equal opportunity and affirmative action, can indeed obscure the 
reiteration of old hierarchical forms of discrimination (Lewis 2002, p.346). Jeff Lewis (2002) 
notes Stuart Hall’s observation that Western popular consumption of ‘international cuisine’ 
may be substituting real difference with commodified and palatable difference. Lewis goes on 
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to say that: ‘it is perhaps for this reason that the ideologies of racism and imperialism are able 
to survive even in the midst of significant articulations of tolerance, equal opportunity and 
affirmative action’ (Lewis 2002, p.346).  The commodification of multiculturalism has 
created a situation where as long as diversity can be performed as an ideal the consequences 
of racialised exclusion and structural racism can be left largely unattended. Thus the 
invocation of diversity and multiculturalism can dangerously serve the interests and tastes of 
white privilege. 
Whiteness is represented as an un-ethnicised human norm in our day to day lives in 
Western cultures. Its privilege is organised and sustained around an uneven and unequal 
exchange of symbols, currencies, violence, ideologies, resources, narratives and images that 
flow through an overlapping network of geopolitical alliances, global multinational 
institutions, interlocking global economies, globalised media, and the movement of human 
beings. These exchanges and networks help shape and structure the ever-prevailing presence 
of racisms in late modern cultures. Recently, this has been most evident in the discourses on 
‘the war on terror.’ Here, notions of humanity and democratic ‘progress’ are held firmly in 
Western hands and are known through Western ownership of particular values such as 
freedom, women’s rights, life, free speech and education (Bhattacharyya 2008). These values 
are the signposts of civilisation that guide and protect us from the ‘barbarism’ of the Islamic 
world. We know our enemy because these are the values they ‘seek to destroy’ 
(Bhattacharyya 2008). Others are welcome to participate in our values, but they can do so 
only on the terms outlined by us. Here, the perceived values of Western civilisation are 
exclusively associated with those who seek to defend the hegemony of Western supremacy 
whether they are phenotypically ‘white’ or not. We know whiteness by ‘culture’ and ‘values’ 
not by race or biology. Thus whiteness stands un-raced and unmarked as the principle 
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expression of what it means to be just human (Dyer 1997). It is assumed to be the normative 
state of existence (Carby 1992).The social construction of whiteness remains largely defined 
outside of racialised discourses on terror and much more through the lens of cultural 
normativity, civility and equitable diversity. Whiteness has thus retained much of its 
normative power to bestow social and political privilege upon groups identified as white 
despite the proliferation of statements on diversity and post-racialism that encourages us to 
believe that white racial privilege and non-white racial disadvantage are no longer an issue.  
However, it is also important to note that whiteness in the Black imagination can also 
be a representation of terror (hooks 1992). hooks argues that one fantasy of whiteness is that 
the threatening other is always a terrorist. Such assumptions ‘enable many white people to 
imagine there is no representation of whiteness as terror, as terrorizing’ (hooks 1992, p.174). 
She goes on to say that an inability to conceive whiteness as terror is an indication of how 
cultures of white supremacy fail to understand the profound and psychological impact of 
white racist domination (hooks 1992, p.177).  I retain the use of the term whiteness because I 
seek to elucidate its power to remain largely invisible, mostly to itself (McIntosh 2004). As 
suggested by theorists in the field of white studies, whiteness has the dubious and 
contradictory capability of being everywhere yet remaining racially unseen or unnamed (Dyer 
1997). This is despite the dynamic political, intellectual and economic shifts occurring within 
our racialised landscape that disrupt and encroach upon the continuing existence of white 
racialised Western hegemony and dominance. These shifts include the emergence itself of 
critical white studies as a field of academic enquiry that as helped to make whiteness more 
‘visible’ [hooks 1992; Dyer 1997; Ware and Back 2002; McIntosh 2004; Jenson 2004]. They 
are also registered by the global emergence of economic powers such as Brazil, China, and 
India that are changing the balance of power in the global economy (Zakaria 2009). Even 
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Obama’s presidential victory, that at present represents a shift, symbolically at least, in the 
‘racial’ administration of America for the first time, is the cause of widespread political 
volatility and white supremacist insecurity (Younge 2009). In spite of these disruptions, 
whiteness continues to have an enduring if not tenuous grip on our global political cultures. 
Goldberg suggests that neoliberalism itself can be read as a response to the concern about the 
impending impotence of whiteness: 
 
In short, from the 1970’s on, the state increasingly came to be conceived as a set of 
institutions supporting the undeserving (recall the identification of Bill Clinton as ‘the 
first Black President,’ first by Toni Morrison but taken up quickly by 
neoconservatives out to do him in). Fear of a Black state is linked to worries about a 
Black planet, of alien invasion and alienation, of a loss of the sort of local and global 
control and privilege long associated with whiteness (Goldberg 2009, p.337). 
 
Goldberg is highlighting that white cultural hegemony is not a completed project. However it 
still remains as a powerful political ideal and social function of neoliberalism. The cultural 
hegemony of whiteness as an ideal particularly in the west becomes increasingly concealed by 
signs and discourses that promote the ideal of diversity and plural societies. Concurrently, an 
un-raced ideal of white cultural and political hegemony conceals and consigns the injustices 
of white supremacy to the past away from the racism of the present and from the liberal 
promises of our promised diverse post-racial futures. As hooks writes, 
 
In contemporary society, white and Black people alike believe that racism no longer 
exists. This erasure, however mythic, diffuses the representation of whiteness as terror 
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in the Black imagination. It allows for assimilation and forgetfulness. The eagerness 
with which contemporary society does away with racism, replacing this recognition 
with evocations of pluralism and diversity that further mask reality, is a response to 
the terror. It has also become a way to perpetuate the terror by providing a cover, a 
hiding place (hooks 1992, p.176). 
 
White supremacy as a ‘naturalised’ and ‘universalised’ political norm mutes the social 
memory of the Black ‘other’ and our impact upon the formation of Western societies both as 
participants and transgressors of the social order.  Whiteness has long stood as the normative 
dominant lens for Western and global historical memory to be mediated and understood. 
White hegemonic cultural memory is selective about the retelling of history in such a way that 
history becomes, ‘an ideological tool to support the existing distribution of power’ (Jenson 
2005, p.28). Robert Jenson (2005) highlights a series of responses amongst some white 
Americans when the celebratory stories of US history are contested by the uncomfortable 
truth of racism. Responses include statements such as ‘why do you insist on dwelling in the 
past’ or why are you ‘trying to humble our proud nation’ (Jenson 2005, pp.27-28). In his reply 
Jenson states, 
 
I want to undermine the intellectually lazy and morally bankrupt practice of rewriting 
history to exclude or downplay inconvenient facts so that in the present we can 
pretend that the United States is the ultimate fulfilment of history, the paragon of 
virtue, the repository of justice (Jenson 2005, p.28). 
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Indeed, Russell Jacoby writes, 
 
Exactly because the past is forgotten, it rules unchallenged. To be transcended it must 
first be remembered. Social amnesia is society’s repression of remembrance (Jacoby 
cited in Wilson 1993, p.34) 
 
Jenson further argues that white supremacist thinking has always been at the core of the 
American project: ‘The country’s formation, economic expansion, and imperial endeavours 
are inextricably intertwined with racism’ (Jenson 2005, p.30).  White hegemony through the 
neoliberal nations’ rhetoric of freedom, justice and equality, encourages socio-historical 
amnesia, serving to obscure our deeper understanding of the intimate and interconnected links 
between equality/racism, freedom/violence, democracy/enslavement, liberty/terror and the 
ways in which blackness/whiteness have themselves been constructed along these paradoxical 
borders. It thus remains a necessary imperative to interrogate any assumption that the values 
of freedom, democracy and liberty are intrinsic to the west (as imagined in Brown’s early 
invocation of ‘great British values’ or Bush’s rhetoric on ‘the war on terror’) and that the best 
purest expressions of such values can be located within white Western liberal democratic 
cultures. What is clear is this; whilst we see a deepening silence instead of any meaningful 
public debate about race, racism continues to grow, globally, and violent hate crimes continue 
to rise.
2
  
                                                 
2
 See the international human rights monitoring group, Human Rights First who note that in the United Kingdom 
racist incidents reported to the police in 2006/2007 had increased by 3.7 percent over the previous year. ‘Among 
these, there were 42,551 racially or religiously aggravated offences, representing a 2.6 percent increase in the 
number of offenses over the previous year. Just over half of all police forces recorded an increase in the number 
of offences motivated by a religious or racial bias’ 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/discrimination/reports.aspx?s=racism-and-xenophobia&p=racvio. Accessed on 
23 November 2008. 
A love that binds the nation 
 
 89 
The hegemonic processes of white supremacy promote the idea that Western violence 
on Black bodies as a direct outgrowth of racism is a necessary and unspoken function in the 
advancement of Western civilisation. Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and other clandestine 
detention facilities are seen as ugly ‘exceptional’ necessities where the torture and 
imprisonment of ‘enemy combatants’ can be justified on the grounds that these bad 
brown/Black men seek to destroy us (Bhattacharyya 2008). The over represented and 
disproportionately populated bodies of Black/brown men and women are deemed punishable 
by death and incarceration in the name of ‘crime control’ within the global prison industrial 
complex (Brewer and Heitzeg 2008). These citadels of punishment, torture and retribution 
exist because they are dependent upon oppressive systems of racism, poverty, sexism and 
homophobia (Davis 2001; Bhattacharyya 2008). Our ability to forget their presence further 
permits their existence. As Angela Davis reminds us, ‘One of the reasons the prison industrial 
complex has expanded as it has is because we have learnt how to forget about prisons’ (Davis 
[Date unknown] 2007). By proclaiming meritocracy and deriding racism, attention to 
racialised violence and oppression become delegitimized within the neo-liberal state.  
We can continue to ignore racialised violence so long as our freedoms can be 
preserved. But we must not name racism and its history within the neo-liberal order. Only a 
savage would do that. Such thinking and action encourages us to forget racialised trauma by 
denying racism a language that transcends the muted and ‘murky’ tones of meritocratic, post-
racial, colour blind, diversity speak, leaving racism vulnerable to social amnesia. This culture 
of forgetting is dehumanising, wilful and headstrong and continues to belittle, undermine and 
perpetuate continuing racist violations against Black bodies.  
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‘The forgetting machine’ 
Aimé Cesairé,  the Martinique poet, activist and politician, argued that European civilisations 
and democracies are indivisibly stained by the violent debauchery of colonialism and slavery 
and thus ‘the forgetting machine’, which works to conceal the underbelly of barbarism within 
the establishment of Western civilisations, seeks to sanitise and hide the stains of violent 
enslavement and subjugation which dirty the symbolic values entwined with Europe’s 
civilised development and progress (Cesairé [1955] 1997). The ethos of the civilising 
endeavour of Western slavery and colonialism, like components of globalisation, are 
inseparable from the terror of racial violence and oppression. Cesairé critiques the pseudo 
humanism of the West where the rights of man are conceived in narrow, fragmentary and 
incomplete terms which are sordidly racist (Cesairé 1997, p.77). Cesairé argues that Europe is 
a decadent and dying civilisation because it has failed to solve the problem it created: ‘the 
problem of the proletariat and the colonial problem’ (Cesairé 1997, p.74). Cesairé critiques 
the fractured racist logic within Western European thought, where the crime of genocide 
under colonialism as part of a wider civilising mission was seen as a necessary instrument for 
the enlightenment of the heathen pagans of Africa, Asia and the Americas. In Cesairé’s view 
the crime of genocide under Nazism against the Jewish population in Germany was viewed 
precisely as an abhorrent crime not only because Jewish people were human beings like all 
other victims of genocide, but because Jewish people could also be considered as being akin 
to ‘white’ Europeans. The Jewish Holocaust for Cesairé was evidence of the extremities of 
European barbarity, a blind alley of racism imploding in on its self. He writes, 
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Whether one likes it or not, at the end of the blind alley that is Europe, I mean the 
Europe of Adenauer, Schuman, Bidault, and a few others, there is Hitler. At the end of 
formal humanism and philosophic renunciation, there is Hitler (Cesairé 1997, p.77). 
 
Racism emerges as unresolved problem, a blind spot in Western European hegemony that 
fuels ‘the forgetting machine’ which conceals acts of European barbarity and their inseparable 
relation to Western democracy and capitalism. Western socio-historical amnesia towards 
racism exposes the contradictory nature of so-called ‘Western values’ such as freedom, 
equality and justice. It is an amnesia that leaves Black and non-white people, communities 
and societies broken fragmented and wounded as racism continues to be a powerful 
determinant factor affecting our life chances, our access to citizenship in Western democratic 
states and our fundamental human rights (Goldberg 2009). It produces a form of moral 
paralysis where white supremacist thinking can create an attitude of racialised indifference to 
the suffering of ‘the other’ (Geertsema 2004).
3
  Racism remains the focal hindrance of the 
Western inability to truly view the highly coveted values of freedom, liberty and democracy 
beyond the boundaries of Western liberal democracy. Racism acts as a potent reminder of the 
contradictory duality of these freedoms within Western societies as racism in its very nature 
necessitates the deployment of violence and subjugation. In this respect blackness in the 
Western liberal democratic framework has been constructed against the constancy of white 
violence and amnesia. It is an amnesia that nestles within the supposedly liberal and 
democratic notion of Western civilisation that enables the violence and trauma inflicted upon 
Black bodies to be concealed as a direct result of racism.  
                                                 
3
 Geertsema (2004) discusses the immorality of White Afrikaners and their indifference to the suffering of Black 
South Africans as representing a reactionary clinging on to the status quo which involved massive and obvious 
injustice. It also signifies the difficulty of moving beyond ‘race debates’ in south Africa that are in danger of 
resuscitating a familiar psychology of White superiority and Black inferiority. 
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De-colonial fantasies within liberal democracies 
In an essay entitled ‘Forgotten like a Bad Dream,’ Barnor Hesse (2002) re-inscribes the 
themes of amnesia and the incomplete and unresolved legacies of slavery and colonialism as 
discussed by Cesairé in Discourse on Colonialism. Whereas Cesairé arrives at the conclusion 
that Western European decadence will face a slow gradual death if it fails to solve the 
problem of the inherent barbarity locked into the inheritance of Western civilisation, Hesse 
speaks into the contemporary realities of Western Euro/American neo-liberal democracies and 
their failure to engage with the memory of slavery and the contemporary barbarity of racism. 
In a penetrating analysis of Western capitalisms framing of modernity which Hesse argues is 
conceived within the polarity and interdependency of Christianity and slavery, liberalism an 
imperialism, democracy and racism, he puts forward the view that the West has profound 
difficulty in comprehending and consolidating its memory of slavery. Hesse argues that 
modern day liberal democracies engage with a ‘de/colonial fantasy.’ For Hesse, 
postcolonialism is a critical counterpoint of incomplete forms of decolonisation. Indeed the 
memory of slavery and its forgetting are carefully phrased within a ‘liberal-democratic 
disavowal.’ Hesse proposes for de/colonisation to be rethought and re-fought to ‘work 
through and against the West’s liberal-democratic culture of de/colonial fantasy.’  According 
to Hesse, 
 
When Western history seems so unrelated to its shadowy imperial constitution – 
readily comprehensible only as a successful psychic investment in a European, 
American, democratic enterprise – we are experiencing an episode of de/colonial 
fantasy’ (Hesse 2002, pp.158-159 [authors italics]). 
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De/colonial fantasies are, 
 
Western attitudes, practices, and discourses that imagine against the evidence, against 
counter-interrogation, the comprehensive undertaking and successful completion of 
de/colonisation both within the metropolis and the former colonies or sites of racial 
segregation (Hesse 2002, pp.158-159). 
 
It is an attempt to conceal the bitterly fought and grudgingly conceded battles for 
de/colonisation which within the Western tradition threatens to highlight the discrepancy 
between the liberal democratic ideal and an unsettled postcoloniality (Hesse 2002, p.159). 
For Hesse, Western liberal democracies often imagine a complete rupture, 
completeness and closure from the consequences of trans-Atlantic slavery.  Indeed, trans-
Atlantic slavery is remembered and forgotten in European and American histories in ‘a 
peculiar pathos of distance’ in which ‘the generational, emotional, social, and political 
relations of the people who were enslaved are simply forgotten’ (Hesse 2002, p.155). Hesse 
uses Stephen Spielberg’s Amistad as an example of the whitewashing of history that inscribes 
a master/abolitionist memory of slavery. Thus Hesse argues that in Amistad, ‘the legacy of 
slavery becomes the historical record of abolitionism, not the contemporary agenda of racism’ 
or, might I add, the business of enslavement (Hesse 2002, p.150). The employment of a 
representational strategy that reinforces the concept of whites as the makers of history and 
Black people as a-historical, is a configuration of ‘white amnesia’ that ‘can only be achieved 
with reference to a politically muted if not absent Black presence’ (Hesse 2002, p.150).  
Indeed the erasure of the Black presence from Western historical narratives is also 
acutely illustrated in the film Amazing Grace (2006) which sought to canonise William 
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Wilberforce as the mythical ‘great emancipator’ of enslaved Africans. The presence of 
Africans as agents of and agitators for their own freedom is overlooked within the film, such 
as significantly in the Haitian revolution 1791-1804. With the exception of Olaudah Equiano 
there are no speaking roles for African characters within Amazing Grace, whilst Wilberforce, 
the great crusader for the British abolition of slavery, takes centre stage, symbolising the 
‘great’ democratic values of freedom, a freedom that is imagined to travel cleanly through the 
colonial and imperial epochs of British History unscathed by the trauma and violence of 
capitalism and racism. Indeed, the dream of freedom becomes monopolised as an intrinsically 
British value that is given away to enslaved Africans by ‘decent’ and ‘principled’ 
abolitionists.  
Amazing Grace was released to coincide with Britain’s official year long 
commemoration of the bi-centenary anniversary of the Abolition of The Slave Trade Act of 
1807 during 2007. The anniversary was dubbed the ‘Wilberfest,’ by observers critical of the 
hypocritical self-congratulatory tone and spectacle of the nation’s official commemorations 
that sought to canonise white men as the deliverers of freedom whilst eradicating any mention 
of resistance, rebellion and revolution instigated by millions of African people (Agbetu 2007).  
Abolitionist memory outlined by Hesse and enacted during the 2007 commemorations 
creates a ‘hegemonic disavowal’ of the perverse, systematic and traumatic violence 
perpetrated on Black bodies for the advancement of capitalism. Abolitionist memory 
encourages us to forget that the enslaved African body was commodified and quantified as a 
piece of property for the purpose of industrial development and capitalist expansion. The kind 
of abolitionist memory seen in the example of Amistad and Amazing Grace, erases the 
racialised historical formation of slavery as a degrading social process and replaces it with a 
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‘hypervisable’ heroic white centred abolitionism which ‘works to undermine the possibility of 
actually seeing Black specificity’ (Hesse 2002, p.151).  
Citing the work of Marcus Wood, Hesse argues a Western obsession exists for 
representing the memory of slavery through abolitionist memory as exemplified in Amistad, 
as well as in the realm of ‘curatorial memory.’ Whereas abolitionist memory focuses on ‘the 
consecration of white liberators,’ curatorial memory proceeds to represent slave torture 
through the rearrangement and recollection of objects, tools, weapons, exhibits and images 
displayed in galleries, museums or on our film screens ‘experientially’ or ‘aesthetically’ 
(Hesse 2002, p.155). Hesse argues that the focus on the aesthetic arrangements of objects can 
allow the emotional, social and political legacy of slavery to be forgotten. He cites Woods’ 
analysis of ‘curatorial memory’ to illustrate his point. Here Woods suggests that curatorial 
memory directs our attention to ‘the easy option of an unthinking moral outrage’ (Hesse 
2002). Such representations of African enslavement eclipse the contextual, social and 
emotional violations of the day to day experience of slavery. Hesse suggests curatorial 
memory’s dramatization of slave objects reduces the memory of slavery to the banalities of its 
routine violence. It caricatures the slave/master relationship in the process whilst eclipsing the 
emotional and contextual violations definitive of enslavement. For Hesse, the dramaturgical 
obsession through the curatorial memory of slavery ‘offers a peculiar pathos of distance that 
replicates yet another way in which the generational, emotional, social, and political relations 
of the people who were enslaved are simply forgotten’ (Hesse 2002, p.155). Even where more 
‘liberal’ approaches to critiquing the west’s problematic relationship with the memory of 
slavery are discussed, the privileging of white emotional guilt in the remembrance of slavery 
over the history of Black suffering, repeats old patterns of prioritising white agency over the 
trauma and violence inflicted on the bodies and psyches of enslaved Africans. Hesse critiques 
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Wood for repeating such an error, so displaying a ‘family resemblance’ to the 
master/abolitionist configuration in Woods’ own work (a model in which Woods seeks to 
distance himself from) by his privileging of white historical guilt over ‘contemporary feelings 
of disenfranchisement’ (Hesse 2002, p.157). 
The politics of disavowal as a blueprint for un-remembering the uncomfortable 
legacies of racialised barbarism found in Britain’s colonial and imperial histories marks the 
borders of historical amnesia, where British social memory can reconfigure barbarism into 
benevolence. The politics of disavowal further reflect the reluctance of Western liberal 
democracies to interrogate and seek ways to dismantle the living legacies of racism within 
white dominant cultures. 
In the context of hegemonic distance and disavowal blackness becomes the body 
politic where racism and de/colonial fantasies can be acted out and performed. Blackness 
becomes a space where the memory of slavery and colonialism becomes socially visible 
within Western ‘post-imperial’ societies, despite efforts to disavow the emotional, physical 
and social violations of these histories. As a site of forced and chosen dislocation and 
dispersal, the Black body stands as a continuing reminder to neo-liberal democracies that 
racism in its various mutations continues to open up the routes of racialised barbarism 
between and across disparate temporal eras. The brutalisation of the Black body can be 
expelled from the memory of liberal democracies in order for such democracies to imagine 
themselves as untainted by histories of racial violence and unaffected by their modern day 
consequences. However it is this fantasy of closure, this imagined fracture from past 
brutalities, where the memory of racial violence as a constituting factor of neo-liberal 
democracies becomes vulnerable to the politics of forgetting. In historical hegemonic 
memories of Western liberal democracies, blackness and racialised violence can also become 
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obstacles to the clean and unsullied enunciation and social recollection of freedom and justice; 
values that are believed to secure the cohesion, legitimacy and progress of the Western nation-
state.  
Popular British hegemonic discourses on race continue to play dangerously with 
amnesic disavowal of racism, displaying a reluctance to probe and question the durability of 
racism as a prevailing hangover of imperialism and colonialism. Racism shapes knowledge 
and ways of being in Western cultures (Goldberg 2009). Although racism remains a virulent, 
tenacious and indispensable epistemology that structures thought and determines material 
stratification in global cultures, it also plays a paradoxical function of being a shameful social 
taboo that resides in a culture of denial and amnesia. Racism in today’s neoliberal 
democracies functions as an unspoken discourse below the transparent surface of neo-liberal 
hegemonic respectability. Racism has become increasingly difficult to label and locate.  
Western policies and discourses on race employ non-racial language to achieve racial ends.  
Even the most virulent racist plays the role of a ventriloquist by making vile audible racist 
sounds whilst also being disingenuous by refusing to own up to and take ownership for 
peddling in racism. However the nostalgic yearning for the monolithic nation is symptomatic 
of a wider more entrenched problem that has challenged Britain for all of the twentieth 
century and continues to become more intensified at the start of this new millennia; that of the 
continuing denial of Britain to seriously confront the living legacy of its racist past. Clearly 
racism remains a profoundly unresolved phenomenon. 
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Conclusion 
The chapter has shown the ways in which the politics of ‘forgetting’ racism has 
produced an insufficient examination of the state and complexity of racism and its devastating 
outcomes within Western neo-liberal democracies such as UK and the US.  By examining 
memory, post-racialism and diversity, this chapter has sought to uncover how these discourses 
can appear to mark a positive social shift towards more equitable human relations through the 
ideal of meritocracy. However, conversely, these discourses continue to negate blackness and 
the violence of racism thus allowing racial denigration to remain intact. Systems of 
domination can thus be ‘dressed up’ in the grammars of equality and meritocracy thus 
producing a culture where racism can be wilfully forgotten. One important question for this 
thesis is to consider how we can achieve social transformation through discourses on love to 
bring into existence more equitable human relations.  In the next chapter, I will examine 
multiculturalism which had once seemed to embody the notion that diverse cultures and 
people could build more equitable societies.  However, the multicultural ideal is now in 
disrepute, cast as the ‘breeding ground’ for violence against the neo-liberal state itself. 
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Chapter 3 
 
‘WE DO’T WAT THE HATE MOGERS’ 
Multicultural love and anti-colonial politics in the making of Black Britain 
  
Introduction 
During the 1960s the former Labour Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, is believed to have laid 
the foundations for a multicultural British society with his definition of social integration: 
 
Integration is not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity 
accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance (Sivanandan 
2006 [online]). 
 
However, Jenkins’s vision of tolerant multiculturalism has now been replaced with widely felt 
perception that multiculturalism has failed. Distinctive cultural identities and ethno-cultural 
claims are now presumed to be in conflict with the neo-liberal nation-state. Groups marked as 
different by ethnicity or religious faiths are now accused of retreating behind their ethnic 
walls, refusing to assimilate to a ‘British way of life’ (Johnston 2008). The multicultural state, 
that at one time invited cultural differences without the fear that the nation’s cohesion would 
fragment and disintegrate at the seams, is now in retreat. The very idea of the multicultural 
society within neoliberal democracies is under attack. According to one newspaper report, the 
‘dogma of multiculturalism’ has failed Britain: 
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Multiculturalism has failed because people refuse to move out of the ‘comfort zone’ of 
their own community, academics have warned. The study said the Left-wing doctrine 
had ignored the dangers of religious fundamentalism and should be scrapped. 
Communities should instead be actively encouraged to mix. The report, written by a 
team from University of Leicester, said this should be backed by a new concept of 
Britishness. It would be based upon respect for the monarchy, loyalty to the elected 
Government, and respect and adherence to the law (Slack 2006 [Online]).   
Within this discourse, migrant communities of non-white and particularly Muslim groups are 
failing to ‘mix’ into the mainstream fabric of British society because multiculturalism has 
encouraged them to hold onto distinctive cultural/religious practices and particular identity 
claims, or so the narrative goes (Slack 2006). Tony Blair gave his support to this doctrine in a 
rather dictatorial fashion, when he informed ‘immigrants’ that they had a ‘duty to integrate’: 
‘Conform to it; or don't come here. We don't want the hate-mongers, whatever their race, 
religion or creed’ he said (Johnston 2008). Where multiculturalism was once believed to be a 
progressive democratic ideal in Britain, it is now perceived as a threat to the idea of 
democracy itself, as a breeding ground for intolerance and ‘lethal moral madness’ (Phillips 
2005).  
In this chapter I will examine how Black people in Britain have negotiated their 
relationship to the multicultural nation through transnational models of blackness. The chapter 
is split into two sections. In the first section I will discuss the concept of multiculturalism as 
discussed above in relation to Sara Ahmed’s notion of ‘multicultural love’, where the British 
nation is imagined as being open, loving and hospital to ‘others’ – migrants, asylum seekers, 
Muslims  - at the risk of injury and damage by the foreigner/outsider (Ahmed 2004). As the 
newspaper report cited above suggests, multiculturalism should be scrapped and replaced by 
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‘a new concept of Britishness.’ Thus Ahmed argues that social cohesion discourses put 
forward the view that ‘immigrants’ ‘must learn to be British … by taking ‘the nation’ as their 
object of love’ (Ahmed 2004, p.134). I will then discuss multiculturalism as a particular 
offspring of western colonial histories, arguing that its social invocation can also trigger 
monocultural responses of racial sameness as a valued possession in the construction of 
Britishness. Within Black communities in Britain, multiculturalism has also produced both 
distinct and conflicting modes of blackness. Two distinct positions have emerged in this 
context, through what I have termed as the post-colonial paradigm of blackness in Britain and 
the dialogic paradigm of blackness in Britain. The former is discussed in the context of A. 
Sivanandan’s political notion of ‘unity in diversity’ whilst the latter dialogic ‘paradigm’ is 
discussed in the context of Stuart Hall’s theories on plural ‘hybrid’ identity formations.  
In the second section I argue that Pan Africanism was an exemplary precursor to the 
postcolonial and dialogic paradigms that I identify. The historical underpinning for 
transnational blackness in Britain, beyond the dialogic and postcolonial paradigms, emerges 
from the history of Pan-Africanism as a way to transcend and respond to racism, imperialism 
and colonialism in global and local contexts. Pan-Africanism as a transnational movement in 
the twentieth century promoted the affirmation of blackness as a restorative and 
transformative political location. I will discuss how Pan-Africanists as transnational political 
agents in the twentieth century constructed their own meanings of blackness in the British 
diaspora through Black political networks such as Pan-Africanism and Black feminism. These 
globalised political discourses created a transnational Black political culture that was 
distinctive to Britain. British soil was utilised for the mobilisation of Black transnational 
subjects and for the creation of transnational and transcultural dialogic networks that were 
strategically significant to the constitution of Black liberation and anti-colonial global 
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movements for freedom and justice. Early Pan-African movements and Black feminists 
played an important role in establishing political justice and human dignity for Black 
diasporic subjects. I will argue that they constituted a political modal for loving blackness. 
However, the significance of these transnational political formations in the Black British 
diaspora are often obscured by the evocation of more popular ‘Black British’ memories that 
recall and commemorate the docking of the Empire Windrush at Tilbury Docks in 1948, a 
now iconic symbol of mid twentieth century Caribbean migration to Britain. I am suggesting 
that those pre-Windrush globalised forms of loving blackness such as Pan-Africanism 
provided an historical framework for seeing blackness in Britain, beyond its hybrid coupling 
and coalescence with the nation, in other words beyond Stuart Hall’s framework of ‘Black 
and British’ (which I will discuss in more detail in chapter four). As such, agents within the 
Pan African movement had established not only a multifarious and complex political network 
but an effective dialogic response to racism and colonial oppression centred on the welfare 
and wellbeing of oppressed colonial subjects. I will argue that the Pan-African congress of 
1945 in particular had connected locally specific responses to racism with broader global 
opposition to colonial domination, racial discrimination and imperial subjugation (Fryer 
1984). Finally, to borrow Hall’s terms, I will suggest that for the Black diaspora in Britain the 
‘potentialities’ and ‘possibilities’ of blackness have sought fulfilment and enunciation beyond 
its ‘contestation’ with Britain and through the cultural and political currencies of Black 
dialogic and transnational formations. 
 
Are we all British now? Love and the multicultural nation 
I have already suggested in the previous chapter that ‘forgetting’ racism creates the historical 
amnesic conditions for barbarism to be erased from the socio-historical memory of western 
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neo-liberal democracies. However forgetting racism also allows other political ‘ideals’ to take 
its place, ideals such as hospitality and tolerance. In her book, The Cultural Politics of 
Emotion, Sara Ahmed argues that within the UK,  
 
The nation is imagined as an ideal through the discourse of multiculturalism, which 
we can describe as a form of conditional love, as well hospitality. The nation becomes 
an ideal through being posited as ‘being’ plural, open and diverse; as being loving and 
welcoming to others (Ahmed 2004, p. 133). 
 
However, Ahmed also marks a shift in the multicultural discourse, specifically since 
September 11, where multiculturalism has been viewed as a security threat. Under these new 
conditions, ‘‘migrants must learn to be British’; that is, migrants must identify themselves as 
British, by taking ‘the nation’ as their object of love’ (Ahmed, p.134). Migrants are expected 
to subsume their distinct cultural heritage under a general notion of Britishness by declaring 
allegiance to common British values (Kundnani 2007). Here, a form of assimilation is 
‘reimagined as the conditions for love’ (Ahmed 2004, p.143). Discussing the Home Office 
report Community Cohesion Ahmed suggests that the document makes the notion of 
integration a national ‘ideal’ (Ahmed 2004, p.138, emphasis added). Here, she argues, 
difference becomes an ideal represented as a form of ‘likeness’ for the nation; it becomes a 
new consensus that binds us together (Ahmed 2004, p138). ‘In other words, difference 
becomes an elevated or sublimated form of likeness: you must like us – and be like us – by 
valuing or even loving differences’ (Ahmed 2004, p.138).   
Ahmed examines how love becomes a way of bonding with others in relation to an 
ideal, in this case multicultural Britain, and how individuals become aligned with collectives 
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through their identification with an ideal. Ahmed cites Renata Salecl who suggests that the 
pleasure of identifying with the multicultural nation is that one gets to see oneself as a good 
and benevolent subject (Ahmed 2004, p.133). Such alignments rely on the existence of others 
who have failed that ideal, namely ethnic minority communities, who have fallen short of 
integrating into the national ideal. Thus ‘the nation can also be taken away by migrants and 
asylum seekers who don’t accept the conditions of one’s love’ (Ahmed 2004, p.134). Ahmed 
is not concerned with love as an overt or crude discourse on fraternity and patriotism. Rather 
her concern is with love as an act of benevolence from the nation towards the inclusion of 
‘others,’ a love which she locates within national discourses on multiculturalism. Thus 
Ahmed asks us to consider whether multicultural love works to expand love to include others 
or does this expansion require that other ‘others’ fail the ideal? Within the UK, 
multiculturalism has been diagnosed as a catastrophic failure since the London terrorist 
attacks on July 7
th
 2005. Even before this attack took place, multiculturalism was seen as 
causing harm by fragmenting the cultural fabric of Britain (Hesse 2000). According to 
Ahmed, ‘a crucial risk posed by migrant cultures is defined as their failure to become British, 
narrated as their failure to love the culture of the host nation’ (Ahmed 2004, p.137). Ahmed 
suggests that in Britain the failure of multicultural love is framed as being the fault of the 
inability of  ‘immigrants’ to return the love given to them by the benevolent nation. In this 
sense ‘immigrants’ are failing to demonstrate a sense of gratitude towards the tolerant nation. 
This failure to return the love of the host community can be evidenced by the disturbances 
caused by ‘immigrant’ communities. She writes, ‘One tabloid headline after the burning down 
of a detention centre for asylum seekers reads: This is how they thank us’ (Ahmed 2004, 
p.137). 
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Such disturbances are read as the signs of failure - that the conditions of national love 
are not being reciprocated. Ahmed notes that the ‘race riots’ in Northern England in 2001 
were another telling example of the failure of multicultural love. The failure of immigrants to 
‘mix’ and integrate into the nation and thus ‘segregate’ and ‘stick’ together prevents them 
from loving differences outside of themselves. This is seen as a disturbance to the national 
ideal of multiculturalism (Ahmed 2004). 
Thus, disturbance in the form of riot (and more recently in the form of terrorist 
attacks), is read as a failure that belongings exclusively to the immigrant and not to the nation. 
‘Love for the nation is hence bound up with how bodies inhabit the nation in relation to an 
ideal’ (Ahmed 2004, p.133). The immigrants inability to love, to integrate and come closer to 
the national ideal is further evidence of the failure of multicultural love to deliver harmony 
between others (Ahmed 2004). The narrative would read something like this: our nation has 
been benevolent and loving towards you but you have failed to deliver and return this love 
back to us by rioting in our cities, committing acts of terror on our streets and by burning 
down our detention centres in which we give you hospitality. As Ahmed suggests, rather than 
seeing segregation as being an effect of racism, it now becomes the origin of racism and 
violence (Ahmed 2004, p.138 original emphasis). Immigrants’ must learn to value difference, 
not of each other, as this would be narcissistic, but difference that suggests you must like us 
and be like us, a difference that will not breach the ideal image of the benevolent nation 
(Ahmed 2004). The national ideal on the other hand poses as hybrid, plural and mobile 
(Ahmed 2004, p.136). Ahmed uses the term ‘hybrid whiteness’ to illustrate how the nation 
can envisage itself as being able to incorporate the bodies of ‘coloured’ or ‘bronzed’ others.  
Here she proposes that the nation constructs itself as an ‘ideal’ in its capacity to assimilate the 
other (Ahmed 2004, p.137).   
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‘Tea drinking, hokey cokey’ and other projections of monocultural Britain 
 
No jungle bunnies, coons or Kitekat eaters are present to sully the glorious unanimity 
of tea drinking and hokey cokey dancing that takes place safely down in the 
underground while the bonding adversity of the blitz bursts overhead (Gilroy 
2008[Online]). 
 
Whilst multiculturalism is perceived as exposing the nation to injury, it can also trigger a 
retreat back to discourses that make racial sameness a national virtue. Within Britain 
multiculturalism is a peculiar offspring of European colonial and imperial histories. Large 
scale migration of African, Caribbean and Asian populations from former British colonies 
after the Second World War began to alter the ethnic complexion of Britain’s major urban 
centres.  
Although colonial migrants were not new to British shores, the country’s subsequent 
and emerging multiracial situation created ideological and discursive trajectories that 
suggested this development was new and would threaten the racial shape of Britain forever 
(BBC 2007). The notion that Britain was being ‘swamped’ by ‘immigrants’ created fearful 
meanings and imaginings that put forward the view that Britain as monoculture nation was 
now under threat. As postcolonial migrants arrived in Britain, increasing racial tensions 
became a characteristic feature of the ‘inner-city,’ a space where Black and Asian migrants 
lived restlessly alongside the white poor working class in urban slums (Gilroy 2006). Soon 
after, phrases such as ‘inner city’ and ‘immigrants’ became synonymous with blackness, 
rioting and criminality. Black people, particularly African Caribbean groups, became 
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criminalised as a monolithic scourge on the cohesiveness and solidity of the British nation 
(Gilroy 2006).  
Enoch Powell’s venomous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech epitomised the perceived injury 
and damage that immigration was allegedly inflicting upon Britain. In Powell’s speech the 
vexed nation exists in a state of collective insanity verging on the brink of decomposition; 
 
Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad. We must be mad, literally 
mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who 
are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended 
population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral 
pyre (Telegraph 2007 [Online]). 
 
In a scathing article in The Guardian newspaper, Paul Gilroy asked the pertinent question as 
to why the vexed memory of Powell cannot be left alone (Gilroy 2008). This is in light of the 
fact that in March 2008, the 40
th
 anniversary of Powell’s infamous speech was the cause for a 
nationwide commemoration across the British media. These commemorations were most 
notable by the BBC’s White Season, a series of programmes that supposedly gave a voice to 
white working class people in Britain, but instead characterised this social group as 
monolithically racist and socially inept. Within one flagship programme in the series, a 
documentary entitled White Rivers of Blood (2008) Powell was championed as the 
marginalised hero of the white working class, the valiant torchbearer of truth against the un-
listening British liberal elite. Gilroy describes this recent canonisation of Powell as a 
reflection of a ‘narrowing political culture’ in England in which Englishness can be imagined 
as ‘an oversimplified sense of identity as fundamental sameness’ (Gilroy 2008 [Online]).   
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The revival of Powell’s narrative works in a similar way to Ahmed’s construction of 
the national ideal. Except that, where the national ideal could once imagine itself as being 
loving and hospitable to multiculturalism, now the true and binding love of ‘the nation’ 
requires the return of ‘fundamental sameness’ for both ‘natives’ and ‘interlopers.’ To be part 
of this sameness, ethnic minorities have to effectively subsume their cultural heritage in order 
to claim Britishness (Sivanandan 2006). The British nation in it’s longing for meaningful 
cohesion, calls upon the memory of those that profess to care and love the nation, hence the 
drum-call and bayonets for Powell’s canonisation. Through Powell, ‘the nation’ wants to 
rekindle an old smouldering flame; a flame that is exclusively monocultural, white and 
Anglophone, to guide it through these dark and testing times. In this context, it is not the 
nation that should be decomposing on the funeral pyre but multiculturalism. Whilst 
multiculturalism continues to burn in the political imagination of the nation, the sticky issue 
of racism goes unmentioned. Deriding multiculturalism allows the nation to become the 
central victim in the multicultural narrative where its imagined ‘tolerance’ and indeed 
‘benevolence’ to strangers and outsiders becomes the source of irreparable injury.  
 
Multicultural blackness in Britain 
Whilst multiculturalism has been a narrative concerned with how the nation constructs its self 
image, it has also created distinct and often conflicting modes of Black community formation 
in Britain. The relationship between Blackness and the British nation has remained 
persistently unresolved despite attempts at binding them together to establish grounds for 
reconciliation alongside new ‘potentialities and possibilities’ (Hall 1992). These efforts to 
bind blackness and Britishness have taken two distinct routes between what I call the ‘post 
colonial paradigm’ and the ‘dialogic paradigm’ of blackness in the British context. 
We don’t want the hate mongers 
 
 109 
 
Post-colonial paradigm of blackness in Britain 
The Sri Lankan activist and anti-racist campaigner Ambalavaner Sivanandan explains that the 
Black Power movement in the US had spread to Black communities both in Britain and 
worldwide during the 1960s and 70s. Sivanandan wrote about his own personal politicisation 
through his encounter with Black revolutionary thinking during his time as a librarian at the 
Institute of Race Relations of which he is now chair: 
 
As librarian, I was able to introduce Black radical literature - Eric Williams, C.L.R. 
James, the Black Panther Party newspaper from the States, the works of Frantz Fanon, 
writings and speeches from Nkrumah and Amilcar Cabral, the life stories of Sojourner 
Truth and Robeson, the poems of Langston Hughes. Because this body of Black 
thinking could be found only in the IRR’s library, we began to attract a whole lot of 
Black activists and thinkers – from, say, members of the Black Unity and Freedom 
Party and Grassroots to Third World Liberation groups. And they in turn radicalized 
my own thinking (Sivanandan 2000, p.418). 
 
Blackness became a political space and source for collective community politics, self-
empowerment and self-determination for African, African Caribbean and Asian ‘New 
Commonwealth immigrants’ (Kundnani 2007). We can call this formation of blackness the 
‘postcolonial paradigm.’ Here, ‘Black’ as a political category was constructed around the 
colonial histories of African, Caribbean and Asian communities and their shared experience 
of racism in Britain during the 1960s and 70s.  I would like to suggest for the purpose of this 
study that within the postcolonial paradigm the notion of loving blackness can be conceived 
We don’t want the hate mongers 
 
 110 
as providing a place of solidarity for diverse and marginalised post-colonial migrant groups 
victimised by racism in Britain. Thus the idea of loving blackness in this paradigm had a 
glutinous quality that stretched across diverse ethnicities to find common ground to critique 
Britain’s internal colonial formation rooted in former historical colonial practices. During the 
1960s the political activist Claudia Jones suggested Black self-organization was the 
alternative to state integration (Owusu 2000, p.420). The emergence of Black self-help 
groups, community organizations and structures established to mobilise Black self-
empowerment echoed the earlier works of Pan-Africanists in Britain, as they responded to the 
social welfare needs of the Black community. Racial discrimination in education, housing, 
employment, the media and the printed press gave rise to a proliferation of Black bookshops 
such as ‘Grassroots, Sabarr and Headstart, newspapers and magazines such as the Black 
Liberator, Flame, Black Voice, projects like Harambee and Ujima, Black information centres, 
the Keskidee theatre, the Black University and supplementary schools up and down the 
country’ (Owusu 2000, p.420). 
Blackness became the platform for multicultural anti-racist praxis. It was a 
multicultural model of political love based on anti-racism and anti-imperialist practice that 
enabled Black and Asian communities to mobilise against their collective sense of oppression 
as postcolonial citizens in Britain. Sivanandan locates Black multicultural politics within 
grassroots activism. He suggests that political activism within the Black community as an 
inclusive practice saw British Asian communities unified in struggle with the African 
Caribbean community to obtain employment, housing and social services. Blackness was thus 
constructed as a political model that could withstand the complexities of cultural diversity or 
the varying expressions of disaffection arising from each community. It enabled a joint fight 
on the factory floor and in the wider community against racial discrimination (Sivanandan 
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2006 [Online]). Strategic and political, blackness became the adhesive that enabled a ‘unified 
struggle across communities, ethnic groups, faiths and locales’ thereby creating unity in 
diversity (Sivanandan 2006 [Online]). In the postcolonial paradigm blackness emerged 
through the collective struggle for equality, ‘that also led to the bringing in of the 
government's anti-discrimination legislation in the Race Relations Acts of '65, '68 and '76. 
And it was that understanding of multiculturalism that, in the early 1970s, encouraged schools 
to teach children to respect each other's cultures and religions and celebrate each other's 
festivals’ (Sivanandan 2006 [Online]). 
However blackness within the postcolonial paradigm as a diverse and unifying 
political identity became increasingly undermined by the same multi-ethnic distinctions that 
had held it together. As Heidi Safia Mirza (1997) has highlighted, blackness as a political 
articulation appeared strategic, however in terms of community and personal identity ‘Black’ 
remained a contested space. Furthermore, ‘who could or should be named as ‘Black’ (i.e. 
Asians, Chinese, ‘mixed race’) characterised the political terrain for multicultural Britain for 
over a decade’ (Mirza 1997, p.4). Such a reductionist notion of blackness, Mirza argues, had 
erased religious and ethnic difference (Mirza 1997, p.4).  
Sivanandan contends that both the emergence of ‘cultural politics’ and the demise of 
an ‘anti-racist political culture’ saw the emergence of a more fragmented Black political 
culture in Britain (Sivanandan 2006). According to Sivanandan, African Caribbean, African 
and Asian cultural identity politics thus replaced Black political activism on the ground; 
‘When anti-racism was taken out of the equation, as it was by the beginning of the 1980s, all 
that was left was culturalism, ethnicism and its outcrop: cultural and ethnic enclaves with their 
own cultural and ethnic politics’ (Sivanandan 2006).  With the demise of the ‘postcolonial 
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paradigm’ the terrain of Black cultural politics had shifted from anti-racism to a new location 
concerned with discourses on identity and difference.  
 
The dialogic paradigm of Blackness in Britain 
In the UK anti-essentialist positions have argued against the concept of ‘racial unity’ seeing 
the concept of unity as a ‘homogenising’ force. Hybridity, difference and pluralist notions of 
Black identities became the new ground upon which the formation of complex Black 
subjectivities were being reframed and rethought (Hall 2000). We can call this second model 
of blackness the ‘dialogic paradigm.’ Here, the loving element within blackness presupposes 
that we rethink older models of Black resistance to oppression in ways that are inclusive of all 
our identities and subjectivities.  The ‘dialogic paradigm’ avoids the assumption that 
liberation in one subjective area such as race, gender, sexuality or class will automatically 
lead to liberation in other areas. In the ‘dialogic paradigm’ blackness is imagined as a 
discursive space as opposed to a space that is one dimensional and politically monolithic. 
Stuart Hall in the 1970s and early 1980s focused on race in terms of the politics of identity, 
steering the debate on race away from the ‘race problem’ as the source of ills in British 
society towards more complex understandings of identity, race, racism and Britishness 
(Owusu 2000).
 
The work initiated by Hall at The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
(CCCS) at the University of Birmingham during the 1960s and 1970s, opened up new 
dialogues on Black cultural identity that challenged the notion that British culture was 
essentially white. Hall’s writings and their influence in shaping the discipline and direction of 
Cultural Studies in British universities and beyond should not be underestimated (Owusu 
2000). His theories on identity and Britishness made a direct impact upon a group of young 
and mainly London based artists and critics who came to be a part of what was is now called 
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the Black British Cultural Renaissance of the 1980s, notably filmmakers such as Isaac Julien, 
John Akomfrah, Pratibha Parmar, Martina Atille and cultural critics such as Paul Gilroy and 
Kobena Mercer (Owusu 2000). Hall’s central theme was the ‘non-essentialist Black subject’ 
which opposed the notion that a person is born with a fixed identity or that Black people have 
an underlying Black identity which is the same and unchanging. Hall suggests that identities 
are floating and are not fixed and universally true at all time for all people (Hall and Bailey 
2000). Hall’s revision of ‘race’ discourses had two specific targets: 
 
1. The racist new Right represented by conservative figures such as Enoch Powell and 
Margaret Thatcher, who excluded Black people from the notion of Britishness and, 
2. A Black political orthodoxy that represented the Black experience as a singular and 
unifying framework (Owusu 2000). 
 
What remains key to our understanding of what Hall means when he talks of the ‘non-
essentialist Black subject’ is the concept of difference; sexual difference, racial difference, 
class difference, cultural difference, ethnic difference (Hall 1992). In the ‘dialogic paradigm’ 
blackness could no longer be imagined as a singular unifying framework. Our liberation 
politics could no longer be structured along the lines of racial justice alone. For blackness to 
be ‘loving’ it needed to be a fluid category able to incorporate all our differences so that all of 
our subjectivities could be validated. At the heart of this debate was the tension between 
essentialism and anti-essentialism and the politics of difference and sameness. It was a tension 
between models of Black love that were seen as marginalising ‘other’ Black subjectivities.  
According to Hall (1997) the stereotyping of racial difference during slavery was 
represented around themes such as the ‘innate laziness’ of Black people; that Black people 
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were only fit for servitude; and that the ‘innate primitivism’ of Black people meant we were 
simple and lacking of culture as well as genetically incapable of civilisation. Black people 
were thus essentialised and consequently ‘known’ and identified as Black by these fixed 
‘innate’ differences in contrast to whites. The differences that marked Black people as being 
different to white people – white people being hard workers, fit to be masters, highly cultured 
and civilised – were based on the practice of reductionism (Hall 1997). Black people were 
reduced to ‘nature.’ By naturalising their perceived essential ‘true’ characteristics, they were 
beyond change. Their nature became fixed and permanent, forever. ‘Primitivism’ (culture) 
and ‘blackness’ (nature) became interchangeable. Not only were Black people represented in 
terms of their assumed essential characteristics in nineteenth century racist discourse, they 
were reduced to a perceived set of essences; as a ‘lazy,’ ‘mindless,’ ‘childish,’ ‘simple’ 
species (Hall 1997, p.245). 
However it has been argued that the ‘fixed’ logic of essentialism works in another way 
that does harm to the ‘dialogic paradigm’. Afrocentric discourses have been accused of 
appropriating the fixed racialised logic behind essentialist thinking that are contrary to anti-
essentialist claims (Gilroy 1993). The discourse is accused of appealing to fixed notions of 
racial purity (Gilroy 1993). To challenge Eurocentric accounts of history and to counteract 
entrenched racist ideas that Black people are uncivilised, primitive and ahistorical, African 
centred discourses claim that Black people came from highly civilised cultures in Africa 
before the advent of slavery and colonialism (Asante 1990).  However, the ‘dialogic 
paradigm’ points to a number of conceptual problems inherent in the politics of anti-
essentialism, in that in trying to construct multifarious constructions of blackness it is 
dependant upon fixing, replicating and generating other generalised notions of blackness, 
specifically ‘Afrocentric’ discourses (Gilroy 1993).  As the prefix of ‘anti’ in anti-essentialism 
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reveals, in the field of Black cultural politics anti-essentialism works as a binary counterpoint 
towards ‘locating’ fixed notions of blackness in order to validate the assumed specificity and 
fluidity of its plural politics. Fluidity is staged as positive ‘loving’ value, a space for complex 
validation and recognition, which indeed it is. However, in its logic, anti-essentialism works 
on the presumption that it can successfully locate monolithic discourses which ‘un-lovingly’ 
preclude fluidity in favour of ‘sameness.’ Much of the severest criticism levelled at 
Afrocentricity is questionable, not because the discourse is beyond critique, but because 
Afrocentric thinking has been repeatedly used as a ‘whipping boy’ for all that is ‘wrong’ in 
Black identity formations within Black political cultures (Dent 1992, Gilroy 1993, Algernon 
2006). There are problematical elements within all Black identity formations, including those 
which celebrate sameness as well as multiplicity, hybridity and fluidity. There are no safe 
spaces in constructing subjective or collective forms of blackness. Collective and subjective 
political formations are messy and difficult, and perhaps they ought to be. This is not to 
underestimate a critique of the notion of monolithic ‘racial unity.’ But as Audre Lorde 
reminds us ‘unity does not mean unanimity.’ Rather, ‘unity implies the coming together of 
elements which are, to begin with, varied and diverse in their particular natures’ (Lorde 2007, 
p.136).  
  However, as the dialogic paradigm shows there is an implicit assumption that suggests 
blackness in and of itself is a limited category. For Issac Julien it was not a question of 
blackness but of cultural politics: ‘blackness as a sign is never enough. What does that Black 
subject do, how does it act, how does it think politically … being Black isn’t really good 
enough; I want to know what your cultural politics are’ (quoted in Hall 1992, p.33). Whilst 
we must continually recognise that the cultural politics of blackness is and has always been 
intrinsically contested, multifarious, complex and diverse we must not miss the point that it is 
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not blackness that is limiting but racism. Discourses that re-inscribe the notion of blackness as 
culturally and politically deficient continue to perpetuate the binary notion that, in naming 
blackness as limited and limiting, whiteness and white privilege continue to be nameless 
normative values that support racialised hierarchies. We can and must validate our difference 
but this validation is useless if it is unable to change the prevailing social order of racism and 
white supremacy. It would be erroneous to underestimate the ways in which racism is still 
predicated upon de-racialised forms of whiteness where white cultural and political hegemony 
still determine structural relations of power. Film and television theorist Richard Dyer makes 
a valid point with regards to whiteness, difference and power which is worth quoting at 
length:  
 
We are often told that we are living now in a world of multiple identities, of hybridity, 
of decentredness and fragmentation. The old illusory unified identities of class, 
gender, race, sexuality are breaking up; someone maybe Black and gay and middle 
class and – female; we may be bi-, poly-, or non-sexual, of mixed race, indeterminate 
gender and heaven knows what class. Yet we have not yet reached a situation in which 
White people and White cultural agendas are no longer in the ascendant. The media, 
politics, education are still in the hands of White people, still speak for Whites while 
claiming – and sometime sincerely aiming – to speak for humanity. Against the 
flowering myriad of postmodern voices, we must also see the countervailing tendency 
towards homogenisation of world culture, in the continual dominance of US news 
dissemination, popular TV programmes and Hollywood movies. Postmodern 
multiculturalism may have genuinely offered a space for the voice of the other, 
challenging the authority of the White West (cf. Owens 1983), but it may also 
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simultaneously function as a side show for White people who look on with delight at 
all the differences that surround them. We may be on our way to genuine hybridity, 
multiplicity, without (White) hegemony, and it may be where we want to get to – but 
we aren’t there yet, and we won’t get there until we see Whiteness, see its power, its 
particularity and limitedness, put it in its place and end its rule (Dyer 1997, pp.3-4). 
 
As Dyer suggests, as human beings in our postmodern world, our subjectivities are complex. 
However, who we are is constituted and constructed within a racialised regime where 
whiteness and white privilege are at the helm of western cultural hegemony. In this sense, 
whilst the dialogic paradigm has been critical for recognising complexity within Black 
subjectivities and for de-essentialising blackness (Julien 1992), (and this has been a valuable 
and important strategic move), the post-colonial paradigm reminded us that racism can not be 
obviated by what Dyer has termed as postmodern multiculturalism. 
In the next section, I will attempt to show how Black diasporic subjects have 
negotiated their relationship with Britain at an earlier stage in the nation’s configuration as an 
incomparable global colonial empire. Whereas multiculturalism had emerged from the post-
colonial formulation of Britain as nation, the pre-second world war formulation of Britain 
translated ‘race’ into empire (Hesse 2000). As Hesse observes, ‘The racialised reconstruction 
of Britain as an imagined community in the initial post-war period (1945-62) is partly 
characterised by developments in public culture which attempt to turn the common sense of 
Britain away from an imperial cosmopolitanism towards a nationalist parochialism (Hesse 
2000, p.5). I will now revisit the early history of the Black presence in ‘imperial 
cosmopolitan’ Britain to illustrate the point that blackness within a transnational context has 
historically been a complex and multifarious location for Black post/colonised citizens. 
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Britain itself had become a space to mobilise anti-colonial movements, specifically Pan 
Africanism, for the political autonomy and well being of subjugated colonial populations. 
Indeed, Pan Africanism permitted blackness to occupy a complexity of political positions and 
voices within collective struggles against racialised oppression through transnational models 
of blackness as a way of transcending and responding to racism. In this sense Pan-Africanism 
accommodated difference whilst occupying a position of unity and solidarity. In this sense, it 
was an exemplary precursor which avoided the binary trap of diversity vs. solidarity which I 
have highlighted above through the dialogic and post-colonial paradigms respectively.  For 
contemporary Black citizens in Britain today, these early transnational genealogies provide a 
significant historical map for conceptualising blackness in Britain beyond the simple 
coalescence of ‘Black Britain’ or ‘Black British.’  
 
Symbols and memory in the making of ‘Black Britain’ 
This thesis argues that Black people have found resourceful ways to assert our being and 
humanity through loving blackness. Indeed, loving blackness entails an ethical, political and 
emotional consciousness within everyday life, organised resistance and theoretical responses 
to racialised forms of discrimination and oppression that restore dignity and human worth to 
Black life. bell hooks, the architect of loving blackness as a political resistance argues that 
oppositional Black cultures have provided spaces for the kind of decolonisation that makes 
loving blackness possible within a white supremacist context (hooks 1992 p.10). hooks was 
making specific reference to oppositional movements under systems of apartheid in South 
Africa and racial segregation in the US. In sharing hook’s argument I would like to suggest 
that loving blackness, although not articulated in these terms, was found in Black anti-
colonial transnational movements, namely pan-Africanism in the UK before the onset of the 
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‘Windrush’ era of Caribbean settlement to Britain. By focusing on the 1945 Pan African 
congress held in Manchester, a precursor to the Windrush event, I am suggesting that the 
complex ‘potentialities’ and ‘possibilities’ of blackness were historically articulated through 
the political energy that infused transnational political movements against racism, imperial 
and colonial oppression. In the first half of the twentieth century culminating with the 1945 
Pan African congress, a globalised notion of blackness became a site of radical global 
transformation for colonised human relations. Here, unity in diversity allowed delegates to see 
their different struggles to reclaim the dignity of African life, of Africa human worth and 
value as a shared common cause with colonised populations globally. 
 
 
Windrush 
In the ‘Black British’ context, the former trooper ship Empire Windrush which bought 
predominantly Jamaican migrants to Britain in 1948, continues to stand as a symbolic 
emblematic indicator to the ‘originary’ moment of the Black presence on British shores 
(Hesse 2000). Indeed Windrush immediately signifies narratives of colonial Caribbean arrival 
and settlement to Britain. It also signifies the cartographies of African Caribbean diasporas as 
populations characterised as transnational, as being formulated by migration and movement. 
However the Empire Windrush has what has been called a ‘double edged sensibility’ (Hesse 
2000). It not only opens routes to remembering Black British histories and may even 
symbolise the consolidation of Black Britain (Hesse 2000, p.98), it also can act as perceptual 
obstacle to the broader histories of Black people in Britain. Windrush as a symbol that marks 
the arrival of ‘Black Britain’ also eclipses other avenues of memory.  
The Windrush symbol and narrative is important to Britain’s postcolonial history as in 
some ways it marks the visible onset of Britain as a multicultural nation (Phillips and Phillips 
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1999). In 1998 its significance was marked in ‘official’ discourses by a series of programmes 
on the BBC to celebrate fifty years of Caribbean settlement in England. The book Windrush: 
The Irresistible Rise of Multi-Racial Britain by brothers Trevor and Mike Phillips was 
considered a landmark publication on the Black experience in Britain (Phillips and Phillips 
1999). The Windrush discourse signalled the onset of new configurations of racialised politics 
in Britain. After World War II, post-war migration from the Caribbean and Black settlement 
in Britain’s metropolitan centres became a contentious national issue as race was publically 
staged as an inherent problematic issue (Gilroy 2006; Fryer 1984). The ‘Windrush symbol’ 
changed the history and public face of modern Britain forever. However, it has also become 
an impediment to our understanding of earlier configuration of ‘Black Britishness’ (Hesse 
2000). Barnor Hesse argues that the ‘idea of its suddenness or its newness is a deeply 
misleading invocation because there is a significant residual meaning of Black Britain left 
unaccounted for’ (Hesse 2000, p.99). As Hesse highlights, the discursive logic behind 
Windrush enacts its own form of ‘blind memory’ by symbolising a hegemonic concept of 
Black British identity that removes a number of important and often overlooked factors. 
These include the African and the West African presence in Britain long before the Windrush 
era; existing Black and mixed race populations in Britain in cities such as Liverpool; and ‘the 
role of the politics of Pan-Africanism in the formation of Black British identities’ (Hesse 
2000, p.99). All of these narratives have played their role in the formation of ‘Black Britain’ 
but often remain obscured by the very public remembrance of the Windrush event (Hesse 
2000, p.99). Hesse also argues that the largely overlooked legacy of the Pan African 
Conference held in Manchester in 1945 needs to be ‘revisited.’ In recalling this event, Hesse 
would like to avoid setting-up the memory of Windrush in opposition to the remembrance of 
the Pan-African Congress 1945. Rather, Hesse’s intention is to ‘reactivate this residual 
We don’t want the hate mongers 
 
 121 
discourse of diasporic representation so that it too may be embraced, commemorated and 
rearticulated in defining the political meaning of Black Britain’ (Hesse 2000, p.105). 
 
Why Manchester 1945? 
For the purpose of this thesis, I would like to revisit the Manchester Congress of 1945 to 
demonstrate the historical underpinning to my theoretical argument concerning the validation 
of Black life through transnational back diasporic networks that transcended and responded to 
racism. Whereas the agency of Windrush settlers was centred on access to citizenship and 
belonging to both empire and nation (ultimately for the ends of the nation itself), pan-
Africanists were not necessarily preoccupied with becoming part of a national narrative of 
becoming British. Pre-Windrush Pan-African Black settlers and travellers to Britain were 
continuously at the forefront of antiracist struggles both at the domestic and international level 
(Ramdin 1987; Fryer 1984; Hesse 2000). Central to this thesis is the idea that localised 
struggles against racialised injustice need to be understood within the context of larger 
globalised injustices in order to understand racism as a consistent if uneven global process of 
power and domination. The 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, UK was possibly the 
most notable example of this approach to connecting domestic and international forms of 
racism and systemic forms of subjugation. Again, this is an important point for this thesis, as I 
am attempting to argue that racialised oppression is a globalised practice and that dialogic, 
transnational, global and diasporic responses to racism continue to be necessary. As such, the 
particularities of local manifestations of racism form part of an interrelated and intersecting 
global culture of racism. Whilst we should not lose sight of the specific and the local we also 
need to be aware of how racism is connected globally in complex ways and equally engage 
with complex and connected ways of defeating it.  
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The Pan-African movement acts as a historical precursor that created a transnational 
context for connecting struggles against racism and imperialism. Before the Manchester Pan-
African Congress of 1945, four previous meetings had already been convened in 1919, 1921, 
1923 and 1927. The four previous meetings were structured around the struggle against 
imperialistic as well as political, economic and territorial domination (Taylor 2002, p.165). 
The first ‘Pan-African meeting’ was organised in England in 1900 by the Trinidadian lawyer 
Henry Sylvester Williams. Its impetus was to challenge the barbarity of racialised colonial 
violence, specifically as it related to the violent pacification and partitioning of Africa where 
European colonisers committed genocide in Africa with impunity in the name of civilisation 
(Campbell 2006). Delegates denounced the mistreatment of African people in South Africa as 
well as their subjugation under colonial regimes everywhere. They further looked forward to 
co-operation among African peoples on a world scale for the mutual advancement of African 
people. As Horace Campbell has noted, ‘the definition of Pan-Africanism at that moment 
assumed that the content and meaning of political independence would advance the dignity of 
the African’ (Campbell 2006 p.28). In Britain, earlier forerunners of Pan-Africanism during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century responded to the alienation and degradation of 
Black people in Britain who had suffered racial-discrimination as no other group had done 
before them. They responded directly to the pseudo-scientific arguments which constructed 
Black humanity as sub human (Ramdin 1987). Amongst the Black intelligentsia and Black 
men (sic) of achievement, it was vital that a sense of dignity and pride in ‘race’ should be 
organised and emphasised in the face of racialised degradation. They felt a sense of pride was 
lacking in being Black in Britain. In response the Pan-Africanist Duse Mohammed Ali 
established one of the earliest examples of a Black British press through publications such as 
the African Times and Orient Review and the African and Orient Review published between 
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1912 and 1920. These publications sought to raise Black consciousness with consistent 
attacks against colonialism, imperialism and racism (Ramdin 1987, p.139). Thus a social class 
of Black intelligentsia amongst whom were doctors, barristers, restaurant and club owners, 
had worked on behalf of Black workers in Britain and in the colonies providing essential 
social welfare and professional services for the Black as well as white working class (Ramdin 
1987, p.144). 
At the fifth congress a clear shift had taken place because of the representation of the 
working class amongst the delegates in attendance. Here for the first time the welfare and 
rights of workers set the agenda for a diasporic Pan-African future. As the historian Tony 
Martin observes, many of the delegates were representatives of organisations of workers, in 
contrast to earlier meetings organised by Williams and W. E. B. Du Bois which were 
dominated by the intellectual classes (Martin 2008, p.197). The Congress under the banner of 
political unity registered the complex social and political voices within the movement, linking 
the particularities of their struggles on British soil. The outward looking ‘diasporic compass’ 
of the congress was deeply symptomatic of a burgeoning, transnational Black political culture 
in Britain (Hesse 2000, p.105). The Congress not only debated global international issues 
such as ‘Imperialism in North and West Africa,’ ‘Oppression in South Africa,’ ‘The East 
African Picture,’ ‘Ethiopian and the Black Republics’ and ‘The Problem in the Caribbean;’ 
they also protested against increasing racialised discrimination in Britain (Fryer 1984, p.349). 
The Negro Welfare Centre, for example, raised the issue of Black seamen living below 
subsistence level in Liverpool (Fryer 1984, p.350). In Cardiff, it was strongly suggested by 
white locals that Black youths should be ‘gotten rid of’ because intermarriage between blacks 
and whites had created a large community of Black youth who, though born in Britain with 
white mothers and grandparents, found it difficult to gain employment (Fryer 1984).  In the 
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East End of London, it was reported that Black people suffered injustices at the hands of the 
police. And the late Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) 
represented by Alma La Badie raised the problem of unwanted babies fathered by Black 
American troops stationed in Britain and abandoned by their mothers (Fryer 1984). Issues 
such as the ‘colour bar,’ ‘a conventionalised series of racist practices and decision making 
which regulated and barred the participation and mobility of colonial subjects within the 
jurisdiction of British (imperial and national) civilian and military institutions,’ pointed to the 
interior colonial formation of British society where racism had become both entrenched and 
detached from the exterior imperial project (Hesse 2000, p.106). A Congress resolution and 
session entitled ‘The Colour Bar in Great Britain’ demanded an end to discrimination on 
account of race, creed or colour and that such discrimination be made a criminal offence by 
law. It also declared that all employment discrimination which barred applicants on the 
grounds of race, creed or colour should be made an offence by law. Furthermore, the 
resolution declared that African organizations doing legitimate welfare work among Black 
children, seamen, students and others shall be given encouragement and assistance by the 
responsible authorities to continue the vital social work in which they were engaged (Adi and 
Sherwood 1995). In twenty-first century Britain postcolonial Black and Brown communities 
continue to face similar problems of exclusion, discrimination and marginalisation. As Hesse 
highlights, there was something momentous about the Manchester Congress and specifically 
the resolution itself, in that they bear a resemblance to the political formation of the idea of 
Black Britain itself on the grounds that the social concerns that defined Black people in 
Britain before Windrush continue to define and resonate with our own urgent contemporary 
social concerns (Hesse 2000, p.106). Even more remarkable is that the conference represents 
Pan-Africanism in its multiplicity and diversity whilst at once working towards a collective 
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politics of unity and solidarity, formations which are now largely seen as passé, romantic and 
unworkable (Kundnani 2007). The political focus of the 1945 congress in Manchester had 
pre-1945 origins, a fact which importantly testifies to the accumulation of social critiques 
generated by Black political cultures during the first half of the twentieth century (Hesse 
2000, p.106). 
I would like to pay more specific attention to one of those critiques, namely a Black 
diasporic feminist perspective that emerged at the Congress, which has largely gone 
unrecognised in Hesse’s analysis.  Amy Jacques Garvey, Amy Ashwood Garvey and other 
female delegates, played a pivotal role in placing gender within the transnational circulation 
of Black intellectual thought at the Manchester Congress. Amy Ashwood Garvey and Amy 
Jacques Garvey
1
 were both formidable Pan-Africanists and feminists. Individually, they had 
developed a Pan-African Black diasporic feminist consciousness concerning the welfare of 
Africans, and African women in particular, within the transnational context of the 1945 
Congress (Taylor 2002; Martin 2008).  This is important for this study as it unveils the 
contribution of Black women to the circulation of anti-colonial political ideas from a gendered 
perspective in the first half of the twentieth century. It further indicates the overshadowing of 
Black female political actors and contributors to anti-colonial struggles by contemporary 
cultural theorists and cultural historians of ‘Black Britain’ (Gilroy, Hesse 2000). Despite 
consistently being marginalised by their peers as well as by subsequent academic accounts of 
the formation of ‘Black Britain,’ Ashwood and Jacques have consistently been at the heart 
Pan African anti-imperialist struggles for freedom and justice. Both women were committed 
political activists in their own right and although individually they had remained close to the 
                                                 
1
 As their surnames suggest, Ashwood and Jacques were married to the formidable Pan-Africanist Marcus 
Mosiah Garvey. By coincidence they shared the same forename of ‘Amy’. Ashwood’s and Jacques’ personal 
contributions to Pan-Africanism however remain relatively ‘veiled’ and obscured by Marcus Garvey’s status as 
one of the most influential Black political leaders of the twentieth century. 
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political ideals of Marcus Garvey, they also developed and pursued their own intellectual 
ideas and political endeavours (Taylor 2002; Martin 2008). Moreover, Ashwood and Jacques 
were acutely aware of the male chauvinistic political arena which they operated within. Thus, 
they were willing and astute enough to craft political positions that both mobilised solidarity 
between male comrades and challenged prevailing notions about the role and contribution of 
women to Pan-African politics. As Taylor (2002) notes, Jacques struggled to have her 
intellectual ideas taken seriously by some of her male peers including W. E. B. Du Bois who 
had invited Jacques to serve as the only female co-convenor of the congress. In a letter to Du 
Bois concerning the intellectual direction of the congress Jacques felt it necessary to explain 
to Du Bois that she was accustomed to talking with Marcus Garvey and to taking part in 
conferences with men ‘man to man’ to the point that ‘I don’t think or act, as if I were just a 
woman.’ (Jacques cited by Taylor 2002, p.169). What this example shows is that the 
intellectual space for Black women to engage politically with Black men was highly gendered 
in favour of male to male dialogue, so much so that Jacques felt it necessary to qualify to Du 
Bois her intellectual credentials by appropriating a masculinised identity (Taylor 2002). Hazel 
Carby (1998) explains that within struggles for liberation and democratic egalitarianism, 
gendered structures of thought and feeling have permeated our lives and our intellectual work. 
Such ideologies of gender have undermined our egalitarian visions of the past and the future 
(Carby 1998, p.12).  
However, despite the male bias of the meeting and Pan-African leadership in general, 
the intellectual contributions of Ashwood and Garvey to the 1945 Congress is indisputable. 
Although Jacques was unable to go to Manchester due to childcare commitments and a lack of 
funds, she had played an instrumental role as co-convenor of the meeting alongside fellow 
convenors, Dr Harold Moody, Paul Robeson and Max Yergan (Taylor 2002, p.166). As co-
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convenor, Jacques had written long and detailed letters to Du Bois in which she outlined her 
transnational Pan-African vision suggesting the Congress organise a permanent body called 
the ‘Pan African Union’ ‘to watch over the interest of our people the world over’ (Taylor 
2002, p.67). Her vision also extended to the need for African peoples to self define their 
reality and identity. Thus she proposed that at the Congress delegates should abstain from 
using the terms ‘Negro’ and ‘Native’ because they were offensive to Africans. She further 
proposed that delegates replace the term ‘West Indian’ with ‘Caribbean’ as the former 
perpetuated the geographical error of Christopher Columbus who mistakenly believed he was 
in India when he stumbled upon the Caribbean territories (Taylor 2002; Martin 2007). As the 
only female convenor, Jacques tackled the issue of female participation at the conference. She 
requested of her friend and comrade George Padmore that he invite female delegates Una 
Marson, who could represent the interest of women in the Caribbean, and Tracy Timothy, a 
voice for Black females in Britain. Timothy, born of an English mother and Caribbean father 
had, in Jacques words, ‘suffered from the inequalities meted out to English-born colored 
people’ (Taylor 2002, p170). Jacques had crafted a gendered paradigm of transnational Black 
female actors that connected struggles against racialised oppression whilst articulating that 
Black women too were equal concerned and committed to the struggle for freedom and 
justice. At the conference in Manchester, Amy Ashwood Garvey critiqued the existence of 
sexism at the meeting. She stated, 
 
Very much has been written and spoken of the Negro, but for some reason very little 
has been said about the Black woman. [She] has been shunted into the social 
background to be a child bearer. This has been principally been her lot (Adi and 
Sherwood 1995 p.98). 
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Ashwood was clearly attacking any assumption that Black women can only occupy a 
biological bond to Black liberation struggles based on an ability to produce children for the 
‘race.’ Ashwood also critiqued the unequal working conditions and the unequal pay of Black 
women in Jamaica proclaiming that ‘the Negro men of Jamaica are largely responsible for 
this, as they do little to help the women get improved wages’ (Adi and Sherwood 1995, p.99). 
Ashwood had also highlighted the basis on which a transnational existence had become a 
basic way of life in the Caribbean stating that, ‘Because of the low standard of living, our 
people find it necessary to emigrate to various places, and our women have gone with our 
men to Cuba, Panama and America’ (Adi and Sherwood 1995 p.99). What we are reminded 
of here is that the transnational anti-colonial space was not only highly racialised it was also 
highly determined by economies of gender and class. For Black women engaged in the 
politics of anti imperialism, self-determination required an acute awareness and fortitude to 
cross borders of gender, borders of poverty, as well as the borders of colonial territories in 
order to become not only visible and heard on the transnational stage, but to be self-actualised 
whether politically or economically
2
. It was quite pertinent that Ashwood’s critique of the 
marginalisation of Black women as child bearers resonated with Jacques’ personal 
circumstances. As the mother of two small children, Jacques was unable to travel physically 
to Britain to attend the Manchester conference because of her commitments as a mother to her 
two young boys (Taylor 2002). Yet, as Jacques’s role as convenor demonstrated, her 
marginalised status, although real, was never absolute. Indeed, she was still able to shape the 
development of the emerging Pan African agenda in Britain from the then colonised territory 
of Jamaica. The material borders of gender, economics, nationality and place set very real 
                                                 
2
 Amy Ashwood Garvey had also developed numerous business ventures in Britain including a Jazz Club 
frequented by Pan Africanists in Britain as well as a Boarding house for Black female students and white 
working class women in London (see Martin 2007) 
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limits on the ability of Black women and men to participate in struggles for liberation. 
However, Ashwood and Jacques both demonstrated that such borders were made porous by 
their own agency and ability to create, negotiate and transform interlocked territories of 
colonialism and imperialism between Britain and the Caribbean into spaces that facilitated 
revolutionary dialogue and political transformation in Africa.
3
  
Despite the life long hostile and problematic relationship between Ashwood and 
Jacques, both women, unwittingly at least, share the remarkable position of creating an early 
Black transnational feminist politics responsive to the conditions of Black people in general 
and Black women in particular. However, as Ashwood herself had pointed out in her critique 
of the male centred focus of the Congress, the story of Black Nationalist diasporic struggles 
against colonialism has too often been framed through the experiences of Black men to the 
exclusion of Black women. This goes back to my earlier point in chapter one of this thesis in 
relation to Fanon’s construction of decolonisation as a space of male solidarity, of ‘philic 
bonds,’ between decolonised men as equals in a form of ‘brotherly love.’ Such patriarchal 
frameworks undermine concepts of Black male and female political solidarity in de/colonial 
struggles. They further perpetuate the marginality of the ‘Black female thinking body’ 
providing the amnesic environment in which the decolonising legacies of Black women and 
their far reaching radical politics can be forgotten. Even in recent intellectual accounts 
regarding the formation of ‘Black Britain’ very little attention is given to the role Jacques and 
Ashwood had played in developing a Pan-African transnational feminist politics which 
directly impacted upon the political trajectories that define the political formation of Black 
Britishness (Hesse 2000; Gilroy 1993; Gilroy 2007). In Paul Gilroy’s photographic history of 
Black Britain, the book features a photograph of Amy Ashwood Garvey sharing the stage 
                                                 
3
 The congress was attended by Kwame Nkrumah who was strongly influenced by Pan Africanism. See (Ali and 
Sherwood 1995) 
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with John McNair of the independent Labour Party. Although other prominent figures of Pan-
Africanism such as George Padmore, Jomo Kenyatta and Du Bois are mentioned and named 
within the text as representing an ‘international cast of Black leadership,’ Ashwood is not 
referred to at all, despite the fact that she was an integral leader amongst her peers (Gilroy 
2007, p.65). African women have critiqued the male-centred concepts of Pan-Africanism as 
well as intellectual accounts that have formulated and reconstructed Pan-Africanism as a male 
enterprise (Horace Campbell 2006). One of the failings in remembering the ‘originary 
moment’ of ‘Black Britain,’ if indeed Black Britain exists, is the failure to reconfigure Black 
decolonised political resistance as a shared discursive space occupied by Black female voices 
engaged in radical libratory struggles on British territory. Until we can recall a historical sense 
of the past that wards off the cultural dispossession of Black women (Diawara 1993), we will 
continuously remember and revere a history that impedes how we critically understand the 
present, thus failing to recognise how processes of oppression become gendered. We will 
consistently fall victim to blind memories that rely upon male centred discourses that valorise 
the important and valuable work of radical and revolutionary Black men in raising Black 
consciousness at the expense of the equally valuable contributions of Black women engaged 
in anti-colonial struggle.  
 
Before ‘Black Britain’ 
The Pan-Africanism congress of 1945 provided an historical framework for seeing Blackness 
in Britain, beyond its ‘hybrid’ coupling and coalescence with the nation, in other words 
beyond Stuart Hall’s (1992) later appeal for post-colonial settlers to embrace being both 
‘Black and British’ (I will discuss this point in more detail in the following chapter). Besides, 
at this point in 1945, representatives at the congress came from Caribbean, African and South 
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Asian territories colonised by the British which indeed would have made them both Black and 
colonised British citizens. Their response to the nation was one of agitation for the sole 
purpose of freeing themselves from ‘the yoke of British imperialism’ (Adi and Sherwood 
1995, p.9). The Pan African movement had established not only a multifarious and complex 
political network but an equally dialogic response to racism and colonial oppression that had 
connected locally specific responses to racism with broader global opposition to colonial 
domination, racial discrimination and imperial subjugation (Fryer 1984). It was the continuing 
history of subjugation, servitude and domination as ‘British citizens of empire’ which they 
had come together to reject in Manchester. Thus their relationship to Britain was contested 
along the lines of demanding independence, freedom and equality.  
For post-colonial Black people living in Britain today the relationship between 
blackness and Britishness still remains somewhat vexed.  I am not suggesting a neat linear 
line of vexation has remained the same and can thus be traced tidily through colonialism, neo-
colonialism to a ‘post-colonial’ present. I am suggesting however, that the goals of 
independence, freedom and equality have remained unfinished and as urgent as ever for 
Britain’s postcolonial Black citizens (Adi and Sherwood 1995; Campbell 2006).  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter I have argued that the nation state continues to disavow blackness and racism 
through multiculturalism. The nation can thus imagine itself as being both open and 
vulnerable to what Sara Ahmed calls ‘multicultural love.’ Here the nation can claim to be 
injured and wounded by the way its tolerance and ‘acceptance’ of the multicultural situation 
has not been matched. Multiculturalism is believed to have failed to return or reciprocate the 
love given to it by the nation (Ahmed 2004). The wounds inflicted by multiculturalism upon 
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the ‘tolerant’ nation permits and legitimizes the return of ‘sameness’ or more specifically, 
white monolithic Britishness, where multicultural subjects must learn to love the difference 
outside of themselves (Ahmed 2004, p.138), that difference being Britain. Whilst 
multiculturalism has a national configuration, it has also been reconfigured by Black diasporic 
populations in Britain producing discourse that are contested along the lines of unity and 
diversity. I have also suggested that Pan Africanism is an important precursor of this binary 
split, offering Black communities in Britain a rich resource for constructing transnational 
models of blackness that affirm Black humanity and human worth. 
In the following chapter I will develop my arguments further by analysing the 
disjuncture between blackness and Britishness. I will deconstruct the notion of Black 
Britishness that has emerged during the 1980s and early 1990s and question its relevance for 
blackness in Britain at the start of the twenty-first century. I will examine these issues in 
relation to discourses on ‘mixed-race’ Britain and formulations of blackness beyond state 
borders as an anti-racist practice. 
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Chapter 4 
 
DIMIISHIG BLACKESS 
Transnational Blackness beyond the ‘Black British’ paradigm 
 
Introduction 
There are a number of reasons why the nomenclature ‘Black British’ has remained a tenuous 
and contested political location for Black populations in Britain. In this chapter I will explore 
why our contemporary transnational situation destabilises this notion further. I am suggesting 
that the continuing disavowal of blackness and racism specifically in media discourses and 
amongst wider political and social fields in Britain continues to undermine what I will call the 
‘optimistic moment of Black Britishness.’ That moment occurred between the mid 1980s and 
early 1990s where a ‘veritable renaissance’ of ‘Black British’ cultural representation had 
created a new form of Black visibility in Britain and beyond (Mercer 1994). This new 
visibility came into existence through the representation and cultural production of Black 
British film, visual arts, poetry, literature, music and television as well as through the 
academic writing of Black British scholars during this period such as Kobena Mercer (1994), 
Paul Gilroy (1987;1993) and Stuart Hall (Dent 1992; Owusu 2000). At the height of this 
moment, Stuart Hall (1992) suggested that ‘blacks in the British diaspora must, at this 
historical moment, refuse the binary of Black or British’ (Hall 1992, p.29). For Hall the ‘or’ 
represented a site of ‘constant contestation.’ In his view the aim of the struggle was for ‘a 
new kind of cultural positionality, a different logic of difference’ which he argues was 
encapsulated by the cultural historian Paul Gilroy. According to Hall, Black people in Britain 
should replace the ‘or’ with ‘and’, thus refusing the essentialising binary of Black or British. 
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Instead the preferred ‘and’ could help us to realise the potentiality or possibility of this hybrid 
location (Hall 1992). For Hall the logic of coupling rather than binary opposition meant that,  
 
You can be Black and British, not only because that is a necessary position to take in 
1992, but because even those two terms, joined now by the coupler ‘and’ instead of 
opposed to one another, do not exhaust all of our identities. Only some of our 
identities are sometimes caught in that particular struggle (Hall 1992, p.29). 
 
However, after nearly two decades since Hall’s discourse on being both Black and British, 
has the optimism of this moment gone? Has the expectant ‘and’ deployed by Hall to heal this 
‘constant contestation’ delivered the desired end to the entangled struggle of being Black 
British? I will attempt to answer these questions more specifically in this chapter in relation to 
the predicted ‘mixed race’ future and ‘mixed race’ histories of Britain and the changing 
transnational formation of blackness in contemporary British life. I will approach this analysis 
through the lens of a less than remarkable documentary text, The Great British Black Invasion 
which charts the changing face of Black Britain in the 21
st
 centaury. I will explain that this 
documentary works as a micro representational text to the larger continuing omission of 
specific forms of regional blackness found in Britain in cities such as Liverpool, a city with 
one of the longest settled Black populations in the UK (Brown 2006). I will further discuss 
the political implication of Invasion’s discourse on racialised absorption blackness and 
‘diminishing blackness’ as well the configuration of blackness as a transnational cultural and 
political framework. ‘Mixing’ and ‘absorption’ are terms that describe the faux embrace of racial 
intermixture. And at the same time these terms actually, and somewhat paradoxically, also work to 
reinforce deeply racist ideas about British racial ‘purity.’ I will conclude by suggesting that the 
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transnational space for Black communities in Britain defined as ‘mixed race’ or otherwise 
remains a critical yet complex location to build alternative concepts of blackness. Through the 
dynamic utilisation of diasporic resources, transnational notions of blackness can act as 
revolutionary interventions ‘that undermine the practice of domination’ (hooks 1992, p.20) 
helping marginalised human beings to recover their human worth. 
 
Mixed futures/mixed histories 
Within the UK, the ‘racial’ forecast for African Caribbean populations suggests that this 
particular ethnic group will eventually decline as a distinct ethnic category from Britain’s 
multicultural map (Platt 2008). According to the report, Ethnicity and Family- Relationships 
within and between ethnic groups: An analysis using the Labour Force Survey (Platt 2008), 
Britain is facing a ‘mixed race’ future: 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, Black Caribbean men and women were the most 
likely of any group to be in an inter-ethnic partnership (48 per cent of men and 34 
percent of women in couples were in an inter-ethnic partnership); and this increased 
between first and second (or subsequent) generations and between older and younger 
men and women. Rates were also higher among couples with children. For 55 per cent 
of Caribbean men living with a partner and children under 16, and 40 per cent of 
Caribbean women, that partner was from a different ethnic group. It therefore appears 
a trend that is set to continue and that will result in an increasing number of people 
with diverse identities of which Caribbean heritage forms a part. It also means that 
those who define themselves as singularly Caribbean are likely to decline over time, as 
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increasingly complex heritages emerge among those with some element of Caribbean 
descent (Platt 2008, p.7). 
For many yeas now, it has been suggested that the fastest growing population in the UK will 
be of ‘mixed origins.’ For example, in the early 1990s, it was reported that around 53 per cent 
of African Caribbean men age 16-24 and 36 percent of Caribbean women of the same age 
were married or cohabiting with white partners (Modood et al., 1997). In our increasingly 
globalised societies, where diverse mobile populations move around the globe for temporary 
or permanent settlement, patterns of sexual interaction across racialised, national, religious 
and linguistic borders are set to continue (Bhattacharyya, et al. 2002).  However, it is worth 
pointing out that the practice of ‘race mixture’ is not new to British soil. The long historical 
presence of Black populations in Britain, in particular African, Caribbean and Asian 
populations has been documented in the social histories that trace the Black presence in 
Britain back to the Roman era (Fryer 1984, Walvin 1994, Christian 1998, Ramdin 1987). 
Since the rise of the British Empire, the continuity of this presence has been directly linked to 
transatlantic slavery and the expansion of British imperial and colonial endeavours (Fryer 
1984, Ramdin 1987). Metropolitan cities such as London, Cardiff, Liverpool and Bristol were 
some of the major British seaports involved in the transatlantic slave trade. It was at these 
ports that many Africans enslaved and in servitude first glimpsed British soil and began to 
make an impact upon local white populations (Christian 1998). During the nineteenth century, 
amongst the Black settler communities and visitors that emerged within the major British 
slaving ports, the practice of interracial marriage became widespread between Black males 
and white females (Fryer 1984, Christian 1998). The most common explanation for 
intermarriage suggests that on the whole the Black population during this period (numbering 
approximately 10,000 in total) had largely consisted of young African males who heavily out 
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numbered the presence of African women (Fryer 1984, p.235). The practice of interracial 
marriages and the integration of African men into to larger white populations became a 
common practice amongst earlier noted individual Black settlers to Britain such as Olaudah 
Equiano, Ukawsaw Gronniosaw and others who came before them (Fryer 1984). Early Black 
radical figures to emerge onto the British scene were of ‘mixed origins.’ Personalities such as 
William Davidson one of the infamous Cato Street conspirators who attempted to blow up the 
entire Cabinet of the British Government in 1820 alongside Robert Wedderburn a working 
class hero who advocated press freedom in Britain whilst proclaiming that slaves had the right 
to kill their masters, both had fathers from Scotland and Black mothers from Jamaica (Fryer 
1984). The Jamaican nurse and healer Mary Seacole the celebrated heroine of the Crimean 
War (1853-1856) who risked her life to nurse wounded and dying soldiers in the British Army 
also shared a ‘mixed’ Jamaican and Scottish ancestry (Fryer 1984). In the early twentieth 
century, in port cities such as Liverpool, Black male settlers to the city whether as students, 
seamen or factory workers inevitably formed intimate interracial relationships and families 
with local white women (Christian 1998). What I am referencing here is that the idea of a 
‘mixed race’ future in Britain is neither novel nor without historical continuity. Indeed we 
cannot consider the possibility and implications of mixed futures without considering the 
living contextual legacy of mixed heritage communities in Britain. Thus as Peter Fryer (1984) 
had noted in response to the question as to what actually happened to Britain’s earlier 
nineteenth century Black populations, it would appear that the decedents of ‘interracial’ 
couplings no longer thought of themselves as constituting a distinct Black community and 
over time became part of the British poor (Fryer 1984, p.235). As such it would be reasonable 
to suggest that a significant number of ‘white’ families in Britain share a hidden history of 
Black ancestry. As Fryer explains, 
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The records of their lives are obscure and scattered, and they have for the most part 
been forgotten by their descendents. But there must be many thousands of British 
families who, if they traced their roots back to the eighteenth or early nineteenth 
century, would find among their ancestors an African or person of African descent 
(Fryer 1984, p.235).  
 
Increased awareness of the historical continuity of early Black settlers would enable twenty 
first century Black populations in Britain to form more complex discursive engagements with 
the notion of blackness and its emergence within the British Isles. Furthermore, a more 
complex rendering of the pre-twentieth century Black experience in Britain would further 
contribute to debunking the implausible myth of a racially sealed pure white Anglo Saxon 
race as synonymous with being British.  
The early historical negotiation of blackness and Britishness has thus been a dynamic, 
entangled and often arduous engagement determined by transnational forces that established 
the conditions for systems of slavery and exploitative labour, imperialist economic expansion 
and racial domination (Fryer 1988). In parallel to this, blackness in Britain has also unfolded 
along the lines of intimate interracial relationships between mobile and settled Black 
populations. As I will show in this chapter, blackness in contemporary Britain is erroneously 
staged in popular hegemonic texts as a relatively recent ‘invasion’ that began with post World 
War II migration, a narrative that continues to elide the historical legacy of Britain’s darker 
and often hidden roots.  
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‘Absorbing’ blackness 
‘Mixed-heritage’ histories have lengthy ancestral lineages into Britain’s historical past 
(Christian 1998). The documentary The Great British Black Invasion made by Juniper TV and 
screened in the UK by Channel 4 in August 2006 is one example of how ‘mixed-heritage’ 
histories in cities such as Liverpool become obscured by the narrative of mid twentieth 
century post-war migration from the Caribbean. It is worth stating that Invasion was not a 
landmark piece of television documentary filmmaking. In fact, it is because of its intrinsically 
unremarkable format and scheduling (early evening, easy going weekend entertainment) that I 
wish to draw it to our attention. Indeed its fleeting disposability and intentional frivolity as an 
informative yet ‘light weight’ TV makes Invasion both inconspicuous to critical attention and 
at the same time deserving of it. I see Invasion as symbolic if not symptomatic of the routine 
disavowal of Black and Brown communities in Britain, despite its obvious attempts at being 
an ‘inclusive’ and ‘diverse’ piece of social commentary on multicultural Britain. Before I 
examine the issue of Black Liverpool and mixed race histories in relation to Invasion, I will 
discuss the problematic way in which the documentary engages with generic notions of 
‘Black Britishness.’  
 
Invasion and the Black presence in Britain 
Invasion erroneously charted a cartoon-like history of the Black presence in Britain in a rather 
unexceptional fashion. The documentary sought to provide a quasi-historical update on the 
recent cultural and population shifts that are influencing the contemporary formation of 
‘Black Britain.’ However, I contend also that the programme makers pitched the tone of the 
television documentary to a predominantly (but not exclusively) white British audience 
presumed to be out of touch with the contemporary predicament of their fellow Black 
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neighbours and citizens. The documentary employed the voice over of Fay Ripley, a British 
female actress who became a British household name after starring in the popular ITV drama 
series, Cold Feet in the 1990s. It is not Ripley’s employment as a narrator that I am 
questioning, but rather the story Ripley is given to narrate. For example, within her script, 
Ripley suggests that racial stereotypes of Black and Brown people that were once 
commonplace in everyday culture are no longer fashionable or popular in contemporary 
Britain. These stereotypes included myths such as ‘Black people came from the jungle’ and 
that Black people were ‘really good dancers.’  She declares that these stereotypes were once 
‘good for a laugh,’ but not anymore. The narration gloated that, 
 
It’s all changed now. Who wouldn’t like a slice of Tierry Henry’s panache? But even 
if Black is the new Black, the people you think of as Black are not the same people at 
all. They’re all quite different; from different countries; even from different 
continents. And most of our ideas about them are wrong. You think it all started with 
the Windrush? No, the first to come were the spitfire pilots and entertainers. 
  
Ripley’s jovial voice-over and upbeat take on the historical emergence of Black people in 
British society was, aside from being woefully inadequate, one of the first signs of the 
programme’s privileging of the white gaze. Here the temporal emergence of the Black 
presence in Britain is framed within a nationalistic divisive framework which takes its lead 
from the title of the programme where blackness is staged as an invasion. The language of 
‘othering’ Britain’s ethnic populations demarcates the boundaries of access, inclusion and 
exclusion within the narrative structure of the documentary. It also suggests a subtext of 
‘benevolent’ racial tolerance by the privileged viewer towards the other’s invasive presence. 
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In the quote above, the use of the terms ‘you’ and ‘our’ presupposes a cohesive national gaze. 
This claim is supported by the objectification of Black people as ‘them’ and ‘they.’ The terms 
‘You’ and ‘our’ demarcate national insiders who are invited to adopt the position of 
voyeuristic subjects over ‘them,’ the objectified Black occupiers. Othering blackness in this 
way establishes who will be privileged and spoken to and who will be objectified and spoken 
about. This homogenising logic of the out-of-touch gazing white audience serves a larger 
media spectacle regarding how Black and Brown bodies and communities are made both 
visible and invisible in recent media discourses concerning public fears over the global War 
on Terror. According to Invasion, viewers may have missed the substantial changes that are 
taking place amongst Black Britain’s populations because local South Asian groups have 
become much more visible and the focus of much public attention recently, particularly, to 
borrow Bhattacharyya’s term, as ‘dangerous Brown men’ (Bhattacharyya 2008). As stated in 
Ripley’s voiceover, ‘And while Britain’s Asians have been in the spot light, Black Britons 
have been changing beyond all recognition.’  Here, the eclipsing racial visibility and ‘threat’ 
of South Asian Muslim communities was visually reinforced on screen by the documentary’s 
use of news clips and video footage of the July 7
th
 bombings in London. As a consequence of 
such extensive media exposure, the documentary suggests that the public visibility of South 
Asian communities has consequently made Black communities more invisible. This shift in 
visibility that Invasion registers is much more complex than the documentary suggests. Gargi 
Bhattacharyya (2008) argues that such a shift is an adaption of earlier racist mythologies 
where the demonised figure of the ‘dangerous Black man’ becomes the ‘dangerous Brown 
man’ expanding the net of western racialised anxieties. As Bhattacharyya explains, 
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Importantly, there is a shift to include new communities and develop racial myths for 
new circumstance. In the process, there is a concerted campaign to suggest that ‘race’ 
is no longer the issue and that those who previously suffered racism are now with us 
(as opposed to against us) (Bhattacharyya, 2008, p.96). 
 
What Bhattacharyya describes is the changing and evolving terrain of racism, where new 
racialised stereotypical configurations can emerge as tools in the process of demonising and 
criminalising different ethnic groups for different reasons at different moments. Indeed 
Invasion also deployed the use of new stereotypes to mark the shifting terrain of Black 
Britain, 
 
Ripley: Now this will be a shock. Recent migration from Africa is so great that there 
are more Africans in Britain today than West Indians. And some have come a long 
way to don Britain’s least loved uniform… Got a parking ticket recently? I bet it was 
from a Nigerian. 
 
Whilst engaging in the production of new stereotypes seen here as the autocratic, power 
hungry, dictatorial Nigerian Traffic warden, Invasion also attempted to highlight some 
national, ethnic, and cultural differences amongst Black migrant populations in the UK:  
 
And mistaking a Jamaican for a Trinidadian is like calling the English, French. 
They’re from different countries in the Caribbean and there’s no love lost between 
them. 
 
Diminishing  blackness 
 
 143 
These national and cultural differences amongst Black communities in Britain are staged as a 
new revelation that needed to be explained to unsuspecting (white) audiences.  Such 
differences between continental African and Caribbean ethnicities are represented as being 
fixed to the point that they have nothing in common with each other beyond a shared 
phenotype.  Indeed, the documentary suggested that intra-Black racialised prejudices were so 
deep they were akin to white racism:  
 
Ripley: Africans first met Afro Caribbean’s here in Britain. And different histories of 
slavery led to attitudes worthy of Alf Garnett himself.
1
 
Caribbean interviewee: They used to call us white man slaves.  
  
The divisive borders of Britain’s Black communities are depicted as irretrievably contentious 
and in constant conflict based on the historical legacies of slavery and colonialism. It is clear 
that within Black communities conflicts along the lines of geographic region, ethnicity and 
nationality have existed and continue to exist between and amongst African and Caribbean 
communities; Ghanaians vs. Nigerians, Jamaicans vs. Trinidadians, Nigerians vs. Jamaicans. 
These intra-Black cross-national, ‘inter’ and ‘intra’ generational rivalries, prejudices and 
chauvinisms can be seen as an outcome of internalised racism, a legacy of the values learnt 
from colonial education systems in former colonised territories. Deborah Gabriel (2007) 
argues that such internalised forms of racism can also emerge through the politics of 
‘colourism,’ ‘a process of discrimination based on skin tone among members of the same 
                                                 
1
 Alf Garnett a working class antihero of the British sitcom Till Death Do Us Part and In Sickness and In 
Health, was a loveable rogue who peddled in speaking the unspeakable, ‘coons’, ‘kikes’ and ‘wogs’ (Malik 
2002). Although Garnett’s views were meant to be ridiculed by the British viewing public, in the climate of 
growing anxiety regarding immigration on the back of Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood Speech’,  his racial diatribes 
had endeared him to the white audiences. 
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ethnic group’ (Gabriel 2007). Within Black popular culture in the UK, antiquated internalised 
forms of racism have consistently been highlighted, parodied, mocked, and critiqued by 
‘Black British’ comedians such as Gina Yashere, Curtis Walker and Felix Dexter as well as 
by earlier Black comedy sketch shows such as The Real McCoy (BBC) and Blouse and Skirt 
(BBC). The most popular and successful Black situation comedy on British television, 
Desmond’s (Chanel 4 1989 – 1994) sought to educate audiences around the differences and 
prejudices that existed amongst Black communities as a way of challenging the negative 
assumptions within intra-Black prejudicial attitudes and thinking. Desmond’s not only 
demonstrated that differences in attitude existed between generations of ‘Black British’ born 
children and their parents, but also between African and African Caribbeans’ regionally and 
politically.  These differences necessarily challenged the racially monolithic notion that Black 
people were all the same whilst providing a space where Caribbean and African colonised 
attitudes towards each other could at least be challenged and unlearnt if not transcended 
within the context of a complex Black and multiracial community in south London.  As Sarita 
Malik (2002) points out, like the US situation comedy The Cosby Show, Desmond’s was ‘an 
explicitly ‘corrective’ text; designed to work against the types of ‘negative’ images of 
comedic blackness which had hitherto been on television’ (Malik 2002, p.101). It was also a 
corrective interventionist text that challenged the damaging racially colonised attitudes of 
internalised racism that remain a part of intra-Black folklore, attitudes that were crudely 
represented in Invasion. 
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The ‘mongrel nation’ 
However it is in the area of ‘interracial’ mixing where Invasion slips further into problematic 
territory.  In the jarring comic book spirit of the production, Invasion concluded, in a 
holistically regressive tone, that Britain would eventually become a ‘mongrel nation.’ Mark 
Christian (2000) provides a useful historical framework for understanding the racist notion of 
this unfortunate term: 
 
Mongrel: mostly associated with the result of the interbreeding of dogs. However, 
racist organisations such as the Ku Klux Klan of the US have often used the term to 
define the outcome of ‘racial mixing’ between Africans and Europeans. This form of 
definition is used by the KKK in order to create a ‘moral panic’ in the ‘white race.’ It 
is a highly derogatory term and should be avoided if one is to define persons of mixed 
origin descent (Christian 2000, p.xxvii). 
 
The derogatory racist implications and pseudo scientific connotations of the term ‘mongrel’, 
with its underlying subtext to intermixture as a form of degenerate animalistic breeding, is a 
sharp reminder of the casual racism the programme claimed had been expunged from 
Britain’s social landscape, and presumably from the documentary itself. We can also read it as 
a sign of the cultural and historical denial of Britain’s existing ‘mixed race’ communities who 
are obviated as an integral part of the fabric of the nation. By using the term mongrel to 
forecast the changing ‘racial’ boundaries of Britain, Invasion had forgotten Britain’s history 
of entangled ‘racial’ roots. 
Before its conclusion Invasion’s casual jaunty tone foretold the ‘inevitable’ ‘end of 
blackness’ in Britain. The documentary cheerfully predicted with buoyant optimism, the 
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eventual disappearance of Black populations into the dominant white British mainstream. 
This disappearance was twofold; one because of voluntary repatriation by first generation 
‘returnees’ to the Caribbean and two because of high levels of ‘cross racialised intermixing.’ 
The programme pointed out that Black people from the Caribbean islands and their 
descendents are the most likely Black ethnic group to ‘disappear’ first: ‘The “Afro 
Caribbeans” look like they may disappear. Some are going back but, but many others are 
simply being absorbed in to the British mainstream.’  
That ‘intermixing’ is a significant feature of contemporary life choices in Britain and 
in other parts of the globe such as the Caribbean, South Africa, Latin America and the US 
remains a fact (Parker and Song 2001, Bhatacharyya et al. 2002) However, this seemingly 
modern trend has a longer historical precedence and context within the formation of Black 
communities in Britain and in the formation of Britain as a whole which is repeatedly 
underrepresented. For example, the Black ‘mixed race’ populations of Liverpool, as 
mentioned above, were not represented within the narrative logic of the documentary. Within 
Invasion, it is clear that the temporal orientation of the Black presence in the UK conveniently 
overlooks and ignores a significant ‘mixed race’ heritage population in Britain that perhaps 
can make more concrete claims for an ‘indigenous’ Black British status. The fact that 
Invasion got it wrong by omitting the presence of Black communities both in and from 
Liverpool is not the single point I want to make here. They could have got that bit right and it 
still would have failed as a poor piece of filmmaking on the Black presence in Britain. 
However, its omissions are, as I have alluded to before, symptomatic and symbolic of how 
Black Liverpudlian and ‘mixed race’ histories are often marginalised within discourses that 
configure and reconfigure the historical emergence of Black Britain (Christian 1998). Mid 
twentieth century African and Caribbean immigration and settlement establish the framework 
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and terms of reference for locating blackness and its invasive presence in the British context. 
This is despite the fact that although small in number, Black populations in Britain have been 
here for centuries in cities such as Liverpool, London, Cardiff and Bristol, a legacy that can be 
traced back to Britain’s transatlantic slave trading connections (Fryer 1984). As Mark 
Christian notes, the Black community in Liverpool was also formed by the city’s university 
structure, which attracted male African students. Two world wars had bought West African 
seamen from British colonies to Liverpool, African American men to British military bases 
and African Caribbean men to the city’s munitions factories (Christian 1998). Thus, within 
Invasion, Britain is configured outside of this history, making the representation of mixed 
race heritages ahistorical. Instead, Britain is constructed as an ethnically unified and culturally 
homogenous island, a fixed cultural space where whiteness as a racial ideal and ideological 
assumption underpins a cohesive matrix between national identity, history and regional 
culture. This ideal was ruptured by Black migration from British colonial territories. A Black 
constituency such as that found in Liverpool, which had historically been settled into the 
fabric of Britain before the Windrush era, is unable to fit neatly into the programme’s concept 
of ‘invasion.’ It also defies the neatly formed concept of Britishness as being synonymous 
with whiteness. The evocative use the term ‘invasion’ allows the mid-twentieth century 
arrival and settlement of the Black populace to be viewed as an alien incursion, staged as a 
recent storming of social, cultural, geographical and biological borders. Such imaginings are 
symbolic of the ‘amnesic disavowal’ of blackness in the formation of the nation as discussed 
in the previous chapter. I can only speculate as to why the programme ignored or overlooked 
the Black presence in Liverpool. However it is a significant omission, illustrative of the much 
wider failure of hegemonic narratives of the nation and of the Black presence to take seriously 
the complex history of Black and ‘mixed race’ narratives in Britain beyond the familiar plot 
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line of post second world war immigration. The omission of Africans of ‘mixed’ origin 
heritage from the notion of Britishness reveals much more about how racism has remained a 
defining if not dominant factor in the Black ‘mixed race’ experience in Liverpool (Christian 
1998).  
 
Keeping racism in the mix 
The historical presence of Black populations in Liverpool and in other cities such as Cardiff 
are consistently marginalised and silenced in grand narratives of Englishness and ‘Black 
Britishness’ as Invasion illustrates. This further underlines the reality that, despite high levels 
of interracial mixing alongside long histories of ‘mixed race’ communities, deep rooted 
racially structured social inequalities in Britain have not ended. In other words, ‘the existence 
of ‘mixed race’ populations does not in itself end racism,’ (Parker and Song 2001, p9). 
The documentary failed to take seriously the social implications of the changing 
configuration of blackness in Britain, specifically the question of how despite the apparent 
welcoming of ‘intermixture,’ the phenomena itself has had very little impact upon the 
mechanisms that support structural forms of racism. Racism has remained a persistent 
problem that affects the lives of many Black and ‘mixed race’ heritage groups (Christian 
2000; Parker and Song 2001). Whilst Invasion acknowledges incidents of Black racial 
prejudice towards mixed race populations, the documentary overlooks the ways in which 
structural racism affects Black and mixed race populations as a whole. A study by France 
Winddance Twine (2004) introduces the concept of ‘racial literacy’ to highlight ways in 
which white ‘transracial’ birth parents cultivate ‘Black’ identities in their children of 
multiracial heritage as a form of anti-racist practice. Twine uses the term ‘racism-cognizance’ 
to refer to ‘white parents who identified racism as a serious problem for their children and had 
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concluded that it is either undesirable or impossible for their children to manage ‘everyday 
racisms’ if they are not taught how to identify and respond to racial hierarchies and resist 
racism(s) (Twine, 2004 pp.881-882). 
 
Disappearing Blackness  
The continuing impact of racism on Black, Brown and ‘mixed-race’ populations should lead 
us to question the unsettling celebratory tone of Invasion premised on the prospect of the 
gradual ‘disappearance’ of blackness from Britain, or, to paraphrase the euphemistic and 
ambiguous term deployed by the documentary itself, the ‘absorption’ of blackness into the 
‘British mainstream.’ This celebratory welcoming may reflect a change in white British 
attitudes towards ‘mixed race’ relationships (Bhattacharyya et al. 2002). However, it should 
further force us to question how Britain itself, as an ‘island race’, has ‘managed’ its 
relationship with blackness or non-white others, at different stages of its national socio-
historical and cultural formation. In this sense, the documentary’s pseudo multiculturalism 
and its cosmetic aesthetics of inclusion and diversity are unravelled by an embryonic and 
latent discourse on white privilege. This privilege on the one hand appears to welcome 
Britain’s ‘racially intermixed’ future by paying no attention to its hybrid past, whilst on the 
other, through the rhetoric of ‘mixing,’ ‘absorption’ and ‘disappearance,’ it appears to see its 
intermixed future as an easy way to obviate and camouflage questions of race and racism. The 
welcoming of a ‘mixed raced’ future can subsequently mask the socially entrenched levels of 
racial discrimination, cultural racism and structural disadvantage that have consistently faced 
many Black communities constructed or defined as ‘mixed’ or otherwise (Christian 2000).  
The prediction that Black people will eventually disappear by being ‘absorbed’ into the 
British mainstream seems to indulge a white supremacist fantasy that works against the grain 
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of conventional discourses on white ‘racial’ purity. White supremacist fantasies typically 
insist on the preservation of racial purity to protect the ‘white race.’ Instead this fantasy of 
absorption works differently. It makes the simple equation that more sexual and ‘racial’ 
intermixture across Black and white biological borders equals more progress in the 
eradication of ‘race’ in society because blackness will disappear by becoming more 
biologically ‘absorbed’ into the white nation. Blackness and all of the ‘baggage’ that comes 
with it can simply be washed away into the gene pool of mainstream Britain, thus cleaning the 
scourge and debris of racism from the nation’s collective memory. In this sense the logic of 
white supremacy is more complex and is not always so monolithically concerned with 
biological notions of genetic purity.    
 
Blanqueamianto - ‘The gradual whitening of blackness’ 
Across the Atlantic similar notions have emerged regarding ‘disappearing blackness.’ 
Theories of mestizage (race mixture) are commonplace in Latin American countries, where 
the intermixture of African, European and Native/indigenous cultures has formed hybrid 
‘racial’ populations (Godreau 2006). In her study on blackness as an exception in Puerto Rico, 
Isar P. Godreau (2006) recalls a comparable celebratory tone towards the gradual 
disappearance of blackness in Puerto Rican culture, where ideologies of blanqueamiento, 
reinforce notions of ‘the gradual ‘purging’ of Black features from the general population.’ 
Godreau argues that such discourses encourage and enable dominant nostalgic and romantic 
representations of blackness as remnants of a bygone era whilst whitening discourses are part 
and parcel of future modernity and the need to ‘rescue’ national traditions in Latin America. 
Godreau writes, 
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In March of 1995, The Sun Juan Star, one of Puerto Rico’s leading newspapers, 
announced that ‘Puerto Ricans will ‘bleach away’ many of the physical traces of its 
African past by the year 2200, with the other Spanish-speaking Caribbean following a 
few centuries later (Bliss 1995: 30). The article, which was written to commemorate 
the 122
nd
 anniversary of the abolition of slavery in the island, also seemed to be 
commemorating the future abolition of blackness itself. ‘In two centuries,’ said the 
historian Luis Diaz Soler, one of the experts interviewed, ‘there will hardly be any 
blacks in Puerto Rico’ (Godreau 2006, p.171). 
 
The gradual whitening of blackness she argues ‘goes hand in hand’ with discourses of 
mestizaje. Such discourses she suggests ‘tend to exclude blacks, deny racism, and 
delegitimize indigenous claims and demands’ (Godreau 2006, p.171). David Theo Goldberg 
also argues that Latin American states resist blackness in the national self image by ‘pushing 
it back into the shadows of both the physical and cultural landscapes’ (Goldberg 2009, p.228). 
In this sense, he argues that whitening or blanqueamiento/branqueamento, is not simply 
reproductive in the biological or phenotypical sense, ‘it also involves socio-cultural 
“enlightenment”, acquiring the morals and customs, the sensibilities associated with 
whiteness.’ Acquiring such sensibilities require the shedding of blackness or indigenous 
Indianness (Goldberg 2009, pp.229-228). In the UK, Parker and Song (2001) writing in the 
field of ‘mixed race’ studies, have also commented on the celebratory response to ‘mixed 
race’ people in contrast to classical formulations of ‘mixed race’ pathology, where 
miscegenation was thought to lead to the genetic deterioration of the nation an indeed the 
human race: 
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By contrast, in recent years both the popular and theoretical discussion of ‘mixed race’ 
has taken a more positive turn. Popular discussions in newspapers, radio, and 
television programmes laud ‘mixed race’ people as embodiments of the progressive 
and harmonious intermingling of cultures and peoples. Among theorists, Donna 
Haraway has observed, ‘Cross-overs, mixing and boundary transgressions are a 
favourite theme of late twentieth century commentators (…).’ Inverting received 
wisdom; hybridity, mongrelisation (sic) and syncretism are no longer pathologies, but 
celebrated as exemplars of contemporary cultural creativity (Parker and Song 2001, 
p.4).  
 
Historically, white colonial and imperialist cultures and societies with racialised hierarchies 
have produced conditions which formulate hybridised, racially stratified cultures. Mark 
Christian (2000) observes that the practice of miscegenation in the ‘New World’ was fostered 
within unequal power relations between white colonisers and oppressed Black populations. 
Under such systems, mixed unions were almost always based on force, from rape to 
concubinage (Christian 2000, p.122).  Thus, the question of autonomy and power remain 
important as contextual factors that determine how mixing bodies can relate to each other 
within racially stratified societies. Whilst today individuals can freely choose to be in a 
relationship with someone whose ethnicity is different from their own, this has not guaranteed 
protection from racism nor has it been a reliable indicator of improving race relations.   
Indeed, my concern here is with contemporary ‘celebratory’ discourses that seem to be 
distant from, but at the same time, are dependent upon an epistemology of biology where 
‘race mixing’, specifically ‘white’ race mixtures with non-whites, are seen as a progressive 
‘thermometer’ or measuring of improving social conditions (Platt 2008). This is troubling. It 
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is troubling precisely because ‘race mixture’ or miscegenation is not a new phenomenon in 
Britain. But more to the point, it is a very dangerous basis for any form of progressive social 
policy or politics. As Christian observes, 
 
Given the historical legacy of miscegenation in regard to white Europeans and African 
descended peoples, it is a misnomer to consider it as a contemporary phenomenon … 
Without careful consideration of the historical forces that have shaped racialised 
relations we cannot hope to understand the complex nature of the present situation 
(Christian 2000, pp.122-123). 
 
It is important to note that in the report Ethnicity and family: Relationships within and 
between ethnic groups (Platt 2008), commissioned by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, the term ‘racism’ is not used once within the document. Indeed, the report 
explores patterns of inter-ethnic partnerships across the different ethnic groups in Britain. It 
notes that, inter-ethnic relationships have often been seen as indicative of the extent of 
openness in different societies and of the extent to which ethnic identities are adapting and 
changing over time. They are therefore taken to be a reliable ‘thermometer’ of ethnic relations 
in particular societies (Platt 2008). However it is my contention that although the prevalence 
of mixed race couplings may be an indicator of shifting social attitudes to ‘mixed race’ 
relations, the true openness of society’s attitude towards inter-ethnic relations cannot 
successfully be measured without linking these attitudes to the prevalence of racism in 
processes that continue to exclude and marginalise different ethnic groups. Therefore, they are 
ambiguous and unstable measurements for gauging our progress towards dismantling 
systematised forms of racism. 
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Discourses that infer that more sexual intercourse between ‘different’ ethnic groups 
equates to a progressive anti-racist strategy - even when such discourses appear to be 
operating outside the sphere of ‘biology’ by functioning within the realm of social trends and 
cultural practice - should always be scrutinised. I am arguing that, despite histories of social 
intermixture between different ethnic groups as historically exemplified in cities such as 
Liverpool, histories of ‘intermixture’ have not halted the dire effects of systematic and 
structural forms of racialised oppression on minority groups (Christian 1998). If we move 
beyond the biology of mixing bodies and interrogate discourses that lend themselves to an 
epistemological logic of purity and mixture, then we must consider as Godreau has noted, 
how these discourses ‘tend to exclude blacks, deny racism, and deligitimise indigenous claims 
and demands’ (Godreau 2006). 
 
Troubling terms of race 
The notion of ‘race mixture’ is itself problematic as it implies that before ‘mixture’, racial 
purity and stability were the norms and mixture an aberration. Jennifer Deverer Brody (1998), 
in her study on race, gender and ethnicity in Victorian England notes that the concept of race 
mixture presupposes pure forms and that the reproduction of purity requires the erasure of 
hybridity (Brody 1998 p.1). In this sense a unified ‘dry’
2
 sense of Englishness depends upon 
overlooking and ignoring hybridity to maintain the impossible fiction of ‘a land-locked island 
of Albion free from contact and contamination’ (Brody 1998, p.5). Thus hybridity in 
dominant narratives of the white nation functions as an unsettling smear upon imaginary 
projections of white purity and Englishness. As Brody observes, rather than emphasising 
‘connectedness, contact or commonality, English literary texts often stress the nation’s 
                                                 
2
 Brody makes a distinction between ‘wet and ‘dry’ versions of English history, ‘where  ‘wet’ means muddied, 
muddled, and meddled with (hence impure), and ‘dry’ means officially sanctioned and purified’ (Brody, p.6). 
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continual covering over, absorption, or exaggeration of differences’ to maintain the myth of a 
stable English identity (Brody, 1998 p.6). She further suggests that, ‘repeated ruptures in the 
narration of the nation are smoothed by sanitized, sanctioned versions of history’ (Brody 
ibid.). If we consider Brody’s analysis in terms of how Invasion narrates the nation, the 
constructed sense of Britishness is ‘sanctioned’ by the privileging of a presumed white 
hegemonic gaze, ‘sanitised’ by the nation absorbing and exaggerating the difference of the 
Black subject, whilst the text ‘smoothes over’ Britain’s historical legacy as a hybrid ‘racial’ 
nation by not taking seriously the Black presence in Britain beyond the narrative of mid 
twentieth century Caribbean settlement. Instead Invasion opted for a reactionary discourse 
towards an invasive Black interloper whilst at the same time expunging the socio-historical 
narrative of the Black ‘mixed heritage’ presence. This I would argue negates the welcoming 
of future cosmopolitanism promised by ‘racialised-mixing’ which, therfore, appears to be 
rather shallow and cosmetic in light of the fact that, this development is not at all new, nor 
without precedence. For what use do such celebrations serve if they are not accompanied by 
values and practices for social equality and justice? 
My thesis argues that absorption stands as a sort of assimilation and containment of 
blackness and other forms of ‘otherness’ within the nation. Blackness in this binary logic 
exists in direct tandem to whiteness as an object that can be gradually absorbed and then 
‘mixed away’ into whiteness, until it gradually fades and disappears (Brody 1998). In a social 
climate where the knee-jerk rejection of progressive multiculturalism has become fashionable, 
the notion of ‘absorption’ connotes processes of homogenisation. In the case of blackness in 
Britain, absorption is not always necessarily centred on bio-politics or degrees of phenotype, 
skin shade or hair texture. Most clearly, absorption can also come in the form of policing 
ideas, thinking, beliefs and practices. However, diminishing blackness, signified in the 
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context of Invasion by the biological intermixing of Caribbean Black migrant communities 
with white populations, is represented as an inevitable, if not Darwinian ‘natural’ order, that 
in the end will stabilise the continuity of the nation. Blackness in this kind of racialised logic 
is conceived as an unsustainable intrusion, an aberration whose rupturing tendencies and 
legacies must be contained through narratives of ‘disappearance’ and ‘absorption’ that 
maintain the continuity of ‘normative national sameness’ (Goldberg 2004). 
Thus the ‘Black British’ subject lives in a persistent malaise of social and historical 
‘racial concealment’ through an engagement with processes of amnesia in the erasure of 
blackness from the British body politic. In other words racialised ‘rupture in the narration of 
the nation’ remains contentious and can be concealed through the persistent notion that 
Britishness or indeed Englishness equates, in the end, to the myth of biological whiteness. As 
Brody notes, such concealments are not only implausible but also impossible to maintain 
(Brody 1998).  
 
Reframing Black Liverpool and that moment of optimism 
So how is my discussion on The Great British Black Invasion, blackness and ‘mixed race’ 
populations in the narration of the British nation relevant to the question posed at the start of 
this chapter? The question being as to whether the ‘optimistic moment’ of being Black and 
British has finally passed? In answer, I would say that it has not totally disappeared, but that 
the terrain of this optimism has shifted beyond the national framework towards a more 
explicit transnational axis. To explain this in more detail, it is necessary to highlight that 
within academic accounts of ‘Black British cultural studies’ the cosmopolitan ideal of mixing 
multi-ethnic communities has held much political promise and theoretical appeal for some 
time in Britain (Baker et al. 1996; Owusu 2000). Hybridity and cultural mixes were, as Parker 
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and Song have noted, the cultural order of the day, which underscored the optimism of that 
moment. Contemporary cities such as London were imagined at this stage to be a workable 
cosmopolitan model for British multiculturalism (Hall 2004). Indeed, that earlier moment of 
optimism can be seen as emerging from the specific provisional location of London. Whilst 
London remains an important setting for interpretations of Black cultures in Britain, it is 
nonetheless regionally specific and cannot always be a representational micro construct of 
‘blackness and Britishness’ (Hesse 2000; Hesse 2009). In the online article, ‘The Divided 
City: the Crisis of London’, Stuart Hall (2004), discusses the demise of contemporary 
multicultural cities such as London, which represented a hopeful example of the 
heterogeneous metropolis. Hall now argues that neo–liberal globalisation and its disastrous 
consequences are reproducing in the city the growing inequalities of the world (Hall 2004).  
He notes that certain significant global shifts have taken place, including post–
industrialisation, globalization and migration, which have also bought with them the social 
dislocations that accompany these processes including deepening levels of intolerance and 
inequality (Hall 2004). Whilst The Great British Black Invasion recognises that Black Britain 
is changing in context to these global shifts, specifically globalization and migration, the 
documentary’s latent anxiety perpetuated the familiar notion of Britain as a hermetically 
sealed nation whose only way of coping with these changes is to absorb or obviate the 
invasive presence of migrant human beings. Black Liverpool seems not to be explicitly 
acknowledged as part of the now familiar narrative of the British ‘white’ nation, nor it seems, 
was it part of that ‘optimistic moment’ in the 1990s of plural ‘blackness and Britishness.’ And 
yet it too, like London, provided another unique perspective on ‘Black British’ 
cosmopolitanism. Liverpool suggested that the ‘optimism’ of cosmopolitanism had already 
been tempered, compromised and restricted by systematic deprivation and intergenerational 
Diminishing  blackness 
 
 158 
inequality, poor public services, poorly maintained housing, heavy handed and overtly 
discriminatory policing and the salient presence of white supremacy (Christian 1998).  At the 
same time, Liverpool’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ also created a politically defiant transnational 
space remaking the city as a place with distinct African and Black diasporic orientations that 
were historically rooted and culturally created by its decidedly heterogeneous Black populous 
(Christian 1998 and 2000; Brown 2006). Indeed, at the heart of enunciating ‘Black Britain,’ 
Liverpool’s ‘specific’ and ‘particular’ expressions of blackness present complex questions of 
how notions of nation, region, race, class and gender work to make blackness in Britain a 
dynamic and yet contested diasporic transnational place (Brown 2005). 
 
Transnational Blackness and Liverpool 
Mark Christian’s 2000 study, Multiracial Identity reveals the complexity of theorising mixed 
racial identities within the context of white supremacy. His study provides some empirical 
insight into the views of Black ‘mixed race’ communities in Liverpool. Scholars on Black 
communities in Liverpool, including Christian (Christian 1998 & 2000; Brown 2005 & 2006), 
are keen to point out that Liverpool’s mixed race populations were not afforded any special 
privileges that protected them from racism because of their interracial status. On the contrary, 
Christian argues that people of ‘mixed origins’ in Britain have historically been branded 
social misfits whilst social research carried  out in the 1990s found that in relation to 
Liverpool, the Black community has experienced an unparalleled system of racial oppression 
in the UK (Christian 1998).  
Christian (2000) is concerned with the ways in which ‘mixed race’ communities in 
Liverpool have created their own social reality in response to their location as citizens of the 
city as well as being connected to a wider global Black constituency. In Liverpool, blackness 
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was far from monolithic. Rather than being fixed entities, racial labels had changed politically 
over time and place, from the derogatory and widely rejected term ‘half-caste,’ to the unique 
and specific ‘Liverpool born Black.’ As Christian explains, 
 
Identification with such a term as ‘Liverpool-born Black’ often indicates a sense of 
racialised consciousness in which a person … can articulate a distinct life experience. 
‘Liverpool-Born Black’ is certainly something unique to the city of Liverpool, as you 
do not hear terms such as ‘Birmingham-Born Black’, or ‘London-born Black’, for 
example, elsewhere in Britain. Rather it appears to be a term created solely in the 
context of the Black experience in the city of Liverpool (Christian 2000, p.26). 
 
In constructing what Christian calls the ‘racial self’, most respondents to his study accepted of 
a Black identity. This identity was often qualified by gender - ‘Black woman/man;’ by nation 
– ‘Black British;’ and by location – ‘Liverpool born Black.’ Blackness was also defined 
within the context of African, Caribbean, American and European parental kinship ties. Jayne 
O. Ifekwunigwe (2001), through her interpretation of the oral testimonies of 
African/Caribbean and English/Irish mixed heritage women in Bristol, argues that ‘‘mixed 
race” subjectivities are both self-constructed as situational, negotiable and fluid as well as 
externally constrained by static, essentialist and binary notions of Blackness and Whiteness’ 
(Ifekwunigwe 2001, p.42). Ifekwunigwe seeks to establish a space for African and European 
mixed heritage people to reconcile their mixed ancestry in such a way that blackness can be 
affirmed individually and collectively as a response to racialised oppression without 
‘compromising allegiances and attachments “mixed race” people may have to white identities, 
cultures and family’ (Ifekwunigwe 2001, p.58). But as David Theo Goldberg reminds us, 
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whiteness and blackness ‘are structural conditions of possibility and restriction, not simply 
social identities’ (Goldberg 2009, p.226). Rather than seeing blackness as a site of limitation 
or as a construct that denies access to white parental heritage, for “mixed race” populations in 
Liverpool, blackness opened up a complex set of possibilities which were both gendered and 
transnational in their inception and cultural practice. 
Jacqueline Nassy Brown’s (2005) textured anthropological study Dropping Anchor, 
Setting Sail: Geographies of Race in Black Liverpool makes an important insight into how 
racialised identities were mobilised in Liverpool explicitly as political categories as opposed 
to the racialised logic of genetic ancestry. Brown’s detailed study on Black Liverpool 
provides us with a complex reading of the transnational social space. Brown observes that for 
Liverpool-born blacks ‘Black’ identities were not inherited but created by the local conditions 
of white racism. As Greg, a respondent in her study explains, 
 
[Black is] a political definition of what we have to do for ourselves living in a white 
racist environment. I see it more in terms of that. But my father was West African … 
He was Nigerian and he didn’t really have to find an identity within England … He 
was pro-West African, pro-having children in Britain; he wouldn’t define it as Black 
… I know from being in Nigeria that my statements about being Black are 
predominantly not understood (Brown 2005, p.71). 
 
As Brown observes, ‘Greg frames the relationship between Black and African identities in 
terms of difference, not [biological] descent.’ Blackness thus becomes a form of political 
practice rather than simply an inherited racial biology (Brown 2005, p71). Greg’s account is 
even more revealing in the way the process of ‘becoming’ Black is situational. Here a white 
Diminishing  blackness 
 
 161 
racially-stratified environment creates the conditions for politicised transnational forms of 
blackness. This politicised praxis may not be occupied or shared by all people sharing the 
same phenotype, as Greg’s relationship to his father shows.  Brown also makes an important 
intervention by demonstrating how the Black transnational space, a central component in the 
formation and production of Liverpool’s Black identities, can also be split by the politics of 
gender, providing men and women ‘with quite different motivations for seeking affirmation 
from blacks elsewhere’ (Brown 2005, p.42). Brown argues that whilst Liverpool’s African 
men created the city, ‘Black women’s migration to the United States expanded the space 
within which Black Liverpool presently exists’ (Brown 2006 p.88). Brown’s respondents 
explained the exclusionary gendered practices and sexual tensions that sent ‘some Black 
Liverpudlians down the diasporic path.’ Here Black women from Liverpool married 
Americans GIs and moved to the United States because they felt excluded from Black male 
desire in Liverpool (Brown 2005, p.47). Whilst ‘Black women said they were perpetually 
overlooked by Black men … the latter commonly recited the refrain that ‘the Yanks stole our 
women’’ (Brown 2005, p.47). Brown also observed that Black American iconography in the 
form of the Black Power movement as well as African American music and personalities 
were all accessed by Liverpudlians as a counter-hegemonic diasporic resource, as a way to 
feel good about themselves (Brown 2005, p.53). Interestingly, the city’s engagement with the 
transnational space was not only triggered by the structural effects of white racism, but by 
blacks rejecting different forms of blackness across boundaries of ‘race’, gender and 
generation. Both Brown and Christian have observed the existence of difficult relationships 
between some African/African Caribbean parents and their ‘mixed race’ children. In some 
cases Liverpool-born blacks felt they needed to go beyond kinship relationships to acquire a 
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Black identity that equipped them with a countercultural politics that could effectively 
challenge white racism (Brown 2005; Christian 2000). As Brown writes: 
 
Displaced by their fathers, young Black Liverpudlians accepted the invitation to 
universal belonging being issued from Black American quarters (Brown 2005. p.52). 
 
In light of Brown’s and Christian’s research, I am arguing that Liverpool’s ‘optimism’ beyond 
the ‘Black and British’ paradigm, was concerned with the transnational space as a location to 
assemble Black identities that enabled a sense of wholeness and belonging to other forms of 
blackness that confirmed their worth as human beings. An important part of this project is 
recognising that blackness can be defined and redefined beyond monolithic, static or limiting 
or limited conceptions. As bell hooks reminds us, 
  
It is only as we collectively change the way we look at ourselves and the world that we 
can change how we are seen. In this process, we seek to create a world where 
everyone can look at blackness, and Black people with new eyes (hooks 1992, p.6). 
 
The transnational space became located within the local vicinity of Liverpool as much as 
being genealogically routed to kinship networks which tied Liverpool born blacks to West 
and East Africa, the Caribbean and the United States. Barnor Hesse’s observations suggest 
that the transnational engagement of Black Liverpudlians with Black America demarcates 
how regionalized and urban Black affinity with some of the diasporic lineages of the Atlantic 
world can usurp the coupling of Black Britishness as a national identity. He writes, ‘Black 
regionalism must be understood as a precursor to and a correlative of Black Britishness’ 
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(Hesse 2000, p.103). However, Black regionalism in Liverpool was far from parochial. As 
Hesse has noted further, ‘Liverpool as a city was able to look outwards and forwards towards 
the Atlantic rather than inwards and backwards towards Lancashire’ (Hesse 2000, p.102).  
Blackness was also being made and created within the transnational space as it became 
knitted and woven into the fabrics of Black American anti-racist politics and countercultural 
discourses that supported Black Liverpool’s articulation of self-worth and self respect. 
 
Conclusion 
The original ‘optimistic moment’ of the 1990s has now been tempered by temporal distance 
and by the increasing circulation of transnational practices, in which Britishness and 
blackness are identities being constantly redefined by transnational forces. That moment has 
also been kept in its place by Britain’s and indeed Europe’s racial articulation of itself in  
‘terms of the denial, exclusion, and ultimately the purging of those not white … from first its 
ideational conception and then also from what it has taken as its territory’ (Goldberg 2009, 
p.187). Hall’s proposal that Black people in the UK had needed to adopt a ‘Black and British’ 
identity so as to not exhaust all of our identities, was one way of disrupting the singularity of 
essentialist notions of blackness and Britishness. Hall was proposing a politics of cultural 
pluralism and representation by attempting to align and integrate blackness into the British 
body politic. However, the ‘optimistic moment’ failed to register the complexity of blackness 
itself beyond the politics of plural identities, in such a way that it overlooked the reality that 
‘structural conditions of possibility and restriction’ will always be at play for blacks and non-
whites so long as racism exists (Goldberg 2009, p.226). Hall’s suggestion, whilst building on 
anti-essentialist critiques to problemtize monolithic homogenising notions of blackness, ends 
up relying on the stability of the very notion that blackness is static, in order to develop an 
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anti-essentialist position as an alternative way forward. The problem here is that anti-
essentialist formulation suggests that blackness is simply not enough and thus needs to be 
modified by a pluralistic notion of Britishness, a notion that is itself problematic. I am saying 
that even in without pluralistic modifying notions of Britishness, blackness in Britain stands 
as a complex, plural transnational location with complex and uneven lineages that usurp the 
need for it to be qualified by national forms of quasi or performative pluralism.  
Brown (2005) and Christian (2000) have shown affirming a Black identity provided 
Liverpool’s mixed race population with a set of complex options in terms of shaping their 
political identities. In some cases blackness was actively pursued to challenge prevailing 
conditions of white supremacy. Brown’s study suggests that those who went in search of 
blackness did not always retrieve the same uniform results. Both men and women found 
different models of African Americanised blackness that contrasted sharply with what some 
participants perceived as the apolitical blackness of their African paternal genealogies, from 
which they often felt alienated. The women in Brown’s study also found gendered models of 
blackness that, according to Brown, significantly challenge the dominant historical narrative 
of Liverpool’s formation as an ‘African city’, a narrative that predominantly identities and 
affirms the role of African male seafaring travellers as the forefathers and shapers of 
blackness in Liverpool. The oral testimonies in Brown’s work suggest an alternative and 
much more discursive narrative at play. Women travellers had also played a role in shaping 
Liverpool as a Black transnational space through their marriages to American servicemen, 
their subsequent migration to the US (where on arrival they were seen as novelties due to their 
combination of ‘blackness’ and Liverpudlian identities) and as returning travellers to 
Liverpool to visit or resettle. Brown argues that rather than reifying Black female travel and 
experience over male narratives of seafaring, she is much more concerned with,  
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how particular practices, such as travel, and processes, such as community formation, 
come to be infused with gender ideologies (or ‘gendered’), and how such gendering 
effectively determines the different social locations men and women can legitimately 
occupy (Brown 2005, p.56). 
 
Brown’s study helps us to realise the ‘centrality of gender ideologies to the production of 
diasporic space’ (Brown 2005, p.56). I have utilised Brown and Christian’s research on Black 
Liverpool in this study to interpret a form of ‘loving blackness’ where identities are created 
and made in such a way as to reclaim Black life. In this respect, loving blackness is far from a 
monolithic enterprise that reproduces monolithic notions of Black humanity.  
Thus it is necessary to ask can Black people in Britain really continue to talk about the 
plausibility of the ‘Black British’ subject. This question may appear to concede a victory to 
the racist xenophobes who would like nothing more than to see the annihilation of blackness 
from a white supremacist racialised Britishness. Take for example The BNP chairman Nick 
Griffin whose party leaflet claims that Black and Asian Britons ‘do not exist’ (Guardian 23 
April 2009). In this respect, here, through the dynamic utilisation of diasporic resources, 
transnational notions of blackness can act as revolutionary interventions ‘that undermine the 
practice of domination’ (hooks 1992, p.20) helping marginalised human beings to recover 
their human worth.  
If blackness is continuously undermined by hegemonic narration (Invasion), by 
narratives of its disappearing presence, as well as by extremist exclusionary notions of 
whiteness and Britishness (BNP), what relationships are Black subjects forming with 
Britishness and blackness beyond national borders? In the next chapter, I will discuss how 
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Black peoples are forming dynamic transnational connections which consciously and 
unconsciously decentre and transcend nationhood by constructing identities on routes of 
popular culture and migration that shed some new light on the layered and complex 
expressions of Black life in the UK. 
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Chapter 5 
 
SLIPPIG AD SHIFTIG 
The changing parameters of Blackness in Britain 
 
Introduction 
As a consequence of globalisation, the changing formation, pattern and shape of Blackness on 
British soil is occurring with such speed and complexity that it is now disrupting our former, 
perhaps simpler notions of ‘Black Britishness.’ These dynamic shifts make the task of 
locating ‘Black Britishness’ and its meaning even more tenuous and difficult. So why am I 
arguing that Black Britishness has become a tenuous location? To answer is to rearticulate the 
obvious fact that we are and have been for sometime now, living in an increasingly ‘global’ 
world (Song 2005, p.60). The consequences of our globalised situation are that we are 
increasingly interconnected through distinct flows or ‘scapes’ that circulate our planet with 
scant regard for national sovereignty carrying capital, information, images, people, ideas and 
technologies (Appadurai 2004). Miri Song (2005) observes that globalization is a dialectical 
process. Rather than producing a uniform set of changes, globalisation consists of mutually 
opposed tendencies.  Song argues that on the one hand globalisation can be seen as a process 
of gradual homogenization dictated by the West in, for example, what we eat and what we 
wear. But on the other, globalisation can also produce new hybridized identities in the context 
of declining national identities where more and more people are said to be involved in more 
than one culture (Song 2005, pp.60-61).  
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In this chapter, I will attempt to show how the turbulent currents generated by these 
global ‘flows’ are impacting upon the everyday spheres of Black life in Britain, gradually 
eroding the coupling of ‘Black and Britain.’ I will also show that Black diasporas in the UK 
are ‘transnational, spatially and temporally sprawling sociocultural formations of people’ 
(Song 2005, p.61), tempered by deep-rooted social inequalities that affect young Black people 
in Britain as well as ‘newly arrived’ refugee, asylum and migrant populations. I am using the 
‘transnational’ as a framework to illustrate and to, 
 
describe the ways in which globalization challenges social organization and identity 
construction. Scholars using these terms are interested in how heightened social, 
economic, and political interconnectedness across national borders and cultures 
enables individuals to sustain multiple identities and loyalties, create new cultural 
products using elements from a variety of settings, and exercise multiple political and 
civic memberships (Levitt and Waters 2002 cited in Song 2005 p.61).  
 
But rather than just focusing on the construction and organisation of identities, I am also 
questioning the political and ethical value of Black Britishness within a highly contentious 
national situation where racism and the popular vilification of migrant groups continue to 
shape the lives of various Black and migrant populations in Britain. I will begin with a brief 
examination of contemporary ‘grime music’ in the UK and then move on to a lengthier 
discussion on migration and racism and their continuing impact upon our understanding of 
what ‘Black Britishness’ means in 21
st
 century. These two examples of Blackness and racism 
in Britain may appear unrelated. However, I am situating them within a wider populist 
discourse driven by circuits of fear (Kundnani 2007, p.184). Such fear-inducing discourses 
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thrive on the demonization of Black youth and asylum seekers in different ways whilst 
chastising Muslims for having ‘alien’ values,  excluding the underclass for having no value, 
and expelling asylum seekers for being ‘both valueless and alien’ (Kundnani 2007, p.184). 
Furthermore, both examples are important to the ways in which we understand the slippery 
and shifting parameters of Blackness in Britain today. Whilst the visibility and popularity of 
Black popular culture can be read as a sign of Black ‘settlement’, this can conceal discourses 
on the continuing marginalisation of young Black people in Britain. This Black visibility also 
contrasts with the invisibility and vilification of refugees and asylum seekers who are 
consistently configured as perpetually alien outsiders. Both discourses demonstrate in 
different ways the changing, contradictory and unsettling tensions within Black populations in 
Britain. I will therefore conclude by introducing bell hooks’ concept of loving Blackness and 
ask whether this idea is an ethical political position for divergent and different Black and 
migrant populations to find some common ground to develop a politics of solidarity and anti-
racism within a transnational context. 
 
‘It’s Grimey’ - Black Popular Culture in Britain 
Globally, hip-hop music no longer sits at the margins of popular culture within global circuits 
of music. Indeed, it has with certainty shifted to the centre. Within the global economy, Black 
transatlantic cultural forms such as hip-hop and RnB as well as Jamaican dancehall music, are 
highly lucrative cultural commodities. Due to its commercialisation, hip hop is now accused 
of producing hegemonic representations of globalised Blackness (Codrington 2006). Paul 
Gilroy describes African American popular music and culture as ‘being reduced to the role of 
soundtrack to the new imperium’ (Gilroy 2007, p.304). Here, Gilroy seems to be making a 
rather sweeping point that cleanly implicates African American music and culture as part of 
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the axis of globalised US imperialism. He too holds African American culture to account for 
creating a generic US-centred form of Blackness that has become the ‘lingua franca for bored 
and disenchanted youth everywhere’ (Gilroy 2007, pp.304-306). As a result Gilroy warns us 
that ‘many young Black Britons have no idea that their social and economic predicament 
might differ from the position of African Americans trapped in an environment where rigid 
segregation remains an unspoken norm’ (Gilroy 2007, p.306). Gilroy is suggesting that many 
young Black people in Briton have access to unique and distinctive historical experiences that 
can not be fully articulated, in any meaningful way, by simply imitating commodified US 
representations of Blackness. Whilst the sentiment of Gilroy’s argument may be true, I want 
to show that amongst a generation of young Black artists in the UK Grime and hip-hop scene, 
many have demonstrated an historical appreciation of their distinctive heritage as Black quasi-
citizens in Britain. 
Within the continuing traffic of globalised, commodifiable and hegemonic Blackness, 
aspects within UK hip-hop are also eagerly engaged in consuming and reproducing 
‘hyperbolic’ modes of Blackness. By ‘hyperbolic’ I am referring to representations of 
monolithic and hegemonic Blackness that are mapped onto what Robin D. G. Kelley (2006) 
calls the bankrupt images of gangsterism and materialism that continue to dominate the 
globalised narratives of commercial hip-hop. Or indeed what Tricia Rose (2008) has called 
rap’s calling cards of hyper-sexism, homophobia as well as self-destructive and violent 
portraits of Black masculinity. In the UK, Channel AKA on Rupert Murdoch’s Sky Digital 
TV service streams late night ‘underground’ xxx-rated low budget ‘porno’ style UK hip hop 
videos. AKA is one example of a media platform where hyperbolic Blackness UK style is 
both reproduced and consumed.  At the same time, however, and contrary to Gilroy’s 
legitimate concerns, amongst those who participate in UK hip hop cultures, some are doing 
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more than simply aping or imitating commodified African American cultural exports. 
Through the genre of ‘Grime’ music, some are also asserting aspects of the political 
particularities of their cultural, socio-historical and economic predicament of being young 
human and Black in London.  
Grime music is an innovative syncretism of ‘street English’, reggae, dancehall, hip 
hop, drum n base and UK Garage, that constructs a distinctive East London soundscape 
(McKinnon 2005). Its syncretic character is also an example of the dialectical process of 
globalisation as discussed above by Miri Song that represents a multiplicity of globalised 
intersecting identities. More to the point however it also articulates what Barnor Hesse has 
called the ‘historical discontinuities’ of Black Britishness where, in a ‘historical series of 
signifying sequences’, we see that Black Britishness has ‘recurrently been articulated 
precisely because there have been constant narrative displacements and interruptions of 
historic continuity’ (Hesse 2000, p.113). I am suggesting that the narrative disruption of 
grime, can also occupy a distinctly transnational expression. 
 
Black Boys and Eski Beats 
In 2007 UK Grime artists, Bashy, ‘The Street Commentator,’ released his track Black Boys, 
firstly as a solo performance, then followed by a remix featuring over 20 different Grime 
lyricists, creating what has since been called a moment of unprecedented and rare unity within 
the UK Grime scene (Devlin, circa 2007-2008). As an intentionally ‘positive,’ record (it was 
released to coincide with Black History Month in the UK), in a music scene known for being 
‘eski’ - meaning brittle, cold and rugged - Black Boys unapologetically set out to dismantle 
the mainstream ‘negative’ media stereotypes of young Black boys as a monolithic group of 
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criminal perpetrators of gun and knife crime in London.
1
 Bashy, the 24 year old former post 
office worker and bus driver stated ‘I wanted to do something positive and aspirational, and 
something that’s not been done before.’ Black Boys reproduces Blackness and the problems 
facing Black youth in Britain predominantly through the lens of Black masculinity within a 
rites of passage narrative that highlights the male transition from boyhood to manhood: 
(Chorous) 
Black Boys, Black Boys, 
Yeah We're All Black Boys, 
And One Day We're Gonna Be Black Men, 
One Day We Might Have Black Boys  
And We Gotta Teach Them To Be Black Men (Bashy 2007) 
 
Despite repeating a long tradition of masculinising blackness by reducing blackness to the 
experiences of Black males, Black Boys had also created a rare public space for young Black 
men as well as a scattering of women and white males to collectively ‘spit’
2
 an insightful 
piece of social commentary on young Black life in London. Whilst the solo single paid 
homage to a long eclectic list of ‘Black British’ public figures from the world of politics, 
grime, sport and entertainment (including Bernie Grant, Beverley Knight, Wiley, Trevor 
McDonald, Mark Louis Frances, Sade and Ms Dynamite) the remix went a step further by 
highlighting the ambiguous representation of popular images of Black people in the British 
media and public imagination. In one verse, Black Boys highlights the contradictory 
representations of Black athletes and footballers celebrated for being as British as ‘bangers 
and Mash and tea’ whilst in everyday life, Black boys are stereotyped as criminals and 
thieves. The remix also asked its audience to contextualise the contemporary racism 
experienced by young Black people in London within earlier histories of racial discrimination 
                                                 
1
 In 2003, Culture Minister Kim Howells launched an attack on rap music calling its proponents ‘idiots’ whilst 
claiming it ‘glamorises’ gun culture. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/2752681.stm 
 
2
 The term ‘spit’ means to deliver a verse of rap.  
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in Britain; ‘They make us feel like the enemy, but have you forgotten “No Blacks, No, Dogs 
or Irish”’ - a reminder of the discriminatory housing practices by private landlords during the 
mid twentieth century settlement of Caribbean migrants to Britain. The track also narrates the 
historical continuities between the sacrifices made by Black citizens for Britain; ‘we went 
through two world wars for this country … our granddad blood poured for this country,’ with 
the persistence of contemporary racism; ‘still you want to call us a monkey.’ Alongside 
Bashy’s Black Boys, other artists within the grime music scene have also expressed their own 
contested relationship to the nation. In his track entitled Slippin’ (2007), Grime artist Wiley a 
leading pioneer of Grime music, expresses his contestation through narratives of multiple 
boundaries and affinities across spaces and locations.  He states, 
 
I was slippin’ in southwest London 
&o strap, no ‘chete on my ones with the gash 
I had to splurt from southwest London 
Wrong place, wrong time no you can’t have a stripe 
[Listen, yo] 
I’m real the people know 
I go places where you don’t go 
You can find me in the hood murkin’ a show 
It’s all normal, I’m up for making the dough 
And if you wanna rob me don’t be an amateur 
‘Cause if I get away I’ll be back in a mo 
Tell me to convert if you wanna 
‘Cause I swear the only answer you will hear is no 
I will return to my country one day 
but only when I’ve got enough dough 
I won’t get cozy here in England 
I’m goin’ back to Trinidad and Tobago 
Listen, if I was you I wouldn’t watch my dough 
‘cause I would never let two pound go 
And I won’t stay around so you can get stripes 
You’ll see me again and I’ll be on my own (Wiley 2007). 
 
On this track, Wiley demarcates spatial territories of belonging and alienation between the 
UK and the Caribbean leading us to enquire as to where and how Black Britain is emerging 
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between these two contested transnational locations. Within Slippin, Black Britain emerges 
from the local specific ‘hood’ space that interconnects the UK and the Caribbean. Here, inner 
city London becomes the ‘normal’ yet ‘dicey’ everyday intermediary territory situated 
between England and Trinidad and Tobago, the diasporic space he calls ‘my country.’ An 
expressed desire to return to Trinidad and Tobago in contrast to a deliberate reluctance to 
becoming too ‘cozy in England,’ marks the ‘transruptive politics of Black (unsettlement) in 
Britain’ (Hesse 2000, p.134). In this narrative, diaspora becomes a space of psychic cultural 
dependence, of hope and economic investment. Indeed, his imagined return ‘to my country’ is 
dependent upon hustling or making enough ‘dough’ (money) one day.  
This enterprising and entrepreneurial cultural formation of Black Britain has been 
noted by Stuart Hall (2000) as emerging from a contradictory space of desirable Black style, 
Black social exclusion alongside Black victimisation and systematic structures of deprivation 
(2000, p.128). Indeed, as one artist explains in the Black Boys remix, ‘from a place called 
“have not” where we make do with the space that we have got there’s no hand outs here on 
the Black Block.’ Hall’s observation underlines this ‘hustling’ sentiment as he argues that this 
generation, 
 
Are not reliant on any kind of corporate or collectivist culture to make a life for 
themselves. We have to understand this development in its context. In the last two 
decades the majority of Black people have seen the decline of the welfare state; the 
political culture which supported more collective aspirations to a better and more 
secure life has withered away (Hall 2000, p.128). 
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Hall is registering the discord between the ‘hustling’ aspirations of young Black people to 
occupy and carve out a meaningful space for themselves in British society against the falling 
away ‘of institutional apparatuses concerned in principle at least to advance the welfare state’ 
(Goldberg, p.331). Alongside social security and welfare safety nets, the welfare state 
between the 1930s and 1970s, saw an investment in public education, national health systems 
and the emergence of state bureaucracies as major employers of historically excluded groups 
(Goldberg 2009, p.331). Under Thatcherism and then New Labour (Hassan and Barnett 2008) 
neoliberal democracies had expanded the privatisation of ‘property, revenue generation, 
utilities, services and social support systems’ (Goldberg 2009, p.332). In this era of 
neoliberalism, social welfare commitments to education, work, health care and housing have 
become increasingly under-or defunded, gradually eroding the small social gains made by 
those historically excluded and thus exacerbating their inequality even further (Goldberg 
2009). David Theo Goldberg argues that the demise of the welfare state should be seen in the 
context of securing privatised interests from ‘those considered to have little or no standing, 
the welfare of whom is calculated to cost too much, economically or politically’ (Goldberg 
2009, p.332). 
As we can see in the lyrics of Black Boys and Slippin, grime music like hip hop, has 
grown out of extreme social and economic disenfranchisement. Tricia Rose argues that in the 
US, the creativity of hip hop emerged under extreme social and economic pressure (Rose 
2008, p.266). The ‘do for self’ rugged entrepreneurial creativity and consciousness espoused 
and evident in Slippin and Black Boys is an indication of how young Black working class 
people claim a sense of autonomy over space which is critical in a situation where Black men 
and women continue to experience high levels of social disenfranchisement and limited 
access to structural forms of power. However it is also a reflection of how, as Hall suggests, 
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the individualistic politics of ‘hustling’ has now taken over from collective group politics. In 
this social context, where the hustle has become the normative mode of survival, the once 
perhaps inviting notion of a conciliatory sense of ‘Black Britain’ has also been ‘slippin’ away. 
Furthermore, the ‘hustle’ is not confined to the ‘street’ or to one generation or social class. It 
has become the lingua franca for 21
st
 century Black and migrant people in Britain who more 
often than not are left to their own devices to hustle their own way through the social 
inequalities and intensifying forms of discrimination since the demise of collective anti-racist 
politics (Kundnani 2007).  
By focusing briefly on the UK Grime scene, I am attempting to question why some 
British born third and fourth generation Black children are still feeling unsettled in Britain. 
Why are they still struggling to benefit from those battles which were fought by their parents, 
grandparents and great-grandparents before them to gain a sense of belonging and access to 
an inclusive sense of British citizenship? I am also registering that the concept and utility of 
diaspora has not lost its currency in terms of being an important resource in the formation of 
Black identities for the current generation of Black people in Britain. Whilst it cannot be 
claimed that grime music is a rejection of Britishness, it can be argued that the notion of a 
‘Black British’ identity becomes entangled, contested and submerged within the complex 
circulating currents of Black transnational/diasporic influences.  
The global Black diaspora is thus a contradictory space that reproduces Black 
hegemonic narratives (as Gilroy observes) and at the same time produces important cultural 
resources that allow young Black people and their comrades to create spaces to validate Black 
life in Britain through a transnational perspective. Third and fourth generation Black 
communities in Britain are choosing to map their identities beyond the coupling of being 
‘Black British,’ and much more through a globalised framework that allows for complexity 
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and recognises the bonds of multiple intersecting nationalisms, as Wiley demonstrates in 
Slippin. Indeed, these themes of social alienation, racism and spatial belonging, alongside the 
dialogical blending and referencing of transnational musical forms and influences within 
grime
3
, form part of a diasporic discursive mode of Blackness that destabilise the ‘cosiness’ of 
the ‘Black British’ coupling.   
In this chapter, not only am I attempting to turn our attention to the cultural and social 
(dis)continuities that exist in the ‘slippery’ formation of Black communities in Britain, I am 
also trying to indicate their shifting parameters. At the micro level of globalisation, one 
indication of the shifting formation of Black Britain is the appearance of African digital media 
on British television platforms such as Sky Digital. Although North American and Caribbean 
representations of hyperbolic Blackness remain predominant in popular culture in Britain, the 
emergence of UK based African TV stations serving the demographic interest of continental 
diasporic Africans such as OBE (Original Black Entertainment TV), BE& (Bright 
Entertainment Network) and Passion TV, are reshaping the digital media landscape. With a 
distinctive African continental and Christianised diasporic consciousness represented through 
various genres such as news, film, music videos, soap opera’s, documentaries, talk shows and 
Christian ministries, these channels serve as cultural indicators of the shifting demographics 
of transnational diasporic Blackness in Britain.  
As mainstream British ‘free to air’ broadcasters’ appear to abandon their public 
service remit to provide ‘a broad range of high quality and diverse programming which, in 
particular appeals to the tastes and interests of a culturally diverse society’ (Channel 4, 2009 
                                                 
3
 It is important to note that the scope and limitations of this thesis do not allow for a deeper exploration of grime 
music and culture in relation to the problematic issues of gender and sexism as well as the complex identity 
formations of ‘tough’ street savvy female grime artists. Furthermore much could be gained by a closer analysis 
of how aesthetic and performative aspects of Blackness for young ‘white’ men and women in the grime scene 
remains a potent cultural currency where notions of Blackness can be selectively, blended, appropriated, adapted 
and performed across ethnicities and ‘white’ transnational heritages in London.  
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[Online]), new digital channels are now providing a platform to screen African television 
content. In the arena of digital television, African American Blackness is now being 
supplemented with a much more dialogic interplay of Blackness from divergent regions of the 
globe, most notably with content from Nigeria and South Africa. This recent development in 
the provision of African television content is one rather blunt yet important indicator of the 
demographic shifts taking place in the formation of ‘Black Britain’, where migration from 
Africa to the UK is changing the formation of Black communities. On a macro level, the 
presence of ‘new communities,’ including migrant workers, asylum seekers and refugees, 
provides further and more visible indications of these migratory shifts. The presence of new, 
emerging migrant communities in Britain also forces us to rethink the meaning, relevance and 
definition of ‘Black Britain’. 
 
ew migration and new racisms 
From 1945 to the late 1990s, it can be argued that hegemonic and dominant forms of 
Blackness in the UK had a distinctively postcolonial Caribbean texture. However, in this new 
century, other shifts are taking place in the formation of ‘Black Britain’. As Paul Gilroy notes,  
 
Black communities are being actively re-composed by the pressure of local 
circumstances, by the new arrivals whose experience of racism leads them to either 
seek or refuse political allies, and by inter-generational adaption as well as novel and 
unstable geo-political conditions. The forms of solidarity these communities produce 
in answer to the racisms that still circumscribe them are not like the defensive 
formations built by the post 1945 wave of citizen migration (Gilroy 2006 p.xii). 
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In this segment I will discuss these recent demographic shifts in Britain in relation to ‘new 
migration’ and national anxiety over refugees and asylum seekers.  I am attempting to show 
that as Caribbean communities are slowly being dislodged from the centre of Black identities 
in Britain (determined by the recent histories of African countries such as Sierra Leone, 
Somali and Nigeria [Gilroy 2006, p.xii]), the notion of ‘Black Britain’ becomes a divisive 
category that both includes and excludes different migrant populations, creating migrant 
social hierarchies and divisions. 
 
o more saris, no more steel bands, no more samosas 
Up until 10 years ago, in the streets of Birmingham where I live, evidence of ‘settled’ post-
colonial migrant communities from the Caribbean and the South Asian diaspora were 
commonplace. In popular public discourses that sought to celebrate cultural ‘diversity’, these 
communities were once flagged up by the now derided signifiers of British multiculturalism – 
‘saris, steel-bands and samosas.’ Over the past decade or so, ‘settled’ older migrant diaspora 
communities and their descendants have now been joined by emergent ‘new communities 
[sic],’ including migrant populations from the Congo, Somalia, Congo DRC, Iran, Sudan, 
Poland, Iraq, Gambia, Ghana, Afghanistan, Kenya, Eritrea, Zimbabwe and a new generation 
of Caribbean migrants particularly from Jamaica (Birmingham Scrutiny 2007). Nigel Harris 
(2002) writes that between, 
 
the mid- to late 1990s, there was an increase in the numbers of people seeking asylum 
in much of Europe. There were terrible wars in the Horn of Africa, the Balkans, 
Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, and the collapse of order in Iraq, the Congo, Algeria, 
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Colombia and elsewhere, producing the familiar flight of those fleeing terror’ (Harris 
2002, p.132).   
 
Birmingham has not been untouched by these global ruptures. Areas of the city, for example, 
Aston, Bordesley Green, Small Heath, and Sparkbrook, which for many years have been the 
cultural and economic centres of the Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Kashmiri communities are 
now spaces also shared by communities from Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia (BBC 
Birmingham 2006). In 2006 a BBC Birmingham online news report by Mohammed Sharif 
investigated the emergent population of Somali residents in Birmingham. In his report, 
contributors from Somalia and Sudan talked about how they had come to arrive and settle in 
Birmingham. Jack Aymam explained, ‘I have a lot of friends here in Birmingham. People 
come to Stratford Road in Sparkbrook to socialise with their own community; it makes them 
feel less homesick. Birmingham is great because there are lots of different cultures.’ Another 
contributor named Mohammed, the Secretary General of the Somali Elders Council UK 
highlighted that, 
 
Somalis come to Britain because they understand the British culture more than any 
other European country. There was a big exodus of Somalis to the UK in 1988 when 
the civil war started in our country. A lot of Somalis came to Britain and claimed 
asylum and refugee status, the majority of Somalis have been granted their stay here 
(BBC Birmingham 2006). 
 
Sharif concluded that many Somalis had come to Birmingham for a better life to seek better 
job opportunities and to achieve academic goals (BBC Birmingham). In 2007, The Human 
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City Institute, a Birmingham-based ‘think tank’, published their report into the housing needs 
and aspirations of the Somali community in Birmingham (Jones 2007). The report found that 
a substantial number of Somalis came to Birmingham as refugees. However, the document 
also highlighted that, 
 
Many members of the community have not come directly to Birmingham as refugees 
but, rather, have come via other European countries (primarily Holland and the 
Scandinavian countries), where they obtained refugee status and citizenship i.e. they 
have come to Birmingham as European Union (EU) citizens (Jones 2007).  
 
But as one interviewee for this research points out: ‘Is the Somali from Europe a refugee? On 
paper no, but they have a lot of common needs with refugees’ (cited in Jones 2007). 
As yet, there is no accurate data regarding the size of the Somali population in 
Birmingham, although some community estimates suggest a population of some 40,000 
(Jones 2007). According to Jones (2007), the Somali community in Birmingham has been 
concentrated in the most deprived areas of the city, a pattern that is also replicated in other 
parts of the country where recent Somali populations have developed, for example London, 
Liverpool, Bristol and Sheffield (Jones 2007).  In Birmingham, Somali families have mainly 
been housed in poor quality housing both in the private rented sector and within the local 
authorities housing provision. Housing in both sectors was seen as ‘sub standard’ with damp, 
condensation and poor maintenance identified as key problems (Jones 2007). 
  Nationally, in the UK, immigration and its relationship to social housing provision are 
highly contentious issues underpinned by casual ‘commonsense’ racism, inaccurate media 
reporting and sensationalist hyperbolic spite. There is no evidence that social housing 
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allocation favours foreign migrants over UK citizens (Rutter and Latorre 2009).  Yet, the 
popular press in Britain produce and reproduce myths concerning ‘illegal immigrant 
handouts’, fuelling the falsehood that ‘immigrants’ receive preferential treatment over 
‘indigenous’ white populations in the allocation of social housing. Indeed, the so-called 
housing ‘crisis’, a myth perpetuated by the popular press and the far right to stir the cauldron 
of hate and popular racism against asylum seekers, was successfully exploited by the British 
National Party during the 2009 European Elections (BNP 2009). Their web site claimed 
Britain’s ‘open door policy and unrestricted, uncontrolled immigration’ was driving house 
prices out of the reach of young people and leading to a shortage of council houses for 
‘indigenous’ whites (BNP 2009). Liz Fekete (2009) argues that in recent times a new anti-
refugee discourse has emerged in popular culture where refugees and asylum seekers are 
demonised as ‘bogus’. Indeed, in popular hegemonic public discourse new migrants are 
frequently criminalised as foreign ‘abusers’ and alien ‘parasites’, ‘scrounging’ from the 
British immigration and benefit system. Dehumanising newspaper headlines such as ‘queue 
jumping immigrants,’ ‘immigrant scroungers’ and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, forms the 
language of demonization that is too often regurgitated in the national British press.  
This brand of xeno-racism – a non-colour coded form of institutional racism - reflects how 
migrant communities have been both demonised and excluded as ‘a suitable enemy’ (Fekete 
2009) of the British public for supposedly abusing British social security benefits and 
taxpayers money (Hall 2009). However, in the area of housing, most new migrants including 
asylum seekers, students and work visa holders rent private accommodation because they 
have no ‘special’ entitlement to social housing (Rutter and Latorre 2009). In response to 
widespread media hysteria that suggest migrants are prioritised in the allocation of social 
housing, and in doing so displace non-migrants (whites), the Institute for public Policy 
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Research was commissioned by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission to conduct 
research in social housing allocation across Britain (Rutter and Latorre 2009). The report 
found that: 
 
• New migrants to the UK over the last five years make up less than two per cent of the 
total of those in social housing. 
• Some 90 per cent of those who live in social housing are UK born. 
• Most of the newly-arrived migrant group who occupy social tenancies are refugees 
who have been granted permission to remain in the UK  
(Rutter and Latorre 2009). 
The TUC report, Hard Work Hidden Lives, further reported that migrant workers were too 
scared to complain about their housing conditions as their accommodation was often tied to 
their employment (TUC 2005, p.193).  The Making the City Work report found that ‘in 
contrast to the image of migrant workers as 'benefit scroungers' and working 'off the books', 
94% of people [interviewed] paid tax and National Insurance, whilst fewer than 1 in 5 (16%) 
claimed any kind of state benefits (Working Tax Credits, Child Benefit etc)’ (Evans et al 
2005).  
Although it continues to be ‘vilified’ migration represents ‘a process that both excites 
extreme emotions and enables the performance of absolutely necessary tasks in society’ 
(Bhattacharyya 2005, pp.155-156). Migration is a necessary function in the day to day 
operation of capital cities such as London, where the city’s economy significantly relies on 
the cheap and exploited labour of migrant workers (Evans et. al. 2005). London’s cleaners, 
hotel workers, and care assistants provide vital services to the capital. Without them, London 
would, without doubt, grind to a halt (Evans et al. 2005). These largely unrecognised workers 
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are vital to the reproduction of urban life, yet remain invisible to most city dwellers and public 
policy makers. Indeed, their conditions of work do not feature in policy debates about poverty 
alleviation, or economic and social exclusion, and, according to the Making the City Work 
report, there is an urgent need to look at this issue now (Evens et al. p.30). Migrant workers 
are now literally ‘making our cities work’. Migrant workers earn major profits for their 
employers, providing key services for the city, and allowing large public and private sector 
organisations to ignore their responsibility for the conditions of work (Evans et al. 2005). 
The search for work is one of the most common reasons for migration to the UK, as well 
as to be with family, or to join friends and acquaintances, suggesting a process of 'chain 
migration' is taking place (Evans et al. 2005). Indeed, the process of chain migration has long 
been evident within most migrant populations, including Caribbean communities in Britain. 
Through the process of migration, dynamic transnational links and family cultures continue to 
be a feature of Caribbean family life (Chamberlain 2005). Third and fourth generation ‘Black 
British’ born Jamaican off-spring are being joined by our cousins, aunties and uncles from 
‘yard’. Our newly arrived family are often helped by our elder relatives - grandparents, uncles 
and aunts - as it was often this earlier generation that felt committed to ‘send’ for their 
relatives and support them on their arrival in England. These young men and women account 
for a migrant class that straddles being visible as a part of a transnational network of kinship 
and family ties, and invisible as a faceless undocumented population of cheap and exploited 
migrant labour. Anyone who arrives to work in Birmingham’s city centre before the morning 
rush hour will if they stop to look hard enough see the many different faces of cleaners and 
domestic workers, men and women of different age groups and at different stages in their 
migratory journeys entering the city’s civic and commercial institutions. You will see the now 
dwindling first generation of African Caribbean women who came to England during the 
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1950s and 1960s, arrive to work at 6 am, some having just finished an earlier night shift. In 
anecdotal conversation with some of these women, including my own friends and family, they 
explain that they have now retired but continue to work past retirement for complex reasons. 
In some cases it is to generate funds to aid their retirement and return back to the Caribbean or 
to help send remittances in the form of money or ‘barrels’ back home. For others, it is a 
continued commitment to sustain a standard of living in England that enables them to 
contribute to the welfare, education and upbringing of their grandchildren in the hope that this 
new generation do not have to face the same level of educational, occupational and economic 
disadvantage which faced many of them as women when they first came to Britain. However 
many of the women explain that they also work because they had no choice but to work in 
low paid employment. Here again we see the logic of the ‘hustle’ as a matter of survival, a 
will to make something out of nothing. 
Working side by side with these women are a generation of recent migrants, young men 
and women from East Africa, West Africa, the Caribbean as well as Eastern Europe. In the 
Making the City Work Report, which examines low paid employment in London, the authors 
note that with regards to the ethnicity of migrant workers, the majority of respondents defined 
themselves as of Black Minority ethnic origin. Black Africans were the dominant ethnic 
group and accounted for nearly half of all workers (44%). White British workers accounted 
for only 8.5% of the sample. There were other non-Irish white workers (20%), originating 
mainly in Eastern Europe. The remaining workers were spread across the ethnic groups and 
some 11% of workers chose the ‘other’ category, which included a variety of categories such 
as ‘Hispanic’ and Caribbean (Evans et al). Many young people from ‘Third World’ territories 
are part of a global network of mobile men and women who work abroad for long indefinite 
periods. Poor economic opportunities in their countries of origin force them to leave their 
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often very young children with aunties, parents and other extended families when the 
opportunity arises to seek employment abroad (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). 
In the Making the City Work report respondents were often well educated in their ‘home’ 
countries acquiring tertiary level qualifications. Many had experienced de-skilling and 
downward social mobility on entering the British labour market and expressed their 
frustration that they were unable to secure jobs suitable to their skills (Evans et al. 2005). Of 
course some migrant workers with ‘valued’ skills are ‘more welcome’ than others by the UK 
government. Arun Kundnani (2007) argues that at the end of the 1990s the introduction of 
legal routes for skilled migrant workers from non EU countries was linked to New Labour’s 
alliance with the corporate world. British immigration policy was being led by what Kundnani 
calls the ‘hidden hand of capitalism’, where New Labour’s ‘positive’ immigration policy 
selected those migrants who had the most to contribute to the British economy and society; 
 
This system allowed for the migration of thousands of professionals, such as doctors, 
nurses, teachers, IT workers and business managers. The NHS, in particular, was 
becoming increasingly dependent on migrant workers. During the 1990s, of the 16,000 
new staff recruited to work in the NHS, half had qualified abroad (Kundnani 2007 
p.142).  
 
As a policy of ‘managed migration’ was introduced, undocumented migrants lived with the 
constant fear of getting ‘dip’ (deported). ‘Illegal’ migrant workers from the ‘Third World’ 
lived with a more acute and tangible awareness of their unsettled transitory and vulnerable 
transnational status. This was in comparison to other migrants from ‘affluent’ countries in the 
EU Australia, the United States and New Zealand who were valued as ‘highly skilled’ migrant 
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groups (Kundnani 2007). As Kundnani highlights, ‘in 2003 and 2004 there were 1,488 
successful ‘operations’ against illegal working and 5,111 illegal workers were ‘detected’ and 
presumably arrested and imprisoned or deported’ (Kundnani 2007 p.151).  
 
‘The deportation machine’ 
The deportation machine (Fekete 2007) operates most severely against asylum seekers. In 
Fekete’s view, deportation targets for asylum seekers are enforced through officially 
sanctioned state violence (Fekete 2009). She writes, 
 
Deportations on routine passenger flights are neither popular nor economic. At least 
twelve people have died during violent, forced deportation attempts. Heart failure, 
asphyxiation, and a combination of panic and stress have been the official causes of 
death. Not surprisingly, passengers are shaken when they see crying children 
frogmarched on to planes, or have to witness violent control and restraint methods 
against adult deportees … (Fekete 2009, p.137). 
 
Indeed, in 2007 The Independent newspaper investigation uncovered widespread claims of 
abuse of asylum seekers by British immigration escort teams (Verkaik 2007). A dossier of 
200 cases collated by doctors, lawyers, immigration centre visitors and campaign groups over 
a two year period, unearthed claims of physical and mental mistreatment of some of the most 
vulnerable people in the UK asylum system. The claims included allegations of physical and 
sexual assault and racist abuse by immigration removal officers hired by the government as 
private security contractors to carry out the enforced removal of asylum seekers (Verkaik 
2007). The case of Beatrice Guessie is one example of the brutalisation of asylum seekers by 
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UK and French removal officers. Beatrice was beaten and kicked by security officers during 
her deportation to Cameroon. She was also kicked in the groin so hard that blood poured from 
between her legs (Verkaik 2007). On her arrival in Cameroon, Beatrice, 29, was unable to 
walk alone without support and collapsed on the floor. Cameroon officials refused Beatrice 
entry to the country on the grounds that if she were to die in prison, the Cameroon authorities 
would be blamed for her death. On her return to the UK, a psychiatrist said Beatrice was 
‘traumatised by events.’ She was treated in hospital for severe genital bleeding and multiple 
bruising over her body (Verkaik 2007). As Emma Ginn of the National Coalition of Anti-
Deportation Campaigns says, ‘it is easy to abuse when the victim is deported out of sight, out 
of mind … The Government does not monitor the safety of its deportees. Silence makes us 
complicit’ (Ginn 2007).  
Yet, for many migrants the UK is seen as an attractive destination because of its 
reputation as a tolerant and multicultural society (Evans, 2005; BBC Birmingham 2006; Jones 
2007). However, absent from the pledge to British citizenry which new unsuspecting migrants 
are supposed to give to ‘Queen and Country’ is the unspoken caveat that they need to prepare 
for new and virulent forms of xeno-racism (Sivanandan 2006). Refugees and asylum seekers 
living through the threat and violence of deportation find not only are they exposed to 
imprisonment, their children of schooling age are too (Fekete 2009; Hayter 2000). It is not 
uncommon to find migrant children as the victims of xeno-racism, where they are held with 
their parents or guardians in immigration detention centres (Fekete 2009). In March 2000, 
New Labour opened the Oakington Immigration Removal Facility where asylum seekers 
including families with small children, have their asylum applications assessed on site. Here, 
families are routinely separated whilst men are kept apart from women and children (Hayter 
2000). Fekete highlights that as ‘European governments expand the criteria for detaining 
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families, particularly in pre-deportation detention, more and more children are being detained, 
sometimes for lengthy periods’ (Fekete 2009 p.179). It is the detention of children in families 
as well as those separated and unaccompanied, that is regarded by children’s right lobbyists as 
the most serious breach of the state’s responsibility towards children, ‘even a form of 
officially sanctioned child abuse’ (Fekete 2009 p.179). As A. Sivanandan reminds us, children 
‘are the measure of our possibilities; how we treat them is the measure of our humanity. The 
moment we categorise them as foreign is the moment we lose both’ (cited in Fekete 2009, 
p.177). 
  It has been estimated that migration has added approximately £6 billion to economic 
growth, around one-sixth of total growth in the UK economy during 2006 (TUC 2008 pp.15-
16). Our global world of cheap, disposable and exploited migrant labour is also a world of 
globalised personal human interconnections mapped by transnational family ties. 
 
‘Ethnic’ hierarchies and the new Blackness in Britain 
What I am attempting to construct in this chapter through outlining the axes of migration and 
earlier through exploring Black popular culture, are the limitations of ‘Black Britain’ as a 
social construct to comprehend the complex, uneven and unequal formation of Blackness in 
the UK.  To return to my earlier point in the previous chapter, the ‘optimistic moment’ of 
Black Britain has been slipping away. As a social construct, the much celebrated ‘Black 
Britain’ of the 1980s and 1990s has gradually been submerged by increased traffic in 
transnational processes such as migration, caused by the forces of globalisation (from the top 
down and bottom up) and the deepening disavowal of national forms of racism, both popular 
and institutionalised.   
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At the level of national politics, high profile ‘Black Britons’ in the public eye work 
very hard to overstate their allegiance to Britishness. Some have calculated the costs of 
multiculturalism alongside migration and have concluded, in line with popular opinion that 
British values and Britishness are under threat. For example, Trevor Phillips, the former head 
of the Commission for Racial Equality and the current Chair of the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, fuelled populist myths about immigration by claiming that some migrant 
communities are becoming ‘marooned’ outside of mainstream Britain. According to Phillips, 
some individuals and migrant groups are doing comparatively well, whilst others are not. The 
failure of some migrant groups to integrate would, he argued, have dire consequences for the 
nation in future; Britain is ‘sleepwalking our way to segregation. We are becoming strangers 
to one another,’ and in years to come will produce ‘US style ghettos.’  Having made this now 
infamous speech, Phillips, was hailed for being ‘brave’ by the right wing newspaper The 
Daily Mail (2006) and praised by The Times (2005) for breaking taboos and puncturing the 
complacency of Britain’s progress as a multicultural society. Indeed, in spite of the daily 
repetitive discourse on anti-immigration which is closely linked to anti- Muslim hysteria 
fuelled by the British press, Phillips was commended for breaking the imagined silence on 
this debate by helping to ‘create a climate’ in which the problems of immigration and 
multiculturalism could be discussed (The Times 2005).  However, his speech had also 
provoked a strong critical attack from the left. Sociologists Finney and Simpson (2009) used 
statistical information to dismantle Phillips’ arguments as well as other ‘common sense’ 
myths that are circulated on segregation, immigration and integration. Finney and Simpson 
(2009) argued Phillips had misread the facts on racism and immigration, saying that he,  
  
Slipping and shifting 
 
 191 
has increased misunderstanding of key social trends in Britain and on this basis could 
easily contribute to a rise in fear and racial hatred; [and] has set a bad example of how 
it is possible to argue your case by misquoting statistical evidence, deliberately 
misleading the public and policymakers on statistics as a result (Finney and Simpson 
2009 p164).   
 
As Finney and Simpson argue, Phillips was the first to make the link between the so-called 
self segregation of Muslim communities and terrorism in Britain. However The Cantle Report 
following the 2001 riots in Oldham and Bradford observed no link with terrorism (Finney and 
Simpson 2009). Other prominent ‘minority figures’ have also been hailed as ‘brave non-white 
Britons.’ These include the BBC senior news reporter George Alagiah who was admired for 
his attack on the ‘excesses of multiculturalism’ which he feared was producing an apartheid 
Britain where immigrant communities lived in enclaves. And the Archbishop of York, John 
Sentamu, was also praised for his bravery because he claimed multiculturalism, had betrayed 
England and the English since, 
 
Multiculturalism has seemed to imply, wrongly for me, let other   cultures be allowed 
to express themselves but do not let the majority culture at all tell us its glories, its 
struggles, its joys, its pains’ (Times Online 2005).  
 
Thus, it appears that only a few of us are permitted to benefit from being ‘Black and British.’ 
Its privileges come at the price of othering new or ‘troublesome’ migrants and by proclaiming 
that our first bond should be to the nation, not to our respective heritages or to other migrant 
groups.  Effectively, Black Britain has been split into two camps: The first camp are members 
Slipping and shifting 
 
 192 
of older migrant populations, colonial and ex colonial subjects whose families settled in 
Britain after the demise of the British Empire, but who now have experienced some level of 
social mobility into the ‘higher strata’ of public life in Britain. They are the beneficiaries of 
the multiculturalism espoused by Roy Jenkins in 1966, when the former home secretary 
outlined integration in terms of equal opportunity, diversity and mutual tolerance (Kundnani). 
Indeed, this camp is often the symbol of diversity in Britain, an example of ‘good’ 
multiculturalism, where the nation can feel inviolable against claims of racialised intolerance 
and discrimination because of Black Britons minimal representation in otherwise exclusive 
social and political circles. This small camp of ‘Black Britons’ can manoeuvre amongst the 
elite enclaves of the British media and entertainment industries as well as the Government so 
long as they stick to the rules; the central rule being, to avoid any meaningful discussion of 
race and racism at any cost despite its intensification and deepening stranglehold across the 
whole spectrum of British life (Kundnani 2007). As Sivanandan reminds us, new racism 
encourages older migrant populations to forget that ‘They [refugees and asylum seekers] are 
us, 40 years back. We are they, now’ (Sivanandan 2002). He states, 
 
We are in the higher echelons of the media, of government, of business, of education. 
We are sociologists and police chiefs, ministers and principals of schools. We are 
now, in this information society, entered into the engine-room of power and yet we do 
nothing about the refugees and asylum seekers (Sivanandan 2002 [Online]). 
 
And yet our entry into the ‘engine room of power’ is set upon slippery and far from stable 
grounds. For as the beneficiaries of multiculturalism - Phillips, Alagaiah, Santamu and others 
- began to attack its very existence, the second camp, in very specific and uneven ways, were 
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experiencing deeper social divisions and more entrenched forms of social alienation within an 
increasingly hostile and complex racial climate. In this multifaceted camp British and foreign 
born Black populations, young, old, poor, immigrant, asylum seeker, refugee, Muslim, male, 
female, were excluded from the multicultural dream despite being fully embroiled in the 
nightmare of its demise. The UK has a long history of criminalising Black and migrant 
populations. Historically, the Black male body has become a vehicle for legitimising police 
harassment, police brutality and genetic racial profiling. A recent example of this 
criminalising process is reflected in the racial disparity of Black and minority groups on the 
UK’s National DNA Database (NDNAD). According to Black Mental Health UK (2008), 
    
About 4 out of every 10 Black men have a record on the database, compared to about 
1 in 10 white men. For young Black men, the bias is even worse: about 3 out of 4 
young Black men, aged between 15 and 34, have records on the DNA database. 
Vulnerable people, including children and people with mental illness, also often end 
up with records on the database as a result of being arrested by the police (Black 
Mental Health UK 2008 [Online]).  
 
Despite the very serious danger that the unlawful retention of DNA records and the racial bias 
in the database is effectively criminalising a generation of young Black men (Black Mental 
Health UK 2008[Online]), Trevor Phillips, would like us to believe that Britain as a society 
has been transformed, so much so that terms such as ‘institutional racism’ are no longer 
relevant and should be abandoned (Phillips 2009). In an article for the MailOnline, Phillips 
argues that as a concept, ‘institutional racism’ is corrosive and it is his belief ‘that Britain is 
by far - and I mean by far - the best place to live in Europe if you are not white’ (Phillips 2009 
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[Online]). Is Britain racially reformed to such an extent that concepts such as institutional 
racism are no longer relevant? Not according to Doreen Lawrence (2009), 16 years after the 
brutal murder of her son Stephen Lawrence, who was stabbed to death in London by racist 
thugs in 1993. Ten years after the McPherson enquiry into Stephen’s murder which 
introduced the term institutional racism into the public consciousness, Doreen recalls how the 
police automatically presumed Stephen to be the criminal at the scene of his murder. Black 
families, she said, are still seen as the perpetrators rather than the victims of crime. Stop and 
search figures for London between January and March 2007 showed that as Black people we 
are four times more likely to be stopped and searched than a white person and three times 
more likely to be arrested (Lawrence 2009).   
 
Racial excesses of white privilege 
This type of discrimination is part of a wider process of structural and systematic forms of 
racial discrimination and disadvantage.  It is also informed by a wider popular culture of 
‘harmless’ jaunty racism, racism’s routine disavowal and the sprightly racial excesses of 
white privilege. Take for example Carol Thatcher, daughter of the former UK Prime Minister 
Margaret, who in 2009 stated she was the victim of bullying by her colleagues at the BBC 
after her racist comments about the French tennis player, Jo-Wilfred Tsonga were leaked to 
the British press. In the green room, she ‘allegedly’ called Tsonga a ‘golliwog frog’ and a 
‘half-golliwog’ off-air after a TV recording of the One Show, a popular BBC One magazine 
programme (Times Online 2009). The Golliwog, a direct product of the Blackface minstrel 
tradition, was meant to objectify, demean, insult and ridicule people of African descent. As a 
popular racist caricature it was until 2001 found on the jars of Robertson’s jams and 
marmalade spreads. Goliliwogs were popular objects in the children's books of Florence Kate 
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Upton and later in Enid Blyton’s children stories. Most recently they were on sale at one royal 
palace in Scotland. Since the controversy over Thatcher’s comments they have been 
withdrawn from sale in that palace. In April 2009, Thatcher defended her use of the term by 
saying her words were taken out of context and that the whole incident is a symptom of 
‘today's obsession about political correctness - and that remains a topic that has to be 
addressed and some common sense injected to it’ (Leach 2009). Indeed, racial slurs are often 
dismissed or trivialised as harmless banter these days. Anyone who takes offence over such 
comments are often labelled as oversensitive or as belonging to the ‘politically correct 
brigade’. 
In the ensuing debate over Thatcher’s sacking we saw mostly white commentators in 
the media and press engaged in the now routine theatrics of a ‘race row.’ A debate ensued 
over Thatcher’s unapologetic use of racism, and indeed whether it was racism or not, and over 
whether the BBC were being overzealous in sacking the presenter over something that was 
said in a ‘private’ conversation. The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson had defended Thatcher 
saying that her ‘indiscretion should not have been punished so severely’ (Times Online 
2009a). He himself had to apologise the year before for calling Black children ‘piccaninnies’ 
with ‘watermelon smiles’ (Times Online 2009a). Not long after the ‘Golliwog’ controversy, 
we learnt that the future King of the UK, The Prince of Wales, refers to a close friend of 
South Asian origin, as ‘Sooty’, whilst his son, Harry, was caught on video by a popular 
tabloid newspaper referring to a fellow soldier as a ‘Paki’. Although Harry issued an apology, 
his fathers and his own remarks were excused and explained away by their victims as 
‘nicknames’ and terms of endearment between friends and colleagues (Telegraph 2009a & 
2009b). In each instance the racism spoken from the mouths of the speaker was disengaged 
from the person. Their sounds offended, but they themselves could be disconnected from the 
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offense. Here, racial insults are devoid of racism and racists. Such casual dismissal of racisms 
allows virile and more dangerous forms of racism to go unrecognised and unchallenged. By 
its disavowal, the barbarity of racism becomes more unremarkable and more entrenched, 
making it all the more dangerous. 
In a climate where the cult of monocultural homogeneity defines the parameters of 
access and expulsion from the British nation, what is the future of being Black and British? 
An important tradition of scholarship in the UK has argued that Blackness in Britain should 
be seen as integral to rather than as permanently outside the notion of Britishness. Paul Gilroy 
(1987/2006) has contended that white British racisms have made Blackness and Britishness 
mutually exclusive categories. Writers such as Shirley Anne Tate (2002) have argued that in 
Britain choosing to be Black and British is a ‘subversive location,’ that demands the adoption 
of a double or multiple consciousness in order to negotiate the racist discourse that states 
Black and British are mutually exclusive. Les Back (1996) has suggested that Britain’s multi-
ethnic urban communities have created new syncretic forms of Britishness at a local level 
where the semantics of race, nation and belonging have undergone important transformations, 
creating a workable multiculturalism from the ground up.  Claire E. Alexander (1996) adopts 
a similar approach to Back (1996) by suggesting that ‘street level’ youth culture creates Black 
British identities that go beyond entrenched pathological notions of Black youth as persistent 
‘problems’ in Britain. Indeed, I would like to add that ‘Black Britishness’ from the bottom up 
has made an important and irreversible contribution to popular culture in Britain and indeed 
shapes the contours of how multiculturalism is both lived and perceived to be both successful 
and workable. The presence of multifarious Black migrant populations has radically altered 
the racialised, and more importantly, the cultural landscape of Britain.  Our presence is a 
challenge to mythical and nostalgic representations of Britishness built on the imagined 
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exclusivity of whiteness as a stabilising hegemonic entity. The presence of migrant groups 
reminds us that such homogenous imaginings are false and are persistently destabilized by 
historical and contemporary patterns of movement and migration:  
 
Why the English, or the British, should consider themselves superior to foreigners, 
and how the English, or British, should be defined is a mystery. Notions of national 
culture and national homogeneity have little basis in reality. Britain, like most other 
countries, is the product of immigration. The two things that immigrants have in 
common is that they have nearly always been the object of prejudice and hostility 
when they first arrive in Britain, and that they have subsequently in different ways 
made large and valued contributions to the wealth and culture of the country (Hayter 
2000, p. 165). 
 
However, whilst diverse migrant populations grouped under the labels of Black and British do 
alter and disrupt any false notions of cultural homogeneity in the British national character, 
these disruptions, as Stuart Hall has observed, are both vulnerable and often temporary and 
guarantee no secure political gain (Hall 2004). If we consider Hall’s (1992) earlier 
reconciliatory construction of Blackness and Britishness to rightly challenge the racist 
assumptions behind their presumed mutual exclusivity, Back’s(1996) and Alexander’s (1996) 
street level syncretic Black Britishness as creating important spaces to articulate other ways of 
being British, and Tate’s (2002) provocative notion of ‘Black Britain’ being a ‘subversive’ 
location, we still must arrive at the conclusion that the ideological and political idea of Black 
Britain has yet to deliver the wide and deep socio-political gains which Black and migrant 
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communities need to make far reaching progress on the issue of racial justice and inequality in 
Britain. 
I’m not sure on what terms we can safely talk of the Black British subject anymore if 
only a few of us can benefit from its promise. This coupling seems close to exhaustion in 
other ways too. Black and migrant populations in Britain can be willing transnational agents 
through our diasporic heritages that can provide cultural relief from our continuing social and 
political alienation. But we are also forced into transnational global networks of migration in 
order to provide cheap exploited labour to service the global economy, whilst at the same 
time, being maliciously maligned in this process.  
As Britain becomes increasingly more disillusioned and anxious about the meaning of 
its own national identity and its influence and status on the global stage, we are also 
witnessing an increase in racial hostility towards migrant populations and widespread 
racialised religious intolerance of Muslim communities throughout Europe and the UK 
(Fekete 2009; Bhattacharyya 2008; Kundnani 2007). This xeno/anti-muslim/anti-Black/anti-
immigrant -racism and hostility to cultural diversity has its roots in the traditional lexicon of 
right wing politics in Britain (Kundnani 2007). However, as Kundnani argues, since 9/11 and 
the riots in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in the summer of 2001, cultural diversity and 
multiculturalism are now attacked by ‘liberal’ thinkers and those on the centre left for creating 
a generation of young Muslims who have forgotten ‘what being British is about’ (Phillips 
cited in Kundnani, 2007 p.123). Of the liberal left, Kundnani writes,  
 
They have argued that an over-tolerance of cultural diversity has allowed Asians in 
northern towns to self-segregate, resulting in violent tensions on the streets of Britain. 
They have argued that public confidence in the welfare state is being undermined by 
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the presence in Britain of immigrants of a different culture. And they have argued that 
multiculturalism has encouraged Muslims to separate themselves and live by their 
own values, resulting in extremism and, ultimately, the fostering of a mortal home-
grown terrorist threat (Kundanani 2007, p.123). 
 
Whilst a politics of anti-Blackness (Bashi 2004) is still a fundamental component of western 
racism, anti-Muslim hysteria has widened the net of western racist discourse to include the 
vilification and dehumanisation of Muslim men and women (Bhattacharyya 2008; Kundanani 
2007). Blackness has also been caught in this web of fear, particularly as two home-grown 
British bombers were of Jamaican parentage (Goldberg 2009, p.179).  
Within this climate of pick and mix, multifaceted racism where racism switches and 
shifts targets within discourses of fear, ‘Black Britishness’ has fragmented. And like the 
contemporary struggle to define Britishness itself, the ways in which we have come to 
understand and come to terms with the meaning of ‘Black Britishness’ are also under threat. It 
can no longer be seen as the optimistic cosmopolitan experiment of the 1980s and 1990s that, 
in the end, bequeathed limited privileges to a few whilst establishing new hierarchies of 
exclusion for the rest of us.  
And yet there is no doubting the fact that many Black citizens in the UK are quite 
comfortable with calling themselves British even more than some white citizens (TimesOnline 
2007). Yet, within Black ‘urban’ working class spaces, Britishness can also be marked and 
reduced to a set of micro geographic coordinates. For example, so-called ‘postcode gangs’, 
where local working class and Black youths defend their area postcode or territory from 
‘outsiders’, have divided Britain’s inner cities into ‘glocalised’ microscopic bits of England, 
sometimes with deadly outcomes. Such micro geographic spaces can form the borderlines of 
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gang related violence and activity (BBC News 2007). They also reveal how these small 
residual spaces of belonging are related to a wider sense of powerlessness and social 
alienation. In official and popular discourse, these marginalized spaces, sometimes known as 
‘ghettos’ or ‘inner city enclaves’, are seen as existing outside of the narrative of belonging to 
Britishness. Theses spaces are more likely to be seen as the source of contemporary Britain’s 
problems, an illustration of the damage that is being inflicted upon the nation.  
It is possible to argue that Black Britishness can also be defined in legal or structural 
terms such as citizenship and entitlement. However, this too is a precarious and an uneven 
position for many Black people in Britain when we consider the continuing criminalisation of 
Black life and the ‘illegal’ or ambiguous status of some recent ‘Third World’ migrants who 
are often left outside the entitlements of ‘legal’ citizenship.  As a consequence ‘Third World’ 
migrant groups and individuals become vulnerable to all forms of domination exploitation, 
violence and widespread vilification. In Divided Cities, Stuart Hall (2006) argues that recent 
migration flows into the UK driven by new developments in globalisation, rather than easing 
tensions, have thus created a more complex overlapping system of ‘civilisational’ differences. 
These ‘clash of cultures’ and systems of difference exist alongside older racialised repertoires 
producing what has been called ‘differential racism:’ ‘a racism of racialised differences 
complexly articulated in relation to, but also between, different groups’ (Hall 2006, p.47). 
Hence a wider western culture of state power and domination over migrant citizens has 
produced sub-cultures of inter and intra ethnic hierarchies where marginalised groups seek 
power over other marginalised ‘others’. Indeed, what does it mean to be ‘Black British’ when 
some of us who proclaim to belong to this secondary group now feel we have the right to 
attack and exclude new migrants because, supposedly, they have not earned the ‘right’ to 
belong or to call themselves British?  Anecdotal evidence suggests that older settled migrant 
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populations are willing to partake in the domination and vilification of new migrant groups 
based on the misconstrued belief that these new arrivals encroach upon the basic resources 
earlier settlers had earned and struggled for the right to claim – resources such as housing, 
jobs and healthcare (Dispatches 2008). In these circumstances, ‘Third World’ asylum seekers, 
migrant workers and refugees find that not only are they living at the bottom end of the social 
hierarchy of ‘Black Britain,’ but also excluded from the historical and cultural narrative of 
how Black Britain is articulated, recollected and recounted. This exclusion may signal deeper 
problems of social insecurity. As resources become evermore finite, migrants may be feeling 
the need to protect and hold onto the very little that they do have. 
Being both Black and British has become even more contentious and contradictory at 
a time where the notion of Britishness itself and what it means to be British appears vacuous 
and in crisis. Although Stuart Hall (1992) has previously argued that it was necessary for 
Black people in this country to be both ‘Black and British’ and thus to choose otherwise 
would be a site of ‘constant contestation’, Blackness and Britishness are yet to be fully 
reconciled. This is despite various efforts to reformulate an idea of Britishness that moves 
away from narrow exclusionary notions of whiteness in the hope that practical workable 
models of cosmopolitan multiculturalism can exist (Hall, Stuart 2004). Globalised forces such 
as migration and fears over national security and terrorism, coupled with complex 
articulations of race and racism, have remained potent obstacles to a ‘settled’ and formally 
accepted notion of cosmopolitan multiculturalism in Britain. These forces - globalisation and 
nationalism – alongside the break up of Britain into Englishness, Scotishness and Welshnesss, 
continue to undermine the political meaning of Black Britain. 
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‘Constant contestation’ 
As part of the condition of being Black in Britain I would like to suggest that ‘constant 
contestation’ is part of the historical and contemporary context that defines and shapes the 
production of Blackness in Britishness. I say this because although Blackness cannot and 
should not solely be defined by its proximity to racism, the racialisation of Black and migrant 
life in Britain continues to be defined by the vexed politics of racialised ‘difference’ and 
cultural ‘sameness’.  The presence of new communities of Black and migrant populations 
from divergent geographical locations, living amongst un/settled and racially disenfranchised 
former migrant groups and white working class communities who experience uneven and 
unequal legal rights to citizenship, represents the continued rupture at the seams of what 
‘Black Britishness’ means. Complex Black populations and networks are being formed in the 
UK along and across the lines of transnational settlement and movement. These lines are 
demarcated by a nationalistic discourse on race which ‘serves as an invisible border line 
demarcating both who formally belongs or not and what can or cannot be said about it’ 
(David Theo Goldberg 2009, p.176). The perceived ethnic stability of older communities 
understood to be ‘Black British’ is continuously being redrawn and dislocated by the 
recurring circuits and movements of people. ‘Black Britain’ has changed and is changing in 
tandem with complex notions of what Blackness means as a form of global consumption, 
cultural production and how Blackness is constructed in connection to multiple nations and 
geographical territories. The evolving presence of global diasporic migrant populations from 
multiple geographic regions in Britain represents not so much what it means to be British, but 
much more what it means to constitute global cultures and identities that slip into and out of 
nationalist forms of social cohesion. The presence of these complex emerging and circulating 
‘ethnoscapes’ within the urban landscapes of Britain comprising of ‘tourists, immigrants, 
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refugees, exiles, guestworkers and other moving groups and persons’ (Appadurai 2004) have 
since 9/11 and 7/7 sparked fierce debates over the success and failure of multiculturalism 
echoing the continued genealogy, ecology and economy of racism as it relates to the entry and 
exit of moving populations through British borders.  The constant contestation of being Black 
in Britain will continue to exist along the fraught lines of racism, migration and belonging as 
social divisions deepen and as racism seeks new victims to blame for poor governance. 
Prescribed identities from the state designed to assimilate migrant groups will not ease these 
tensions. On the contrary, such tensions will be exacerbated by the State’s grudging 
accommodation of some migrant groups, its systematic ill-treatment of new migrants and by 
the systematic failure to deliver progressive solutions to the problems of social injustice and 
racialised inequalities. For Black people, celebrating or promoting the aesthetic and anti-
essentialist virtuosities of being ‘Black and British’ is no longer sufficient if a clear ethical 
stance on justice, equality and anti-racism is absent from its articulation. Old and new Black 
and migrant communities must refuse to partake in the processes of domination that 
dehumanise and devalue our existence. Instead we must see our different and specific 
migratory journeys as sources of shared struggle and the foundations for a robust debate on 
the ways in which we can pursue urgent political justice, freedom and equality away from 
racialised forms of domination within our local spaces shaped and determined by global 
forces.  
 
Conclusion - Loving Blackness within a transnational context 
This chapter has attempted to show the changing formation of Black transnational 
populations, cultures and identities in Britain and the impact of the transnational space on the 
very notion o ‘Black Britain’ itself. This is taking place in the face of an increasingly strident 
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racism within popular public discourse against different marginalised groups. This in turn has 
produced an increasing climate of fear and hatred directed toward migrant groups who find 
themselves bereft of coherent anti-racist strategies to tackle a growing racist discord in 
Britain.  This leads those of us who are interested in building anti-racist strategies to re-
examine how varied forms of blackness can fight racialised forms of discrimination and 
oppression.  How do we go about achieving an ethical politics of solidarity that can value 
human life when ‘difference’ is more often a source of division and conflict where ‘some are 
more equal than others.’ bell hooks argues that our postmodern condition should not separate 
the politics of difference from the politics of racism. Indeed, what she calls ‘radical 
postmodernism’ should call attention to ‘those shared sensibilities which cross the boundaries 
of class, gender, race, etc., that could be fertile ground for the recognition of common 
commitments, and serve as a base for solidarity and coalition’ (hooks 1991, p.27). But she 
also argues that radical politics are hopeless if they are devoid of a love ethic: 
 
Without love, our efforts to liberate ourselves and our world community from 
oppression and exploitation are doomed. As long as we refuse to address fully the 
place of love in struggles for liberation we will not be able to create a culture of 
conversion where there is a mass turning away from an ethic of domination (hooks 
1994, p.243). 
 
In her seminal essay ‘Loving Blackness as Political Resistance’, hooks further writes: 
 
A culture of domination demands of all its citizens self-negation. The more 
marginalized, the more intense the demand. Since Black people, especially the 
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underclass, are bombarded by messages that we have no value, are worthless, it is no 
wonder that we fall prey to nihilistic despair or forms of addiction that provide 
momentary escape, illusions of grandeur, and temporary freedom from the pain of 
facing reality (hooks 1992, p.19). 
 
But is the concept of loving blackness, as articulated by an African American feminist 
speaking from the specific historical, social and cultural context of the African American 
experience, relevant to Black life in Britain? I am arguing that loving lackness is a necessary 
anti-racist strategy because it addresses the need to correct the increasing devaluing of Black 
life in Britain. Indeed there is little public debate on why the lives of Black and Brown 
communities in Britain should be considered as valuable and why our human worth should be 
defended. Whilst racism and racist discourses continue to evolve and spread in relation to old 
and new migrant groups, we are also witnessing a systematic failure to understand and 
address the impact of racist violations against racially marginalised groups. One important 
aspect of this thesis addresses the ways in which groups who are racially excluded utilise the 
transnational space in ways that contradict and transcend racism and its need for Black self-
negation. In this sense, loving blackness becomes an ideology of hope which can form the 
basis for a new politics of solidarity that seeks to make connections between national and 
transnational forms of racism whilst recognising the need for discourses that value Black life 
and humanity as a whole. 
 In the next chapter I will examine the key African American theorists concerned 
with concepts of ‘loving blackness,’ including bell hooks, Cornell West and Michael Eric 
Dyson.  I will suggest that discourses concerned with ‘loving blackness’ are a necessary and 
important critical intervention for a socially engaged public discourse on the transformative 
Slipping and shifting 
 
 206 
power of love in validating and valuing Black life. However these discourses I argue are also 
concerned with the ‘racial healing’ of America as a nation. I will suggest that in order for 
loving blackness to be effective outside of the US it needs to be mobilised within a 
transnational context to address the global phenomena of racism.  
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Chapter 6 
 
THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVIG BLACKESS 
 
 
Introduction 
So far this thesis has attempted to engage critically with contemporary racism and its 
historical, representational, epistemological, social, and cultural formation in the context of 
transnational blackness in Britain. I have demonstrated how blackness has been denigrated 
through racialised discourses which in turn leave racial inequalities in tact. I have shown the 
many divergent ways in which different forms of blackness have been and continue to be 
denigrated, mainly within the western social context of Britain and the US, alongside the 
damage caused by historical and contemporary processes of racial violence and power.  In this 
chapter the focus shifts to a discussion of love and repair as approaches to racist violations. 
This shift turns to a tradition of African American scholarship, where a response to racism 
and white supremacy has enlisted a passionate defence of a love as a weapon against multiple 
forms of domination. Within this debate, love is configured as a form of social justice and 
psychic repair against the socio-psychic devastations of racism. 
bell hooks and Cornell West are two of America’s most influential Black intellectuals. 
In very different ways hooks and West are concerned with a socially-engaged public 
discourse on the transformative power of love. For both intellectuals, love is a rich critical 
source for validating and valuing Black life in America in response to the continuing 
degradation of blackness and the persistent condition of white supremacy. In this chapter I 
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will discuss hooks’ and West’s approaches to love as a tool to bring into existence deep and 
meaningful social transformation on the issue of racism.  In the face of social despair and the 
psychic-political vacuum left behind by the ‘assassination’ of racial justice, specifically 
through the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X, this chapter will consider 
hooks’ thesis on love to repair the damage caused by diminished forms of racial justice.  
I will examine West’s 1992 essay ‘Nihilism in Black America’ and his assertion that 
the African American community is facing its demise due to this ‘nihilistic threat’ (West 
1992, p.38). For West, this threat emerges from deepening conditions of lovelessness and 
hopelessness in Black America. I will then contextualise West’s nihilistic thesis in the context 
of Hurricane Katrina and the ‘loveless’ federal government response to this epic tragedy. 
I will analyse the influence of spirituality and psychoanalytical theories within hook’s 
notion of loving blackness and summarise key arguments within hooks’s work, specifically 
her politicised notion of a love ethic and how this ethic is tied to psychic and social 
transformations. I wish to intervene in this debate to reconfigure and mobilise loving 
blackness within a transnational context. My concern is that hooks’ and West’s 
conceptualisation of radical political love is by and large rooted within the specific discursive 
project of healing America’s racialised condition. In this thesis the lens of blackness has a 
transnational incarnation that is immediately felt and understood by Black diasporic 
communities globally. Thus in order for loving blackness to become meaningful beyond the 
American condition, I am arguing that it is necessary to locate it within a transnational 
framework. I will conclude by suggesting that Caribbean families provide one example of 
loving blackness within a transnational context through migrant networks of love and care. 
However, these networks of care are also fraught with loss and pain when migrant parents are 
separated from their children, thus producing a form of ‘tough love.’ I am suggesting that 
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loving blackness in the context of highly racialised societies has a transformative role to play 
in ‘transnational’ networks of blackness where globalised, ethical discourses on validating 
Black life are both necessary and timely. 
 
‘Loving Justice’ Malcolm and Martin 
Spirituality in Black America has been intimately woven into African American struggles for 
freedom and justice. bell hooks reminds us that the call for justice was one that too often 
ended in sacrifice. Speaking about the assassinations of Dr Martin Luther King Jr. and 
Malcolm X, hooks writes, 
 
Both Martin Luther King and Malcolm X were assassinated at the point when they 
began to hone a truly revolutionary vision of liberation, one rooted both in a love ethic 
and the will to resist domination in all its forms. Martin and Malcolm did not live long 
enough to fully integrate the love ethic into a vision of political decolonization that 
would offer practical guidelines for the eradication of Black self-hatred, as well as 
strategies for building a diverse beloved community (hooks 2001, pp.213 -214). 
 
The debate between Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X was in some ways a debate on 
what were the most strategically useful approaches to tackling and overcoming white 
supremacy and its ravaging effects on Black America (Dyson 2000). Was the message of 
‘brotherly love’ offered by King in conflict with the call for ‘self love’ as espoused by 
Malcolm X? Both revolutionary leaders had engaged with discourses concerned with a love 
ethic as part of the solution to ending racism in the US. In the chapter entitled ‘Loving Your 
Enemies,’ Martin Luther King writes in Strength to Love, 
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Probably no admonition of Jesus has been more difficult to follow than the command 
to ‘love your enemies.’ Some men have sincerely felt that its actual practice is not 
possible. It is easy, they say, to love those who love you, but how can you love those 
who openly and insidiously seek to defeat you? Others, like the philosopher Nietzsche, 
contend that Jesus’ exhortation to love one’s enemies is testimony to the fact that the 
Christian ethic is designed for the weak and cowardly and not for the strong and 
courageous. Jesus, they say, is an impractical idealist (King 1964, p.47). 
 
King goes further by suggesting that far from being a dreamer or an impractical idealist, Jesus 
was in fact a practical realist. For King, the practicalities of loving your enemy are firmly 
rooted in the principal of forgiveness. The ‘forgiving act’ as King calls it, should always be 
initiated by those who are the victims of injustice and oppression, as opposed to the 
perpetrators of oppression. For King an inability to forgive equals an inability to love. 
Forgiveness equalled reconciliation, a coming together, without which we are unable to love 
our enemies (King 1964, p.48).  
Michael Eric Dyson argues that in King’s mind, white bigotry was a sign of the great 
need for white forgiveness (Dyson 2000, p.33). King believed in the humanity of Black 
people but he also believed in the latent goodwill of racist whites (Dyson 2000). As Dyson 
argues, 
 
King’s claim that Southern Whites really hungered for redemption was proof enough 
to his Black critics that loving the hell out of bigots was a deluded, even destructive, 
strategy for social change (Dyson 2000, p.34). 
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Dyson suggests that King’s strategy of loving your enemy gave Black people an ethical 
advantage of ‘moral superiority’ over whites, which was hard for whites to accept since Black 
people were supposedly racially inferior (Dyson 2000, p.34). Nevertheless, King’s strategy of 
occupying the moral high-ground was no guarantee to ending racism.  
For Malcolm X, love was manifested firstly in a love-for self engendered by acts of 
self-love, justice and atonement (Haley 1965). Malcolm saw that one way African Americans 
could combat the negative dehumanising affects of racism was to combat Black self-hate.  
Self-hate was contextualised within the aggressive US national framework of a racial 
segregation. Malcolm also contextualised this oppression within a globalised context in that 
by hating Africa, Black Americans would simultaneously hate themselves (Malcolm X. 
1992). Thus the transformation of self-hate was linked to developing a psyche that recognised 
the conditions of racial oppression and exploitation in parallel to validating Black humanity, 
Black self-worth and a global Black heritage (Malcolm X, 1992).  
For Malcolm, forgiveness did not rest upon the law of unconditional love for your 
enemy or upon a theological orthodoxy of God’s love of all humanity. Forgiveness in 
Malcolm’s view was only workable if clear conditions of accountability were in place. Only 
then could forgiveness have any deep or meaningful effect on America’s racially fragmented 
society. Those conditions of accountability were atonement and justice. Although such 
conditions were seen as desirable by Malcolm himself, he remained doubtful as to whether a 
genuine culture of atonement was possible within America’s white supremacist society. Even 
if a culture of atonement did exist, Malcolm questioned the demands that would be made on 
such a culture by asking what would the God of Justice demand for the robbery of Black 
people’s labour, their lives, their true identities, their culture, their history and even their 
human dignity (Haley 1965). Hence by questioning the very demands of atonement, namely 
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reparations for crimes committed, Malcolm was assessing whether the damage from such 
crimes was even reparable, thus placing them beyond atonement and forgiveness on the basis 
of their gravity. Malcolm’s political transformation after leaving the Nation of Islam had led 
him to believe that the goal of solving America’s racial problems was the responsibility of all 
sincere people, Black and white alike. However, Malcolm had not adopted a position of racial 
integration as advocated by King. For Malcolm if white folks were sincere about ending 
racism, they would need to engage in decolonising white supremacist ways of thinking within 
and amongst their own communities. In the meantime, African Americans were to push 
forward with the work of healing the legacy of self-hate and engaging in their individual and 
collective recovery. With different groups working separately within their own communities, 
Malcolm envisaged the collective salvation of America’s soul.  
For Malcolm, America could only be salvaged if human rights and dignity were 
extended to Black folks (Haley 1965).  Malcolm called for a deeper sense of humanity and 
moral responsibility in order to confront the causes of racial conflict in the US. For Martin 
Luther King, as well as acknowledging the darkness of racial injustice, he insisted that no 
permanent solution to America’s race problems would exist until the oppressed developed the 
capacity to love their enemies (King 1963, p.53). Whilst King wanted to recognise and 
validate the humanity of white Americans by avoiding monolithic generalizations about 
whiteness, he failed to realize how the will to dominate and the will for power would not be 
relinquished by the capacity of Black people to forgive their oppressors for their violation 
against Black life. As hooks writes, 
 
Focusing on the power of forgiveness, King also often overlooked the importance of 
accountability. For genuine forgiveness to be transformative, white people, 
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undergoing a conversion process, by which they divest themselves of white 
supremacist thinking, would necessarily have to focus on accountability and 
atonement. Having also abandoned a love ethic when it comes to the issue of social 
justice, most enlightened white citizens respond with rage at the suggestion that the 
nation must atone to its Black citizens for the unique genocidal assaults experienced in 
the past and present day. Every white person who has committed themselves to anti-
racist struggle understands that there is no shame to be had in assuming accountability 
for the collective wrong done to Black people by the agents of white supremacy, most 
of whom have been and are white. Indeed, assuming responsibility and accountability 
empowers (hooks 2001, p221). 
 
What remains clear within King’s message of forgiveness is that firstly, loving and forgiving 
your enemies without the enemy taking responsibility for their actions, dissolves 
accountability, thus quelling any expectation held by the oppressed that their oppressor may 
want to end their reign of oppression. Secondly, the arduous work of ending oppression 
ultimately rest in the hands of the oppressed if forgiveness becomes the ultimate strategy 
against racialised denigration. Thus loving and forgiving your enemies become acts of faith 
rather than tangible actions towards ending domination in all forms. King writes, 
 
May we solemnly realize that we shall never be true sons of our heavenly father until 
we love our enemies and pray for those who persecute us (King 1963, p.55). 
 
Although ‘loving our enemies’ could be read as an ultimate act of self-love, it is not. A 
requirement of ‘loving’ is that love itself needs to be reciprocated or else instead of love we 
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are left with inequity, imbalance and injustice. By forsaking our dependence on others to 
change and thus taking full responsibility to liberate ourselves and taking charge of our own 
path towards liberation, we need to be mindful that such a position can dissolve the 
accountability of those in power to end oppressive forces such as racialised and other forms of 
domination. To this extent, the abuses of the structurally powerful are allowed to continue, 
even if we feel we are doing the right thing by loving ourselves and loving our enemy through 
endless cycles of suffering. Indeed, structural forms of power and domination – capitalism, 
racism, (hetero)sexism - are dependent on a ceaseless and never-ending capacity for suffering 
by those being oppressed; ‘But be ye assured that we will wear you down by our capacity to 
suffer’ (King 1963, p.55).  Although King’s vision was to create a beloved community of 
equality and justice, ceaseless suffering would not furnish the path to a loving political society 
where developing a culture of repair would enable the healing and well being of the 
oppressed. A beloved community could only exist if racism and other intersecting oppressions 
of class, gender and sexuality were to be dismantled and where the social moral consciousness 
of the collective would afford all of its citizen’s respect and the right to human dignity. 
hooks believes the death of Malcolm and Martin has left a legacy of psychic despair 
and devastation in African American communities: 
 
No work has been done that examines in an in-depth manner the extent to which the 
loss of our leaders created major mental-health problems for Black people, whose 
wounded morale had been sustained and rejuvenated under their loving guidance 
(hooks 2001, p.214). 
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Citing her earlier writing on the same topic, hooks describes how a sense of collective grief 
had taken hold of the African American community with the assassinations of Martin and 
Malcolm. With their death went the hope that racial justice would one day become the norm 
(hooks 2001, p.215). The legacy of collective grief argues hooks, left an emotional vacuum 
which created the conditions for a mass embracement of the values of ‘white supremacist 
capitalist patriarchy,’  
 
It set the stage for the takeover of poor Black communities by a drug economy which 
brought in its wake a hedonistic ethos of violence, consumerism, and amoral pursuit of 
pleasure powerful enough to usurp and destroy the foundations of communalism, a 
love ethic, and a belief in the healing power of forgiveness, faith and compassion 
(hooks 2001, p.215). 
  
The African American philosopher, theologian, preacher and public intellectual Cornel West, 
refers to this condition as ‘the nihilistic threat’, a condition of lovelessness that has ravaged 
poor African American communities. Alongside hooks, West keenly advocates a love ethic as 
a means to transform social relations of domination. For West white supremacy has shaped 
the plight of Black America to such a degree that the overwhelming majority of Black people 
in America remain at the bottom of the social ladder facing what he sees as the most basic 
issue in Black America, the nihilistic threat to its very existence (West 1992, pp.27-47). The 
threat of nihilism is not simply a matter of relative economic deprivation and political 
powerlessness but primarily a question of the profound sense of psychological depression, 
personal worthlessness, hopelessness and social despair that have, in his view, taken hold of 
poor Black communities in the US (West 1992).  
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Cornel West and the nihilistic threat to Black America 
 
Often when Cornel West and I speak with large groups of Black folks about the 
impoverishment of spirit in Black life, the lovelessness, sharing that we can 
collectively recover ourselves in love, the response is overwhelming. Folks want to 
know how to begin the practice of loving (hooks 1994, p.248). 
 
West argues that within public discussions on the plight of impoverished Black Americans, 
public opinion tends to be divided into two camps. The first camp belongs to what West calls 
the ‘liberal structuralists’ who analyse the continuing social crisis facing Black America 
through the lens of structural constraints and obstacles such as ‘a subtle historical and 
sociological analysis of slavery, Jim Crowism, job and residential discrimination, skewed 
unemployment rates, inadequate health care, and poor education’ (West 1992, p.37). The 
second camp, who he refers to as the ‘conservative behaviourists’, focus on perceived 
behavioural impediments that undermine Black social mobility, such as a waning protestant 
work ethic of ‘hard work, deferred gratification, frugality, and responsibility’ which 
‘behaviourists’ believe are absent from much of poor blacks in America (West 1992, p.37).  
West is critical of both positions, arguing that ‘liberal structuralists’ are concealing the 
threat of nihilism in fear that a focus on social despair, psychological depression and personal 
worthlessness will deflect our focus away from the structural obstacles to Black social 
mobility,  whilst the conservative behaviourists not only misconstrue the nihilistic threat, they 
inadvertently contribute to nihilism by failing to acknowledge the insurmountable cases where 
Black people have adopted an ethic of hard work and have still remained at the bottom of the 
social ladder. He also criticizes conservative behaviourists for treating a discussion of Black 
victimisation by white supremacist practices as if taboo: 
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What is particularly naïve and peculiarly vicious about the conservative behavioural 
outlook is that it tends to deny the lingering effect of Black history – a history 
inseparable from though not reducible to victimization. In this way, crucial and 
indispensible themes of self-help and personal responsibility are wrenched out of 
historical context and contemporary circumstances – as if it is all a matter of personal 
will. This ahistorical perspective contributes to the nihilistic threat within Black 
America in that it can be used to justify right-wing cutbacks for poor people struggling 
for decent housing, childcare, healthcare and education (West 1992, pp.38-39). 
 
West argues that African Americans had created cultural structures of meaning that were 
powerful buffers to ward off the nihilistic threat.  His well cited essay entitled ‘Nihilism in 
Black America’ outlines the nature of this nihilism: 
 
ihilism is to be understood here not as a philosophic doctrine that there are no 
rational grounds for legitimate standards of authority; it is far more the lived 
experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaningless, hopelessness and most 
importantly lovelessness. This usually results in the numbing detachment to others and 
a self destructive disposition toward the world. Life without meaning, hope and love 
breeds a coldhearted, mean-spirited outlook that destroys both the individual and 
others (West, 1992) (Italics in the original). 
 
West locates nihilism within an historical context of systematic Black oppression in the US. 
He charts what he believes to be the primordial moment of Black America’s ‘disease of the 
Loving Blackness 
 
 218 
soul’ through the history of slavery and enslavement, arguing that the enslaved African 
struggle against degradation and devaluation was in part a struggle against nihilism. Hope and 
meaning were indispensable to the psychological survival of earlier generations of subjugated 
Black Americans. West puts forward the view that hope and meaning lay at the heart of 
generations of subjugated Black people and their unremitting struggle and their resistance 
against adverse New World conditions. For West, the fundamental enemy of Black survival in 
America is neither oppression nor exploitation but the nihilistic threat.  This threat is seen as 
the main cause for what he sees as the collapse of hope and loss of meaning amongst 
impoverished African American communities. Black civic traditions and communal networks, 
such as the neighbourhood, the church, mosques and families, were major barriers against the 
nihilistic threat but have now been weakened: 
 
These traditions consist primarily of Black religious and civic institutions that 
sustained familial and communal networks of support. If cultures are, in part, what 
human beings create (out of the antecedent fragments of other cultures) in order to 
convince themselves not to commit suicide, then Black foremothers and Black 
forefathers are to be applauded (West 1992, p.40). 
 
In West’s view, nihilism is the response of impoverished African Americans who are bereft of 
resources to confront the workings of the US capitalism. Whilst this does not mean that 
individual Black people are not responsible for their actions, it does mean that the nihilistic 
threat contributes to criminal behaviour, feeds off poverty and shattered cultural institutions 
(West 1992, p.41). West argues that what he sees as ‘non-market values’ such as love, care 
and service were handed down by preceding generations through traditional cultural structures 
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of meaning and communal networks of support. However, love, care and service have now 
been ‘edged out’ by American corporate culture. He suggests that in our contemporary reality, 
corporate market culture has also spawned a market morality that stigmatises blackness and 
Black bodies reducing them to objects for personal pleasure and gratification. However, West 
does not mention the ways in which these values have also become intrinsically co-opted and 
commodified by a culture of corporate morality, specifically if we think about what Barbara 
Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild (2002) call the ‘care drain’ through the global 
importation of care and love from poor countries to rich ones (I will discuss this point later in 
this chapter), or what David Theo Goldberg refers to as the ‘privatisation’ of wellbeing 
(Goldberg 2009).  
Like all Americans, West argues, African Americans have been greatly influenced by 
nonmarket values. Corporate market institutions, particularly in the culture industries – 
television, radio, video, music – have had an adverse influence on the undermining of 
traditional morality in order to stay in business and make profits (West 1992, p.42).  West 
writes, the ‘eclipse of hope and collapse of meaning in much of Black America is linked to 
the structural dynamics of corporate market institutions that affect all Americans.’ However, 
West warns,  
 
Under these circumstances, Black existential angst derives from the lived experience 
of ontological wounds and emotional scars inflicted by white supremacist beliefs and 
images permeating U.S. society and culture. These wounds and scars attack Black 
intelligence, Black ability, Black beauty, and Black character daily in subtle and not-
so-subtle ways (West 1992, p.42).  
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West’s retrospective view of ‘traditional’ modals of Black morality and the durability of civic 
institutions of the past has been critiqued elsewhere. Michael Eric Dyson suggests that ‘a 
belief in nihilism is too, well, nihilistic’ (Dyson 1997, p.139). Dyson critiques West for his 
‘nostalgic’ view of ‘traditional values’, values that West claims were established by our Black 
forefathers and foremothers to ward of the nihilistic threat (West 1992). David Theo 
Goldberg’s response to West’s defence of traditional morality notes that they are ‘as tied to 
racist, sexist and homophobic commitments”, as to love and respect (Goldberg 1997, p.121). 
For Dyson, West’s theory of nihilism is driven by a type of nostalgia that casts the current 
generation of young African Americans as ‘moral strangers’, ethically estranged from the 
moral practices and spiritual beliefs that helped previous generations of African Americans 
through harsh and dangerous times (Dyson 1997). Dyson supports West’s view that earlier 
generations of African Americans had refused to give up on the struggle for freedom and 
equality. Unlike West, however, Dyson sees that the determination to keep up ‘the good fight’ 
has not gone away and that the attempt of contemporary Black folk to make a way for 
themselves beyond the limitations of their circumstance has not ceased:  
  
But I guess I just don’t see where nihilism is winning, where the attempts of Black 
folk to make a way out of no way have ceased … The real miracle of contemporary 
Black life is that there are still so many sane, sensible, struggling, secular, sanctified, 
spiritual and spunky Black folk who just said no to destruction way before Nancy 
Reagan figured out what crack was. In other words, those Black folk of the past are us 
Black folk of the present (Dyson 1997, pp.139-139). 
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For Dyson, nihilism is not as detrimental as West would have us think. The more or less 
exclusive focus on the effects of nihilism on the African American underclass in West’s 
analysis obscures the ways nihilism impacts upon the African American middle classes. Do 
they not suffer from the effects of nihilism? Indeed taking into account the penetrative reach 
of market values, does America itself not have a problematic culture of nihilism which 
permeates through and across class, race and gender formations? As bell hooks (1992) has 
pointed out, Black intellectuals and professionals may have attained access to certain levels of 
material wealth but this does not make them more immune to the lust for money and power 
than any other Black group. Equally, she suggests, material privilege has not kept at bay the 
‘Black professionals’ own encounter with hopelessness, helplessness and powerlessness. 
Indeed, hooks accuses Black middle class intellectuals and professionals of being willing to 
‘participate in the commodificaton of blackness in ways that ultimately perpetuate the existing 
social order’ (hooks 1992, p.49). This is despite the reality that being Black and middle class 
in America is much more tenuous than it is for non-blacks occupying the same socioeconomic 
bracket (Goldberg 1997, p.112).   
For Dyson, also, love alone is simply not enough to ward of the devastating effects of 
Black suffering. It must be accompanied by fundamental social resources such as 
employment, education, housing and food. He adds that these resources cannot guarantee a 
successful outcome (evidenced by the vulnerable social gains made by the Black middle 
class) but without them a bad outcome is highly likely (Dyson 1997). As hooks states clearly, 
any discourse on love needs to be strategically aligned to practical programmes for political 
and social transformation and empowerment (hooks 1992, p.50). Otherwise, we are in danger 
of perpetuating the prevailing social order without ending the conditions that support 
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lovelessness and structures of domination and degradation. Dyson argues that nihilism is not 
so much the problem but as more a symptom of the basic predicament of white racism, 
 
I don’t mean the here just the nasty things many white folk believe about Black folk. 
I’m referring to the systematic destruction of Black life, the pervasive attack on the 
Black sense of well-being, the subversion of Black self-determination, and the erasure 
of crucial narratives of Black self-esteem that are foundational to American versions 
of democracy. Nihilism is certainly self-destructive. That’s because Black folk were 
taught – and have had it reinforced across time, geography, and ideology – that our 
Black selves weren’t worth loving or preserving. Nihilism is the outgrowth, not the 
origin, of such harsh lessons. Without the destruction of white supremacy, Black 
nihilism will continue to grow (Dyson 1997, pp.136-137). 
 
David Theo Goldberg makes the point that given the fact that intensified commodification and 
the morality of the market are conditions that also impact upon non-blacks in the US, West’s 
employment of the nihilistic threat obscures a discourse on how these market mechanisms 
exacerbate white supremacy (Goldberg 1997, p.114). This is an important point. It is 
important because West is attempting to forge a critical position between what he sees as the 
conservative behaviourists and the liberal structuralists by establishing an existential analysis 
of the degradation of Black life. However, as Goldberg points out, if Black people are 
suffering more intensely from the accumulative threat of nihilism, then, 
 
These effects necessitate an analysis of how historical shifts in the modes of 
accumulation transform white supremacy, and how such transformations have served 
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both to licence and rationalize different exploitative practices in relation to whites and 
blacks (Goldberg 1997, p.11). 
 
Goldberg’s critique poses a dilemma for West in that by focusing on nihilism, West 
unintentionally ‘draws the focus away from the political economy’ thus ‘entailing that 
structural issues remain largely hidden from view’ (Goldberg 1997, p.114). Thus West’s 
position seems to make an involuntary slip into the conservative behaviourist tradition by 
ultimately proposing an existential ‘self-help’ strategy. I suspect that this slip is not what 
West intended in his analysis. Indeed, the strategy proposed by West to combat the perceived 
threat of nihilism is the politics of ‘conversion.’ For West, a politics of conversion, through 
new models of progressive Black leadership and the affirmation of ones own worth, would 
offer poor Black Americans the chance to believe there is hope in the future and a meaning to 
struggle:  
  
Like liberal structuralists, the advocates of a politics of conversion never lose sight of 
the structural conditions that shape the sufferings and lives of people. Yet, unlike 
liberal structuralism, the politics of conversion meet the nihilistic threat head-on. Like 
conservative behaviourism, the politics of conversion openly confronts the self-
destructive and inhumane actions of Black people. Unlike conservative behaviourists, 
the politics of conversion situates (not exonerates) these actions within inhumane 
circumstances (West 1992, p.44).   
 
West believes that a love ethic must be at the heart of a politics of conversion. Whilst he sees 
the need for analyses of racism, sexism and class subordination, such analyses are not, he 
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believes, enough to tame the threat of nihilism. Nihilism he argues is a disease of the soul 
similar to alcoholism and drug addiction and can only be tamed by love and care (West 1992). 
Self-love and a love of others are both modes towards increasing self-valuation and for 
encouraging political resistance in one’s community (West 1992). Crucially for West, these 
modes of valuation and resistance are not only rooted in progressive leadership but also in 
subversive memory, a memory that takes the best of one’s past without romantic nostalgia 
and is guided by a universal love ethic (West 1992). However, as Dyson argues, it is precisely 
a nostalgic view of the past that underpins West’s belief in the nihilistic threat (Dyson 1997). 
In West’s work the concept of love is closely linked to a concern for America as a 
nation in which nihilism is one of the many instances of cultural decay in a declining empire 
that is racially polarised (West 1992).  Historically, the negative racial caricatures invented to 
define Black people and blackness itself as a separate sub-human form have evolved and 
morphed blackness into a devalued counterpoint to a white hegemonic norm. In 1982 West 
argued in ‘A Genealogy of Modern Racism,’ that the ‘notion that Black people are human 
beings is a relatively new discovery in Western civilisations. The Afro-American encounter 
with the modern world has been shaped first and foremost by the doctrine of white 
supremacy.’ West traced a genealogy of modern racism, in other words, the ideological route 
of ‘white supremacy’, back to the recovery of classical antiquity in the modern west and the 
‘classical aesthetic values of beauty, proportion and human form’ as expressed within 
classical culture (West 1982). West refers to these western aesthetic values as the ‘normative 
gaze.’ He further argues that the normative gaze, alongside pseudo scientific disciplines such 
as phrenology (the reading of skulls) and physiognomy (the reading of faces), formed the 
intellectual legitimacy of white supremacy (West 1982). To counter the accumulative 
intergenerational affects of white supremacy (its historical, ideological and social effects on 
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Black life) and its intersection with the social neglect and urban decay, West’s love ethic 
seeks to generate a sense of justice amongst ‘downtrodden people’ (West 1992). This justice 
would be a critical affirmation of Black humanity through self-love that works closely with a 
concern and love for others (West 1992). In short, love as a form of justice would be a cure 
for ‘ihilism.’  
But again the politics of conversion may obscure the cumulative effects of long 
standing historically rooted and socially generated forms of racial injustice if sufficient 
attention is not given to the structural mechanisms that support Black suffering. As Dyson 
argues, a politics of conversion resembles a politics of self-help (1997). On its own, the 
politics of self-help is an insufficient mechanism to combat the deep and profound traditions 
and conditions of social neglect, economic disparity and political abandonment. In his book, 
Is Bill Cosby Right (or has the Black middle class lost its mind?), Dyson explains,  
 
The poor cannot erase the blight of white supremacy by behaving better, no matter 
what advocates of racial uplift or personal responsibility like Bill Cosby suggest. 
Assuming personal responsibility cannot remove vicious structural barriers to 
economic mobility. Exercising personal responsibility cannot prevent the 
postindustrial decline in major northeastern cities, nor can it fix the crumbling 
infrastructure that continues to keep the poor, well, poor. Being personally responsible 
can’t stop job flight, structural shifts in the political economy, the increasing 
technological monopoly of work, downsizing, or outsourcing, problems that middle-
class folk, who are presumed to be more personally responsible than the poor, face in 
abundance these days (Dyson 2005, pp.216-217). 
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In this book, Dyson is angry at Black middle class groups who have abandoned poor working 
class communities and at the same time accuses them for their own racial disenfranchisement. 
For Dyson, ‘nihilism shifts the burden for getting Black America back on track to suffering 
Black folk. That seems a tall order for a people already strapped with sparse resources and 
weighted down with nihilism’ (Dyson 1997, p137).   
West is arguing in part, that Black people despite the major historical and social 
burden of systematic subjugation and disenfranchisement, are ultimately responsible for 
instigating the transformation of our condition. Whilst keeping in mind the structures of 
oppression, he is unwavering in his approach to highlighting the failings of Black leadership 
and the self destructive thoughts and actions Black people can have toward each other (West 
1992). But as Dyson argues, the responsibility Black folk have to combat the perceived 
nihilistic threat is indeed ‘a tall order’ if the correct structure of laws, duties, and obligations 
that have the power to change behaviour are not in place (Dyson 1997, p.138). Using Martin 
Luther King’s love ethic to illustrate his point, Dyson argues that, ‘True enough, King’s life 
and ministry were regulated by a love ethic. But he saw righteous power, that is, power linked 
to justice, as the imperfect but indispensible social translation of love’ (Dyson 1997, p138). 
The harsh reality facing many poor Black communities in America is that social justice has 
been all too elusive and self-help has been one de facto mode of survival in the face of racial 
attack and increasing social ‘invisibility’ within the poor populations of Americas (Goldberg 
2009). This crisis of social abandonment was no more evident when, in late August 2005, 
Hurricane Katrina hit the city of New Orleans. Once again a spirit of self-reliance became the 
imperfect but necessary strategy for self preservation in the face of annihilation by a 
catastrophic natural disaster and an astonishing act of government neglect. 
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eoliberal nihilism, Katrina and the (in)visible Black American underclass 
West is quite right in his analysis of the impact of corporate values and corporate institutions 
in shaping American culture in general and some aspects of African American culture in 
particular. This is especially true when we consider the marginality of countercultural 
discourses in popular African American musical genres such as hip-hop and r‘n’b and the 
subsequent rise of ostentatious and garish modes of commercialised Black music that appear 
to celebrate the African American corporate male, the ‘hypersexual’ Black female body, and 
hip hop’s ‘entrepreneurial dynamic’ (Dipannita Basu 2006).  Aspects of Black popular culture 
in America are very much a part of the ‘market morality’ of contemporary neo-liberal 
corporate American culture. Whilst fetishised notions of blackness as ‘hypersexual,’ desirable 
and ‘hyper-dangerous’ abound in visual culture the majority of poor African Americans get 
caught between the hypervisibility of corporate neoliberal tropes of blackness whilst being 
largely excluded from the wealth and profits generated by the intensification of American 
capitalism and the commodification of blackness. As West argues, African American 
consumers of market morality are like most Americans, seduced by the comfort and 
convenience that capitalism has to offer. However, where many African Americans differ 
greatly from most other Americans, stems from the fact that a significant majority are 
victimised by the very system that seduces, forcing too many to remain impoverished at the 
bottom of this capitalist social order. The commodification of Black life has not only 
undermined blackness as a political category, it has also helped to entrench even deeper levels 
of lovelessness afforded to Black life and Black bodies. Commodified blackness and the 
reification of an elite class of visible Black individuals such as, for example, Barack Obama, 
Oprah Winfrey, Colin Powel, Beyonce Knowles, Condoleezza Rice, Russell Simmons, has 
diverted our attention away from the ways in which many African Americans continue to be 
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socially ravaged by the impact of race, class, gender and poverty discrimination amongst 
other forms of domination in American society.  
 
ihilism and the Katrina catastrophe 
The crisis of lovelessness afforded to blackness literally surfaced through the flooded toxic 
waters left behind by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In this tragedy, West’s original observation 
that ‘many Black folk now reside in a jungle with a cut-throat morality devoid of any faith in 
deliverance or hope for freedom,’ would have been an apt prophetic description of Katrina in 
all of its ugliness and heartbreak as the overwhelming majority of victims, Black, Brown and 
poor, were abandoned and left to fend for themselves in the face of the damage and filth of 
Katrina’s deadly flood waters. In the original social context of West’s (1992) essay, the 
‘lovelessness’ and ‘cut-throat’ morality that resided within the urban ‘jungle,’ although 
created by capitalist neglect, had belonged to America’s Black underclass. This social group 
was the victim of corporate excess, government neglect and increasing welfare cutbacks.  
However in the aftermath of Katrina, clearly, a culture of ‘lovelessness’, ‘cut-throat morality,’ 
‘nihilism’ and a lack of care, rested firmly in the hands of the neoliberal American 
government as opposed to the impoverished Black and Brown communities of New Orleans. 
As Dyson (2006) points out, both the Bush and Clinton administrations played a helping hand 
in making Katrina an epic and shameful catastrophe, 
 
Clinton criticised Bush for his leadership in the federal government’s response to 
Katrina, noting the disproportionate burden borne by the Black poor. Yet, because 
some of Clinton’s presidential decisions hurt poor blacks, neoliberal neglect is 
sometimes just as large a factor in their suffering as conservative assault. It may have 
Loving Blackness 
 
 229 
been Bush’s hands stretching forth to rebuke the interests of poor blacks in Katrina’s 
aftermath, but the misery of the Black poor has been indelibly marked by Clinton’s 
fingerprints (Dyson 2006, p.23). 
 
Before the Katrina devastation, New Orleans could have been considered, to paraphrase West, 
as one of the many Black urban centres within the US where Black people were bereft of 
material resources to confront the workings of the US capitalism (West 1992). Dyson (2006) 
highlights how before the storm, more than 90,000 citizens of Louisiana, Mississippi and 
Alabama made less than $10,000 a year. The New Orleans’s poverty rate ranked seventh 
highest out of 290 large U.S. counties. Of all the children of African American descent in 
New Orleans 69 percent lived in poverty (Dyson 2006). As such New Orleans was an 
exemplary location for the festering threat of nihilism that in West’s analysis had taken hold 
of much Black America. However, Goldberg has observed that the broader structural 
backdrop and political context of the Katrina catastrophe was driven by a longer trend of the 
‘social disappearance’ and ‘expanding invisibility’ of poor Black and Brown Americans 
(Goldberg 2009 pp.66 -105). This ‘disappearance’ and ‘invisibility’ formed part of a broader 
commitment by ‘fundamentalist fiscal radicals’ to, 
 
Defund social programs in education, health care, emergency management and 
response, popular culture and the arts through extreme forms of tax reduction while 
increasing military, security, and prison expenditures and investments [which] brings 
public funding to the point of bankruptcy (Goldberg 2009 p.80). 
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As Goldberg argues, this meant the conditions of wellbeing were increasingly privatised, in a 
process where the lives of the rich (overwhelmingly white) were being guarded from those of 
the poor (overwhelmingly Black and Brown), whose fate was more likely prison than work 
(Goldberg 2009 p.88). For the Katrina disaster this logic of privatised wellbeing meant federal 
resources to protect the city were becoming less and less available for its most vulnerable 
residents. As Goldberg writes: 
 
The well to do could scramble for safety in their air-conditioned tank-sized vehicles 
while the poor were reduced to a decaying and in some cases deadly doomed stadium. 
The tens of thousands unable to flee the evacuation order in New Orleans as the 
hurricane bore down were overwhelmingly Black, as revealed at the Superdome and 
Convention Center. Family and other networks could support the mobile while the 
immobile were left to flounder in a flooded and rotting city, many losing contact with 
family members sharing their fate. The less lucky lost their lives. The wealthier got to 
watch from afar while the stricken got to share the streets with floating bodies, 
excrement, oil pollution. The privileged seemed to need no medical care while the 
poor restricted to the city got none, even where doctors from further afield were 
volunteering their help. The rich were free to roam the country, the poor rounded up 
and subjected to prison like conditions even when bussed off to safer turf, their crime 
nothing else than abject poverty and the color of their skin (Goldberg 2009, p.88). 
 
Global news coverage of Katrina saw African Americans being described not as American 
citizens but, in the language of displacement, as ‘refugees’, as quasi-citizens. Within the 
visual literacy of globalised media, their abandoned predicament meant their horrifying story 
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became comparable to other narratives of displacement and dislocation much further afield in 
African territories. As phenotype, blackness once again became disassociated and displaced 
from the narrative of Western citizenship. As Anna Hartnell points out, 
 
News reports did focus on the government's apparent abandonment of its own people, 
but a hysterical and arguably racist undercurrent was almost compulsively drawn to 
rumours of rape and murder – nearly all of which turned out to be untrue (Hartnell 
2008[Online]). 
 
In pointing to the underbelly of American racism and how racist attitudes determine and 
shape responses to catastrophic life or death situations, Katrina’s victims were caught between 
the representational history of racialised blackness and decades of deep seated structural 
poverty and social neglect. Katrina also proved that the US federal government was not afraid 
to adopt military tactics honed in foreign territories upon its most vulnerable citizens: 
  
In the name of securing the city, New Orleans was quickly turned into an armed 
military camp. Combat ready forces went door-to-door urban warfare style, kicking 
down locked entrances searching for survivors to evacuate at the end of often fully 
loaded AK47s. While critics were rightly bemoaning the dehumanizing conduct of 
war abroad, few seemed to notice that for domestic purposes America was mimicking 
tactics of militarization honed in the desert war (Goldberg 2009, p.89). 
  
Amongst the death, suffering and neglect, those who were not wealthy and white were left to 
fend for themselves whilst waiting in misery for federal government assistance. Rather than 
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the threat of nihilism from within it was annihilation from without that many had to fear. 
Rarely have the victims of an indiscriminate natural disaster been criminalised and demonised 
in the minds of the public by the media and public officials, to the point where many were left 
to die unnecessarily whilst others suffered the humiliation of being labelled rioters, looters, 
rapists and hoodlums.  At the point when the majority of survivors were trying stay alive in 
the face of a woefully inadequate emergency response by the US Government, Katrina’s 
Black and poor victims were being threatened with a shoot to kill policy.  Indeed, privately 
employed soldiers off-duty from protecting politicians and corporate entities in Iraq, were 
firing at random ‘upon perceived looters with the tacit blessing of the more constrained 
National Guard (Goldberg 2009, p.89). Darnell Herrington, a Katrina survivor, recounts his 
ordeal of being shot and left to die in circumstances that invoke older histories of predatory 
racist murders; 
 
My cousin hollored, ‘You’re shot.’ I got up and tried to jump over the tree stumps on 
the street, and as soon as I got in mid-air another blast hit me in my back. And I fell on 
the ground again. Somehow it was a miracle, I got up again, and I began to run. I 
heard [the white guy] saying, ‘Nigger, you gotta run.’  I ran around a corner and I saw 
this Black guy sitting on the porch, and I said ‘Man, help me.’ And he said, ‘Come 
on,’ but he was in the house with some white people.  When I went to the back of the 
house, this white lady said ‘I can’t help you. You gotta get out of here.’ So I ran away 
from their house. And I ran up to this truck with two white guys, and I said, ‘Please, 
please, please help me.’ I felt like I was going to die. And the older white guy said, 
‘Get away from truck. We can’t help you. We’re liable to shoot you ourselves.’ And 
they pulled off and called me a nigger. It’s like [white people] were using the 
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opportunity to do something they’ve been waiting to do. And I’m thinking about 
racism and all that’s running in my head. I’m like, ‘I can’t believe this.’ After 
everything we’ve gone through, and everything I’ve been through, I would have never 
imagined this happening to me (Dyson 2006, p.16). 
 
It is not clear who had shot Darnell. But it is clear that Darnell feared he was going to be 
punished by death at the hands of whites in an act of violent vengefulness and racist 
resentment. When the hip hop artist Kanye West said George Bush ‘doesn’t care about Black 
people’ he was articulating what some have described as a deeply institutional rationality of 
the US state government that has existed for the past 20 years: 
 
Since the Reagan administration, and exacerbated dramatically under George W. 
Bush, the state has been restructured in such a way that poor people generally, which 
means especially Black and Brown citizens, are not to be taken into consideration, 
cared for, or exhibited compassion by the institutional apparatuses representing the 
state (Goldberg 2009, p.91). 
 
A loving or caring response to save the lives of Louisiana’s poor Black population seems not 
only unthinkable but delusional. It was openly reported that if the victims of Katrina had been 
overwhelmingly white Americans, then the response by the federal government and local 
emergency services would have been dramatically different (Dyson 2006). Indeed, white 
Katrina victims were actively separated from blacks in many of the holding centres for fear 
that they would be attacked.  Behind such racial stereotypes lay some of the most basic 
reactionary assumptions behind our common sense thinking about race and how we act upon 
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race. On the surface level, these assumptions reveal deeply embedded social judgements 
attached to ‘whiteness’ (visible, worthy of protection, life and well being) and ‘blackness’ 
(hyper/in -visible, dangerous, worthy of death, punishment and suffering). Beneath the 
surface, however, as Goldberg argues, race constitutes the making of modern state 
populations; 
 
Race accordingly has been one of modernity’s principal modes, interactive with the 
likes of class, ethnicity, and gender, of categorization and abjection, incorporation and 
ablution, citizenship and alienation. In short, of belonging and distantiation, of 
claim(ing) and reject(ion) (Goldberg 2009 p.366).  
 
Dyson suggests that the failure of the government to respond in a timely manner to Katrina’s 
Black victims should be seen in an historical context of a segregated conscience within white 
society where Black grief and pain have consistently been ignored (Dyson 2006, p.24). It can 
be argued that the vast sums of money ($2 billion) raised through charitable donations for 
Katrina victims (as well as for Hurricanes Rita and Wilma) were testimony to public 
acknowledgement and recognition of Black grief and pain. Whilst such an overwhelming 
charitable response demonstrated compassion for Katrina’s victims, the government failed to 
capitalise on such episodic acts of care and concern (Dyson 2006). The Black poor of the 
Delta, Dyson argues, lacked the social standing that might have evoked empathy from George 
W. Bush and the federal government, ‘If they had been white, a history of identification – 
supported by structures of care, sentiments of empathy, and an elevated racial standing – 
would have immediately kicked in’ (Dyson 2006, p.25). As images of African Americans left 
to suffer the dehumanising effects of Katrina were broadcast around the globe, the deep-
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seated disdain for the poor Black of New Orleans by the American government exposed the 
durability and structural apparatus of racial thinking, of racism and racial stereotyping that 
deeply permeate and compromise the purported democratic principles of American society.  
When we examine the catastrophe of Katrina, West’s love ethic is dependent on the 
‘turning of the soul’ of ‘white supremacist capitalist patriarchy’ towards respecting and caring 
for the economically poor – Black, Brown and white working class communities made 
invisible by neoliberal neglect. As Katrina had shown us, in sporadic public moments of 
emergency and natural disaster, care and compassion can be funnelled through charitable acts 
of giving. However on a systematic structural level, an ethic of love as a form of social justice 
rests much more on the question of power and resources and how they are shared, controlled 
and distributed before disaster strikes. West’s love ethic is an important critical intervention, 
shedding light on the necessity for a critically engaged public discourse on love. However, 
West’s theory of nihilism carries the danger of eliding questions of accountability and 
structural change. The structural order of western states continues to be mobilised by race in 
spite of the best ‘self-help’ efforts made by blacks and others to combat racism. The 
consequences of not paying full attention to the social structures of race are that the conditions 
of those victimised by racism and the mechanisms that sustain racialised domination risk 
being made invisible.  
The call to engage with the politics of love is a necessary one particularly at a time 
where a growing culture of lovelessness permeates the hostile attitudes and structural 
instruments of racialised states. Racialised states seek to govern those deemed different and 
‘other’ on racially muted but no less racially aggressive terms (see Goldberg 2009). As hooks 
reminds us, it is impossible to talk about new ways of living without facing up to the realities 
that face people of colour where being poor in combination with the threat of natural disaster 
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can tip the scales for millions toward displacement, illness, and death’ (hooks 2006, p.123). It 
is also impossible to talk about Katrina solely as an American ‘national’ disaster. Most 
tellingly, Katrina’s Black victims and their representation in the media, was framed within 
discourses on migration and refugees. Black American citizens became globalised and linked 
to global Black populations, not as an act of liberty, but by being associated with other acts of 
marginalisation and exclusion. Their blackness was removed from western citizenship and 
relocated within the narrative framework of Black global migration as a trope for 
displacement, invisibility, erasure and non-belonging.  
 
hooks and ‘loving blackness’ 
In her book Salvation: Black People and Love bell hooks (2001) argues that Black people 
were perceived by those who had colonised them as lacking the human capacity to love 
because they were dehumanised and uncivilised (hooks 2001). ‘Love’ as the foundation of 
political struggle has been a continuous and important theme throughout hooks’ writing as a 
Black feminist cultural critic. From her essay, ‘Loving Blackness as Political Resistance’ to 
her treatises on love known as the love trilogy - All About Love: ew Visions (2000); 
Salvation: Black People and Love (2001); and Communion: The Female Search for Love 
(2002) – hooks has been engaged with constructing a concept of love that can tackle the 
ravages of ‘lovelessness’ in American society.  One example of lovelessness critiqued within 
hooks’s work is the system of patriarchy. In The Will to Change: Men, Masculinity and Love 
(2004) hooks argues that a system of patriarchy keeps men both from loving themselves and 
from loving others. As a consequence she writes,  
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As our culture prepares males to embrace war, they must be all the more indoctrinated 
into patriarchal thinking that tells them that it is their nature to kill and to enjoy 
killing.  Bombarded by news about male violence, we hear no news about men and 
love (hooks 2004, p.11).  
 
For hooks, love is both an ethical and indeed political response to a culture of domination and 
violence that is damaging in different and uneven ways to all of us as, but in particular for 
marginalised groups of Black people:  
 
A culture of domination demands of all its citizens self-negation. The more 
marginalized, the more intense the demand. Since Black people, especially the 
underclass, are bombarded by messages that we have no value, are worthless, it is no 
wonder that we fall prey to nihilistic  despair or forms of addiction that provide 
momentary escape, illusions of grandeur, and temporary freedom from the pain of 
facing reality. (hooks 1992, p.19). 
 
hooks’ theoretical construction of love is thus multifaceted in its response to the social ills 
that create and sustain what she often calls ‘white supremacist capitalist patriarchy.’ Love 
becomes the foundation at the heart of our political struggles to defeat all interlocking systems 
and forms of domination, including racism, sexism and patriarchy.  
hooks’s writing on the subject of ‘love’ as a force for social transformation is 
extensive as she believes that love is profoundly political (hooks 2001). Her essay ‘Loving 
Blackness as Political Resistance,’ draws our attention to discourses on blackness that ‘choose 
to value, indeed to love, blackness’ (hooks 1992, p11). These discourses are often at the 
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margins of dominant racist thinking, meaning they are not normally sanctioned by wider 
cultures of white supremacy. Unorthodox discourses on blackness are discourses that publicly 
validate and place value on blackness and Black life in a white supremacist context where 
blackness is more often essentialised as a site of denigration or pathologised as a human 
condition from which Black subjects ultimately wish to escape. In her essay ‘Loving 
Blackness’, hooks speaks of her frustration when trying to establish a discourse on blackness 
with students in her class beyond narratives of Black self-hate;  
 
I asked the class to consider the possibility that to love blackness is dangerous in white 
supremacist culture – so threatening, so serious a breach in the fabric of the social 
order that death is the punishment. It became painfully obvious by the lack of response 
that this group of diverse students (many of them Black people) were more interested 
in discussing the desire of Black folks to be white, indeed were fixated on this issue. 
So much so, that they could not even take seriously a critical discussion about loving 
blackness (hooks 1992, p.9).  
 
hooks is arguing that within a social context that overvalues ‘whiteness’ and  a culture that 
devalues ‘blackness’, not only do white subjects learn to undervalue blackness, Black people 
and other non-white subjects are also susceptible to denigrating Black life (hooks 1992). 
Black self-hatred becomes a consequence of internalised racism. In her essay, ‘Revolutionary 
attitude’ she writes, 
 
I can still see the images of young Black men brutally murdering one another that 
were part of the fictional narrative of John Singleton’s film Boyz ‘ The Hood. These 
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images were painful to watch. That is how it should be. It should hurt our eyes to see 
racial genocide perpetuated in Black communities, whether fictional or real. Yet in the 
theatre where I saw this film, the largely Black audience appeared to find pleasure in 
these images. This response was powerful testimony, revealing that those forms of 
representation in a white supremacist society that teach Black folks to internalize 
racism are so ingrained in our collective consciousness, that we can find pleasure in 
images of our death and destruction. What can the future hold if our present 
entertainment is the spectacle of contemporary colonization, dehumanization, and 
disempowerment where the image serves as a murder weapon. Unless we transform 
images of blackness, of Black people, our ways of looking and our ways of being 
seen, we cannot make radical interventions that will fundamentally alter our situation 
(hooks 1992, p.7).  
 
Anti-Black socialisation becomes part of a process of psychological colonisation. It becomes 
a normative social practice in an environment where as hooks argues blackness as sign 
primarily evokes hatred and fear in the public imagination of whites ‘and all the other groups 
who learn that one of the quickest ways to demonstrate one’s kinship within a white 
supremacist order is by sharing racist assumptions’ (hooks 1992, p.10). Anti-Black 
socialisation can be defeated by decolonising the mind of white supremacist ways of thinking 
(hooks 1992, p.11). hooks suggests that discourses on Black self-hatred are the norm. Indeed 
she argues that Black people are both complacent about and complicit in society’s obsession 
with the notion of Black self-hate, so much so that when this hegemonic view is challenged 
by discourses such as loving blackness, the challenge is seen as ‘suspect’ or ‘threatening’ to 
the prevailing dominant social order. Loving blackness becomes an act of psychological 
Loving Blackness 
 
 240 
decolonisation within the social and historical context of racialised hierarchies, where the 
‘natural’ or normative assumed superiority of whiteness and white supremacy are intimately 
tied to the faulty binary logic of ‘inferior’ racialised others.  
Within this context, loving blackness becomes an insurgent radical act that goes 
beyond simply demonising whiteness and white people. On the contrary, loving blackness 
‘disrupts’, ‘unsettles’ and ‘subverts’ the logic of ‘racist narratives [and structures] that are 
constructed for the purposes of racial domination’ (Farr 2009, p.159). Clive Headley (2009) 
highlights the connection hooks makes between the politics of decolonisation and her 
formulation of postmodern blackness. He writes, 
 
A decolonisation of blackness is needed precisely because blackness, in its modern 
variation, was constructed in a context where only whites were viewed as the 
appropriate individuals worthy of being considered subjects. The construction of 
modern white subjectivity was concurrent with the project of European colonization, 
which, among other things, involved not only the project of political control but also a 
control of thinking about the very meaning of existence. Colonization also included a 
control of thought and imagination. Hooks believes that decolonization is needed in 
order to realize the potential of postmodern blackness (Headley 2009, p.149). 
 
In her essay ‘Postmodern Blackness,’ hooks deconstructs blackness as an ethical project to 
denounce racism and to critique essentialist or monolithic interpretations of blackness. Indeed, 
she embraces a politics of difference by developing the notion of ‘postmodern blackness’, to 
‘affirm multiple Black identities, varied Black experience [that challenge] colonial imperialist 
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paradigms of Black identity which represent blackness one dimensionally in ways that 
reinforce and sustain white supremacy’ (hooks 1991, p.28).  
Headley argues that we should not be surprised by the fact that hooks considers 
postmodernism to be an effective tool for combating racism because ‘racism is among other 
things, premised upon certain conceptions of blackness, [thus] eradicating racism entails 
interrogating oppressive notions of blackness’ (Headley 2009, p.146). Indeed, racism as a 
system of thought and as a structure of domination is one ‘grand narrative’ that needs to be 
continuously deconstructed to eradicate the false ‘truths’ that underpin its logic. Arnold Farr 
(2009) argues that hooks’ essay ‘Postmodern Blackness,’ is also crucial for understanding the 
Black identity politics. He writes: 
 
It presents a problem that I think is central to hooks’s contribution to race theory. That 
is, how is racial identity possible without some support for racial essentialism? Is 
racial identity necessary if we are to overcome racism? (Farr 2009, pp.159-160)  
 
Farr (2009) argues that postmodernism has presented an important critical challenge to 
essentialist identities by challenging the notion that identity is static, fixed and universal. Thus 
postmodernism helps us all to realise that there are no fixed Black or white universal identities 
(Farr 2009). However, postmodernism is also awkward and problematic. In support of 
hooks’s position, Farr highlights how postmodernism attempts to rid Black people of 
subjectivity and identity before we are even recognised as subjects: 
 
Simply put, Black identity, although not universal or fixed, is shaped by its 
social/historical context. To be Black in America situates one within a social/historical 
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narrative that includes the slave trade, slavery and Jim Crow segregation. What binds 
together blacks in America is not some Black essence that is imparted to us by nature, 
but rather, a history, a history that included the attempt by white supremacists to deny 
our humanity, as well as a history of resistance and affirmation of ourselves as human 
beings.  There are many ways to respond to this history, many forms of resistance, and 
therefore, many different ways of being Black (Farr 2009, p.161). 
 
Loving ative Indianess 
Outside of the US, Emerance Baker (2005) utilises hooks’s theoretical model of loving 
blackness in defence of native cultures and specifically native women storytelling cultures in 
Canada through constructing a notion of ‘loving Indianess.’ Baker argues that it is 
strategically necessary to develop a theory of ‘loving Indianess’ in the face of ongoing racism 
and oppression faced by native communities in Canada. She explains, 
 
For me, a loving perception means loving Indianess in the face of our ongoing cultural 
genocide. It means that even while I'm walking in cities across Canada where our 
people are living on the streets and being ravaged by histories of cultural trauma, I 
need to be proud of the strength, courage, and optimism that being a Native woman 
has given me. All the while I still need to acknowledge that all this negative and 
hurtful history is a part of being Indian today, and is surely killing us. I also know that 
we need to continue to speak it, to address it in order for our cultural survival to 
continue (Baker 2005 p.6). 
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Baker is concerned with the ways in which Native women in Canada produce ‘loving spaces’ 
in their writing, spaces that affirm their lives and their bodies. She writes, ‘we don’t need to 
look far to see how Native women’s bodies are not loved.’  In conversation with other Native 
women on what it means to have a loving perception, Baker shares with her readers that 
‘loving Indianess’ is complex. It entails establishing ‘intimacy and responsibility whilst 
simultaneously acknowledging the problems in our Native communities’ (Baker 2005, p.7). 
She also highlights the necessity of a ‘loving gaze’ by communities that face continuing forms 
of oppression and domination. By replacing ‘blackness’ with ‘Indianess’, Baker employs a 
strategy of ethical and political solidarity, moving beyond biological conceptions of Indianess 
or blackness as purely ‘racial’ identities whilst seeking to affirm such identities in the face of 
cultural genocide (Baker 2005). Hence ‘blackness’ or ‘Native Indianess’ can be seen as tropes 
against systems of domination that mark as ‘other’ those who are seen as outside a ‘white 
male heterosexual norm.’ 
Loving blackness seeks to ‘critically interrogate’ the logic of whiteness and white 
supremacy as an epistemological standpoint by which we come to know and understand the 
world (hooks 1992). It is radical in that loving blackness, ‘creates the conditions necessary for 
us to move against the forces of domination and death and reclaim Black life’ (hooks 1992, 
p.20). 
 
Love and philosophy 
The necessary ‘politicisation of love’ is central to hooks’s construction of love as an active 
force. Here, psychoanalytical theories become a major thread in hooks’s writing on love. The 
work of psychoanalysts Erich Fromm and M. Scott Peck have heavily influenced hook’s 
notion of love as action and consciousness working together. Love is not merely a feeling or 
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something one requires or consumes, it is in of itself an action, requiring ‘a willingness to 
unite the way we think with the way we act.’ Love is something we choose to do rather than 
something that simply happens to us. In The Art of Loving (1995), Erich Fromm describes 
love as an activity that requires a constant state of awareness and alertness to become capable 
of loving (Fromm 1995, p.100). Our capacity to love should not be separated between 
personal and social commitments. He writes, 
 
If to love means to have a loving attitude towards everybody, if love is a character 
trait, it must necessarily exist in one’s relationship not only with one’s family and 
friends, but towards those with whom one is in contact through one’s work, business, 
profession. There is no division of labour between love for one’s own and love for 
strangers (Fromm 1995, p.101). 
 
Fromm is describing what hooks has referred to as ‘loving community.’  In her essay 
‘Community: Loving Communion’, hooks writes: ‘enjoying the benefits of living and loving 
in community empowers us to meet strangers without fear and extend to them the gift of 
openness and recognition’ (hooks 2000, p.143). In order to understand and to take seriously 
how the love of self and a love of strangers are part of the same process, Fromm argues that 
we would need ‘a rather drastic change in one’s social relations’ from the ones we have 
become accustomed to under the system of capitalism (Fromm 1995, p.101). Fromm is 
concerned with the disintegration of love in contemporary western society and the 
incompatibility of loving principles with the principles of capitalism (Fromm 2009). One 
principle of capitalism is domination, another is the system of exchange. For hooks ‘A culture 
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of domination is anti-love’ (hooks 1994, p.246). She argues that our contemporary culture 
advocates a system of exchange around desire that mirrors the economics of capitalism: 
 
Though many folks recognize and critique the commercialization of love, they see no 
alternative. Not knowing how to love or even what love is, many people feel 
emotionally lost; others search for definitions, for ways to sustain a love ethic in a 
culture that negates human value and valorises materialism (hooks 1994, p.246). 
 
Whilst arguing that capitalism is a complex and changing structure, Fromm nevertheless sees 
the values of the market economy as creating the conditions that prevent human beings from 
developing loving principles to transform society: 
 
People capable of love, under the present system, are necessarily the exceptions; love 
is by necessity a marginal phenomenon in present day Western society. Not so much 
because many occupations would not permit of a loving attitude, but because the spirit 
of a production-centred, commodity-greedy society is such that only the non-
conformist can defend himself successfully against it. Those who are seriously 
concerned with love as the only rational answer to the problem of human existence 
must, then, arrive at the conclusion that important and radical changes in our social 
structure are necessary, if love is to become a social and not a highly individualistic, 
marginal phenomenon (Fromm 1995, p.103). 
 
In a similar vein, M. Scott Peck (1990) makes the claim that a workable and practical 
definition of love would consist of a unitary understanding that embraces self love with a love 
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of others (Peck 1990, p.70). He defines love as: ‘The will to extend one’s self for the purpose 
of nurturing one’s own or another’s spiritual growth’ (Peck 1990, p.69). In Pecks definition of 
love, the extension of ourselves beyond our limits is labour intensive, requiring effort and a 
will to act. In this sense love is ‘demonstrable or real only through our exertion.’ Indeed, ‘love 
is not effortless. To the contrary, love is effortful’ (Peck 1990, p.71). This definition of love 
also requires that we make choices and decisions.  Rather than seeing love purely as an 
inexplicable involuntary emotion that renders us powerless, love is something we can choose 
to opt in and out of. Hence Peck’s use of the term ‘will.’ Peck makes a distinction between 
desire and action. Desire he argues, is intention without action. On the other hand, ‘will, is 
desire of efficient intensity that it is translated into action.’ Thus in Peck’s view, our desire to 
love is not itself love, for love is an act of will: ‘Love is as love does’ (Peck 1990, p71). hooks 
shares Pecks vision on love in the hope and possibility that a love ethic could be at the core of 
all human interaction (hooks 1999, p.246). 
hooks, and the authors who have influenced her conceptual understanding of love are 
attempting to unmask the common assumption that we, particularly those of us who reside in 
the western world, know how to love by virtue of belonging to ‘advanced’ capitalist societies.  
Indeed it is the derailment of this myth that uncovers a prevailing culture of lovelessness that 
functions within the material structures of western societies and seems to deepen social 
divisions of racism, sexism, xenophobia, classism, homophobia and the neglect of children 
and young people. An entrenched culture of lovelessness, and the belief that love is politically 
unimportant, prevents the development of politicised, practical and ethical model of love that 
can transform society (hooks 1994). It is our consumption of mythical forms of love through 
popular misconceptions of romantic love that engenders our alienation from knowing 
meaningful definitions of love beyond the individuated private realm. We are in love with the 
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mythology of love, specifically romantic love (eros), and are reluctant to face up to the hard 
realities of risk, danger and vulnerability that are a requirement of other forms of loving. And 
yet still, I support Fromm’s observation that ‘society must be organised in such a way that 
man’s (sic) social, loving nature is not separated from his social existence’ (Fromm 1995, 
p.104). In many ways, love is one of the few remaining ‘big’ myths or ‘grand narratives’ in 
society that we have been reluctant to dismantle. However, ‘to analyse the nature of love is to 
discover its general absence today and to criticise the social conditions which are responsible 
for its absence’ (Fromm 1995, p.104). hooks believes that we must choose to love to begin to 
move against the prevailing forces of domination and oppression; 
 
The moment we choose to love we begin to move towards freedom, to act in ways that 
liberate ourselves and others. That action is the testimony of love as the practice of 
freedom (hooks 1994, p.250). 
 
Spirituality and politics  
A further critical component in hooks’s formulation of love is the relationship between 
spirituality and politics. hooks explains how the work of the Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh 
has influenced her own understanding of spirituality by forging a bridge between theories of 
political recovery and spiritual recovery (hooks circa 2000). hooks’s spiritual resources are 
vast and varied ranging from Buddhism, Christianity to self-help literature. Alongside the 
work of Tich Nhat Hanh and Erich Fromm, she also utilises the writings and sermons of 
Martin Luther King and the social activist and monk, Thomas Merton to make explicit the 
politicisation of love and spirituality. She writes,  
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The teachings about love offered by Fromm, King and Merton differ from much of 
today’s writing. There is always an emphasis in their work on love as an active force 
that should lead us into greater communion with the world. In their work, loving 
practice is not aimed at simply giving an individual greater life satisfaction; it is 
extolled as the primary way we end domination and oppression. This important 
politicisation of love is often absent from today’s writings (hooks 2000, p.76). 
 
In Sisters of the Yam (1993) hooks’s specifically addresses the spiritual needs of Black 
women by speaking openly about her personal spiritual outlook. She writes, ‘lately, when I 
am asked to talk about what has sustained me in my struggle for self-recovery, I have been 
more willing to talk openly about a life lived in the spirit than in the past (hooks 1993, p.183). 
Whilst acknowledging the role of spirituality as a source of well-being in her life and in the 
lives of many Black women, hooks is careful to avoid promoting dogmatic and narrow 
religious systems informed by ‘intense participation in patriarchal religious institutions’ 
(hooks 1993, p.184). She is highly critical in her analysis of the ‘blatant misuses of spirituality 
and religion’ and the ways in which they can ‘uphold the values of a production-centred 
economy’ (hooks 2000). As she reminds us, 
 
It is no accident that so many famous New Age spiritual teachers link their teachings 
to a metaphysics of daily life that extols the virtues of wealth, privilege, and power. 
For example, consider New Age Logic, which suggests that the poor have chosen to 
be poor, have chosen their suffering. Such thinking removes from all of us who are 
privileged the burden of accountability (hooks 2000, p.73). 
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hooks’s spiritual outlook is not prescriptive. In other words she is not interested in outlining a 
particular religious perspective or spiritual belief in order to convert ‘non-believers’ to her 
spiritual practice. Instead, hooks is intent on sharing her insight into the ways in which 
cultivating a spiritual life can help to enhance self-recovery which in turn can inform our 
chosen political practice (hooks 1993, p.184). Again, hooks seeks to dismantle perceptual 
barriers between spirituality and politics by insisting that the two are intimately woven 
together, 
 
I have seen that we cannot fully create effective movements for social change if 
individuals struggling for that change are not also self-actualised or working towards 
that end … Toni Cade Bambara reminded us that ‘revolution begins in the self.’ She 
urged us to see self-actualization as part of our political effort to resist white 
supremacy and sexist oppression (hooks 1993, p.5)  
 
It can be argued that like love, spirituality must have an ethical and political dimension to 
enable and facilitate social transformation.  In ‘Loving Blackness’ hooks utilises James 
Cones’s Black liberation theology by suggesting its critical intervention was significant due to 
Cone’s insistence that the logic of white supremacy would be radically undermined if 
everyone would learn to ethically identify with and love blackness as a site of difference. 
Cone was not suggesting that we all must simply love blackness for the sake of someone 
having Black skin. He was as hooks argues, engaged in the critical awakening and education 
of readers ‘to break through denial and acknowledge the evils of white supremacy, the grave 
injustices of racist domination’ and to be moved to such an extent ‘that they would 
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righteously and militantly engage in ant-racist struggle’ (hooks 1992, p.11). She highlights 
that Cone’s ‘shock’ tactics were used to stress the seriousness of the issue: 
 
In his early work, A Black Theology of Liberation, Cone urges folks to understand 
blackness as an ‘ontological symbol’ that is the quintessential signifier of what 
oppression means in the United States. Cone calls upon whites, blacks and all other 
non-Black groups to stand against white supremacy by choosing to value indeed love, 
blackness (hooks 1992, p.11). 
 
Cone was thus engaged with the process of unlearning white supremacist attitudes and values 
(hooks 1992, p.12). As hooks goes on to explain, Cone was not evoking the notion of racial 
erasure or ‘colour-blind’ humanism where racism would simply cease to exist if everyone 
could forget about race and see all of humanity as the same (hooks 1992, p.12). Despite the 
binary logic of Cone’s argument and its essentialist veneer, according to hooks, Cone was 
making a radical intervention during the 1960s for two reasons. Firstly, he called for an 
ongoing interrogation of conventional thinking about race and strategies to eradicate racism 
that would radically undermine the logic of white supremacy. And secondly he hoped that 
whites could learn how to identify with blackness as a site of difference in order to scrutinise 
how society has learnt to over-value whiteness and to devalue blackness. Thus by scrutinising 
the regime of racism, valuing blackness would undermine racist logic. Seeing blackness as 
different rather than dangerous and threatening could then form the basis of political solidarity 
(hooks 1992, p.12).   
The notion that difference can act as the basis for solidarity and that we can practice 
ethical love across difference has been critiqued elsewhere by Sara Ahmed (2004). In chapter 
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three, I used Ahmed’s work on ‘multicultural love’ to illustrate her concerns about how a 
discourse on love can be used to serve the interests of western states at the expense of ‘others’ 
or outsiders who reside within but who do not necessarily belong to the ‘nation.’ Here, love 
demarcates belonging and bonding to the nation based on how the nation imagines itself, in 
this case as tolerant to others and outsiders, specifically those of us from ethnic minority and 
working class communities in Britain. This tolerant multicultural love is believed to be given 
or bequeathed to ‘others’ by the nation but the nation may feel this love has not been 
reciprocated back by ‘others.’  Ahmed wants us to question the pitfalls of this ‘loving’ 
narrative of collective belonging to show how love serves to both exclude and include 
particular groups to form the national ideal, in this case, the ideal of Britain as a benevolent 
multicultural nation to ‘foreigners’ and ‘others’ (Ahmed 2004). Indeed the national ideal can 
only work through the practice of exclusion. The failure of ‘others’ outside of the collective to 
return love to the nation leads to further exclusion: 
 
I have suggested that the idea of a world where we all love each other is a humanist 
fantasy that informs much of the multicultural discourse of love (If only we got closer 
we would be as one). Such an ideal requires that some others fail to approximate its 
form: those who don’t love, who don’t get closer, become the source of injury and 
disturbance (Ahmed 2004, p.140). 
 
The love ethic that hooks is proposing, I would argue works in a very different way to the 
notion of collective belonging outlined by Ahmed.  Rather than asking that those that are 
excluded can be loved by becoming closer in proximity to the collective ideal (an 
integrationist model of love), hooks’s intention is to dismantle the ‘ideal’ altogether as it is the 
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ideal that is indeed the source of a culture of lovelessness. Ahmed is concerned with the way 
loving difference can be easily confused with benevolence and charity which rather than 
transforming the status quo, inevitably leaves process of inequality and domination intact 
(Ahmed 2004).  As Ahmed argues,  
 
In fact, ‘to love the abject’ is close to the liberal politics of charity, one that usually 
makes the loving subject feel better for having loved and given love to someone 
presumed to be unloved, but which sustains the relations of power that compel the 
charitable love to be shown in this way (Ahmed 2004, p.141). 
 
Whilst very few of us would discourage the act of charitable giving to alleviate suffering and 
cruelty, Ahmed is correct to question the logic of ‘loving the abject’ if this loving does not 
change or transform the conditions that are the source of suffering and cruelty. It is hooks’s 
intention to turn our attention to those very structures and practices that create the foundation 
for domination to exist, which contribute to systems of inequality and a culture of 
lovelessness.  Whilst hooks’ politicised spiritual outlook may seek to bring us closer in 
proximity to each other, she too realizes that this would be ‘humanist fantasy’ if structures of 
domination remain intact. 
  The model of racial justice at play in US debates on loving blackness focus on the 
possible rapprochement between Black people to end racialised self-hatred and between 
blacks and whites in America to end racism.  However, this thesis argues that blackness has a 
transnational incarnation that is more immediately felt by communities that understand 
themselves as migrants. Therefore, this thesis moves away from nationalised discourses on 
loving blackness in response to national forms of nihilism by stating the claim that there is a 
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need to approach blackness from a transnational framework. The transnational networks of 
love and care amongst diasporic Caribbean families offer one example of loving blackness 
within a global context. 
 
Caribbean transnational bonds of kinship and loving blackness 
The politicised love ethic within the work of hooks and West makes specific local references 
to the racialised conditions faced by African Americans. As highlighted in the introduction to 
this chapter, hooks’ and West’s constructions of political love are more often skewed towards 
the ‘racial healing’ of America as a political project with social implications for the 
transformation of the nation. Whilst post-colonial politics have clearly influenced hooks’ 
writing, there is no sustained engagement with the politics of loving blackness beyond 
America within her work, for example, specifically within transnational diasporic populations 
such as that of the Caribbean. I am interested in the ways that the politics of ‘loving 
blackness’ as a social/cultural practice works within transnational diasporic populations, 
particularly, for the purpose of this study, within the English-speaking Caribbean diaspora. 
Many Caribbean citizens in the UK continue to sustain cultural and kinship 
connections ‘back home.’ Whereas politically centred forms of transnational blackness such 
as pan-Africanism were being performed in the public sphere, ties of kinship were also 
forming alternative personal spaces for connection predicated on forms of transnational 
blackness. These spaces facilitated a sense of connection and community where the 
affirmation of Black family life articulated through transnational Caribbean kinship networks 
sustained and nourished a sense of loving blackness in the racially hostile environment of 
Britain. These ties were crucial for maintaining cultural and economic links as well as 
networks of transnational emotional bonds. 
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Mary Chamberlain’s study, Family Love in the Caribbean Diaspora, highlights that 
transnationalism has been a central feature in formation of the British ‘West Indies’ from its 
inception (Chamberlain 2006). She argues that as a region, the Caribbean has been at the 
centre of a global experiment whose colonial formation ‘was within the framework of global 
capitalism.’ Indeed, so far in this chapter we have discussed the politics of loving blackness in 
symbolic terms as a political theory to elucidate conditions of racial domination. However 
within transnational networks outlined by Chamberlain, we can apply the theory of loving 
blackness to understand how ‘acts’ of loving through Black transnational networks become 
practical models for caring for and validating Black life.   
In her chapter entitled, ‘Transnational Narratives and National Belonging’, 
Chamberlain explains that the Caribbean’s ‘West Indian’ formation, and its ‘strength and 
livelihood was intimately bound up with the commercial, military and material ambitions of 
Europe’ (Chamberlain 2006, p.94). Caribbean culture and society has thus emerged as 
inherently transnational as ‘successive waves of migrants (free, forced, or indentured) 
creolized the Caribbean.’ In turn as they migrated out of the Caribbean region to, for example, 
Canada, the US and the UK, they also ‘creolized their new environments’ (Chamberlain 2006 
p.94). Chamberlain argues that whilst the growing literature on transnationalism relates to 
economic and political transnational transactions, very little attention has been given to the 
transnational practices of the ‘family’ as a social unit (Chamberlain 2006, p.91). Similarly, 
Saskia Sassen (2002) argues that the ‘dominant account’ of globalization in today’s media, 
policy and economic analyses emphasizes ‘the hypermobility, international communication, 
and the neutralization of distance and place’ without considering how women emerge as 
economic actors in our global cities (Sassen cited in Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). As 
both Chamberlain and Sassen have demonstrated, the dominant narrative of globalization 
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obscures alternative views of transnationalism, particularly from migrant families and migrant 
women (Sassen in Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002).  
Citing the work of Susan Craig James, Chamberlain argues that the Caribbean is as 
much a state of mind as a geographic entity with ‘intertwining roots and overlapping 
diasporas’ (Chamberlain 2006, p.94). Chamberlain observes that the borders of the Caribbean 
are also shaped by emotional networks that stretch beyond nation and region. Here, political 
borders of belonging are shaped by transnational kin, where citizenship is contingent on what 
Chamberlain calls a ‘diasporic imperative’ (Chamberlain 2006).  
Migration between the English speaking Caribbean and the UK (and other territories, 
particularly Canada and the United States), provided Caribbean families with a globalised 
perspective on family life. As Chamberlain (2006) highlights, the ability to travel was one 
way to better the prospects of the Caribbean family by their own utilization of global 
resources and networks. A ‘transnational imagination’ helped to build and facilitate close 
family ties across geographical borders, created employment and career opportunities, 
broadened the experience base of family members and strengthened family resources 
(Chamberlain 2006, p.111). In her study of 45 families from the British Caribbean, 
Chamberlain noted that with the Caribbean transnational family, 
 
Links and networks are both multinational as well as transnational. Indeed the 
spreading or dispersal of material and emotional resources throughout the diasporic 
trajectory of each family provides diversity and security, strength and opportunity. 
Family members provide important points of contact, facilitating migration, re-
migration and, of course, return. When the family is both the source of belonging and 
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the resource of survival, then identity is both portable and secure (Chamberlain 2006, 
p.112). 
 
Chamberlain’s account of transnational Caribbean families demonstrates that having a 
transnational sensibility is important for the ‘dispersal’ of emotional bonds of kinship across 
geographic borders. Rather than creating barriers to family closeness and connectedness, her 
study shows Caribbean families are utilizing transnational networks of communication and 
transfer to sustain kinship bonds of care and love that dissolve distance and sustain contact. 
These bonds are necessary for the wellbeing of Caribbean migrants in Britain, providing 
‘powerful directives for survival’ in the often hostile environment of Britain (Chamberlain 
2006, p.213). Within Chamberlain’s account of Caribbean families in the diaspora, families 
are infused by a transnational sensibility built on narratives of closeness and values for 
‘loyalty, love and living good’ (Chamberlain 2006 p.110). 
It can be argued that Chamberlain’s understanding of transnational Caribbean families 
is ‘a celebratory narrative’ of the politics of loving blackness within a transnational context. 
This celebratory discourse serves as a political counter-narrative to the history of pathological 
myths that stigmatise Caribbean families as dysfunctional, as lacking morals, structure and 
men folk, myths that have been in circulation from colonial times to the present day 
(Chamberlain 2006). Caribbean families also continue to be stereotyped as deviant, deficient 
and in a state of a perpetual state of meltdown (Chamberlain 2006). As Chamberlain shows, 
the families consulted within her research had also spoken about the bonds within their 
respective families in celebratory terms. As one respondent said, ‘I strongly believe that you 
should never forget your roots’, whilst another British born Caribbean woman stated, ‘The 
sense of family, the sense of unity, was much stronger (than in English families) … I’m 
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actually really proud of Caribbean families, that was something that we will always retain’ 
(Chamberlain 2006 p.110). Here, cultural memory and bonds of kinship are important 
resources for Caribbean families in Britain to defend against social alienation and social 
stigma. Loving blackness within a transnational context of kinship becomes entwined with a 
‘diasporic imperative’ and a ‘transnational imagination’ that provide avenues and ways in 
which Black family life can be ‘reclaimed’ and ‘validated’ across space, years and 
generations (Chamberlain 2006, p.221). In this sense, Chamberlain highlights how a 
transnational sensibility facilitates loving blackness through kinship networks and globalised 
family bonds. In this celebratory sense, Caribbean families are shown as complex and human, 
living through a uniquely transnational inheritance and across and beyond contemporary 
global borders.  
However, in the malaise of everyday transnational Caribbean life, the dynamics of 
care and love are also mobilised through the politics of pain and emotional despair. In this 
sense a transnational sensibility of care and love is not only facilitated by the economic and 
communication networks of global capitalism, such a sensibility can also be crippled by them. 
The effect of migration for some Caribbean family members left behind whilst relatives 
migrate abroad has left some with very little to celebrate. Caribbean academic Audrey 
Pottinger (2008) argues that whilst migration had benefited Caribbean economies and had 
allowed parents to provide the necessary material and financial support for families and 
children ‘back home’, migration had also produced devastating psychological and social 
consequences, particularly for Caribbean children left behind (Pottinger 2008). Here, the 
forces of globalisation that give rise to a transnational sensibility – the movement of 
populations, the circulation of currency, and networks of communication - fuel the conditions 
that actually make loving blackness difficult. Claudette Crawford-Brown (1999) argues that 
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structural adjustment policies in Jamaica at the beginning of the 1980s ‘had the effect of 
biting hard into the pockets of low income families’ (Crawford-Brown 1999, p53). During 
this period government funding to support Jamaican families on low incomes was 
unavailable, thus leaving many with no option but to seek better opportunities abroad 
(Crawford-Brown 1999). This social crisis produced a generation of children and young 
people that were labelled ‘barrel children.’ Crawford-Brown notes that ‘barrel children’ are 
defined as ‘children waiting to rejoin parents [abroad]’ who in the meantime ‘receive material 
gifts in barrels from parents who reside in metropolitan capitals, but receive little emotional 
nurturing from these parents’ (Crawford-Brown 1999). The term was coined by Jamaican 
social practitioners to describe a specific category of children waiting to rejoin parents who 
have migrated. Whilst children had received material goods packed inside barrels sent by 
parents abroad, they were emotionally deprived as a result of absent parents (Crawford-Brown 
1999, pp.53-54). ‘Barrel Children’ were often affected by painful feelings of rejection, 
abandonment and loss compounded by issues of separation and grief (Crawford-Brown 1999, 
pp.53-54). Remittances provided by migrant mothers, through the transference of currency or 
‘barrels’, are one of the few ways migrant families can demonstrate care for their loved ones 
back home when working abroad.   
Remittances can necessarily help to provide food or shelter or funds for education and 
small businesses. However, as Sassen points out the same global infrastructure that facilitate 
remittances allow governments, smugglers and traffickers to make money off the backs of 
migrant women (Sassen cited in Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002 p273). Sassen writes, 
 
Through their work and remittances, women infuse cash into the economies of deeply 
indebted countries, and into the pockets of ‘entrepreneurs’ who have seen other 
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opportunities vanish. These survival circuits are often complex, involving multiple 
locations and sets of actors, which altogether constitute increasingly global chains of 
traders and ‘workers’ (Sassen cited in Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002 p273).    
 
These global economies of love and care show how the practice of loving can be fraught with 
complex and uneven consequences producing a kind of ‘tough love’ for migrant women and 
their children.  This ‘tough love’ demonstrates that how we love and care can be 
compromised and damaged by economic, cultural, political and social forces beyond our 
control.   
Very often migrant mothers are not always in the position to take their children with 
them when they move abroad in search of work, particularly if they enter into global cities as 
undocumented workers (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). Article 9 of the United Nations 
declaration on the Rights of the Child states that a child ‘should grow up in a family 
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding’ and ‘not be separated 
from his or her parents against their will’ (cited in Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002, p.15). As 
Hochschild (2002) reminds us, ‘these words stand now as a fairy-tale ideal, the promise of a 
shield between children and the costs of globalization’ (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). 
Barrel Children are indeed suffering the costs of the ‘feminization of migration,’ the 
globalization of care or, what Hochschild has called the global ‘care drain’ (Ehrenreich and 
Hochschild 2002, p.17). As Hochschild highlights, many female workers from the ‘global 
south' migrate to fill domestic jobs abroad in ‘overdeveloped’ countries. They are employed 
by First World middle-class families to provide love and care for their children, to fill the 
emotional gap created when both parents, particularly women professionals, go out to work to 
build their careers (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). Because of the increasing demand for 
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domestic services in overdeveloped countries, love and care are being extracted from the third 
world to the first (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). Global capitalism has not only 
intensified the growing gap between rich and poor, it has also created a care and ‘love deficit’ 
where ‘Third World’ mothers and third world children experience diminished forms of love as 
a result of capitalist globalization (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). Hochschild explains that 
this deficit should be seen within the historical context of European imperialism, by which 
material resources were extracted from the Third World by force. The extraction of emotional 
resources by today’s north is a form of coercion that is much more benign she argues, with 
scenes of ‘Third World women pushing baby carriages, elder care workers patiently walking, 
arms linked, with elderly clients on streets or sitting beside them in First World Parks’ 
(Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002, p.27). She further adds that, 
 
While the sex trade and some domestic service is brutally enforced, in the main the 
new emotional imperialism does not issue from the barrel of a gun. Women choose to 
migrate for domestic work. But they choose it because economic conditions all but 
coerce them to. That yawning gap between rich and poor countries is itself a form of 
coercion, pushing Third World mothers to seek work in the First for lack of options 
closer to home. But given the prevailing free market ideology, migration is viewed as 
a ‘personal choice.’ Its consequences are seen as ‘personal problems.’ In this sense, 
migration creates not a white man’s burden but, through a series of invisible links, a 
dark child’s burden (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002, p.27). 
 
Of course, the conditions of globalised labour exploitation and chains of care have an impact 
on many different poor migrant communities. Globalisation has increased inequality and 
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exploitation and enabled greater exploitation of desperate migrants. A transnational discourse 
of blackness - as a response to racism over centuries - represents a particular and culturally 
rich example of an alternative conception of human beings and their worth. The insights of 
loving blackness can thus illuminate the challenges facing other communities - particularly 
those facing a similar fragmentation of the family and sense of self in the face of economic 
desperation. 
 
Conclusion 
In this respect, loving blackness becomes a flexible tool to tackle the stereotypical racial 
image of excluded groups. It is to use blackness as a lens or a starting point by which we 
begin to ask questions about how our world has remained so attached to beliefs and systems 
that encourage local and global disparities. It is to continue to question the salient notion of 
white ‘racial’ superiority over all others and about why and how we have become used to 
living with devastating levels of racialised inequality.  It is not the only lens by which we can 
begin to ask these questions. But it is the lens I have chosen for the purposes of this thesis 
through which to view issues of racialised forms of discrimination, domination and 
oppression:  
 
Therefore, it is clear that to be Black is not merely a color nor simply to use the language 
of Black people, but to use it to express the most progressive political, cultural and ethical 
interests that, in a racist society, must always be for human liberation and, thus, against all 
form of oppression. Thus, it has become over the decade a trope of strong ethical 
dimensions with implications for a post-Western construction of reality (Asante 2007, 
p.154). 
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In the next chapter I will examine ‘Lovers’ rock’ music and its emergence in London during 
the nineteen seventies through Caribbean clubs and ‘pirate radio’ stations. Lovers’ rock was 
an integral part of the roots or ‘conscious’ reggae scene of the same period. I am suggesting 
that Caribbean communities in Britain also used the erotic and political intersection of both 
genres to reconfigure the ‘loveless’ and nihilistic representations of their identities found in 
popular British media discourses.  As such, Caribbean communities had created a radical 
political praxis that asserted an ethic of ‘loving blackness’ as a way of restoring and validating 
their experiences.    
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Chapter 7 
 
‘LADIES A YOUR TIME OW!’ 
Erotic Politics, Lovers’ Rock and Resistance in Britain 
 
I felt I needed to be taken seriously as a ‘conscious sister’ in my teenage years, and so I 
developed a haughty snobbish disdain for all sorts of music that sounded remotely ‘smoochy’ 
or ‘romantic,’ things I considered highly damaging to my ‘conscious credentials.’ However, 
most of my female friends and cousins disagreed with my antipathy towards love songs. A 
reggae blues dance was ‘lame’ if the right selection of lovers’ rock music was not played. The 
dance was a complete disappointment if my cousin did not ‘get a dance’ with the right boy, to 
the right lovers’ rock tune, in her case, preferably Peter Huningale’s, Won’t You be My Lady 
or even better, Hopelessly in Love by Carol Thompson. My cousins’ dad had the most 
meticulous and extensive collection of lovers’ rock LPs and 45s which were lovingly and 
routinely polished with a special alcoholic fluid and a velveteen cloth. The fluid, the cloth and 
the treasured collection were all completely out of bounds to us as children. Any evidence of a 
previously unnoticed scratch or smudge would automatically be traced back to us with some 
serious consequences. Rather than face the consequences, we decided not to ‘farce’ with the 
treasured lovers’ rock records, and left them well alone. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the politics of erotic love as expressed through the genre of 
lovers’ rock music and its emergence inside a highly gendered, erotic and political reggae 
scene that developed within the social context of Britain during the 1970s and 1980s. I am 
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arguing that lovers’ rock was an integral component of the reggae music landscape of that 
period. Nevertheless, in historical and cultural interpretations of reggae cultures, lovers’ rock 
has a fleeting if not invisible presence and has often been obscured by the focus on its more 
‘raucous’ relatives, namely ‘conscious’ roots reggae and ragga ‘slackness’ (Noble 2000, 
Stolzoff 2000, Cooper 2004, Henry 2006). On the occasions when lovers’ rock has been 
inscribed into the historical and cultural narrative of the reggae music scene in Britain, it is 
frequently staged as an antithetical movement against the predominance and popularity of 
‘conscious roots’ reggae (Barrow and Dalton 2004, Hebdidge 1987, Koningh and Griffiths 
2003).   
The positioning of ‘lovers’ rock against the hypothesis of ‘conscious roots,’ is 
theoretically and culturally organised along the lines of gender. Here, the genres are allotted 
to categories of femininity and masculinity. Lovers’ rock is rendered as strictly Black female 
territory, whilst the oppositional politics of ‘conscious reggae’ is assigned to the interests and 
concerns of Black men. Although lovers’ rock is by no means exclusively performed, 
consumed or enjoyed by Black women, the genre has commonly been designated as some sort 
of female sanctuary both within the dancehall space and within reggae culture at large 
(Barrow and Dalton 2004, Hebdidge 1987).   
This chapter will cover new territory, in academic terms, by exploring the cultural 
politics of the lovers’ rock genre. It will also explicate lovers’ rock as a distinctly 
transnational cultural project that serves the creative, political and erotic impulses of 
Caribbean communities in Britain. The transnational spirit of lovers’ rock has been briefly 
highlighted elsewhere by Paul Gilroy (1993). I wish to support Gilroy’s claim that lover’s 
rock has a distinctive transnational sensibility. However, this chapter will challenge the 
gendering of lovers’ rock as a feminised space. Its aims are to retrieve a complex and 
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sometimes contradictory interpretation of the way lovers’ rock both affirms and disavows its 
discourse on love whilst interrogating how these contradictions work through the politics of 
gender.  
In the course of this chapter, I will examine (1) the cultural and political context of 
lovers’ rock’s emergence in Britain’s urban cities, (2) the complex outcomes of gendering 
lovers’ rock as a feminised space and (3) the implications of erotic love’s intersection with 
oppositional politics through a ‘subgenre’ of lovers’ rock called ‘conscious lovers’.’ Through 
these key points of departure, this chapter seeks to rehabilitate lovers’ rock by taking seriously 
its erotic political import into the reggae dancehall scene. I wish to counteract the critical and 
intellectual tendency to routinely undermine and thus devalue lovers’ rock’s significance 
within academic studies on the emergence of dancehall reggae cultures in Britain and the 
wider diaspora. Although I have used bell hooks’ theory of loving blackness to defend the 
radical potentialities of political love throughout this thesis, I do not wish to claim that lovers’ 
rock in itself is a radical vehicle for revolutionary politics. Instead I am interested in its 
discursive relationship with the dancehall space as a whole. It is at this discursive point of 
lovers’ rock’s intersection with other reggae genres that its more radical possibilities can be 
revealed.  
This chapter is also concerned with how lovers’ rock has been rendered and 
interpreted as a ‘special’ form of reggae for Black women (Hebdidge 1987; Barrow and 
Dalton 2004). Whilst there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the popularity of lovers’ rock 
amongst Black women in the reggae dancehall scene, indeed many Caribbean women openly 
embrace the genre, I am suggesting that its designation as a ‘special’ female space is 
problematic. In this sense, the division of lovers’ rock from the politics of ‘conscious roots’ 
and culture follows a pattern of thinking that reinforces rigid categories of gendered 
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participation within the dancehall space. This process of rigid gendering also works to 
downgrade and marginalise discourses on love, care and the erotic in such a way that erotic, 
loving and caring identities are perceived as being at best unimportant and at worst irrelevant 
to radical oppositional politics. I wish to demonstrate that such divisions obscure the 
discursive interplay of erotic love with radical politics and thus reduce the complexity of 
Black identities.  
From the outset this chapter seeks to engage with the politics of lovers’ rock through 
the political lens of ‘loving blackness’ as outlined by the African American feminist bell  
hooks (1992). ‘Loving blackness’ allows us to centre the humanity within blackness without 
essentialising blackness within humanity. It can help us to dismantle the notion of blackness 
as a human limitation and instead focuses our attention on the limits superimposed onto 
blackness by racism and other systems of domination. ‘Loving blackness’ enables us to 
highlight and reinterpret cultural practices amongst distinct and different Black communities 
that illuminate the ways diverse groups of Black people have expressed love beyond the 
perceived limits, myths and narratives mapped onto our existence. As cited in the previous 
chapter, bell  hooks writes ‘Loving Blackness as political resistance transforms our ways of 
looking and being, and thus creates the conditions necessary for us to move against the forces 
of domination and death and reclaim Black life’ (hooks 1992, p.20).  
I am suggesting that Caribbean communities in Britain have used the erotic and 
political intersection of lovers’ rock and conscious roots reggae to reconfigure the 
stereotypical, loveless and nihilistic representations of their identities found within popular 
British media discourses on ‘race’ and ‘immigration’ (Gilroy 2006).  Through this 
erotic/political connection, Caribbean communities created complex discourses that asserted a 
love ethic as a way of expressing and validating the complexity of their existence within 
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Britain’s hostile metropolitan centres. However, this love ethic was complicated and 
sometimes compromised by gendered conceptualisations of love and rebellion that reinforced 
patriarchal discourses on what counts as being serious and valuable to the politics of Black 
liberation. Before turning to a detailed discussion of lovers’ rock, I will use Black feminist 
theories to provide an historical context in which the corruption of Black erotic identities can 
be situated within racialised and sexualised discourses. 
 
Black sexuality and erotic corruptions 
In Audre Lorde’s ground breaking and often cited essay entitled ‘Uses of the Erotic,’ she 
writes, 
 
The Erotic has often been misnamed by men and used against women. It has been 
made into the confused, the trivial, the psychotic, the plasticized sensation. For this 
reason, we have often turned away from the exploration and consideration of the erotic 
as a source of power and information, confusing it with its opposite, the pornographic. 
But pornography is a direct denial of the power of the erotic, for it represents the 
suppression of true feeling. Pornography emphasizes sensation without feeling (Lorde 
2007, p.54). 
 
Lorde’s statement is a powerful critique of patriarchal thinking, where notions of femaleness 
as a state of emotional chaos and psychotic irrationality have denied the humanity of women 
by reducing our erotic identities to a monolithic pornographic state of objectification and our 
varied range of emotions to an inferior intellectual preoccupation. In the context of 
‘racialised’ identities, constructing erotic feelings as chaotic, pornographic, irrational, sordid, 
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indecent or improper have significant ramifications for the production of ‘acceptable’ and 
‘respectable’ modes of blackness and love. This is especially true when we consider how 
myths and fantasies concerning Black sexuality and race have stigmatised and corrupted 
notions of Black erotic identities as pathologically perverted and debased. Patricia Hill 
Collins argues that dehumanising images of Black sexuality are deeply rooted in chattel 
slavery where Black bodies were both commodified and objectified as property in the 
development of US capitalism (Collins 2005, pp.55-56).  Collins further argues that ‘the 
institutionalised rape of enslaved Black women spawned the controlling images of the jezebel 
and the sexually wanton Black woman’ (Collins 2005, p.56). Whilst for men, the gendering of 
Black sexual oppression during chattel slavery not only produced the notion that Black men 
were ‘big, strong and stupid’ but that they are also prone to wild sexualised violence because 
of their ‘racial’ being (Collins 2005, p.56). Such myths have been a staple product of western 
culture perpetuating harmful, dehumanising and enduring beliefs surrounding the presumed 
deviant ‘nature’ and ‘essence’ of Black male and female sexuality. 
Notions of Black female promiscuity also feed into other familiar stereotypes, namely, 
the irresponsible single Black working class mother dependent on welfare cheques to support 
herself and her illegitimate children. Cathy J Cohen (1999) states that, 
 
We must remember that sexuality, or what has been defined by the dominant society 
as the abnormal sexuality of both Black men and women (e.g., images such as 
oversexed Black men in search of white women, promiscuous Black woman, and 
illegitimate baby producers), has been used to justify the implantation of 
marginalizing systems ranging from slavery to, most recently work fare. Throughout 
the history of the United States, images and ideas of reckless Black sexuality have 
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been used to sustain the exploited position of Black people, especially Black women 
(Cohen, 1999 p.35). 
 
The enduring myths surrounding Black sexuality have indeed created much anxiety around 
policing the erotic sexual identities of Black people both from inside and outside Black 
communities. From ‘within’ the group, concerns that Black people should perform a role of 
‘respectability’, particularly to figures of public authority and to white audiences, has led 
some writers to comment on the ‘the politics of respectability’ often employed by some 
middle-class and working-class Black folk as a way to regulate the behaviour of the so-called 
‘under-class’ (Hibbingbottom in Cohen, 1999 p.72).   
Policing the Black female body within reggae dancehall culture has also become a site 
of contention with regards to ‘acceptable’ and ‘respectable’ standards of behaviour imposed 
upon Black women. Carolyn Cooper (2004) defends the right of women in the reggae 
dancehall scene to openly express their sexuality and erotic identities, seeing this as a sign of 
sexual liberation. Cooper argues that when females in the dancehall display their bodies 
erotically many view their behaviour negatively. However she contends that the transgressive 
behaviour of women who intentionally go outside the boundaries of moral convention, allows 
Black women to assert the beauty of their bodies in a culture where Black female bodies are 
not valued (Cooper 2004). Lady Saw, one of Jamaica’s leading female dancehall deejays has 
received heavy criticism for the sexually explicit content of her lyrics. Cooper highlights the 
criticism Lady Saw received from the American anthropologist Obiagele Lake who wrote, 
 
Given Jamaica’s patriarchal climate, one would expect sexist lyrics emanating from 
men. Unfortunately, women who have internalised sexist norms add to these negative 
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images. Lady Saw is one such songstress who plays herself and by association, all 
other women (Cooper 2004, p.100). 
 
However Cooper defends Lady Saw, and other Black women, who choose to abandon the 
notion that women alone are responsible for the social codes of morality. She writes, 
 
The flamboyantly exhibitionist DJ Lady Saw epitomizes the sexual liberation of many 
African Jamaican working-class women from airy-fairy Judaeo-Christian definitions 
of appropriate female behaviour. In a decisive act of feminist emancipation, Lady Saw 
cuts loose from the burdens of moral guardianship. She embodies the erotic. But one 
viewer’s erotica is another’s pornography. So Lady Saw is usually censured for being 
far too loose-or ‘slack,’ in the Jamaican vernacular. Or worse, is dismissed as a mere 
victim of patriarchy (Cooper 2004, p.99). 
 
Following on from Cooper’s analysis, Denise Noble’s study on sexuality and the Black 
female body in the UK reggae dancehall scene, makes the point that sex and sexuality ‘are 
celebrated as a source of power – for both men and women in dance-hall culture’ (Noble 
2000, p.153). Here, Black women transcend the politics of respectability to invest in the 
politics of reputation. As she explains, 
 
Ragga shows how Black women also are invested in the values of reputation; how 
they utilize it to advance their social power and influence over men, and to contest 
dominant middle-class and Eurocentric notions of femininity, marriage and kinship 
(Noble 2000, p153). 
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Indeed, the politics of respectability can lead to devastating consequences particularly when 
notions of respectability and social acceptance silence critical issues such as the impact of 
HIV and AIDS in Black communities throughout the diaspora (Cohen 1999, pp.70-77) or the 
concealment of sexually abusive behaviour, or indeed the social rejection of transgressive 
sexualities or queer identities. In her study on the social, political and cultural impact of HIV 
and AIDS in Black America, Cathy Cohen highlights how middle-class sensibilities have 
fractured the Black community’s response to the epidemic of AIDS as issues such as class, 
gender and sexuality illuminate fault lines in the notion of a cohesive Black community. 
Cohen also suggests that from within the Black community, attempts to reconstruct a public 
image of blackness suitable for the white gaze has formulated indigenous definitions of who 
is or is not Black. Such notions of belonging and exclusion are based not merely on physical 
characteristics but on ‘moralistic and character evaluation’ used to appraise community 
membership (Cohen 1999, p.74). Such ‘public policing’, as she outlines, demarcate the 
boundaries of the group identity, in other words the boundaries of ‘acceptable blackness.’ As 
Cohen argues, policing the visible boundaries of group identity can threaten the status of 
those most vulnerable in marginal communities (Cohen 1999). Whilst fully acknowledging 
the negation and marginalisation of Black communities by dominant white groups in 
racialised hierarchies, Cohen is equally concerned with the ‘secondary process of 
marginalisation’ imposed by more affluent and influential members of the Black community. 
A sense of a shared identity within blackness can easily be mitigated and fractured by other 
identities that are seen as ‘letting us down’ and ‘bringing shame and disgrace’ to Black 
communities, identities such as ‘underclass, homosexual, drug addict, or single mother’ have 
become useful scapegoats in the ‘secondary processes of marginalisation’ (Cohen, 1999 p.75).   
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Historical legacies 
Histories of slavery and imperialism have impacted upon the sexual identities of Black men 
and women also. Under the system of slavery, strategies of terror such as the systematic rape 
and sexual abuse of Black men and women were essential to dehumanising Black people for 
the purpose of physical and psychological exploitation and domination as well as for the 
reproduction of future slaves (Collins 2005). Black people were seen as one monolithic group, 
believed to be intellectually inferior and cognitively docile. We were also considered 
emotionally shallow, psychologically immature and of an infantile disposition, thus lacking 
the true human qualities of empathy and love which characterised the experience of being 
human (hooks 2001). William Les Henry (2006) reminds us that African people were the only 
people in history to be reduced to three fifths of a human being ‘as articles of commerce. No 
other members of the human family have ever been reduced to a mathematical equation 
(Henry 2009, conference paper). 
Our status as chattel under transatlantic slavery meant African people were not 
considered human. Brenda Richardson (1999) notes our classification as chattel meant that 
rather than being human we were considered as ‘moveable property’ (Richardson and Wade 
1999, p.11). The belief that Africans transported to the so called ‘New World’ were inferior 
was almost universally accepted. This legacy of inferiority still remains with us despite 
developments in the biological and social sciences which discredit the intrinsic concept of 
race as a false pseudo scientific doctrine (see Chapter 1 of this thesis). Such thinking is clearly 
evident if we consider popular notions of genetic and biological determinism as espoused by 
the Bell Curve theory (Herrnstein and Murray 1996). Or indeed if we consider Patricia Hill 
Collins’s description of western social thought’s continuous association of blackness with an 
imagined uncivilized wild sexuality which serves as a lynchpin of racial difference (Collins 
2005).  
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In the context of racialised and sexualised oppressions, Black erotic identities in 
dominant western thought have thus been debased and separated from notions of love, care, 
emotion and human connection ( hooks 2001). Some of our most common representations of 
eroticised blackness have been reduced and shaped by the historical legacy of racial and 
sexual objectification. The feared and fabricated notion of wild erotic power supposedly 
innate within blackness has meant the Black body has throughout history been systematically 
punished and abused to curtail its dangerous and abnormal animalistic instincts. African male 
and female sexual identities have been historically tied in to the belief that Black men and 
women are sexually deviant and promiscuous and that such promiscuity stands up as evidence 
that we are deficient of deep human feelings and emotion and are consequently inferior 
humans ill-equipped for the ‘higher’ workings of love ( hooks 2001).  
On the underside of this narrative, the amalgam of blackness and erotic feeling has 
also been considered as a mark of Black authenticity. Stereotypical and archaic notions that 
suggest Black people have more ‘rhythm’ and ‘soul’, that we can dance better, sing better and 
run better, shroud commonly held myths surrounding Black authenticity as an untamed 
eroticised bodily state. Such thinking presumes blackness to be more organic and earthly, 
bound to the rhythm of ‘nature.’ However, one of the underlying implications of such 
stereotypes is that such earthly and organic connections are again evidence of the false 
separation of the Black body from the mind and intellect.  Within this dichotomy the mind in 
a white western context is rendered ‘naturally’ superior, holding the door ajar to civility and 
reason. Thus in a white supremacist context intellect becomes a prerequisite and innate 
composite of whiteness. The body on the other hand is rendered as a secondary, more 
‘primitive’ source of power. Here blackness becomes defined for its usefulness as labour and 
as a site of physical spectacle. In such faulty logic, whiteness becomes the symbolic 
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quintessence of the highest intellectual agility whilst the agility of blackness is lived ‘merely’ 
through the body. When erotic feeling is conceptualised purely as an expression of bodily 
excesses we indeed are given a limited understanding of its capacity. A false dichotomy 
between our physical, emotional and cognitive selves begins the process of fracturing our 
humanness. A phoney separation of the self by compartmentalising the various elements of 
our very existence disallows more complex interpretations of erotic feeling. 
Black vernacular cultures are important critical sites for locating the overlapping 
intersectional workings of the self, where the mind, eros and the body remain closely engaged 
as relational entities. Although the erotic remains a highly contested site in constructing 
notions of blackness, its emotive power has been the source for an expansive and abundant 
catalogue of love songs and stories within Black transcultural vernacular and performative 
cultures (Neal 2003). As I have discussed, the notion of the ‘erotic’ has also been a theoretical 
wellspring for Black feminist such as Audre Lorde and bell hooks, to be explored as an 
essential source of knowledge and power in discourses that construct radical politics that are 
deeply concerned with concepts of love and blackness. Lovers’ rock is one example where 
Black people have created an arena to reclaim and express in public spaces the erotic 
dimensions of themselves in ways that transcended corrupted notions of Black sexuality. 
However, as I will now show the process of transcendence, whilst validating Black bodies, 
was also compromised by sexist notions of love and the gendering of the lovers’ rock/roots 
reggae scene. 
 
 
 
 
Erotic politics, lovers’ rock 
 
 
 275 
Lovers’ rock and its transnational emergence in Britain 
The ‘lovers’ rock’ nomenclature was coined in Britain by music producer Dennis Bovell and 
his co-producer and guitarist John Kapiaye, alongside husband and wife music producers 
Dennis and Eve Harris. Bovell, Kapiaye and the Harris team were all credited as the original 
architects of the lovers’ rock sound in Britain (Garret 1985; Hebdidge 1987; Barrow and 
Dalton 2004). During the mid 1970s in the early stages of lovers’ rocks development, 
producers such as Bovell were in search of a distinctive reggae sound that did not merely 
imitate the music being produced within Jamaica (Independent 2006). As far as Caribbean 
audiences in London and Birmingham were concerned, during this period, the best and most 
popular reggae was still being imported from Jamaica to England (Hebdidge 1987). Since the 
1960s love songs have been an important part of the Jamaican reggae music scene. Singers 
such as Dennis Brown, Owen Gray, Alton Ellis, Kem Boothe, Sugar Minot and Gregory 
Isaacs are considered as some of the most important lovers’ rock reggae artists of their 
generation (Hebdidge 1987). However, although Jamaican singers were clearly not averse to 
performing love songs, lovers’ rock as a defined and identifiable genre was only given its 
name and greater definition in London during the 1970s, particularly after the emergence of 
British based lovers’ rock musicians (Hebdidge 1987). When Bovel began putting the ‘lovers’ 
rock name onto his own record labels, the tag gradually caught on (Hebdidge 1987). Indeed, it 
was after the genre emerged in the UK that the lovers’ rock name became attached to 
romantic reggae singers throughout the Jamaican diaspora. Bovell had previously co-founded 
the British roots band Matumbi in 1971. He went on to successfully produce Janet Kay’s 
lovers’ rock album, Silly Games, as well as writing and producing the soundtrack to Franco 
Rossos 1980 film Babylon. Many young female musicians including the late Louisa Marks, 
Marie Pierre and others had entered the lovers’ rock scene through auditions and talent 
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competitions organised by Bovell and John Kapiaye at various venues across south London 
(Hebdidge 1987). Lloyd Coxsone, a huge influential and important figure within the 
development of sound system culture in the UK, was instrumental in the recording Mark’s 
‘Caught You in a Lie’ (Garrett 1985). Mark who is reported to have introduced herself to 
Bovell one night at a dance where his sound system, Jah Sufferer HI FI, were playing, was 
subsequently chosen by Bovell and Coxsone to be the ‘natural choice’ to record a cover of the 
Donnie Elbert original version of the track. As Garrett explains, 
 
Coxsone produced, Euton Jones was the drummer, Webster Johnson played keyboards 
and Dennis did the rest. The sweet, yearning vocal – wherein Louisa discovers that the 
girl her boyfriend has been seeing is not, after all, his cousin – were recorded in just 
one take, and made the record an instant hit (Garret, 1985 p.69). 
   
Mark’s brilliantly produced version of ‘Caught you in a Lie’ remains a classic lovers’ rock 
recording, belying any dismissal of the track as a foray into ‘teeny popping’ drivel and dross. 
The popular face of lovers’ rock in the UK was frequently characterised by young Black 
women, like Mark, who were supposedly eager to cover African American soul songs on top 
of the deep and heavy baselines of roots reggae (Garrett 1985; Hebdidge 1997).  
Lovers’ rock with its distinctive ‘tender’ take on reggae, was also characterised by 
utopian and erotic narratives of romantic love. Its popularity was established through the 
‘free’ (pirate) radio stations and underground local ‘blues’ party networks and venues across 
the UK during the 1970s and 1980s (Barrow and Dalton 2004, p.383). Despite the recent 
demise of vital reggae music venues in cities such as London and Birmingham, these local 
clubs had previously served as both porous and hidden locations for engaging with lovers’ 
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rock as well as other transatlantic musical styles and cultures. In these intimate subaltern 
spaces, Black people come together for leisure, celebrations and entertainment. Sound system 
nights, engagement parties, weddings, christenings and Rastafari gatherings all provided 
‘safe’ spaces of sanctuary where music was central to easing the tensions of urban inner city 
life. Lovers’ rock musicians had carved out their own dynamic vernacular and rhetorical 
spaces within reggae. Young Caribbean musicians and audiences utilised other Black 
diasporic musical dialects and sounds by blending and interweaving the heavy Jamaican 
reggae baseline with the ‘soft-soul’ vocal harmonies emanating out from Chicago and 
Philadelphia, thus creating a unique diasporic lovers’ rock style and aesthetic (Barrow and 
Dalton 2004). Dick Hebdidge (1987) argues that lovers’ rock brought soul and reggae so close 
together that it really was a fusion of the two styles of music. This new genre had its own 
transnational sensibility. Lovers’ rock signalled the emergence of an early ‘Blak’ British 
transnational soundscape that would latter give rise to UK soul acts such as Soul II Soul 
whose leading vocalist Caron Wheeler, had previously emerged as one of the early 
forerunners of the first generation of lovers’ rock artists (Gilroy 1993; Henry 2006; Barrow 
and Dalton). At just fifteen years old, Wheeler formed one member of the trio Brown Sugar 
alongside fellow band mate and lovers’ rock veteran Kofi.  Wheeler’s group were amongst 
that first crop of young women that attended Bovels and Kapiaye auditions in South London 
(Barrow and Dalton 2004; Hebdidge 1987). The group achieved success with tracks such as 
I’m In Love With A Dreadlocks and Black Pride, which signalled the arrival of ‘conscious 
lovers’,’ a politically inspired ‘sub-genre’ of lovers’ rock which I will discuss further on in 
this chapter. In later years, Wheeler’s 1990 debut solo album entitled UK Blak, would be 
instrumental in the formation of an ‘outernational’ understanding of ‘Blakness’ in Britain.  
Her use of the term ‘Blak’ (as opposed to Black spelt with a ‘c’) was introduced into to the 
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public domain on the release of her first solo project after leaving the group Soul II Soul. The 
cultural and political significance of the term Blak has subsequently been integrated into the 
cultural theories of both Paul Gilroy (1993) and William ‘Lez’ Henry (2006). Blak is 
mobilised within the critical theories of Gilroy and Henry to underscore their intellectual 
debates on the formation of a transnational, ‘outernational’ and countercultural ‘blak’ 
consciousness in the UK. Whilst Gilroy does not provide a precise definition or explanation to 
the term ‘Blak’, he locates the transnational logic of its meaning within the formation of 
musical subcultures that emerged out of Britain’s urban inner cities. He argues that these 
subcultures drew heavily from a range of ‘raw materials’ supplied by transnational currents 
from the Caribbean and Black America (Gilroy 1993, p.81). Henry however provides us with 
a more explicit historical context for the emergence of the term. He writes, 
 
The usage of ‘blak’ emerged in urban London during the late 1980’s and when Caron 
Wheeler of ‘Soul to Soul’ fame released an album entitled ‘UK Blak’ for EMI records, 
the word became known in mainstream British society. By omitting the letter ‘c’, 
Wheeler was making a profound Africentric political statement that reflected a 
conscious move by certain members of the Black community to distance themselves 
from the negative connotations of Black as the colour of doom, oppression, bad luck 
etc. This meant that the term blak, which was created within the counter cultures of the 
Afrikan Diaspora, had much currency and signified an alternative way of thinking 
about the Black presence in Britain (Henry 2006, p.27). 
 
Henry introduces the concept of an ‘outernational consciousness’ to demonstrate how ‘Blak’ 
British born Caribbean communities have used diasporic resources from Jamaican dancehall 
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and sound system culture to critique the effects of racism on the everyday lives of Black 
people in Britain. He also suggests that Black communities in the UK have continuously 
looked to resources outside of Britain to facilitate its cultural and psychological survival 
(Henry 2006). Henry develops the notion of an outernational consciousness by using 
biographical and ethnographic sources based on his life as a former deejay in the dancehall 
scene in the UK. He argues that UK dancehall culture, and in particular the role of the 
dancehall deejay in providing a ‘critique from the street’, has helped to create cultural 
interconnections across the African Diaspora. Henry also suggests that what he terms as ‘self-
generated concepts’, such as ‘Blak’, were created from African centred outernational 
resources to  allow the ‘downpressed’ Caribbean community in Britain to remove themselves 
from their peripheral placement in Europe’s new world. He also suggests that the cultural 
templates of dancehall culture from the 45 inch single, ‘sound tapes’
1
 to the dancehall itself, 
furnished alternative public arenas for Blak youth in Britain. These cultural templates enabled 
them to link ‘disparate elements of our history, making it outernational and whole’ (Henry 
2006). Henry argues further that the counter-cultural critiques developed by Black deejays in 
the UK dancehall context were an essential intellectual discourse for blak youth that 
highlighted the day to day problems of surviving within a racist environment (Henry 2006). 
Thus the development of an outernational notion of Blakness provided fertile ground for a 
discursive political engagement with the diaspora and with an oppositional critique of the 
nation state. By espousing an ‘outernational consciousness’, blak youths born in Britain 
developed critical perceptions and intellectual frameworks that deliberately transcended the 
racialised geography of Britain (Henry 2006, p.129). However, whilst I support Henry’s 
thesis, he proceeds to overlook the historical and political context of lovers’ rock in the 
                                                 
1
 Sounds tapes were in common circulation during the 80’s and 90’s with live recordings of dancehall invents 
taking place through out the Caribbean/dancehall diaspora. 
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formation and intellectual conception of an outernational consciousness. Whilst 
acknowledging and mobilising the political and intellectual significance of Wheeler’s use of 
the term ‘Blak’, Henry does not situate this critical moment within the historical and cultural 
emergence of lovers’ rock music nor within the genres cultural contribution to the dancehall 
scene in Britain. After all, it was a Black female singer and former exponent of lovers’ rock 
who had conceptualised the term Blak and mobilised it to demarcate the very specific 
historical journey of Blak Britain’s cultural formation (Wheeler, 1990). The cultural context 
of lovers’ rock was indeed critical to Wheeler’s emergence as a politically ‘conscious’ lovers’ 
rock artist, and too, as a soulful musician who successfully and significantly utilised a Blak 
diasporic political sensibility throughout her UK Blak’ album. Her political affirmation of 
blackness in earlier lovers’ rock tracks such as ‘Black Pride’ to her later albums as the leading 
vocalist in Soul II Soul also expressed politicised countercultural narratives that retell 
important stories about diasporic Black identities and histories in Britain. By overlooking the 
political significance of these historical and cultural continuities that emerge through a history 
of lovers’ rock, critical interpretations of reggae dancehall cultures obscure the significance of 
complex discourses by Black women that affirm the intersection of our erotic and political 
identities. It further undermines the ways in which the intersections of these identities are 
indeed relevant to the development of oppositional politics and social movements in Britain. 
This oversight can be explained by a number of factors. One obvious factor is that within 
dancehall culture both in Jamaica and throughout the diaspora the position of the male deejay 
reins supreme (Henry 2006). Male singers, and to a lesser extent female singers, remain 
highly valued but in general terms occupy a less elevated status in contemporary dancehall 
culture (Cooper 2004). I am also suggesting that the skills of deejaying and singing are deeply 
connected to notions of gender that demarcate ‘chatting’ and ‘toasting’ (rap) as a discursive 
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space that privileges talk between males, whilst singing and harmonising within the dancehall 
becomes a designated space first and foremost for women. This is particularly evident through 
the overt and covert gendering of lovers’ rock as a feminised reggae genre against the 
gendering of roots reggae and deejaying as the domain of militant or oppositional Black 
masculinity. Of course men and women could be deejays and singers. However it is the 
gendering and social construction of these musical forms that is under scrutiny. This chapters 
situates lovers’ rock at the heart of the reggae music scene in order to demonstrate that such 
divisions are not always so clearly defined and are in fact more discursive than is often 
imagined. 
Lovers’ rock affirmed the importance of the ‘erotic as an essential source of power’ 
(Lorde 2007) in the formation and transformation of loving identities amongst the making of 
Black expressive cultures in Britain. Loving identities in lovers’ rock are not solely concerned 
with the ‘trials and tribulations’ of interpersonal relationships although the trials of romantic 
love are without question the genre’s dominant focus. Lovers’ rock, however, suggests that 
the ‘personal’ erotic domain also shares much emotional and political investment in the 
‘conscious’ politics associated exclusively with roots reggae culture. I am suggesting that 
within the social context of the dancehall setting the music of lovers’ rock and conscious roots 
reggae both interflow and interplay between each other creating a discursively flexible space 
where public and private boundaries are at once established and at the same time agitated. By 
registering the erotic interruptive role of lovers’ rock, the dancehall space moves beyond the 
binary juncture of ‘culture’ vs. ‘lovers’’ or ‘male’ vs ‘female’ space. Whilst these categories 
suggest that women and men have very different expectations from the reggae music scene, I 
would like to acknowledge the erotic interplay of Black female and male bodies engaged in 
rhythmic courtship and flirtation known as ‘rubbin’ and ‘winnin.’ These dance forms exercise 
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openly erotic and public displays of intimacy and erotic play that were equally anticipated by 
men and women alike. In this moment, the coupling of male and female dance loosen the 
rigid gendered boundaries of the dancehall space. These open public displays of sexualised 
intimacy between Black bodies were uncommon outside of the dancehall in the UK. Amorous 
and arousing dance movements, where bodies intertwine and press against each other, not 
only act as a metaphor for disrupting the rigidly demarcated boundaries of gender they also 
challenge wider public perceptions of Black sexuality. In this view lovers’ rock music sits in 
tandem to roots reggae as opposed to in opposition to it. For ‘love’ as expressed in the genre 
of lovers’ rock furnished notions of hot spaces, sensual sanctuary and intimate communion 
where sexual desire and closeness soothed and eased the tensions that surrounded the 
conditions of being Black in Britain. Lovers’ rock generated its own heat which was 
juxtaposed with the politically combustible space of the dancehall as a countercultural 
revolutionary location for critiquing Britain (Henry 2006). The political and erotic concerns of 
Black males and females were articulated in the dancehall via the turntable and decks of 
predominantly male selectors who skilfully controlled the mood and pace of the dance by 
their informed ‘selection’ of records. Indeed, within the dancehall space, lovers’ rock became 
gendered by male selectors and DJs as specifically ‘female time’ - ‘Ladies a your time now!’  
This rallying call could be heard during the blues party after a ‘serious’ conscious roots 
session had finished to be followed by the ‘softer’ intimate vibes of lovers’ rock. For the most 
part, ‘ladies’ replied with agreement to this clarion call to take centre stage. The introduction 
of lovers’ rock into the audio soundscape of the dancehall, signalled the interjection of a 
presumed ‘feminised space,’ something marked as ‘extra special’ for the ‘ladies.’ This 
designated ‘extra special’ temporal moment presumably for female participants obscured the 
fact that this moment was highly engineered, determined and eagerly anticipated by males. 
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Whereas Black male and female sexualities are often fetishised and objectified in the wider 
dominant culture, lovers’ rock provided a countercultural space for the erotic expression of 
Black sexual subjectivity.   
 
A feminised sanctuary 
Lovers’ rock has a distinctive male tradition where artists and crooners such as Vivian Jones, 
Winston Reedy, Victor Romeo Evans, Peter Spence and Peter Hunningale have enjoyed 
popular success in the UK reggae charts on a par with if not more so than their female 
counterparts (Barrow and Dalton 2004). Frequent musical collaborations between male and 
female artists were also very popular. However it is the voice of Black females within the 
genre that I wish to focus on to explore notions of the erotic, love and blackness. As I have 
already suggested, lovers’ rock was not exclusively performed, consumed or enjoyed by 
women even though the genre was commonly designated as a feminised sanctuary within the 
reggae dance hall culture (Barrow and Dalton). Dick Hebdidge argues that ‘lovers’ rock is 
important because it gave British Black women a chance to make themselves heard in reggae 
music’ (Hebdidge 1987, p.131). This view is also reinforced within the dancehall space itself, 
where the genres preoccupation with love and romance is often deemed to be the primary and 
sole concern of women. In particular, Black women alone were presumed to be waiting in 
anticipation for a well needed break in tempo from the  serious ‘chanting’ and ‘chatting’ 
performed by male deejays during a blues session. Within the critical commentary that exists 
on lover rock most commentators have been quite right to stress the popularity of lovers’ rock 
amongst many Black female audiences (Garrett 1985, Hebdidge 1997, Barrow and Dalton 
2004). Without doubt this is a correct observation. However, the literature on lovers’ rock has 
not attempted to deconstruct the popularity of the music with Black women within the broader 
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contextualisation and socialisation of love as ‘women’s work.’ What I am suggesting is that 
gendered notions of love combined with historical patterns of sexism and patriarchy have 
positioned women to be the ‘natural’ providers of care, nurturance, compassion and service. 
bell hooks argues that it is common for women to see themselves as intrinsically knowing 
more about love than men in her book, Communion: The Female Search for Love. She writes, 
 
Women are not inherently more interested in or more able to love than are men. From 
girlhood on, we learn to be more enchanted by love. Since the business of loving came 
to be identified as woman’s work, females have risen to the occasion and claimed love 
as our topic … Our obsession with love is sanctioned and sustained by the culture we 
live in ( hooks, 2003 p.75). 
 
In Dick Hebdidge’s account of the lovers’ rock scene he states, 
  
What Lovers’’ rock did was to give young women a voice inside reggae without 
forcing them to deliver sermons when they didn’t want to. It didn’t ask them to lay 
down the law for the ‘righteous .’ In some cases, in records like Indestructible Women, 
it implied that all laws were made by men anyway and that women didn’t have to bow 
down to any man-made law unless they wanted to. Most importantly, Lovers’’ rock 
made it possible for women to sing about real things close to home – things that 
affected them (Hebdidge 1987, p.135, emphasis in the original).  
 
Indeed, there are spaces for women to claim some sort of female autonomy within lovers’ 
rock, in spite of the fact that lovers’ rock can be dismissed as putting women back into a 
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position of patriarchal dependency (Hebdidge 1987, p.131). However, it is also necessary to 
recognise that autonomy is never clear cut. It is always negotiated within relationships of 
power. It can be consciously fought for and gained, whilst also appearing to be real when in 
fact it is assumed, imagined or frequently lost. What I am really scrutinising here are claims 
that suggest that Black females simply found their voice, agency and autonomy in lovers’ 
rock music, enabling them to articulate those ‘things that affected them’ within the broader 
‘masculinised’ culture of reggae (Hebdidge 1987, p.135).  With good intention, Hebdidge’s 
assertion sets out to champion the cause for young Black women, both as active participants 
in the cultural production of lovers’ rock and as active critical agents giving voice to ‘their’ 
own reality. Whilst this observation seeks to underline Black female autonomy, I believe it 
can also dangerously essentialize the Black female experience as it suggests that what actually 
affected ‘them,’ Black women (as opposed to Black men), was a specifically gendered female 
preoccupation with everyday love and romance. Thus love and romance are positioned by 
Hebdidge as being antithetical to those ‘sermons’ and chants of ‘righteousness,’ voiced by 
male contemporaries in the ‘conscious roots’ reggae tradition. Although Hebdidge 
acknowledges that some common yearning may exist between our ‘yearning for a lover and 
deliverance from Babylon’ (Hebdidge 1987, p.134) the assertion rests on a false dichotomy 
between female erotic desire and male political aspiration. Quite often the so-called ‘sermons’ 
were, as Henry (2006) as demonstrated, part of the everyday social realities that impacted 
upon the experiences of Black men and women. Within the UK reggae dancehall scene, 
racialised forms of oppression became entangled with complex gender politics and class 
marginalisation which were also interwoven into our loving and erotic relationships.  Films 
such as Burning an Illusion (1981) and Babylon (1980) represented the intersection of these 
structural and social factors that affected both Black men and women in very specific ways. 
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The soundtrack to both films utilise a mixture of conscious roots reggae and lovers’ rock as 
the cultural back drop to Caribbean life in Thatcher’s Britain during the early 1980’s. Within 
Illusion, the erotic is an important space for suggesting that loving relationships between 
Black men and women (romantic or otherwise) served as critical sources of affirmative and 
transgressive power that sustained marginalised communities. However these relationships 
were also under frequent pressure from social factors such as unemployment, social 
marginalisation, domestic violence and racism. Directed by Menelik Shabazz in 1981, Illusion 
tells the story of Pat (Cassie MacFarlane), a young Black woman and social aspirant who 
through her desire for a serious loving relationship with her boyfriend Del (Victor Romeo 
Evans) embarks upon an unexpected journey of personal and political transformation. When 
Del is arrested and imprisoned, Pat embarks upon a journey of transformation in what can be 
described as a process of physical and psychological decolonisation. In the film’s most iconic 
scene Pat strips herself of her gold jewellery and wipes away her lipstick whilst staring back 
at herself in the mirror. She tears up her Barbara Cartland romance novels and starts to wear 
her hair ‘natural’ as opposed to her former straightened ‘Europeanised’ hair style. Del’s court 
case comes up for appeal, but the appeal fails and Pat is devastated by the injustice metered 
out by the court. Pat is attacked in the street in a drive-by shooting by a group of racists on her 
way home and is subsequently hospitalised. Whilst making a recovery in hospital Pat is filled 
with rage and anger over her violent racist attack. She becomes politicised once and for all 
and returns to being an activist for Black liberation. Within Illusion lovers’ rock is 
acknowledged as integral to how blackness in London and other Black urban centres was 
being formed at the period through the politics of race, gender and class conflict. Illusion 
demonstrated that Black consciousness as a counter-cultural critique of racism and 
imperialism was as ‘close to home’ for as many Black women for Black men. Furthermore, 
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these political factors were intimately connected to the trials and tribulations of erotic loving 
relationships.  
It is important to remember that many female lovers’ rock singers started out as 
teenagers during the early development of the lovers’ rock scene (Barrow and Dalton; Garrett; 
Hebdidge). One group by the name of ’15, 16 and 17’ were exactly fifteen, sixteen and 
seventeen when they recorded their track, Black Skin Boy. It is commonly reported that 
Louisa Marks, one of the first pioneers of lovers’ rock, was possibly as young as fourteen 
when she recorded her cover version of Caught you in a lie (Barrow and Dalton 394). In an 
interview conducted in 1985, Janet Kay lamented, ‘… I’m sick of the term ‘Lovers’ Rock.’ 
It’s got so that every time a woman opens her mouth to sing, she’s stuck with that label’ 
(Garrett 1985). Leading lovers’ rock vocalist Caroll Thompson elaborates on how as a young 
Black woman growing up in England, the struggle to be taken seriously informed the 
direction her career would take as a lovers’ rock artist. This was equally determined by her 
deep love and enjoyment of both reggae and soul music, 
 
I grew up hearing the Supremes, Stevie Wonder, The Jacksons … Then there was 
Minnie Ripperton, Aretha, so many. But Catch A Fire came out when I was still at 
school, and it really got to me – Bob Marley and the I-Threes. I really started listening 
and becoming aware of my roots, my culture, where I’m coming from, and how I 
should be. That’s still there – I love reggae music, and that is my first, natural kind of 
music … In Jamaica, its always been roots and the men singing about their culture and 
Rasta … And because of that, women always had a low profile. At first it was the 
same in England, because you only had Louisa Mark, Janet Kay, 15, 16, & 17 and 
Brown Sugar who had any real success, and I don’t think the producers really took 
Erotic politics, lovers’ rock 
 
 
 288 
women seriously. They thought, ‘Oh, they’ll just get pregnant and give up, or a man 
will give them a whole heap of trouble, and there’s no point putting money into it.’ So 
they didn’t really concentrate on them and give them the credit that was due. Then 
after a while it changed as they realised that women weren’t stupid, that they did want 
to make a career out of singing (cited in Garrett 1985, pp.69-70). 
 
Carol Thompson’s commentary suggests that female lovers’ rock artists had an uphill struggle 
to be taken seriously to achieve any level of autonomy or agency within the music scene. 
Indeed, as we will see, Thompson became emphatic about establishing the parameters of 
respect which determined how women were both perceived and treated as credible musicians. 
Having the will to sing was not enough. Thompson suggests that young Black women had to 
employ a high level of self-determination to navigate sexist obstacles and prejudices that 
faced many Black females within the reggae scene: 
 
It depends on your mentality and what you want to project – if you’re the kind of 
woman who wants to go through all that shit, then you go through it. If you show them 
that this is your profession and tell them that if they want a woman to mess around 
with, then they should go to a club and find one, then they’ll treat you with respect. 
And in this business you have to have respect if you’re a woman, otherwise you want 
get far (Garrett 1985, p.70). 
  
As Garrett notes, Thompson became so frustrated with waiting for attitudes and prejudices to 
change, that she formed her own company C&B, where she wrote, sang and produced her 
own records (Garrett 1985).  In an industry where young women often felt pigeon holed by 
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male peers into being merely ‘lovers’ rock singers,’  female agency for young women in 
lovers’ rock could not be so easily claimed by notions of ‘giving voice.’ It is important to take 
seriously how such agency was negotiated and compromised by age, a lack of female 
ownership of recording studios, the rarity of finding female musicians to form female bands 
and the fact that some male bands were reluctant to be seen in public playing love songs for 
girls (Garrett 1985).    
Thomson’s account of her experience as a lovers’ rock artist also challenges the 
presumption that Black women who were engaged with lovers’ rock as both artists and as 
listeners had very little interest in a Black conscious political sensibility (Barrow and Dalton 
2004; Hebdidge 1987). Subsequently, Black women were thus assumed to be generally 
disengaged cognitively, emotionally and socially with the political discourses and aspirations 
that had ‘exclusively’ troubled Black men. Hence, Black conscious music is presumed to offer 
very limited expressive opportunities for Black women in Britain in comparison to African 
American soul music:  
 
And to most Black British girls living in places like Tottenham and Handsworth, 
Africa didn’t look much like home. For behind the success and popularity of Lovers’’ 
rock among the female audience there was another message.  The message was that 
the soul of the big American cities, of Aretha Franklin and Dianna Ross and new 
singers like Gwen Gutherie, was there to teach women about a different set of options 
(Hebdidge 1987, p.135). 
 
As Thompson’s discussion above suggests, rather than being an alternative option to 
conscious roots music, African American soul music was one option amongst the many 
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discursive transnational sound cultures that contributed to the syncretic noise of lovers’ rock. I 
would also add that whilst Africa may or may not have looked much like home, Handsworth 
and Tottenham did not always feel much like home either, particularly as it was these 
locations that exploded with successive urban uprisings ‘riots’ during the 1970s and 1980s. 
These urban areas were centres of intensified racial tensions and social resistance in the UK 
where Black women were very much a part of, and in specific cases, the impetus for 
community struggles against police harassment and brutality. Take for example the shooting 
of Dorothy Cherry Groce by police officers in Brixton that sparked the Brixton uprisings of 
1985, and the death of Cynthia Jarrett, who died a week later during a police raid of her home 
in Tottenham, an incident which became the main driver for the Broadwater Farm ‘riots’ 
(Gilroy 2006). 
What is underestimated when lovers’ rock is constructed as a sanctuary for ‘female 
concerns’ are the complex relationships that Black women have formed with the politics of 
Black consciousness alongside our own sexual politics. It is possible that Black women could 
be thinking and feeling through our political and erotic positionalities concurrently, without 
these identities necessarily being at odds with each other. The feminisation of lovers’ rock 
does not allow for the intersectionalty and multidimensional engagement of Black female 
experiences. These experiences can pull together the complexities of location, sexuality, race 
and gender alongside an engagement with love and decolonising politics that permits lovers’ 
rock not to be simply antithetical to roots and culture but engaged in a much more dialogic 
relationship with notions of freedom and Black liberation within the social contexts of Black 
people in Britain and beyond.  
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Blocking Jah vibes 
As we have seen, the historical and cultural development of lovers’ rock came during a period 
in the 70s and 80s where reggae music was characterised by the predominance of male lead 
bands and artists from the UK and the Caribbean such as Aswad, Matumbi, Steel Pulse, The 
Wailers, Burning Spear and Third World amongst many others (Barrow and Dalton 2004). 
Indeed, roots and culture became synonymous with blackness as a political category in reggae 
music. Conscious roots music incorporated an African centred narrative of Rastari repatriation 
back to Africa, resistance to and liberation from ‘Babylon’ oppression, whilst affirming and 
validating Black humanity (Campbell 1987). In ‘conscious’ radical discourses, love as a 
political category took a ‘universalist’ stance.  Love was conceptualised beyond the domestic 
sphere and used to service broader political concepts of freedom and emancipation. Love as a 
form of psychological political insurrection demanded decolonisation of our minds from 
destructive and harmful notions of Black humanity. For example, Bob Marley charged us to, 
‘Emancipate yourself from mental slavery, none but ourselves can free our minds.’ However 
Black humanity and redemption in reggae music was framed predominantly through male 
vocal chords. Black female participation was certainly evident in conscious reggae music. The 
I Threes from Bob Marley and The Wailers and Sandra ‘Puma’ Jones from Black Uhuru are 
just a few obvious examples. Indeed, Black female audiences also actively chose to occupy 
their own positions of solidarity within narratives of ‘livication’ and liberation, whilst 
seeking, feeling and believing in the liberative potential that arose from such verses of 
redemption. However, our loving roles also remain tied to the domestic sphere as the 
backbone that supported the ‘worldly’ work of Natty Dread in the quest for righteous freedom 
and redemption. This is evident in Jamaican lovers’ rock tracks such as Horace Andy and 
Tappa Zukie’s ‘/atty Dread a Weh She Want’, where Rasta love is depicted as a superior if 
Erotic politics, lovers’ rock 
 
 
 292 
not a more righteous form of loving. Andy and Zuki inform the girl that what she needs is the 
loving of a Natty Dread above all other men, so she can keep him and care for him without 
the need to share him. Thus, the girl is enlisted to serve and facilitate the needs of erotic 
righteous loving. 
Indeed, female or feminised loving could also be seen to be standing in the way of 
‘righteous’ men. In examining Bob Marley’s love song ‘Waiting In Vain’ Carolyn Cooper 
argues in ‘Virginity Revamped’ that Marley’s lyrics express an ambivalent representation of 
women and male sexual desire (Cooper 2000). Cooper suggests that from a male point of 
view, the transgressive woman in the song becomes synonymous with Babylon as whore, 
becoming an ‘alluring entrapper, seducing the Rastaman from the path of righteousness’ 
(Cooper 2000, p.350). Similarly, in the UK, it was said that many male musicians frowned 
upon playing lovers’ rock music and felt that any female presence on stage could actually be 
‘blocking the vibes coming from Jah’ (Garrett 1985). Lovers’ rock was not only characterised 
as the softer, sensitive side of reggae it was also seen as less serious with minimal political or 
spiritual value. It was commonly seen as a musical interlude where male and female artists 
and audiences could turn away from the serious conscious politics so common to roots reggae 
and focus on the frivolous and trifling matter of love. As one critic writes, 
 
For teenage Black girls, whose dreams of escape were more likely to involve marriage 
to a caring man than repatriation to Africa, lovers’ rock 45s presented a welcome 
alternative to the diet of militant roots being presented by many UK sound systems 
(Barrow and Dalton 2004, p.396). 
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The division of ‘lovers’’ from the labour of radical ‘conscious roots and culture’ follows a 
pattern of thinking that engenders what counts as ‘serious’ and ‘trivial’ to the transformative 
political concerns of Black people. This creates a false and gendered dichotomy between 
erotic love and rebel politics, which in turn become gendered as female and male respectively.  
As Audre Lorde points out this pattern of thinking is a problem that falsely separates the 
spiritual (psychic and emotional) from the political (Lorde 2007, p.56). Reinforcing this 
dichotomy between rebel politics and erotic love, ‘Poko’ Walford Tyson, lead vocalist of the 
1970s roots reggae band Misty Roots from Southall, London puts it like this, ‘[we] no longer 
wanted to sing about love and women. We wanted to do progressive protest music’ (Simpson 
2007). It appears that for Poko ‘progressive’ music was defined by the expulsion of both 
women and love from their repertoire of political songs. Indeed, for Poko, the frontline of 
serious struggle was shared with white punk bands of that era at gigs such as ‘Rock Against 
Racism.’ The guitarist, Peter Harris, described the bond formed between roots reggae bands 
and punk bands as ‘very simple.’ He explains, ‘The punks were the same … They were seen 
as dregs of society. We were all anti-establishment, so there was a natural synergy between 
us’ (Simpson 2007). Harris’s comments suggest that much more rebellious camaraderie and 
bonding appeared along the lines of a ‘natural’ masculinity between Black and white male 
dissidents than across the lines of gender between Black males and Black females. For ‘Poko’ 
and Harris, women could be seen as a monolithic obstacle, ‘blocking’ or ‘getting in the way’ 
of serious political and spiritual concerns. However, solidarity between Black roots reggae 
bands and white punk bands could be conceived in their view as being much more dangerous 
and subversive. Nevertheless, musical collaborations between lovers’ rock singers and 
conscious roots artists from Jamaica and the UK were extremely popular, particularly 
amongst ‘conscious lovers’ aficionados. 
Erotic politics, lovers’ rock 
 
 
 294 
‘Conscious lovers’’ 
‘Conscious lovers’’ is described as a ‘sub genre’ of lovers’ rock that combines the melodic 
style of the lovers’ rock genre mixed with the politics of Black consciousness (Barrow and 
Dalton 2004). The group Brown Sugar, one of the first generations of lovers’ rock recording 
artists in the UK to perform ‘conscious lovers’ had recorded a track penned by John Kipaye 
about a Black girl falling in love with a Rastafari boy. On the sleeve notes that accompany the 
music CD, The Lovers’ Rock Story (2004), Kipaye recalls that I’m in love with a Dreadlocks 
was written as a response to the Junior Byles song Curly Locks, released previously by lovers’ 
rock producer Dennis Harris. In Byles’s track the girl falls in love with a Rasta much to the 
disapproval of her parents. Brown Sugar’s rhetorical response to the Byles record echoes a 
similar sentiment found in Horace Andy and Papa Zuki’s track /atty Dread a Weh She Want’, 
as highlighted above, where the object of female desire is no ordinary ‘balhead bwoy,’
2
 but a 
‘conscious Dread.’ I’m in Love was remixed and re-released again by former Brown Sugar 
member Kofi in the late 1980s under the title of Dread A Who She Love. Only on this 
occasion, Wolverhampton’s veteran deejay/dub poet, Macka B was enlisted onto the track to 
‘chat’ a verse, providing a dialogical space for Rastafari toasting and lovers’ rock singing:  
 
(Kofi) 
I’m in love with a  Dreadlocks’ 
And I never felt this way before, 
I’m in love with a Dreadlocks’ 
And everyday I love him more and more 
We live righteously, in love and harmony 
And I just want the world to know 
I’m so in love 
                                                 
2
 Ball head in Jamaican culture was the antithesis to a conscious Rastafari male. In Bob Marley’s song ‘Crazy 
Ballhead’ he threatens to chase them out of town. Here ballhead becomes synonymous with an intermediary 
social class of Black males with middle class sensibilities. In another context, it can also suggest a lack of 
political and spiritual awareness presumed to be an inherent aspect of Rastafari culture. 
Erotic politics, lovers’ rock 
 
 
 295 
 
(Macka B) 
Dread a weh she love 
Dread a weh she love 
/atty Dread a weh she love 
 
The track suggest that Rastafari loving supplies ‘honourable’ feelings of love through a form 
of virtuous ‘righteous patriarchy.’ It further suggests that Rastafari ‘conscious’ love sees the 
concept of ‘honourable’ coupling as integral to the reproduction of harmonious community 
and ‘decent’ living. The track thus combines a number of different loves, erotic love (eros), 
love of community (philia) and righteous godly love (agape). However, erotic love is 
somewhat diluted by its ‘cleaner’ siblings, ‘philia’ and ‘agape.’  Any trace of Black female 
sexual agency, of the erotic body, or Black sexual subjectivity is contained within the safe and 
sanitary boundaries of exalted Rastafarian values. Denise Noble (2000) cites the work of bell  
hooks to make a salient point about representations of Black female sexuality by Black men 
within Black popular culture.  hooks argues that, ‘In telling us what they think about [Black 
women] they are telling us what they think about  themselves, their values, their desires. She 
is the object that stimulates the discourse. They are its subjects’ (in Hesse 2000 p.164). Noble 
uses this critique to deconstruct the ‘slack’ lyrics of Jamaican dancehall deejays suggesting 
that their lyrics are perhaps a celebration of particular types of masculinity rather than a 
celebration of Black women’s sexual liberation (Hesse 2000, p.164). Carolyn Cooper (2000) 
has also questioned the ambivalent representation of women in Bob Marley’s love songs and 
in Rastafari culture in general, arguing some Rastafari values are ‘an extreme manifestation of 
the duplicitous gender ideology that pervades Jamaican society [which] is ultimately derived, 
via Victorian England, from Judaeo-Christian theology’(Cooper 2000 p.351). Cooper is 
critical of conservative values within Rastafari culture, preferring instead to champion the 
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rights of women as free active agents who hold a proper claim to the control of their own 
bodies (Cooper 2000). Thus although Dread A Who She Love converges the multiple facets of 
love by taking into account romantic desire (eros), beloved community and (phillia) and Jah 
love (agape), this takes place at the expense of a free and autonomous sense of Black female 
sexuality. Within conscious lovers’ the dichotomies of erotic and conscious oppositional 
politics appear to be reinforced even further. In this context female lovers’ rock singers can 
bring some aspects of their political identities to the table as conscious artists whilst other 
aspects, namely their sexuality, are constrained by the demands of righteous living. 
  
Love as a discourse for liberation   
As suggested above, lovers’ rock and conscious roots are much more dialogic and discursive 
than is frequently imagined. Lovers’ rock has since its inception remained an integral and 
consistent component of ‘Black expressive cultures’, where, in Gilroy’s analysis, a 
preoccupation with erotic concerns have long existed in tandem with pragmatic and utopian 
notions of Black liberation (Gilroy 2006). I am suggesting that the marginalisation of lovers’ 
rock as an erotic soundscape is due to the following factors: the feminisation of erotic love, 
the masculinisation of Black public politics, and the false separation of erotic discourses about 
love from the radical politics of liberation found in roots reggae.  
I wish to argue that lovers’ rock stands as a forerunner for a distinctly Black erotic 
music tradition in Britain, where sexual politics and public politics converge upon the 
discursive acoustic environment of the blues party and dancehall. Lovers’ rock emerged 
against the back drop of successive urban uprisings as mentioned above up to and during 
Margret Thatcher’s rein as Prime Minister of Britain. Deep-seated feelings of injustice, 
disaffection and social alienation were not uncommon to Black people growing up in during 
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this period (Gilroy 2006). Eruptions of anger and rebellion against police authorities were not 
rooted in mindless violence but within a malaise of rage over repeated violations against 
Black humanity (Gilroy 2006). Black communities in Britain on a social level were facing a 
crisis of deepening levels of marginalisation born out of institutional forms of racism. The 
rage which permeated the inner city streets of Handsworth, Brixton, Toxteth and Chapletown, 
repeatedly and periodically during the 70s and 80s, were triggered by a cauldron of social 
factors including unemployment, police brutality and harassment and racialised social 
alienation (Gilroy 2006).  I am arguing that this period in British history was filled with deep 
and abiding levels of social neglect, lovelessness and carelessness ingrained within a vile 
disregard for Black life amongst the British press and wider society. The event that seemed to 
epitomise these sentiments came in 1981, where The New Cross Massacre fire killed 13 
young Black teenagers whilst they were out attending a house party in South London. The fire 
is believed to have been racially motivated and remains a tragic yet powerful reminder of the 
British media’s attitude and public disregard for Black life which was commonplace during 
that period (Gilroy 2006). As Gilroy observes, 
 
The ‘Black party’ had become such an entrenched sign of disorder and criminality, of 
a hedonistic and vicious Black culture which was not recognisably British, that it had 
become fundamentally incompatible with the representation of Black life and 
experience in any other form (Gilroy 2006, p.130). 
 
The possibility of engaging human empathy or securing political justice from the guardians of 
British public opinion was as utopian a concept as to be unimaginable after this tragic event.  
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Conclusion 
Critically, within the context of racist marginalisation, lover’s rock amplified and affirmed 
that blackness, through a complex and contradictory gendering process, was nonetheless, 
worthy of being loved with all of love’s imperfections. Lover’s rock articulated a discursive 
narrative that said Black males and females were deserving of a space to express an erotic 
interlocking politics of desire, pleasure, love and justice. bell hooks argues that, ‘Erotic 
pleasure requires of us engagement with the realm of the senses, a willingness to pause in our 
daily life transactions and enjoy the world around (hooks, 1993, p.116).The public display of 
the erotic, in the form of song lyrics as well as by the intimate ‘slow wine’ dance to lovers’ 
rock music, can be interpreted as an open expression and validation of Black male and female 
vulnerability and humanity through the public display of erotic pleasure. Indeed, it could be 
argued that love expressed through lovers’ rock was, in and of itself, an act of radicalism and 
rebellion. As Patricia Hill Collins (2005) notes, oppression works by not only forcing people 
to submit, it also works by rendering its victims unlovable. She states, ‘In this context, 
resistance consists of loving the unlovable and affirming their humanity. Loving Black people 
(as distinguished from dating and or/having sex with Black people) in a society that is so 
dependent on hating Blackness constitutes a highly rebellious act’ (Hill Collins 2005, p.250). 
Erotic desire expressed through lovers’ rock formed part of a wider discourse on rebellion and 
revolution that helped to revitalise Black life in Britain. Lovers’ rock became a highly 
syncretic political and erotic element in the vernacular traditions and transnational networks 
of Caribbean communities as both producers and audiences of the genre. I have attempted to 
challenge the way lovers’ rock is frequently disavowed and overlooked both within reggae 
music culture and within scholarly and journalistic accounts that exist on lovers’ rock 
(Hebdidge 1987; Barrow and Dalton 2004).    
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The gendered fissures of blackness fashioned around sexuality, gender conflict and 
eroticism (Gilroy 2006) exist in a much more complex and ambiguous relationship to Black 
liberation and resistance struggles than is often imagined.  Such complexities do not furnish 
uncomplicated readings of lovers’ rock as a genre that simply expresses ‘feminised’ or 
‘female’ concerns for female audiences. As Gilroy has suggested both reggae and soul place 
issues of sexuality, eroticism and gender conflict as a prominent thematic concern alongside 
discourses that were previously aligned with notions of freedom (Gilroy 2006, p.268). He 
further states, 
 
… the celebration of desire is articulated by both male and female performers on an 
equal basis and provides the primary context for statements about love and gender 
based antagonisms (Gilroy 2000, p.273). 
 
Carolyn Cooper also asks us to rethink the oversimplification of reggae categories specifically 
in the case of reggae ‘culture’ and ragga ‘slackness.’  
 
But even that politically conscious reggae tradition is much more textured than is 
often acknowledged. The erotic was contained in the protest and often disrupted the 
simple logic of ascetic cultural warfare. This seductive tension between the erotic and 
the political continues to energize the dancehall, rub-a-dub style. Acknowledgement of 
this carnal element in ‘conscious reggae’ makes it possible to hear the continuities in 
the work of the contemporary ‘slackness’ DJs and that of their forebears (Cooper 
2004, p.76). 
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A closer ‘textured’ reading of lovers’ rock that takes into account the politics of Black 
consciousness and sexuality reveal the tensions between the erotic and political energies that 
Cooper highlights. These intertwined energies reconfigure the dancehall not only as a 
countercultural revolutionary space but one that existed at once as a dialogic space for 
engaging in the erotic politics of rebellion, pleasure, and love.  
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COCLUSIO 
 
“Blackness” acquires its full revolutionary potential as a social site for resistance 
only within transnational and Pan-African contexts.  
(Marble and Agard-Jones 2008, p.3). 
 
This thesis has examined the politics of loving blackness within the transnational context of 
‘Black Britain.’ It has shown how blackness has been denigrated, for the most part, in 
contemporary western culture and constructed in opposition to notions of love in light of the 
continuing power of racism and white supremacy. 
One major aim of this project has been to expand the concept of ‘loving blackness’ as 
outlined by bell hooks (1992) into a wider transnational discourse on racism and anti-racist 
strategies. bell hooks’s thesis on loving blackness alongside Cornell West’s theory of nihilism 
in Black America suggest that political discourses on love are both necessary and important 
critical interventions in the reclamation and recovery of Black life, specifically as responses to 
centuries of racialised brutality. However the theoretical orientations of hooks’s (1992) and 
West’s (1992) debates emerge from the specificity of race and responses to racism within the 
African American experience. As such, they do not take on an explicit transnational 
engagement. This thesis has argued that blackness has a transnational inscription that 
transcends nations and nationalities. In this sense, loving blackness has political relevance 
beyond the US as an approach to anti-racism within a global context. I have shown that an 
ethic of loving blackness in practice can be seen historically within pan-Africanism, as well as 
through contemporary transnational Caribbean kinship networks, and through the influence of 
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the transnational space on the emergence of lovers’ rock music in Britain. Through the 
emergence of lovers’ rock and its political intersection with conscious roots reggae, Caribbean 
communities formed eroticised countercultural spaces of resistance in response to their 
racialised alienation. For Black communities in the UK diasporic lineages to transnational 
forms of blackness provide important political and emotional resources for healing and 
transcending the ruptured wounds of broken and uneven forms of Western citizenship, 
belonging and alienation.   
Through ‘the racial ordering of states’ (Goldberg 2009, p.372), the transnational space 
has become an important location to contextualise discourses on old and new forms of racism 
– xeno-racism, post-racial-racism and postmodern racism - which themselves are routed 
within longer western histories of systematic brutalisation such as slavery, imperialism and 
colonialism. Racism in these new forms, like older forms, determines human worth. It is 
intimately tied to rights of access and belonging within Western nations. The configuration of 
Western neoliberal states as post-racial, tolerant and diverse social enterprises precludes any 
meaningful discussion on continuing forms of racism as a dehumanising practice. As David 
Theo Goldberg (2009) argues, instead of antiracism, we have ‘born again racism’ which 
appears ‘whenever called upon to do the dirty work of racist politics but purged of its 
categorical stiffness. Indeed, shed of its stiff categoricality, raceless racism operates in denial, 
anywhere and anytime’ (Goldberg 2009, p.25).  
The transnational space in Britain has earlier roots in the emerging postcolonial 
conversations and anti-imperialist struggles that had taken place in the first half of the 
twentieth century. The historical underpinning of diasporic and transnational blackness in 
Britain beyond a ‘Black and British’ paradigm can be contextualised within the Manchester 
Pan African Congress of 1945. Here Pan-Africanist males and females connected and 
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conceived global struggles against imperialism, colonialism, domestic racism and gender 
inequalities in such ways as to develop interconnected globalised strategies to defeat 
racialised and gendered forms of oppression. 
In our contemporary postcolonial context however, in many ways the ‘Black British’ 
identity has been fragmenting through the seemingly unrelenting impulse to conceive 
whiteness and Britishness as synonymous interchangeable categories, excluding histories, 
narratives and populations deemed racially and culturally different or ‘alien’. The ‘optimistic 
moment’ in Black Britain which sought to redefine what it means to be Black and British 
(Hall 1992) has not only been troubled by the continuing problem of racism, it is also being 
re-imagined and reframed by our contemporary transnational situation where blackness in 
Britain is being routed much more through Western, Eastern and Southern African 
populations from Somalia, Nigeria and South Africa. Migration and the emergence of new 
communities of refugees and asylum seekers destabilize the postcolonial configuration of 
‘Black Britishness’ even further. This thesis has sought to highlight these important 
demographic shifts in order to reconsider Stuart Hall’s and Paul Gilroy’s influential work on 
the formation of Black Britain and to further re-evaluate how Black Britain has changed 
beyond an identity that was primarily routed through Caribbean and postcolonial ties to the 
British Empire. Blackness in Britain is still being shaped by the postcolonial as my 
discussions on grime music and lover’s rock suggest. However, blackness is also determined 
by the impact of neoliberal globalisation which has not only provided commodified, 
homogenised and hegemonic forms of African Americaised blackness, it is also been the 
route cause of cheap and exploited migrant labour from the African continent and the global 
South to overdeveloped countries like Britain in the global North. 
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Another important debate within this thesis is the demise of anti-racist politics 
specifically within the UK. Arun Kundnani (2007) provides a clear explanation of how this 
problem emerged and the wider ramifications for Black and Brown communities in Britain, 
 
The worsening racial climate of Britain has only been encouraged by the absence of a 
coherent anti-racist politics. The anti-racist movement that emerged in the late 1960’s, 
influenced by the politics of Black Power in the US and anti-imperialist movements in 
the Third World, had been the major factor in making it possible for Asian, African 
and African-Caribbean communities to gain a foothold in British society. But its 
original notion of a Black identity had fragmented, by the 1980s, into the politics of 
ethnic difference. By the end of the decade, there was clearly no easy return to an 
earlier sense of collective struggle. The idea of uniting ethnically diverse communities 
into a singular ‘Black’ struggle came to be seen as an artificially imposed 
commonality. What was less obvious at the time was that, in discarding this ‘Black’ 
political identity, the ideal that it embodied, of anti-racist political solidarity combined 
with cultural diversity, was also lost. Indeed, any notion of solidarity was henceforth 
regarded as inherently dangerous (Kundnani 2007, p.180). 
 
What Kundnani is registering here is the incomplete and politically arrested development of 
anti-racism in Britain which in turn was tied to the unfinished business of anti-racist, anti-
imperialist, post-colonial struggles of the Third World and Black liberation struggles in the 
US from the mid twentieth century onwards (Winant 2008). David Theo Goldberg has quite 
rightly brought to our attention, the fact that ‘Anticolonialism and civil rights struggles were 
global movements’ (Goldberg 2009, p.17). As Howard Winant observes, ‘There is also a 
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widespread recognition that the reforms [for racial justice] undertaken in the 1950s and 60s 
have ossified and been derailed far short of their goals’ (Winant 2008, p.43). Thus the demise 
of collective movements against racism has repercussions far beyond localised anti-racist 
politics here in the UK. Indeed, this issue is fundamentally a global problem.  
This project has sought to revisit the possibilities of a ‘Black’ political identity 
unhindered by difference, in order to envisage a theoretical framework for anti-racist political 
solidarity combined with the ideal of diversity. As Kundnani quite rightly reminds us above, 
this ideal was lost and indeed frowned upon in favour of the battle to construct complex 
human identities and subjectivities. Whilst recognising complexity in racialised identities is 
both necessary and important to counter claims of monolithic pathological blackness, the need 
for a robust anti-racist politics has never gone away. Indeed, the struggle over racialised 
identities seems set to continue in Britain and elsewhere, specifically in light of Europe’s 
emerging Black populations of African descent (Hine et al. 2009). Equally the need for 
complex anti-racist discourses, movements and coalitions will become evermore apparent. 
Theoretically and politically, transnationalism extends our analysis and knowledge of 
Black Britain to include more complex regional configurations of blackness in cities such as 
Liverpool. Here blackness is constituted specifically on regional as opposed to national 
connections to the wider world where, as Mark Christian (2000) and Jacqueline Nassy Brown 
(2005) have demonstrated, travel, movement, migration and emigration became both 
racialised and gendered. As this thesis illustrates, transnationalism also serves to extend our 
configuration of blackness in Britain beyond narratives of settled postcolonial diasporic 
communities to include new communities of refugees, asylum seekers and migrant workers. I 
have already stated that these communities of ‘new communities’ are changing the future of 
Black and Brown humanity in Britain. However, for undocumented workers and migrants, 
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asylum seekers and refugees, the transnational space can be unpredictable, highly 
contradictory and not to mention, risky. Outcomes can lead to stronger kinship ties, new 
opportunities of access to essential material resources in the form of work and remittances. 
Conversely, they are also to often tied to systems of illicit and legal forms of exploitation, 
death, demonization, imprisonment and new forms of ‘xeno-racism’ (Fekete 2009). Again, 
Kundnani argues that whilst new communities of refugees, asylum seekers and migrant 
workers have been at the sharp end of state racism they have also been ‘excluded from 
existing structures of community representation and are effectively denied the means to 
construct their own’ (Kundnani 2007, p.183). This new future will force us to re-examine how 
varied forms of blackness and racialised marginalisation can fight racist forms of 
discrimination and oppression. It also requires that we find alternative ways to nurture human 
relationships that can clean away the debris of psychological and social dehumanisation in 
order to create a new human condition as Fanon suggests (Fanon 1963). Indeed, our 
racialised, gendered and unequal transnational situation requires us to build a new politics of 
solidarity and compassion where loving blackness addresses the specificity and complexity of 
Black life whilst developing a collective understanding of what Howard Winant calls ‘The 
Modern World Racial System’ (Winant 2008, pp.41-53).   
 
Future research – ‘Black Europe’  
The transnational space that I define and explore within this thesis is constructed 
predominantly through an English speaking ‘transatlantic’ lens. Thus, a closer critical 
engagement with loving blackness in relation to other regions such as Europe, Africa, Asia 
and the Pacific, is beyond the scope of this thesis but presents an important opportunity for 
future research. Further research and investigation into loving blackness for regions such as 
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South Asia and China, have implications for their global positions as economic powerhouses 
on the transnational stage with complex ethnic populations.  Here the dynamics of racially-
stratified societies can ‘arise from within national configurations of the region – even if 
perhaps influenced by the articulation of racially fuelled derogations from without’ (Goldberg 
2009, p.372). This poses questions for the salience of discourses on racialised supremacy 
beyond its ‘Black’ and ‘white’ configuration in the West. Indeed what are the implications for 
discourses on loving blackness as a way of ending racism and racialised forms of domination 
in societies that were once emerging but which have now arrived on the global stage. The 
implications of anti-racist movements and strategies in an era of what some are calling the 
post-American world are yet to be unearthed. 
With the emergence of ‘Afro Europe’ (Blakely 2009), countries within the European 
Union have seen significant increases in Black African immigration over the past few decades 
(Blakely 2009). This poses fundamental challenges to the premise of a collective Black 
politics which this thesis advocates and supports. For example Blakely (2009), highlights that 
the notion of a group identity has largely been forced upon Europe’s Black populations by 
their shared experiences of discrimination and racism (Blakely 2009, p.3). However, this 
group identity is complicated further by countries such as France, that discourage the ‘formal 
stipulation of racial or ethnic categories by law or tradition’, preferring instead to be ‘colour-
blind’ (Blakely 2009, pp.3 -12). It has also been highlighted by Kwame Nimako and Stephen 
Small (2009) that Black politics in one EU member state can be constituted quite differently 
elsewhere with different meanings. They note that in the UK, Black politics requires a clearly 
identifiable constituency, whereas in the Netherlands, it may only be constituted by a 
mainstream political party placing one ‘Black’ candidate on their members list. They cite the 
example of Somali-born former Netherland parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi Ali who entered 
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public life through her ‘Muslim bashing,’ as one example of how Black politics are 
formulated differently between different EU member states (Nimako and Small 2009 p.221). 
Other factors at play and deserving of further research include Nimako and Small’s (2009) 
observation that, 
  
Changing definitions of who is Black in Europe, who is a bona fide member of the 
African diaspora, including suggestions that would expand the idea of who is the 
diaspora, are currently taking place in Europe and Africa (Nimako and Small, 2009 
p.212).  
 
Indeed, the authors highlight that although ‘Black Europeans’ have been pre-occupied with 
struggles against racism and for social mobility and social justice, the African Union has been 
preoccupied with economic and political development of Africa through a renewed 
institutionalised form of pan-Africanism. In the context of Africa’s economic decline and 
global marginalization, the African diaspora for the African Union is defined and formulated 
in terms of those diasporans with skills and capital who can help to stem the tide of Africa’s 
brain drain (Nimako and Small 2009). This seems to be a reasonable and logical conclusion to 
make. However Nimako and Small suggest that this formulation of the African diaspora in 
Europe fails to take account of the hardships African diasporas face across the EU: 
 
The assumption is that the diaspora is better off than residents of the home countries, 
whereas in reality, many people of the African diaspora are leading marginal 
existences in European states … On this score African economic and political 
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problems affect the identity formation of the African diaspora (Nimako and Small 
2009, p.231). 
 
How Black populations are negotiating their relationship with Europe will be a critical area of 
research for the configuration of blackness within a transnational context, particularly as 
Europe tries to implement Article 13 Race Directive and Employment Directive, ‘which will 
radically transform discourse and policy regarding racism and equality across much of 
Europe’ (Lusane 2008, p.215). As Clarence Lusane observes, more than fifteen million 
Europeans have voted for far-right parties in the last ten years (Lusane 2008, p.219). Indeed, 
Lusane suggests that the danger of Europe’s swing to the far-right is not that these parties will 
dominate electoral politics. The danger lies in the fact that these ‘parties are determining 
political and policy agendas across the region. It is their spin on immigration, jobs, crime, 
education, and culture that is shaping events and social intercourse’ (Lusane 2008, p.219). 
The engulfing phenomena of racism can no longer be exclusively conceptualised 
within the borders of nations. Racism is intimately woven and indeed buttressed by the 
process of globalisation. As such, the interpretation of loving blackness in this thesis is one 
that addresses racism and the politics of solidarity against all systems of domination within a 
global framework. In feminist discourses, love forms an essential element of liberation work 
to alleviate suffering, shaping and informing the process of collective Black self-recovery 
where, ‘the suffering many Black people experience today is linked to the suffering of the 
past, to historical memory’ (hooks 1991, p.209). Thus an engagement with the politics of love 
as praxis is a crucial factor to redrawing the contours of modern Black liberation politics. It is 
critical for a socially engaged public discourse on love as a transformative power formulating 
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alternative conceptions of what it means to be human, creating new conditions that validate 
and value Black life. 
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